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ABSTRACT 
 
Willingness-to-Pay for Pomegranates: Impact of Product and Health Features Using 
Nonhypothetical Procedures. (August 2011) 
Callie Pauline McAdams, B.S., North Carolina State University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Marco A. Palma 
 
The use of functional foods by individuals to address health issues is now gaining 
attention.  Pomegranate fruits and other pomegranate products contain phytochemicals, 
including antioxidants with potential human health benefits.  The production of 
pomegranates in the United States is concentrated in California; yet pomegranates can be 
grown in other regions.  The purpose of this study was two-fold: 1) to address the market 
potential and consumer preferences for pomegranate fruits and other pomegranate 
products in Texas and 2) to address issues of experimental auction design and estimation 
in regards to novel products and health benefits of food products.   A nonhypothetical 
experimental procedure was developed that combined preference rankings with a 
uniform nth-price auction to elicit preferences and willingness-to-pay (WTP) for 
pomegranate fruit products. 
A representative sample of subjects (n=203) from the Bryan-College Station area 
of Texas submitted baseline rankings and bids on six pomegranate products and a 
control fruit product.  Of the participants, 75.4% had never purchased a pomegranate 
fruit.  Three additional information treatments were imposed: tasting information, health 
 iv 
and nutrition information, and anti-cancer information.  Subjects had the greatest WTP 
for the control product and the processed pomegranate products; the whole pomegranate 
fruits had the lowest WTP.  The preference rankings for the baseline round indicated the 
same order of preferences as the bids. 
Random-effects tobit models and mixed linear models on the full bids and 
individual changes in bids were used to make estimates of WTP.  Unengaged bidders 
and bid censoring were addressed.  Previous purchases of pomegranates and household 
size were the most robust demographic/behavioral predictors of WTP.  Tasting 
information had a greater effect on WTP than health and nutrition information or anti-
cancer information.  Providing a reference price also increased WTP.  Preference 
rankings were estimated using a rank-ordered logit and a mixed rank-ordered logit 
model.  There was an interaction effect of each information treatment with the product 
characteristics, indicating that studies of effects of information treatments on preferences 
are not generalizable across products.  There was divergence in the results for the 
preference rankings from the results of the experimental auction; preference rankings 
and bids gave conflicting results for the same products.   
 v 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION  
 
 Marketing opportunities for new products rely on innovation and creativity, but 
they also rely on the adequacy of information that is available to decision-makers.  One 
marketing opportunity that has seen growth in recent years is the development of foods 
that address health issues; in particular, this includes foods that are plant-derived (Espín, 
García-Conesa, and Tomás-Barberán 2007).  The cost of traditional health care is on the 
rise with total national health expenditures in the United States (US) in 2009 estimated at 
$2.5 trillion, a staggering 17.3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) (Truffer et al. 
2010).  The government has many incentives to reduce health care costs as well with 
$1.1 trillion in public funds going towards health expenditures in 2008, and it is 
projected that by 2012 half of total spending on healthcare will be from public rather 
than private sources (Truffer et al. 2010).  Orszag and Ellis (2007) went so far as to 
suggest that the financial health of the United States will be determined by the growth 
rate of per capita health care costs and to indicate that serious policy discussions of how 
to slow increases in spending will be necessary to limit healthcare spending as a percent 
of GDP.  This is coupled with a rising life expectancy in the US; life expectancy at birth 
has increased by almost 10 years in the last half century to 78.4 years in 2008 (World 
Bank 2010).  The combination of rising health care costs and longer life expectancies  
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2 
affords an opportunity for businesses to market products with which consumers can take 
a proactive and preventative approach to managing their own health.  Epidemiological 
studies have demonstrated for years the relationship between diet and disease risk, and 
most scientists accept that consuming plant-derived products can have some beneficial 
effect on health, particularly on age-related diseases.  Diet is only one area that affects an 
individual‘s health; however, each individual has a greater degree of control over his or 
her own nutrition than over many of the other factors that may affect health, including 
genetics or environmental hazards.  This awareness of health, and the role that nutrition 
can play in it, has spawned the development of so-called ―functional foods‖ (American 
Dietetic Association 2004).   
The term functional foods can include any food that is consumed as a part of the 
regular diet and has health benefits other than direct nutrition from energy, vitamins, and 
minerals.  In reference to plant-derived functional foods, the compounds in plant 
material that are not yet identified as essential nutrients are called phytochemicals.  
Phytochemicals may have positive effects on health when consumed despite the fact that 
they do not provide direct nutrition (Seeram et al. 2006a).  Consumption of fruits and 
vegetables, including phytochemicals, can potentially reduce the risk of a number of 
chronic illnesses, including many diseases believed to be oxidation-related (Kelawala 
and Ananthanarayan 2004).  This includes certain cancers, inflammatory diseases, 
cardiovascular diseases, and neurodegenerative diseases (Seeram et al. 2006a).  Several 
important plant phytochemicals are known to have antioxidant activity (Larson 1988).  
Antioxidants in the body protect against oxidative stress that can damage cells.  Thus, 
  
3 
the potential implication is that some of the many antioxidants in plants may be able to 
defend against the development of these diseases.   
Pomegranates are among the many plants that have been researched for potential 
health benefits.  The pomegranate fruit, along with several other components of the 
plant, contain high levels of several active antioxidant species called polyphenols (e.g., 
Kelawala and Ananthanarayan 2004; Adams et al. 2010). These polyphenols, including 
tannins, lignins, and flavonoids, are named due to their characteristic of having multiple 
hydroxyl groups on phenolic rings.  Some claim that polyphenols are the most powerful 
antioxidant species in the body (Williamson and Holst 2008). This makes the 
pomegranate, with its high antioxidant levels, of particular interest for future in vivo 
research on the health benefits of polyphenols. 
This spark of interest in functional foods and antioxidants comes at the same time 
as the growth of the pomegranate industry in several parts of the world in recent years.  
The pomegranate is widely cultivated in regions with the high summer temperatures 
required for fruit maturation; these include the Mediterranean basin, Southern Asia, and 
several areas in North and South America (Martínez et al. 2006).  Despite a lack of 
direct and accurate information regarding the size of the pomegranate industry, estimates 
are that pomegranate fruit production worldwide has grown by a tremendous amount in 
the past decade and has reached about 3.3 billion pounds per annum (Holland and Bar-
Ya‘akov 2008).  USDA stopped reporting average prices and shipping amounts for 
pomegranate production in 1989.  However, based on the 2007 US Census of 
Agriculture, 518 California farms reported a total plantings area of 24,458 acres, and the 
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remaining states with production (Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Washington) had a 
production in 2007 of a total of 59 acres across 82 farms.  This gives a total U.S. 
production in 2007 of 24, 517 acres of pomegranates planted, with that acreage 
approximately evenly divided among bearing (12,103) and nonbearing (12,415) acres.  
In the case of Texas, USDA reports indicate there were 12 acres planted on 18 farms in 
2007.  The total number of acres planted for the United States is a sharp increase in 2007 
from the reports in the 2002 US Census of Agriculture, when there were 9,535 acres 
planted across 369 farms (National Agricultural Statistics Service 2007).  Based on 
historical US Census of Agricultures for the state of California, acreage fluctuated from 
reported levels of 524 to 1,093 acres between 1920 and 1950, with between 
approximately 24,000 and 110,000 trees of bearing age during that time frame (USBC 
1950).  In 1992, there were over 3,000 acres and almost 430,000 trees planted in the 
state of California (NASS 1992).  Several producers in the pomegranate industry in 
California, where the majority of the crop in the United States is grown, have mentioned 
the large amount of growth in acreage and total pounds harvested that they have seen in 
recent years (e.g., Bryant 2003; ―Pomegranate Acreage‖ 2009; Castellon 2010; 
Kinoshita 2010).  
Although pomegranate has historically survived in the southern half of the 
United States (Hodgson 1917), within the US the crop has not been cultivated 
extensively outside of California (Pomegranate Council 2007).  For example, a 2005 
report of pomegranate acreage in Texas indicates a total reported planting of only 5 acres 
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for the state (Smith and Ancisco 2005), and while there is always a chance of unreported 
acreage, this report suggests with considerable certainty that the acreage grown in Texas 
was small. With recent growth in the demand for pomegranate fruit, juice, and other 
pomegranate products, there has been interest in other states (e.g., Florida- DuBois and 
Williamson 2008) and nations (e.g., Australia- Lye 2008) in the possibility of producing 
pomegranates.  However, accurate estimates of the market potential for pomegranates 
are needed before these efforts can be undertaken.  Experimental economics offers a 
novel way to analyze not only consumer interest in pomegranates, but also to look at the 
effect that the provision of information has on those consumers. 
Experimental economics is useful for elicitation of willingness-to-pay estimates 
from consumers and has been used for such estimates of a number of horticultural 
products.  The methodology of experimental economics is designed to be incentive 
compatible; that is, the methods are designed to induce consumers to reveal their true 
preferences to researchers.  Particularly in the case of pomegranates, which are not a 
familiar product to US consumers in comparison to many other fruits, experimental 
economics provides a useful way to gather information on market potential for a novel 
product.   
Further, experimental economics (including laboratory and field experiments) 
affords an opportunity for control of conditions that is not available using traditional 
observational or stated preference methodologies.  This is one of the primary differences 
between observational and experimental data.  However, there can easily be unobserved 
variables that are confounding results in an experimental versus an observational 
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approach; these unobserved or uncontrolled variables may be equally difficult to sort out 
in either approach (Roth 1995).   
However, if experimental methods are to be used for the data collection, there are 
a number of considerations that must be accounted for by the researcher.  These include 
issues of internal and external validity, as well as a careful decision-making process for 
which type of experimental technique should be used.  There has been much discussion 
of the benefits and drawbacks of many of these within the experimental economics 
literature.  The current state of research on the topic suggests that the experiment that 
should be selected depends on the specific purpose of the experiment and the decisions 
that are to be made using the information that is gathered. 
The question of whether to use willingness-to-pay (WTP) or willingness-to-
accept (WTA) estimates is somewhat contentious, and the preference for one or the other 
often depends on the specific item that is being valued.  Not only has this been as a 
practical concern, but also as a question of economic theory to explain the deviations (or 
lack thereof) between WTP and WTA in empirical results.  Learning behaviors, an 
endowment effect, differences in the hypothetical vs. nonhypothetical nature of the 
auction, reference relevance, and differences in experimental auctions procedures have 
all been proposed as possible explanations.   
  There are also a range of specific auction protocols that can be utilized in 
experimental methodology.  These include open outcry or sealed bid types; examples of 
methods are traditional English or first-price sealed bids auctions that are commonly 
used in real marketplaces, or techniques that are only used in the experimental 
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environment such as the random nth-price auction.  Regardless of which technique is 
used, the experiment must create a direct connection between maximizing the benefits of 
participation and the truthfulness of the responses made by participants.   
In the case of a novel product not yet available on the market, it is nearly 
impossible to determine whether the results obtained from experimental procedures are 
reliable since there is no benchmark market or sales data for comparison.  This makes 
the justification for utilization of one auction mechanism over another even more 
subjective.  Another consideration is whether multiple rounds of bidding are necessary 
or a single round is sufficient to do accurate value elicitation; further debate could center 
around whether subjects should be given a product and asked to bid for an upgraded 
product (―endowed approach‖) or be asked to bid the full-price for each product (―full 
bidding approach‖).  The list of possible factors influencing outcomes extends to include 
whether subjects should bid for a single unit or multiple units of a good.  Therefore, until 
there is greater theoretical understanding of which auction mechanism is preferred, the 
analogy of experimental auctions as tools may be helpful.  One would not use a hammer 
to sew on a button, nor would one use a needle to loosen a bolt.  The appropriate tool for 
the job means choosing the auction that is tailored to suit the analysis that will be 
conducted, and ultimately, the economic decision that will be made as a result of 
information gathered in the experiment.   
Regardless of which experimental auction technique is used, there remain 
fundamental experimental principles that should not be violated.  Among these 
principles are internal and external validity.  For an experiment to be internally valid, the 
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procedure used should guarantee that conclusions can be made within the experiment 
and that observed differences are a result of true differences or differences in treatment, 
not differences compounded with other effects or influences (Loewenstein 1999). 
Internally valid experiments test the experimenter‘s hypothesis and are generally 
consistent with the predictions of economic theory.  Also, any assumptions must be 
applied uniformly throughout the experiment.  In keeping with the traditional scientific 
methodology, results that are internally valid can be replicated by other researchers or in 
other locations under similar conditions. 
External validity, unlike internal validity, does not describe the consistency of 
results within an experiment; rather, external validity refers to the consistency of 
experimental results with the real world.  Any factors that are different in an 
experimental setting than they are in the situation that is being analyzed could potentially 
influence results from the experiment and invalidate the extrapolation of those results to 
a broader context.  Economic theory is a necessity in explaining results of any analytical 
economic technique, from econometric modeling to experiments in a laboratory (Levitt 
and List 2009).  This can lead to questions of what the role of experiments should be.  
Should they test economic theory, or should they provide information that will be 
applied to the real world?  If experimental results are applied to the real world, should 
they be applied literally or in a qualitative sense?  These questions have led to debate 
over the external validity of almost every type of experimental auction.  Differences in 
experimental techniques discussed earlier have often been analyzed in terms of which 
technique led to results that had greater external validity.   
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Despite the lack of clarity among experimental auction techniques and the 
generalizability of such methods, many value elicitation studies have been undertaken 
for food and plant-based products.  The procedures used by these studies include choice-
based conjoint analysis (e.g., Darby et al. 2006), best-worst surveys (e.g., Lusk and 
Parker 2009), and a range of auctions (e.g., Maynard and Franklin 2003; Yue, Alfnes, 
and Jensen 2009).  Many of these involve situations that are artificial but 
nonhypothetical, meaning that although they would not be normally encountered in the 
outside world by consumers, the experimental situation has real monetary consequences 
for the participant.  Some of the products analyzed range from beef (Lusk and Parker 
2009) to potted plants (Hall et al. 2010) to the value of food safety (Fox et al. 1995).  Of 
particular interest are studies with some attribute that adds value to the underlying good.  
Examples include whether consumers are willing to pay a premium for produce that is 
grown locally or for food with health benefits.   
This final case, foods with potential health benefits, is of particular relevance to 
this study and brings us back to the previous discussion of functional foods.  Although 
value elicitation analysis is not necessarily generalizable from one product to another, 
there have been some lessons and points of interest from earlier studies.  The necessity 
of scientific evidence to validate health claims, the amount of information that is 
provided, how fresh a product is, how novel a product is, and the prior knowledge and 
demographics of the consumer are all considerations in value elicitation procedures for 
functional foods.   Functional foods are relatively new to the marketplace, and much 
information is needed by those wishing to enter the market and by potential consumers 
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of functional foods.  This includes scientific research on what effect, if any, consumption 
of functional food products may have in human subjects and what the long term effects 
of functional food consumption may be; much of the initial evidence in support of the 
disease prevention and treatment effects of functional foods is on the basis of in vitro or 
animal studies.   The size of the functional food market was estimated at $27 billion in 
the United States alone in 2007, attracting a range of companies that have introduced 
new functional food products (Granato et al. 2010).  Research suggests that consumers 
may consider the underlying attributes of the food when making a purchase decision, but 
the decision on whether to purchase also depends on the underlying attributes of the 
consumer.  Differentiated marketing by the many companies involved in the functional 
food market may be achieved if more information can be gained about demand for 
functional food products and the characteristics of functional food consumers.  
Specific to experimental design for this type of product, lifestyle and food culture 
factors must be considered.  For example, the use of a primarily college-aged subject 
population could bias results when analyzing WTP for additional health benefits; college 
students may not be as concerned with health issues as older age groups.  Other 
demographic factors, as well as food habits, may influence results.  This is in addition to 
the considerations mentioned previously that may affect the outcome of experiments.  
Therefore, the auction must be structured in order to make the most accurate estimates of 
willingness-to-pay and to also allow for the most valid conclusions to be drawn.   
There are several goals of this analysis ranging from gathering applied marketing 
information to an analysis of auction procedures and econometric methods.  More 
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specifically, information gathered on consumers and their purchasing behaviors was 
used to make inferences about the characteristics of products and information that affect 
individual preferences.  Information gathered on experimental economics procedures can 
be analyzed to add to the discussion of which procedures are most useful for which types 
of applications, and the modeling and estimation of these preference elicitation results 
was further investigated.  As an additional task, information on the specifics of 
cultivating and marketing pomegranates is necessary for producers in order to take 
advantage of any premium in WTP for pomegranates that may be found. 
The overarching goals of this analysis can be further divided into the aim of 
measuring specific WTP and determining preference rankings for a novel fruit product 
using incentive compatible, nonhypothetical methods.  Changes in preference rankings 
and experimental auction due to additional information on a novel good will be studied 
further.   The implementation of a procedure for obtaining both rankings data and bids 
from a set of participants in order to make paired comparisons of responses will also be 
discussed. 
This paper proceeds as follows.  First is a literature review of the specifics of 
value elicitation and experimental methods, along with a discussion of the most highly 
contested points in the literature.  Particular attention is given to previous research that 
analyzed WTP for functional foods, as well as the scientific basis behind the use of 
functional foods.  A description of the pomegranate and its chemical composition 
follows, as well as a description of cultivation practices for pomegranate and the current 
state of the industry.  Next is a description of the experimental procedures used in this 
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study.  The results and a discussion of those results follow.  The conclusion describes the 
implications of this study‘s findings, as well as possible implications for expansion of 
the pomegranate industry.  
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CHAPTER II  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Experimental Economics and Value Elicitation 
Experimental methods have been adopted in the field of agricultural economics 
as a means of eliciting willingness-to-pay (WTP) in an incentive-compatible manner.  
The willingness-to-pay refers to the maximum amount that a consumer will pay for a 
given quantity of a good.  This research has helped to develop an understanding of 
consumer preferences and the influence of non-price factors in purchase decision-
making (Unnevehr et al. 2010 and references therein).  An increase in consumer 
affluence suggests a need for greater understanding of factors affecting consumer choice, 
and there is the general need within the field to understand whether, and if so how, the 
results of experiments can be applied to actual marketplace decision-making.  The 
methodology and results described here attempt to assist in this endeavor. 
 
Types of Data 
 There are a number of methods that have been utilized in the past to both 
measure willingness-to-pay and consumer attitudes towards different food attributes.  
These include transactions data, survey data, and auction experiments (Werternbroch 
and Skiera 2002).  All of these methods seek to determine the value that the consumer 
brings to the experiment for the good, sometimes termed the ―homegrown value‖ (e.g., 
Cummings, Harrison,and Rutström 1995; Lusk, Feldkamp, and Schroeder 2004), making 
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it even more of a challenge to determine which method is the most accurate way to elicit 
values when compared to ―induced value‖ mechanisms.  Induced values refer to the 
values that experimenters induce in subjects during laboratory investigations (Smith 
1976); these mechanisms have been used historically for testing economic theories of 
auction equivalence and to test models of causes of deviations from the predictions of 
economic theory in the real world (Rutström 1998).  
 
Transactions Data 
 Transactions data, including revealed preferences from scanner data, are high in 
external validity because they are based on actual purchases made by consumers in their 
day-to-day lives.  However, the information provided from such data indicates that the 
consumers‘ WTP is at least as high as the transaction price and does not inform the 
researcher on the actual level of WTP (Wertenbroch and Skiera 2002).  Transactions 
data is sometimes used in conjunction with other data as a measure of external validity; 
hypothetical choices and nonhypothetical choices and rankings were compared to retail 
shopping behavior by Chang, Lusk, and Norwood (2009), who conclude that 
nonhypothetical procedures, and the nonhypothetical ranking procedure in particular, 
have higher external validity (in terms of prediction of sales) than hypothetical choice 
experiments. 
 
Survey Data 
Survey data can be used to elicit willingness-to-pay in the form of conjoint 
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analysis, which presents consumers with various bundles of goods and examines 
rankings of those bundles or the amount of money that would make participants 
indifferent among the bundles.  However, there is little incentive in this approach for 
consumers to reveal their true WTP, as all decisions are hypothetical in nature (Green 
and Srinivasan 1978).  At best, this could be termed incentive-neutral as there is no 
incentive to be either truthful or dishonest about willingness-to-pay (Wertenbroch and 
Skiera 2002).  Fox et al. (1995) conclude that experimental auctions can be used to 
complement or serve as an alternative to the more common nonmarket valuation 
methods of stated preference and contingent valuation.   
 
Experimental Data 
 Experimental methods that have been used in the past include choice 
experiments, willingness-to-use measurements, and willingness-to-accept and 
willingness-to-pay auctions. The details of each of these are discussed in the subsection 
on experimental design.  
Two key advantages exist for experimental methodology, both within economics 
and across the sciences: replicability and control (Davis and Holt 1993).  The 
replicability of an experiment is the capacity to reproduce the experimental results, either 
by the original researchers or by others.  In contrast to experimental results, 
observational data lacks replicability.  Secondly, control gives researchers the ability to 
manipulate conditions and test alternative theories based on observations of behavior in 
the experimental setting.  Control is generally lacking in observational approaches as a 
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number of assumptions are made to carry out any sort of analysis.  Smith (1976) 
suggests that there are also two key uses for experimentation in economics: one, that 
laboratory results can be used to test economic theory, and two, that experimental results 
can be useful in the understanding and interpretation of data collected in the field.  
Reservations about experimentation as a means of understanding economic 
phenomena include questions of external validity.  This is discussed in greater detail 
later.  However, as a brief introduction, Davis and Holt (1993) offer examples of cases 
where extrapolation of laboratory results to the marketplace could be inaccurate and 
misleading.  First, there is the question of whether subjects included in the experiment 
possess the same knowledge and behave in the same way as actual participants in the 
marketplace.  Second, experiments generally greatly simplify markets and other 
complicated economic institutions for the purpose of the experiment, and this leads to 
questions of whether the failure of a theory in an experiment justifies its rejection in a 
broader context.  However, Plott (1982, 1989, 1991) suggests that the rejection of a 
theory in the simplified experimental context can serve as justification for its rejection in 
the more complicated world.   
 
Categorizing Experimental Data 
 In general, experiments can be divided into three categories proposed by Roth 
(1995) as 1) ‗speaking to theorists,‘ 2) ‗searching for facts,‘ and 3) ‗whispering in the 
ears of princes.‘  These divisions are based on the intended goals of the experiment; 
more specifically, whether the experiments are intended to validate (or disprove) 
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economic theory, explain real-world data not sufficiently explained by economic 
models, or provide guidance for policy-making, respectively.  However, these categories 
are not mutually exclusive, as some experiments may seek to accomplish one or more of 
these three broad goals.  Experimental auctions dealing with value elicitation can be 
divided by several criteria; these include divisions on the basis of the nature of goods 
offered in the auction (private value vs. common value), the number of units auctioned 
(single-unit vs. multiple unit), and the auction procedure used (e.g., English, first price 
sealed bid, BDM mechanism).   
 
Types of Goods 
Separation based on the nature of the goods leads to two broad categories: those 
experiments that deal with independent private value goods and those that deal with 
common value goods (Kagel and Levin 1986).  Independent private value goods are 
those goods for which an individual has his own value for the good that may be different 
from the values of other individuals and is assumed to be independent of those other 
values.  Examples in this category would be the sale of sculptures or memorabilia.  
Common value goods are those which should have the same value to all individuals, but 
in this case, the information that each individual has regarding the underlying value 
varies.  One frequent example of a good in this category is the auctioning of oil rights 
(e.g., Thaler 1980; Milgrom 1989).  However, many goods may fall somewhere between 
these distinctions with elements of both common value and private value goods (Goeree 
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and Offerman 2003).  Corrigan and Rousu (2010) suggest that almost all private value 
goods have at least some common value component. 
 
Where Experiment Occurs 
Experiments can also be categorized on the basis of where they take place: in the 
field or in the laboratory.  Laboratory experiments occur in a more structured and limited 
environment, whereas field experiments occur in the natural environment where 
economic decision-making occurs.  There are benefits and limitations to both; there is 
also value in the description of the two as a spectrum, with intermediate values in 
between.  Harrison and List (2004) argue that there are characteristics of each present in 
the other and that results from the field and results from the lab can offer important 
intuition into further research in the opposite setting.  Additionally, they suggest that 
results should not be taken cumulatively from the two, but rather integrated into a single, 
more thorough understanding of the question at hand.  Differences between the field and 
experimental environment do not necessarily influence results, but each one may impose 
factors that could have a measurable outcome in terms of behavior.  For example, the 
lack of real monetary incentives does not by necessity bias results, but it is an 
artificiality that has the potential to do so.  Also, some studies have indicated that fees 
paid for participation in laboratory experiments may influence estimations of WTP 
(Rutström 1998).  Marette, Roosen, and Blanchemanche (2008) found that decreases in 
demand predicted by a lab experiment were less than those observed in a field 
experiment for similar products.  A criticism of the control that is frequently described as 
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an advantage of laboratory experimentation is that such control is somewhat illusory and 
could create other compounding effects that are difficult to measure if the controlled 
conditions are in fact artificial (Harrison and List 2004).  
 
Uses for Value Elicitation Procedures 
The relevance of all of these types of data collection lies in the way that they can 
be applied to real world problems and decision-making.  A number of applications have 
been discussed in the literature.  These include judgments on new products as well as on 
the effects of public policy.  In general, procedures that are used for such purposes are 
based on eliciting the ―homegrown value‖ of the subjects rather than the induced value; 
induced values are applied in many experiments to test the mechanisms that are being 
used or some aspect of theory (e.g.; Cherry et al. 2004, Andersen et al. 2006).  An 
example in the literature of the application of these procedures to real problems is the 
study by Lusk and Marette (2010) that analyzed the welfare effects of food labels and 
bans on particular qualities.  In doing so, they looked at the net effects of changes in 
government policy and if those changes would have a positive or negative impact on 
society based on changes in the cost of production, limits on consumer choice, or 
increased availability of information to consumers.  Other authors have suggested the 
use of auction design theory from experimental economics as useful in designing real 
world auctions, such as the sale by governments and their agencies of spectrum licenses, 
(including 3G mobile phone licenses) to telecommunications companies (Klemperer 
2002, 2004).  Additionally, some studies have analyzed the effect that the presence of 
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genetically modified and non-genetically modified foods has on consumer surplus 
(Moon, Balasubramanian, and Rimal 2007).  However, there have been more recent 
suggestions of limitations of WTP estimates as a sole basis for computing consumer 
welfare effects; consumer demand estimations were shown to be dependent on the price 
elasticity of demand for a good where information is inadequate about a characteristic 
and further, that consumer demand based on laboratory results was not reflective of 
time-series demand for the good (Marette, Lusk, and Roosen 2010).  Based on the range 
of opinions on the application of WTP to the public arena, the robustness of welfare 
estimates should be thoroughly examined before they are used as the basis for public 
policy decisions.  
In terms of marketing decisions, several applications have been developed by 
both agricultural economists and others to aid in decision-making.  For example, 
Umberger and Feuz (2004) suggest that experimental auctions may be useful in 
determining quality factors that influence whether consumers will choose to buy the 
product and if so, what premium they will be willing to pay.  Guala and Mittone (2005) 
suggest that for experiments in economics with the goal of informing policy, 
modifications should be made to the experiment according to differences in the specific 
situations where results will be applied.  Hoffman et al. (1993) described the use of a 
sealed bid experimental auction of beef as a test market for new products; they suggest 
that this may be a cost effective way to determine the demand for a product prior to 
spending large sums of money on product development only to find that consumers are 
unwilling to purchase the new product. Other studies have found evidence of market 
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segmentation, which might be valuable information to marketers developing a marketing 
strategy for a product, in this case bison meat (Hobbs, Sanderson, and Haghiri 2006).  
Briedert, Hahsler, and Reutterer (2006) provide a review of the literature focusing on the 
marketing uses of various WTP elicitation methods.  These include uses for private 
companies determining pricing structure for products, management of brands, and 
competitive strategy.   
Other studies have analyzed the use of geographical-based produce marketing 
and whether consumers are willing to pay a premium for produce labeled as such (e.g.; 
Hu, Woods, and Bastin 2009; Giraud, Bond, and Bond 2005).  Still other researchers 
have used experimental economics for elicitation of values for environmental goods 
(e.g., Cummings and Taylor 1999; Hanley, Wright, and Alvarez-Farizo 2006; Shogren, 
Parkhurst, and Hudson 2010).  
Specific to estimates of WTP, Lusk and Hudson (2004) suggest that there is a 
high degree of applicability of experimental auction procedures to agribusiness decision-
making.  The WTP estimates based on individual-level data can be used to construct an 
inverse demand curve for the sample marketplace. This can be used as a basis for 
development of a demand curve for the larger market. However, these authors also 
present several notes of caution when using auctions or other WTP elicitation 
techniques.  These include the degree of substitutability of the products (i.e. cross-price 
effects).  If such an effect is suspected, the econometric model to be used must relax the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption.  Further, there may be a need 
to address issues of consumer heterogeneity.  Variance in consumer characteristics from 
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the sample to the targeted market may influence the ability of experimental results to 
accurately predict market potential.  Finally, agribusiness should not rely solely on the 
results of experimental economics procedures to determine potential profitability.  In 
addition to a number of assumptions that are made in modeling and potential biases that 
may be introduced to the results by sample selection, experimental procedures, and 
others, the agribusiness firm faces the possibility of reduction in sales of a current 
product with the introduction of a new product or potential price-lowering by 
competitors in the marketplace.  
Since economically important decisions are sometimes made based on the results 
of experimental economics, the auctions must be conducted carefully and methodically 
in order to obtain results that are relevant.  The factors mentioned later regarding 
experimental design and the discussions of internal and external validity are necessary if 
experimental results are to be used as a basis for decision-making.  The understanding of 
these must be based on consideration of the wide range, and sometimes conflicting, 
results of many previous experiments within the experimental economics field. 
 
Experimental Design 
  The range of experimental methods that can be utilized in value elicitation is 
quite broad, with an equally broad number of considerations to be made when designing 
experiments.  Binmore (1999) suggests that as long as certain requirements are met in 
the experimental design then the results of the experiment can be useful.  The criteria 
used are as follows: 1) the problem faced by subjects is not only ―simple‖ but seems 
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simple to the subjects, 2) the incentives provided are sufficient, and 3) adequate time is 
allowed for adjustment following trial-and-error. 
 
 Conjoint Analysis and Choice Experiments 
There are a number of conjoint analytical techniques and choice experiments that 
have been conducted in order to analyze consumer WTP.  In conjoint analysis, the 
characteristics of the product are varied systematically, and the differences in preference 
for each product are measured.  These differences (―part-worths‖) are used to construct 
WTP estimates for the whole product.  However, one major theoretical problem with 
conjoint analysis is that it frequently uses price as one of the attributes for which the 
part-worth is estimated.  This is in violation of neoclassical economic theory and the 
premise that price does not in and of itself have a utility; rather, the price is the exchange 
rate between different utility scales.  Specifically, the price reflects the value of the 
composite product, the budget constraint, and the utility that must be given up from not 
consuming relevant substitutes (Briedert, Hahsler, and Reutterer 2006).  When analyzing 
the range of choice experiments, there is a range from dichotomous choice to open-
ended choice to the ranking of members of a discrete choice set.  The latter of these is of 
greatest relevance to the discussion that follows.   
Conjoint choice analysis is a combination of the conjoint analysis and choice 
techniques and has served as a means of eliciting consumer valuations for decades (e.g., 
Bohm 1972; Bishop and Heberlein 1979).  However, a meta-analysis by List and Gallet 
(2001) of much of the collected data indicates that the elicited values using this 
  
24 
technique are not consistent with actual decision-making if consumers do not face real 
economic decisions.  That is, the results of the hypothetical choice experiments are not 
always statistically equivalent to results from nonhypothetical choice experiments.  
Cummings, Harrison, and Rutström (1995) also tested whether hypothetical 
dichotomous choice surveys were equivalent to real dichotomous choice surveys and 
found that there were statistically significant differences in the two that were robust to 
differences in private goods, location, and subject populations.  Alfnes et al. (2006) 
generated incentive compatibility in an auction of salmon filets by requiring participants 
to purchase the salmon filet they had indicated as preferred in a randomly drawn round 
of a dichotomous choice experiment.  However, as Lusk, Fields, and Prevatt (2008) 
indicate, there is an informational inefficiency of choice experiments as compared with 
ranking experiments.  Therefore, these authors suggest the use of an incentive 
compatible profile ranking mechanism that they developed as a means of gathering more 
information while still maintaining a nonhypothetical preference elicitation setting.  
Chang, Lusk, and Norwood (2009) compared the nonhypothetical ranking procedure 
with other experimental procedures in addition to an analysis of differences in 
econometric models to analyze results.  The incentive compatible ranking procedures 
described by the Chang, Lusk, and Norwood (2009) and Lusk, Fields, and Prevatt (2008) 
papers call for subjects in the experiment to rank their preferences for a bundle of goods.  
One round was randomly selected as binding, and then the experimenters assigned 
probabilities to each good based on the ranking order to determine the likelihood that 
each good from the binding round would be purchased.  Only one good was purchased 
  
25 
after a random draw from the goods for that round.  Results suggested that the 
nonhypothetical ranking procedure was the best predictor of buying behavior, but that 
both nonhypothetical procedures outperformed the hypothetical choice procedure.  
For choice experiments, experimental design can have a significant impact on the 
results; Sándor and Franses (2009) find that presenting subjects with choice alternatives 
that are similar in utility leads to choices that are inconsistent, thereby biasing estimates 
of consumer preferences.  They further suggest designing the experiment with the use of 
an algorithm to maximize statistical efficiency while varying the choice complexity 
variables (i.e. the number of options faced by subjects) within the experiment.  However, 
Lusk and Norwood (2005) indicate that a large sample size can compensate for poor 
experimental design in choice-based conjoint analysis.  Other research comparing 
choice-based experiments and experimental auctions found that subjects‘ WTP values 
elicited from choice experiments were greater than those from experimental auction, 
with the implication of this being that people may purchase steaks in a retail setting 
(where they face a choice task) for more than they would bid for them at auction (Lusk 
and Schroeder 2006).   
 
Value Elicitation 
Several techniques of estimating value for a private value product are utilized in 
the literature.  Willingness-to-pay (WTP) is the maximum monetary amount that an 
individual would give up to have a good, willingness-to-accept (WTA) is the minimum 
monetary amount that an individual would have to be given in order to give up a product 
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(also known as compensation demanded), and willingness-to-use is a scale value used as 
a measure of the level of desire to use a product.  A more simple, but perhaps less 
informative definition is that WTP is the price a buyer would pay for a good and WTA is 
the price a seller would take for a good (Lusk and Shogren 2007).  
Although WTP and WTA are utilized most frequently in private value elicitation 
for a good, willingness-to-use a good is sometimes a preferred approach to willingness-
to-pay in the case where a good is not well-established or new to the marketplace (Urala 
and Lähteenmäki 2007), although the ability to extrapolate information from this 
measure is not as strong since it lacks a monetary basis.   
Experimental design is of similar importance in experimental auctions, where the 
accuracy of value estimates can be affected by the use of various auction procedures, the 
use of within-subject or between-subject comparisons, and whether WTP or WTA is 
estimated (List and Gallett 2001).   
 
Differences in Willingness-to-Pay and Willingness-to-Accept 
The differences in elicited values for willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-
accept can be large, with WTA generally exceeding WTP by a factor of two to five times 
(Dubourg, Jones-Lee, and Loomes 1994).  Various studies have found WTP estimates to 
either diverge (e. g., Knetsch and Sinden 1984) or converge (e.g., Coursey, Hovis, and 
Schulze 1987) with WTA estimates.  Meta-analysis by List and Gallett (2001) suggests 
that, ceteris paribus, the WTP estimates are closer to subjects‘ true valuations than WTA 
estimates.  Coursey, Hovis, and Schulze (1987) also theorized that the convergence in 
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their study was explained by learning behavior that occurs over the course of several 
trials; this was also explicitly described by Coursey (1987) as useful for inducing 
subjects to engage in demand-revealing behavior.  Later results from experiments where 
the opportunity for learning behavior was provided contradicted a hypothesis of learning 
behavior as an explanation for a disparity between WTP and WTA (Kahneman, Knetsch, 
and Thaler 1990).  Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990) found WTA estimates to 
decrease over subsequent rounds of the experiment and suggested an ―endowment 
effect,‖ or the increased value of a good once it is a part of an individual‘s endowment, 
as a manifestation of loss aversion (Thaler 1980), is responsible for the discrepancy 
between WTP and WTA.  Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1991) also consider the 
possibility of an endowment effect in combination with a preference to maintain the 
status quo in a loss aversion effect.  Tversky and Kahneman (1991) introduced a theory 
of ―reference dependent preferences‖ based on the premise of loss aversion, deformation 
of the indifference curve about the reference point, and a greater weight placed on losses 
and disadvantages than on gains and advantages.   Reference dependent preferences are 
also discussed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992).   
Other theories or variations on the theory of reference dependent preferences 
followed.  For example, a similar theory was proposed by Munro and Sugden (2003) that 
did not require as many deviations from traditional expected utility theory and that also 
allowed for endogenous reference points.  Köszegi and Rabin (2006; 2007) follow with a 
model of reference dependent preferences and loss aversion and predict that disparities 
in WTP and WTA seen in the laboratory are the result of an endowment effect and that 
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their disappearance in the real market is a result of an expectation to trade; they also 
apply this model to preferences over varying levels of monetary risk.  These results were 
in contrast to those of by Plott and Zeiler (2005), who were able to manipulate the 
presence of a WTP/WTA gap by controlling several aspects of the auction mechanism.  
This supported the suggestion of Shogren and Hayes (1997) that the lack of convergence 
of WTP and WTA estimates in Vickrey second price versus BDM auctions may not be 
due to an endowment effect but to fundamental differences in the auction types.  Still, 
Bateman et al. (1997) analyze eight different methods of value elicitation and cannot 
disprove a WTP/WTA disparity in their analysis and indicate that the results favor an 
interpretation as loss aversion under the theory of reference dependence.  
In another meta-analysis of WTP and WTA estimates, Horowitz and McConnell 
(2002) find that goods that are less similar to ordinary private goods have a pattern of 
more divergent WTP and WTA estimates.  Furthermore, they suggest that the influence 
of hypothetical versus nonhypothetical elicitation procedures, student subjects versus a 
broader subject base, and the opportunity for learning do not affect the disparity between 
WTP and WTA.  Knetsch (2007) contends that WTP should be used to measure gains 
and WTA should be used to measure losses, indicating further support for the ―reference 
relevance‖ in eliciting valuation.  For example, Moon, Balasubramanian, and Rimal 
(2007) find mean WTA a discount for genetically modified food to be greater than mean 
WTP a premium for non-genetically modified food; therefore, the reference frame of 
having GM or non-GM food was important to subject responses.  
Even the difference between WTP and WTA has been disputed; other 
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experiments showed neither a disparity between WTP and WTA when a within-subject 
design was used nor a change in WTP and WTA over repeated trials (Harless 1989).  
Still others have suggested that the convergence of WTP and WTA estimates depends 
heavily on the degree of substitutability of the goods (Hanemann 1991; Shogren et al. 
1994).  Singh (1991) found that there was less variation in median WTP values when 
―bounded‖ commodities with a maximum value (such as a percentage of annual income) 
were used in the experiment; this could have implications for public policy based on the 
use of these techniques.  Environmental and ecological applications of choice 
experiments to elicit WTP and WTA are commonly used as a basis for estimating the 
economic impacts of environmental policy (Hanley, Wright, and Alvarez-Farizo 2006; 
White et al. 2005).  Lusk and Shogren (2007) suggest that differences in WTP and WTA 
may be partially a result of available information on the good up for auction, the ease of 
reversing the auction transaction, the difficulty of delaying the decision, and the 
availability of substitutes under conditions of imperfect information.  Under conditions 
of no uncertainty, they find that the disparity between WTP and WTA may depend on 
price, income, and the elasticity of substitution between the auction good and any 
relevant substitute or complement goods.  This idea was previously introduced by Zhao 
and Kling (2004), who found that the theoretical equivalence of WTP and WTA did not 
hold under conditions of irreversibility, uncertainty, and learning over time.  They 
suggest that if such a divergence arises, the estimated WTP premiums may not be useful 
for welfare analysis.  Zhao and Kling (2004) further hold that under any of the three 
previously mentioned conditions, the bid subjects place will include the expected value 
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of the good, along with option values for purchasing the good at present and another 
option value for delaying the purchase decision. 
Plott and Zeiler (2005) conducted an experimental auction using a modified 
BDM mechanism and were able to eliminate the WTP/ WTA disparity by controlling for 
incentive compatibility of the elicitation device, training of subjects with the auction 
mechanism, paid practice with the auction mechanism, and maintained anonymity 
during the experiment.  These authors conclude that while it is certainly possible to 
observe a WTP/WTA disparity using experimental auctions, the results of their 
experiment indicate a lack of support for the endowment effect theory as the cause of 
this disparity as they were able to turn the disparity on and off by modifying 
experimental procedures.  Further, they suggest that experimental procedures must by 
necessity affect WTP/WTA gaps.   
 
Incentive Compatibility of Auction Mechanisms 
 In designing the experiment, the auction mechanism to be used is a critical 
decision.  Individuals must have an incentive to truthfully reveal their valuations; when 
the dominant strategy is to bid in order to do so, an auction mechanism is said to be 
―incentive-compatible‖ (Lusk, Feldkamp, and Schroeder 2004).  This term was 
previously introduced into the literature and developed further by Hurwicz (1960; 1972).  
Vickrey (1961) suggested the term incentive-compatible be used when a given bid 
determines only that the buyer has the right to buy the good up for auction; it does not 
determine the price that the buyer pays.  For example, in a Vickrey second price auction, 
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a participant can never win, and the participant can lose, by not bidding exactly his true 
WTP (Hoffman et al. 1993).  Since the experimenter cannot force subjects to give 
truthful responses, the experiment must be designed so that there is no incentive to be 
dishonest in order to estimate true valuations (Myerson 1979).  However, if an individual 
does not believe that he is likely to win, then the incentive to bid truthfully is greatly 
reduced; thus, the ability of the researcher to estimate the entire demand curve may be 
limited because of inaccurate responses by low-value subjects in the experiment 
(Shogren et al. 2001).  Lusk, Alexander, and Rousu (2004) also point out that although 
an incentive compatible mechanism should encourage bidders to submit their 
homegrown values truthfully, it does not guarantee that they will do so.  Rather, 
incentive compatibility simply increases the cost of deviating from the dominant strategy 
of submitting truthful bids.   
 Experimental procedures should also take saliency into account (Davis and Holt 
1993).  Subjects must perceive a relationship between the decisions they make and the 
rewards offered by the experimenter; they must further conclude that those rewards are 
substantial enough to be a motivation to provide true information.  An extensive 
literature describes the hypothetical bias that exists when subjects express values in a 
hypothetical context lacking these motivations versus values provided in a real context 
with real economic incentives, although the size of that bias varies considerably across 
experiments (For extensive reviews, please see Harrison and Rutström 2008; Murphy et 
al. 2005).  In particular, subjects answering hypothetical questions may perceive their 
answers to have an impact on their future utility and thus bias results; one suggested 
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solution to this is ‗instrument calibration‘ to measure and then account for this effect 
(Cummings et al. 1997).  Calibration for WTP estimates was proposed most prominently 
by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA 1994, 1996) as the 
use of a bias function to correct hypothetical estimates of WTP to actual WTP values.  
The NOAA proposed dividing by a factor of 2 to correct for systematic bias unless WTP 
estimates could be calibrated using market information.  Unfortunately, this estimated 
calibration factor has not been further validated to be an exact value.  However, 
Blackburn, Harrison, and Rutström (1994) suggest that there is indeed merit to this 
approach and that there was some predictability for the hypothetical bias observed in 
private value, dichotomous choice experiments.  Still, the range of estimated values for 
such a calibration factors can, at the very minimum, be characterized as broad with 
values ranging from 0.3 to 28.2, but most values falling between 1.0 and 10.0 for the 
ration of hypothetical/actual statements of value (see List and Gallett 2001).  Hofler and 
List (2004) describe one calibration procedure using a stochastic frontier approach that 
could be used to correct for bias in previously collected estimates of willingness-to-pay.  
Nevertheless, List and Shogren (1998) found treatment effects in comparisons of 
hypothetical versus real auctions of baseball cards; Lusk and Shogren (2007) suggest 
that the results of the baseball card study present evidence for the need for a separate 
auction for each good that is to be calibrated.  This would be a major problem for 
hypothetical value elicitation and subsequent calibration for public or other goods that 
cannot be delivered in a real auction due to time or financial constraints.  This also 
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presents challenges to any intention to generalize results of experimental auctions for 
one private good to other private goods.   
At least two other methods are used in dichotomous choice field experiments to 
control for hypothetical bias: ―cheap talk‖ and certainty adjustment.  Cheap talk, as 
described by Cummings and Taylor (1999), refers to an explicit discussion by 
researchers of hypothetical bias, and a certainty adjustment refers to asking subjects how 
certain they are about their response and removing uncertain responses from the 
analysis.  Blumenschein et al. (2008) suggest that the certainty approach is effective at 
removing hypothetical bias from WTP estimates but that cheap talk is not.  There is a 
lack of consensus on this topic, with others finding effective reduction of hypothetical 
bias using a cheap talk script (e. g., Lusk 2003; List 2001). 
 Hayes et al. (1996) used nonhypothetical experimental auctions to replicate the 
decisions made by consumers in a retail setting.  They contend that realism is achieved 
with this procedure by using real products, real money, multiple trials, and market 
discipline by not taking the highest bid as the price.  An experimental auction is 
nonhypothetical when subjects are given money to participate in the auction, and the 
preferences that those subjects state have a monetary consequence (Jaeger and Harker 
2005).  
 
Auction Mechanisms 
 Several types of auction are commonly mentioned in the literature; these include 
the English auction, Dutch auction, first price sealed bid auction, second price sealed bid 
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auction, random nth-price auction, and the BDM mechanism for auctions (Lusk, 
Feldkamp, and Schroeder 2004).  Descriptions of these mechanisms, along with 
considerations for using the mechanisms, follow.   
 
Types of Auctions 
The English auction starts at a relatively low price, and participants stay in the 
auction by either indicating that they want to stay in as price ascends or by offering 
successively higher bids.  The auction ends when only one participant is willing to pay 
the current price; that participant pays the last price offered (Vickrey 1961; Coppinger, 
Smith, and Titus 1980).  In a first-price sealed bid auction, all participants submit sealed 
bids; the winner is the participant who submits the highest bid, and he then pays the 
amount he bid (the highest bid).  The Vickrey second price auction is a sealed bid 
analogy to the English auction but in this case, competitors concurrently submit sealed 
bids.  In a second price auction, the winning bidder is the one who submitted the highest 
bid; however, he pays an amount equal to the second-highest bid (Vickrey 1961).   
A Dutch auction is a descending bid scheme that operates in the reverse manner 
of the English auction.  The auctioneer starts at a relatively high price, and the price 
descends until one of the participants indicates he is willing to pay that price; however, it 
is not as well-established that this method gives a price that is at or very close to Pareto-
optimality (Vickrey 1961; Coppinger, Smith, and Titus 1980).  If bidders are 
nonhomogeneous, then the item being auctioned may go to a bidder with the lower 
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value.  This is also true if there are differences in the expectations of the actions of other 
bidders.   
In contrast, in the BDM elicitation procedure introduced by Becker, DeGroot and 
Marschak (1964), the price is randomly drawn from a predetermined uniform 
distribution, and all the individuals who submitted sealed bids higher than the random 
price selected must purchase a unit of the good at the random price.  Shogren et al. 
(2001) describe a random nth-price auction that they contend can be used to predict 
consumers‘ true preferences for products.  In a random nth-price auction, one bid (the 
nth-bid) is selected from all of the sealed bids submitted by the participants, and all 
participants who bid above that price must buy one unit at the nth-price.  Thus, the 
random nth-price auction is a combination of the features of the second price auction and 
the BDM method.  Ausubel (2004) introduces an alternative auction type for bidders 
with demands for multiple units as an ascending-bid Vickrey auction which should 
promote efficiency in a multiple-unit setting.  Also, many consumers now face real-
world encounters with online auctions (e.g., eBay® and Amazon®) that allow them to 
bid in an auction or end the auction by purchasing the item at a buy price that is preset 
by the seller (e.g., Shunda 2009). 
 
Auction Mechanism Issues 
An analysis of general issues with experimental auctions leads to several points 
of interest.  One of these is the ―winner‘s curse‖ discussed by Capen, Clapp, and 
Campbell (1971) in reference to the winning bidder for oil rights; a theoretical analysis 
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of the winner‘s curse was conducted earlier by Wilson (1969).  More specifically, in a 
first-price common value auction, the winner is generally the participant who over-
estimated the value of the product, and hence he experiences the ―winner‘s curse‖ (Roth 
1995).  Others conclude that the winner‘s curse decreases with experience and changes 
in the bidding environment and that the availability of public information may increase 
or decrease the role of the winner‘s curse (Kagel and Levin 1986; Kagel, Harstad, and 
Levin 1987).  Crawford and Iriberri (2007) describe similarities in the winner‘s curse in 
common value auctions and overbidding in independent private value auctions, 
explaining both with a non-equilibrium model of bidding responses based on strategic 
thinking.  Recent work in private value auctions has focused on regret as a means of 
explaining overbidding in first-price auctions, both for the winners and losers of the 
auction (e.g., Nuegebauer and Selten 2006; Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay 2007), with 
contradictory results across experiments.  Further, results varied with different number 
of bidders in the auctions (Nuegebauer and Selten 2006). 
 
Which Type of Auction Is Preferred? 
 The preference among types of auctions is conflicting in the literature, both in 
regards to which type of auction is preferred and in regards to the theoretical basis for 
divergences from expected results.  Other questions of experimental design that have 
been addressed in detail include the use of a single round versus multiple rounds of 
bidding and the use of an endowment versus full bidding approach.   
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Divergence from Expectations   
Several models have been provided that give expectations for the outcomes of 
experimental auctions; Nash equilibrium models include the risk-neutral Nash 
equilibrium (RNNE) that was predicted in first-price auctions by Vickrey (1961) on the 
assumption of identical probabilities and strategies, as well as the constant relative risk 
aversion model (CRRAM) described by Cox, Smith and Walker (1982; 1983; 1988) that 
allowed for generalization of Vickrey‘s hypothesis to account for heterogeneity among 
bidders.  The results of Cox, Smith, and Walker (1988) also indicate support for a risk 
aversion hypothesis to explain divergence from RNNE.  Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 
(1990) suggest that the divergence is explained by errors in the decision-making of 
inexperienced auction participants as a manifestation of the habits of standard bargaining 
behavior: buyers are often rewarded for understating their true value, and sellers are 
frequently rewarded for overstating their true value (Knez, Smith, and Williams 1985).  
Davis and Holt (1993) conclude that the positive deviations from RNNE conditions in 
first-bid auctions are consistent with risk aversion.  However, Kagel and Levin (1993) 
found a tendency for subjects to make errors (as consistent deviations from the dominant 
strategy) by overbidding in second price auctions as well.  They further report that some 
subjects increased bids in response to an increase in the number of bidders, but conclude 
that Nash equilibrium bidding theory is able to describe the main strategies behind the 
observed behaviors of participants.  
Riley and Samuelson (1981) reject a hypothesis of uniform risk aversion as an 
explanation for deviations from the dominant strategy of bidding.  Furthermore, Harrison 
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(1989; 1992) presented and defended an alternative hypothesis of ―payoff dominance‖ as 
an explanation of deviations from dominant strategy, suggesting that the region of the 
payoff curve where participants bid is flat, and therefore little incentive exists to make a 
bid in accordance with the dominant strategy.  If this hypothesis is true, then bids in such 
auctions cannot be interpreted as true measures of maximum WTP.  Kagel and Roth 
(1992) suggest that risk aversion could be one factor contributing to overbidding, but 
that it is not necessarily the most important factor.  More recent results from Neugebauer 
and Selten (2006) offer evidence that providing information on the winning bid 
(information feedback) to subjects may enhance the likelihood of overbidding.  Other 
problems with information feedback, such as bid affiliation over rounds, are discussed in 
more detail later.   
In a quite different approach to this much debated topic of overbidding and the 
winner‘s curse, a synergism of economics and neuroscience by Delgado et al. (2008) 
utilized functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to construct a hypothesis 
suggesting overbidding in auctions as a result of a fear of losing in a social setting.  The 
results from the single-price auctions analyzed should be distinguished from a pure risk 
aversion model; subjects showed differences in bid levels even when the level of risk 
was equivalent.  Rather, the subjects showed a ―social loss aversion‖ that was consistent 
with existing scientific knowledge of the brain‘s reward circuitry. (The application of 
neuroscience to economic decision-making and understanding of economic behavior is 
discussed further in Camerer 2007). 
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Vickrey‘s (1961) description of incentive compatible strategy for sealed bid 
auctions was extended by Coppinger, Smith, and Titus (1980) to include that bidding a 
full (true) value is a dominant strategy because ―it maximizes the probability of winning 
the award while the gain obtained depends only on the bid of an independent bidder.‖  
Comparisons of dominant strategies among auction types indicate English auctions and 
second price auctions are isomorphic in the sense that the weakly dominant strategy in 
both is to bid the value of the good regardless of risk preferences and rival bids 
(Coppinger, Smith, and Titus 1980; Cox, Roberson and Smith 1982), but that this is not 
the dominant strategy for Dutch and first price auctions (Cox, Roberson, and Smith 
1982).  An additional comparison of auction types found that of first price sealed bid, 
second price sealed bid, and Dutch auctions, second price auctions were the most 
efficient, followed by first price auctions, and then Dutch auctions; efficiency is 
characterized as a situation where there are no unrealized gains from exchange, which is 
consistent with a Pareto-optimal allocation (Cox, Roberson, and Smith 1982).  Davis and 
Holt (1993) point out that the incentives to bid based on value are similar for a first price 
and second price auction, and that price and efficiency predictions are the same for both 
of these types of auctions.  Since the bidder with the highest value is predicted to bid the 
highest amount, it is predicted that the outcome for English and second price auctions is 
therefore efficient.   
The auction mechanism can have a significant effect on the willingness-to-pay 
estimates of the experiment.  This is true for the random nth-price auction and later 
bidding rounds of second price auctions (Lusk, Feldkamp, and Schroeder 2004).  
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Furthermore, ―the second-price auction works better on-margin, and the random nth-
price auction works better off-margin‖ in an analysis of those two types (Shogren et al. 
2001).  Those bidders in a second price auction who are disengaged because they 
possess a WTP much lower than the second price are, conversely, engaged and have a 
chance of buying the good in a random nth-price auction.   
Conflicting results have been obtained from evaluations of the BDM mechanism 
and the Vickrey second price auction.  Some research indicates the second price auction 
is a more effective WTP elicitation device than the BDM mechanism, possibly due to 
differences in the shape of the payoff function (Noussair, Robin, and Ruffieux 2004).  
Others (Lusk, Alexander, and Rousu 2004) suggest that of these two types of auctions, 
the BDM mechanism may be preferable for elicitation of WTP for low-value (off-
margin) subjects provided that the price distribution that is chosen is close to the true 
value for the individual; however, the second price auction was still preferred for high-
value (on-margin) subjects.  The BDM procedure can be a means to elicit WTP in a 
point-of-purchase setting and overcomes the problems of incentive-compatibility of 
reverse (Dutch) auctions, but is not useful for new products not already on the market 
(Wertenbroch and Skiera 2002).  This has implications for the choice of mechanisms in 
this study, where some of the products are available on the market, but only in a limited 
geographical region.  Rutström (1998) compared Vickrey, English, and BDM 
mechanism auctions to look for differences in the behavior of participants.  In an 
analysis of auctions to elicit homegrown values of bidders, she found that when 
compared to Vickrey auctions, English auctions produced lower bids, had less residual 
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variance, were more affected by the number of bidders, and were influenced by learning 
over multiple rounds.  Further, auctions using the BDM mechanism produced values that 
had a statistically significant difference from either the English or the Vickrey auction.   
The comparisons of auction mechanism also extend to differences between first-
price and second-price auctions.  Kagel and Levin (1993) saw differences in the values 
elicited in first-, second-, and third-price auctions.  Lusk et al. (2001a) did not see 
differences in bid levels for first- and second-price auctions, but indicate that a larger 
sample size could have produced results with significant differences.  They did, 
however, find differences in the probability that participants would pay to exchange their 
product for the new product (using an endowed auction approach); marginal bidders may 
have been more willing to bid their true WTP values in the second-price auction.  In a 
theoretical analysis, Milgrom (1989) points out that when demand is inelastic, the 
average price is the same in first-price and second-price auctions.  Still, he suggests that 
when demand is elastic, the incentives of a bidder as a price-taker in a second-price 
auction are different than the incentives of a bidder as a price-setter in a first-price 
auction and result in a lower average price in first price auctions than in second price 
auctions.  In a study by Kagel, Harstad, and Levin (1987), Nash equilibrium theory is 
able to organize the outcomes of first-price (and English) auctions, but does not do a 
good job of organizing the results of second-price auctions.  Additionally, these authors 
suggest that the increased revenues in second-price (and English) auctions over first-
price auctions predicted by Nash equilibrium are not seen empirically due to the 
potential for risk-averse bidding.  The effect of the level of compensation provided for 
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participation in an experimental auction can vary among auction types.  Rutström (1998) 
found that there was an effect on bids as a result of differences in the participation 
payment given to subjects and suggested that this was an income effect, sample selection 
effect, or some combination of the two in a Vickrey second price auction.  No obvious 
income or sample selection effects were seen in English auctions. 
Even in a comparison of two Vickrey-type auctions (second price and ninth 
price), the manipulation of exchange price significantly impacted the values stated by the 
subjects (Knetsch, Tang, and Thaler 2001).  That is, in contradiction to many other 
results, the context of the valuation influenced the outcome of the Vickrey auctions.  
These authors found that endowment effects remained over repeated trials in a second 
price/ninth price study, suggesting that the Vickrey auction may not be robust to these 
effects and thus not revealing of true consumer values.  Shogren and Hayes (1997) 
suggest that the lack of convergence of WTP and WTA estimates in Vickrey second 
price versus BDM auctions may not be due to an endowment effect but to fundamental 
differences in the auction types; the BDM market does not allow for market learning and 
pricing is exogenous, whereas a second price auction enforces market discipline with an 
endogenous market price to provide feedback to subjects.   
A model of reference-dependence (Tversky and Kahneman 1991) for WTP 
values elicited by auctions predicts that such values will vary depending on the frame of 
reference of the participants; for example, the number of goods available in the auction, 
aversion to loss if subjects are given one good and the opportunity to bid for an upgrade, 
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or the repetition of the auction over several rounds are all suggested to influence the 
estimated valuations.  
In a summary of comparisons of several auction types, Lusk and Shogren (2007) 
reject second-price auctions as continually producing overbidding.  They further state 
that in terms of efficiency, English auction are best. They are followed by second price 
auctions.  Auctions utilizing the BDM mechanism are demand revealing, but do so to a 
lesser extent than the two previously mentioned.  The random nth-price auction is also 
demand revealing, but perhaps not best for high-value buyers.  The auction mechanisms 
discussed and their characteristics are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Auction Mechanisms Summary 
 
 
 
 
Auction Type Examples Price
Open Outcry or 
Sealed Bid
Number of Winners
English Auction Vickrey (1961);                                 
Coppinger, Smith and Titus (1980)
Just higher than the 2nd price 
bid
Outcry 1
2nd-Price (Vickrey) Auction Vickrey (1961);                                
Coppinger, Smith and Titus (1980)
2nd price bid Sealed Bid 1
Dutch Auction Coppinger, Smith, and Titus (1980); 
Wertenbroch and Skiera (2002)
1st price bid Outcry 1
1st-Price Sealed Bid Auction Harrison (1989), (1992);                       
Lusk et al. (2001a)
1st price bid Sealed Bid 1
Random nth-price Auction Shogren et al. (2001);                                   
Lusk, Feldkamp, and Schroeder (2004)
nth-price bid (random) Sealed Bid n-1
BDM Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak (1964); 
Rutström (1998) 
Drawn from predetermined 
uniform distribution 
Sealed Bid Number over 
selected price
Uniform nth-price auction Kagel and Levin (1993);                   
Hoffman et al. (1993)
nth-price bid (stated) Sealed Bid n-1
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Single Round vs. Multiple Round Bidding  
Auctions can be conducted in a single round of bidding or over several rounds.  
The necessity for additional rounds has been confirmed by some and challenged by 
others.  Alfnes and Rickertsen (2003) suggest that using a modified Vickrey second 
price auction for several goods simultaneously, one trial was sufficient to find the level 
of the WTP a premium for one good over another.  Corrigan and Rousu (2006b) suggest 
that the practice of conducting multiple rounds of the Vickrey second price auction be 
done away with completely, citing a tendency for ―bid affiliation‖ of bids in subsequent 
rounds, particularly with high posted prices.  Harrison (2006) further recommends that 
the use of single-round auction mechanisms would elicit more accurate WTP estimates.  
He says that this is for two primary reasons.  The first reason suggested is that if 
experimental auctions are truly designed to elicit participants‘ subjective values for the 
good being auctioned, then subjects may perceive that others have more knowledge of 
the attributes of the good and update their subjective values based on that information.  
The second reason Harrison (2006) suggests is that knowledge of bidding behavior of 
other participants may suggest a market value for the good that is below some 
participants‘ value for the good, thus causing them to deviate from a strategy of bidding 
their true value for the good.  This would be a violation of the incentive compatibility of 
the auction.  Bernard (2005) tests a second-price auction for the presence of bid 
affiliation over multiple rounds across three goods that differed in their novelty to 
subjects.  He found that differences that appeared to be based on perceptions of quality 
as expressed in the first round of the auction disappeared over repeated rounds of the 
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auction and suggested that bid affiliation was a likely cause of the subsequent loss of 
information about the initial values held by subjects.  Corrigan and Rousu (2010) 
conclude that for goods with both private and common value, bid affiliation is less of a 
concern than the potential for the auction to ―overheat‖ (for bids to exceed the private 
value, observed in this case in an induced value experiment). 
However, others have questioned the validity of ―single-shot‖ auction 
mechanisms in Vickrey single unit auctions that do not allow for a learning process; the 
necessity of the learning process is suggested based on the fact that the dominant 
strategy in Vickrey auctions is not immediately obvious to some participants 
(Coppinger, Smith, and Titus 1980; Cox, Roberson, and Smith 1982).  Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) further suggest that an ―isolation effect‖ causes people to discard the 
components of all prospects that are uniform, causing differences in preferences when 
the same choices are presented in different forms.  In another type of sequencing effect, 
Huffman et al. (2003) found that the order that different products were presented in an 
auction setting also had a significant effect on results.   
Shogren (2006) suggests that the use of a single round auction mechanism does 
not cure the problem of bid affiliation implicitly, since other signals could be relied on to 
generate affiliation in bids.  Further, he suggests that the use of an auction with the 
purpose of inducing a market-like experiment could be violated by using a single round 
mechanism or even a multiple round mechanism with no price feedback; there is no 
market learning in either of these cases.  In a study of consumer valuations for several 
retail beef options, Lusk and Shogren (2007) found that changes in bid levels were 
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consistent across the different qualities of beef over repeated rounds, thus raising the 
question of whether the subjective views of quality of each participant influenced bids or 
if the bids changed due to participant learning of the auction mechanism.  Drichoutis et 
al. (2009) note the differences between single shot and multiple round auctions, and 
suggest an econometric procedure to test for the presence of bid affiliation.  However, 
this test requires at least four repeated rounds to be applied, and Drichoutis et al. (2009) 
make the specific point that although their procedure has the ability to test for the 
presence of bid affiliation, the authors refrain from taking a position on whether bid 
affiliation is necessarily a problem that should be corrected for in an experimental 
auction setting.  
Bateman et al. (2008) analyze choice-based contingent valuation procedures; 
however, their findings are pertinent to the discussion of single or multiple rounds in 
other valuation procedures.  They recommend against single-shot value elicitation and 
contend that the learning process associated with unfamiliar goods and unfamiliar 
institutions require the need for the opportunity for subjects to practice in order to obtain 
more stable results.    
There are also differences among the auction mechanism for multiple unit 
auctions and auctions for products with possible negative values.  Marked demand 
reduction effects were seen in multiple unit uniform price auctions as compared to the 
dynamic Vickrey/ Ausubel auction (Kagel and Levin 2001).  In an induced value 
experiment, aggregate bidding in a Vickrey second price auction was precise but biased 
(high value bidders and low value bidders overstated benefits and understated costs, 
  
47 
respectively), while aggregate bidding in a random nth-price experiment was demand 
revealing (unbiased) but lacking in precision (large variances) (Parkhurst, Shogren and 
Dickinson 2004).  Still, Menkhaus et al. (1992) point out that multiple unit Vickrey 
auctions (e.g. third price auctions selling two units or fifth price auctions selling four 
units) abide by the same theoretical incentive-compatibility as second price auctions.  
 
Endowment Approach vs. Full Bidding Approach 
Once an auction type has been selected, the type of bidding utilized can still have 
an effect.  Caution must be used at this point; auction bidding, which is a competition for 
a limited quantity of goods, does not necessarily equate to the decision-making process 
in point-of-purchase situations where consumers are price-takers for a practically 
unlimited quantity of goods (Hoffman et al. 1993).  In an endowment approach, subjects 
receive a product and bid the amount that he or she would pay to exchange the 
―endowed‖ product for another product; the amount bid is the WTP premium.  In a full-
bidding approach, the participants in the auction bid the full price for each of the 
different products and differences in bids can be used to calculate WTP premiums 
(Alfnes 2009).  It is important to distinguish the endowed approach described here from 
the endowment effect that has been described as the cause for disparity among WTP and 
WTA (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990).    
There is disparity on whether an endowed approach is the necessary bidding set-
up (Lusk and Shogren 2007) or whether a full-bidding method is preferable (Alfnes 
2009).  Hoffman et al. (1993) suggested that experimental auctions are most valuable for 
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determining differences in WTP among products rather than for determining full values.  
This is echoed by Hayes et al. (1996), who endow auction participants with a good and 
seek the premium (or discount) that subjects have for another improved product.  They 
allow that the full bidding approach may be useful when the motivation for the research 
is general information on the base good.  A direct comparison of random nth-price, 
second-price, BDM, and English auctions found differences in the significance of the 
effect from the use of the endowed approach versus the full-bidding approach; a lower 
value for the auctioned item was obtained using the endowed approach with the random 
nth-price auction, but higher valuations of the auctioned good were obtained in the 
second price auction (Lusk, Feldkamp, and Schroeder 2004).  In general, the results of 
Lusk, Feldkamp, and Schroeder (2004) were mixed.  They found that in multiple round 
auctions the endowment effect became more pronounced in later rounds.  In terms of 
differences in auction mechanisms, there was statistically significant evidence of loss 
aversion in the random nth-price auction but not in the BDM or English auction 
mechanisms.   Lusk and Shogren (2007) contend that the endowment approach has the 
benefits of controlling for the problem of field substitutes and outside option values, 
allowing for imposition of a consumption requirement, and making a more useful 
experimental outcome of estimating differences in WTP rather than actual values.  In a 
field experiment on WTP for steak tenderness, Lusk et al. (2001b) suggest that by asking 
consumers which good they prefer and then endowing them with the opposite good, 
some of the potential problems of the endowment approach will be avoided.  However, 
the incentive compatibility of the choice decision used here seems to be lacking in some 
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cases, as consumers would not have even a weakly dominant strategy to answer this 
question in such a way that their true preferences are revealed. For example, if 
consumers prefer good A over good B, they may receive good A without additional 
payment by stating that they prefer good B.  
On the other hand, Alfnes (2009) contends that since the effect of outside options 
is similar for goods with the same outside substitutes, the Vickrey auction used with the 
full-bidding approach should still provide good WTP estimates for product 
characteristics.  In an endowed auction, interpreting the bid for the new good as the 
value placed on the trait of interest is in defiance of the reference dependence of 
preferences, and the results may therefore be biased (Corrigan and Rousu 2006a).  
Corrigan and Rousu (2006a) further suggest that it is impossible to predict the net 
direction of the bias in the case of the endowed approach, as there is an upward bias 
from reciprocal obligation and a downward bias from loss aversion, with the magnitudes 
of these biases not predicted by theory.  The approach they used compared bids for one 
and two goods with bids to upgrade from one endowed unit of a good to another unit of 
the same good; thus eliminating the possibility of a so-called ―endowment effect,‖ since 
subjects never had to give up an endowed good.  As an alternative means of WTP 
elicitation, using a comparison of the difference in bids for two goods from the same 
subject in a full-bidding approach facilitates the canceling out of the values of outside 
options (including the same good and substitutes); the between-subjects comparisons of 
bid differences should then provide an estimate of the distribution of willingness-to-pay 
a price premium for one of the two goods over the other (Alfnes 2009).  Despite Lusk 
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and Shogren‘s (2007) criticisms of the full-bidding approach, they indicate that 
experimental auctions that utilize the full-bidding procedure may be appropriate if and 
when few outside options exist, the endowment effect is a pervasive phenomenon, actual 
consumption of the product is not an important part of the value, there is little 
opportunity to learn about the value of the good in the future, and subjects will want to 
―return the favor‖ of the endowment by altering their bids. 
In the distinction between private value goods and common value goods, many 
private value goods have a value in the outside marketplace that would be similar for all 
individuals, breaking the private value condition; the usefulness of a common value 
good to an individual may be enhanced by some private value (Laffont 1997).  Further, 
in markets for goods with both private value and common value traits, greater 
inefficiency is expected in those that have higher levels of uncertainty about the common 
value (Goeree and Offerman 2002; 2003). 
 
Auction Mechanism Considerations 
Unfortunately, there is a lack of formal theory to explain why, even among 
incentive-compatible auction mechanisms, there is discrepancy among estimates of 
willingness-to-pay.  Thus, choice of auction mechanism may be based on the sort of 
consumer the WTP analysis is targeting, with more emphasis given to the entire 
marketplace and those consumers with low- to moderate-value with the BDM procedure 
or the random nth-price auction and emphasizing higher-value consumers with the 
Vickrey second price auction (Lusk, Alexander, and Rousu 2004; Shogren et al. 2001).  
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If these auctions are extended to private industry as a means of market analysis prior to 
launching new products as suggested by several authors (i.e. Levitt and List 2009, Hayes 
et al. 1996, Jaeger and Harker 2005), the absence of a clearly defined theoretical 
understanding of the differences in auction results requires a careful consideration of 
which auction type is most appropriate.  Concessions are also made among the full-
bidding and endowed approaches when designing an auction, and exceptions are made to 
suggest the endowed approach if 1) a consumption requirement is applied or if 2) the 
two goods being compared are a novel good not available outside the experiment and a 
conventional good that is available outside the experiment in order to prevent an 
overestimate of the WTP premium value for the novel good (Corrigan and Rousu 
2006a).  Lusk and Shogren (2007) indicate that, based on the study of Lusk, Feldkamp, 
and Schroder (2004), rejection of equivalence among bid mechanisms does not exclude a 
conclusion that bids across mechanisms are highly correlated. The lack of unanimity in 
the research on value elicitation is an indication not only that a great deal of 
experimentation in this field has been carried out, but also that considerably more 
experimental work is needed (Plott 1991). 
 
Internal Validity 
Internal validity refers to the ability to draw conclusions about causation from the 
results of an experiment (Loewenstein 1999).  An alternative definition is provided by 
Samuelson (2005), who suggests that internal validity is the strength of the link between 
the imposed experimental environment and the observed behavior of subjects.  For an 
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experiment to be internally valid it must, therefore, be constructed in such a way as to 
accurately test the hypothesis of the experimenter.  The experiment might also be an 
internally valid test of economic theory if it reproduces the assumptions of that theory in 
order to generate results that are relevant to the predictions the theory makes (Croson 
2005).  Flaws in procedures that are not consistent with assumptions of the hypothesis 
can lead to results that are biased.  The testing of each causal hypothesis must be 
conducted in isolation in order to sort out effects and either confirm or disprove the 
hypotheses one by one (Guala and Mittone 2005).  Economic theory is a strong tool for 
testing the internal validity of experimental results (Samuelson 2005).  Davis and Holt 
(1993) list general methodology for controlling undesired effects within the experiment 
to accurately and reproducibly test the hypotheses of the experiment.  These strategies 
are fairly consistent across the literature, and statistical tests can help determine the 
strength of results in terms of internal validity.  If results are not internally valid, then 
either the researcher will fail to correctly identify the relationship between the situation 
and the outcomes or he will be unable to do so because the results will be too noisy to 
allow conclusions to be drawn (Samuelson 2005).  Factors of internal validity that might 
be of concern in experimental design include types of treatments to be applied, 
elicitation method, randomization, subject pool and number of subjects, psychological 
influences, learning behavior, and incentives.  
 Replication of results is perhaps the simplest way to test the internal validity of 
an experiment (Samuelson 2005).  For example, to further test a theory of bargaining, 
Binmore, Shaked, and Sutton (1985) replicated previously reported results in their own 
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experiment, stating that ―under similar conditions, we obtained similar results.‖  This 
replication as a control treatment in an experiment is useful in making comparisons 
across time and space. 
 
External Validity 
External validity, on the other hand, refers to the generalization of experimental 
results to the broader context of the world.  There is generally some contradiction 
between high levels of internal validity and high levels of external validity (Schram 
2005).  The discussion of the validity of experimental procedures within economics has 
generally focused on the internal validity of experimental auctions, although discussions 
of external validity are on the rise (Grebitus et al. 2010).  
The ability to extrapolate the results from experimental auctions in a contained, 
laboratory setting to the outside world has been questioned by those within and outside 
the field of experimental economics (Umberger and Feuz 2004; Levitt and List 2007).  
However, the external validity of experimental procedures and their application to the 
field of economics is also extensive, with Plott (1982) arguing that experimental 
methods have an important role in testing the validity of theories.  This position was also 
taken by Smith (1976), who extended it to include interpretation of field data as well.     
As economists frequently take on normative roles in addressing policy, there are 
certain strategies to improve external validity of experiments in such situations.  If the 
problems and exact circumstances that experimental results will be generalized to are 
known, then those problems of external validity can be addressed as modifications in the 
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experimental design (Guala and Mittone 2005). 
 Levitt and List (2007) mention five factors that, in addition to monetary 
considerations, influence the behavior of subjects in the laboratory.  These are: the 
presence of moral and ethical considerations, the nature and extent of scrutiny by others, 
the context in which the decision is embedded (including artificial time and location 
constraints), self-selection of the individuals making the decisions, and the stakes of the 
game; all of these could influence the external validity of an experimental market.  The 
factors mentioned are generally different in a laboratory setting than in a naturally 
occurring environment.   
However, the generalizability of experimental results is key to their external 
validity and is a question of which components of the experimental environment are 
valid to use in making predictions of real-world results (Campbell and Stanley 1966). 
Plott (1982) holds that the key to success in experimental design is asking questions that 
can be sufficiently answered in an experimental context where a study of the simple case 
can be generalized to the complex.  Levitt and List (2007) also point out that the 
generalizability of results based on observational data is not infallible and that caution 
should be used when extending those results to real-world markets as well.  Sound 
economic theory is needed in both cases for data to hold value.  These authors later 
(2009) suggest that framed field experiments, including these types of auctions, lie on 
the spectrum between laboratory experiments and econometric modeling based on 
observational data.  Further, they indicate that auctions avoid some of the problems of 
randomization bias and attention bias on the laboratory end and identification 
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assumptions on the observational end.   Roth (1995) questions the extrapolation of some 
of the problems that can be commonly identified in experimental auctions to the field as 
irrelevant in some cases.  He suggests that for example, participants in an experimental 
auction may be inexperienced and show evidence of the winner‘s curse, whereas in the 
field participants in the same sort of auction may have experience and the phenomena 
may not be seen.  This particular distinction was disputed by Dyer, Kagel, and Levin 
(1989) who found similarities in experimental results for bids of both naïve and 
experienced subjects.  Lange and Ratan (2010) base their criticism of the external 
validity of first price and second price auctions on a theory of loss aversion; they find 
that reference dependent preferences may affect the elicited valuations from a laboratory 
setting versus a field setting on the basis of differences in the dimensions of the 
consumption space (specifically, monetary value and actual item value). 
Just and Wu (2009) hold that experimental economics can be useful in testing the 
validity of a theory, particularly in the case that Binmore‘s (1999) criteria are met; 
however they suggest that the greater usefulness of experimental economics as a means 
of testing economic theory over making specific quantitative predictions can be a result 
of the lack of practicality in implementing many proposed experiments.  This view is 
narrower than that taken by Guala and Mittone (2005), who advocate for the application 
of experimental results to the real-world but suggest that the necessity for every 
experiment to be externally valid in every situation is unrealistic.  They suggest that a 
more preferable approach is to categorize the results of some experiments as 
―phenomena‖ and take the range of these, including various anomalies, biases, and 
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paradoxes, into consideration when making applications to particular cases.  Harrison, 
Lau, and Rutström (2010) emphasize that economic theory, experimental results, and 
econometric techniques should be integrated for a more thorough understanding of 
economics, rather than analyzing each of these as mutually exclusive.  Thus, 
experiments in the laboratory or in the field can be interpreted by taking the 
considerations and findings of the other areas into account.  
Relative WTP values obtained through experimental auction procedures appear 
valid, but actual WTP values may be prejudiced by characteristics of the experimental 
design.  Specifically, panel size and the initial endowment were found to affect auction 
prices by Umberger and Feuz (2004); the results of their auction were that market price 
for a beef steak increased as the number of participants in the auction increased.  
Coursey and Smith (1984) found that in a Vickrey fifth-price auction the subjects 
underbid their maximum WTP, but that these underbids were consistent insomuch as the 
underbids among subjects and for different objects were indicative of meaningful 
differences in value.  Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec (2003) conducted a series of six 
experiments and found that in many cases, preferences measured by experimental 
economics show what they term ―coherent arbitrariness.‖  That is, the preferences may 
be heavily influenced by the context of the experiment; however, relative valuations 
(e.g., value for more versus less of an auction good) respond in the way predicted by 
economic theory.  Lusk and Shogren (2007) discuss several empirical results that show 
that preferences are likely not entirely arbitrary based on analysis of contingent 
valuations of public policy where people are less likely to vote to implement more costly 
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policies as well as analysis of the effects of positive and negative information when 
compared to a bid with no information.   
Bateman et al. (2008) tested three hypotheses on the nature of preferences; these 
included the a priori theory of well-formed and readily-divined preferences, the 
discovered preference hypothesis introduced by Plott and Zeiler (2005), and the coherent 
arbitrariness hypothesis of Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec (2003).  Using a contingent 
valuation method, Bateman et al.‘s (2008) results suggest that there are likely at least 
two types of learning that occur over multiple rounds of an auction: value learning 
(learning of individual preferences) and institutional learning (learning of the valuation 
mechanism).  They also suggest support for the discovered preference hypothesis of 
preferences in which stable preferences are gained through practice and repetition with 
both the good and the market institution.  These are important considerations in eliciting 
the homegrown value for good.  
Carlsson (2010) discusses the application of theories of behavioral economics to 
value elicitation procedures.  He raises four areas that are all relevant to the external 
validity of such studies; these include revealed versus normative preferences, learning 
and construction of preferences, context dependence, and hypothetical bias.  In 
particular, the context dependence of preferences is pointed out, but a number of 
methods (such as the use of the random-utility model and design of experiments with 
different contexts as different treatments) that have been used to analyze such context-
dependence in value elicitation are suggested.  
The use of experimental auctions or other experimental techniques to elicit 
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homegrown values are subject to certain issues that are not relevant for induced value 
auctions.  However, they are highly relevant to any results that will be extrapolated to 
the real world.  Many of these issues have been documented over the years; for example, 
Milgrom and Weber (1982) suggested that bids may be affiliated at the beginning of an 
auction or may become affiliated over the course of the auction.  Others have made 
pointed criticisms of the external validity of some mechanisms; the three main issues 
discussed by Harrison, Harstad, and Rutström (2004) are ―field-price censoring,‖ 
affiliation of beliefs about field prices, and affiliation of beliefs about the quality of the 
auctioned good.  Experimenters must account for field-price censoring, or the curtailing 
of bids at the price level for an outside substitute of the good they are auctioning in 
analyzing results, as rational consumers would not bid more in an experimental auction 
for a good than the price they could purchase it for outside the experimental market plus 
some transaction cost, assuming they know the price of the outside good.  Secondly, 
institutions that reveal information to the consumer about the value of the good may 
cause the estimated WTP to be biased over multiple rounds.  Consumers could believe 
that the bids expressed by other participants reflect knowledge of the pricing of perfect 
and imperfect substitutes, as well as complements, in the outside marketplace.  This 
affiliation could be prevented by using simultaneous or one time value elicitation, but if 
the experimenter believes that learning is a necessary part of obtaining valid results, then 
the posting of bids is generally a component of that learning process.  The third 
methodological issue discussed by Harrison, Harstad, and Rutström (2004) is that an 
affiliation of the perceived quality of goods up for auction may occur over multiple 
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rounds.  If participants are unsure of the quality of the good up for auction, they may 
assume that other participants have more knowledge of the quality of the good then they 
do and adjust the bids they place accordingly.   
Alfnes (2009) contends that if product attributes are to be valued using 
experimental methods, the levels of the bids in a Vickrey second price auction are not 
generally useful because they are curtailed at the market price for that good and reduced 
by the value of the surplus that could be obtained by purchasing substitutes.  He suggests 
that products that would normally be purchased in the market place will generate bids 
that are at the market price.  However, for goods that would not typically be purchased 
in the marketplace, participants will still seek to generate the same surplus they would 
have had by purchasing substitutes in the marketplace; therefore, the bid they submit 
should be less than the market price.  Cherry et al. (2004) also found bid shaving 
(reduced bids when homegrown value exceeds the value of the outside good) in real and 
hypothetical induced-value auctions where information on outside substitute goods was 
provided.  Possible options to control for the effect of providing prices for substitutes are 
to account for bids that are truncated (Harrison, Harstad, and Rutström (2004) or by 
asking subjects what their perceptions of available substitutes and prices are for the good 
being auctioned (Corrigan 2005).   
Shunda (2009) found that the price set by sellers to end an online auction early 
affected the valuations that consumers had for goods.  He suggests that bidding behavior 
more closely mirrors a reference-dependent theory than the reference-free expected 
utility theory.  In the case of economic development, Deaton (2009) argues that scientific 
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progress is unlikely based on uncertain experimental results and that the usefulness of 
experimentation in that field may be limited.  Nunes and Boatwright (2004) discuss the 
effects of incidental prices on WTP, defining ―incidental prices‖ as the prices for 
unrelated goods whose prices are irrelevant to the good for which WTP is being elicited. 
The anchoring effect often discussed in psychology literature was observed using 
incidental in three studies by Nunes and Boatwright (2004); this indicates yet another 
example of the context-dependence of WTP estimates.  These authors further suggest 
that the effects that they observe could be strategically manipulated by marketers to 
target the numerical values that consumers are exposed to near the time of purchase and 
influence consumer WTP.  Nevertheless, this effect remains relevant to experimental 
economics in that subjects are likely to be influenced by any prices they are exposed to 
during the span of an experimental session, but also in that subjects may exhibit effects 
of incidental prices they were exposed to prior to the experimental session.  Ariely, 
Loewenstein, and Prelec (2003) also discussed the anchoring effect in their presentation 
of a coherent arbitrariness hypothesis for the formation of preferences.   
In a series of studies to analyze the unique complexity of price, the difficulty of 
evaluating an infinite number of other uses for money, and the evidence that consumer 
preferences are influenced by price, Lee, Bertini, and Ariely (2008) report evidence that 
the decline in preference consistency is not an information effect.  They further suggest 
that preferences appeared to be more stable when price was not included as a factor in 
the decision-making; however, they counter this with the fact that from a consumer 
standpoint, subjects seem to be more satisfied and better able to make decisions when 
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price information is included.  An important methodological consideration they find is 
that there is a reduction in variability of preferences when an explicit suggestion is made 
by experimenters to participants suggesting that they consider the opportunity cost of 
using money to make other purchases.  As a final note, there may be factors that 
confound any type of data, be it experimental or observational; care must be taken to 
make accurate conclusions based on the available information (Roth 1995). 
Incentive compatibility is also applicable to methods of value elicitation other 
than auctions, although it was traditionally lacking in hypothetical choice experiments 
(see Murphy et al. 2005).  Proposals have been made and utilized to develop incentive 
compatibility in conjoint analysis of choice-based experiments (e.g. Alfnes et al. 2006) 
and ranking experiments (Lusk, Fields, and Prevatt 2008).  Analysis by others also 
indicated that the preferences of an individual were not context dependent in a study to 
determine whether rational decision-making by individuals was transferred from market 
to non-market settings (Cherry, Crocker, and Shogren 2003).   
It should be noted that comparisons of dichotomous choice surveys, open-ended 
surveys, and auction procedures as methods of value elicitation indicate that 
dichotomous choice questions overstate values (for both public and private goods), and 
that open-ended questions also overstate the values obtained in auction results but do not 
do so as severely as dichotomous choice questions (Balistreri et al. 2001).  One possible 
solution to this issue is to combine the use of surveys and auctions for a single analysis 
of WTP and the factors that affect it in order to correct for the problems of each 
approach (Yue, Alfnes, and Jensen 2009). 
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In determining whether survey methods that are hypothetical or nonhypothetical 
are preferable, Chang, Lusk, and Norwood (2009) found nonhypothetical methods 
(nonhypothetical choices and nonhypothetical rankings) to outperform hypothetical 
choices as a means of predicting retail choices.  They contend that real-world decisions, 
if they are to be based on either of these two types of survey results, should be more 
accurate when based on the incentive-compatible (nonhypothetical) option.  However, 
previous results suggested that although total WTP was sensitive to the hypothetical or 
nonhypothetical nature of a choice experiment, there was no significant difference in the 
estimates of marginal willingness-to-pay by either method (Lusk and Schroeder 2004).  
A comparison of stated preferences from a conjoint ranking procedure and revealed 
preference from scanner data for consumers of dry-cured ham in Spain used a nested 
logit model and found that stated preferences could be useful for predicting general 
market trends and choices, but not for predicting market shares (Resano-Ezcaray, 
Sanjuán-López, and Albisu-Aguado 2010).  However, Grebitus et al. (2010) found that 
hypothetical nonmarket results were consistent with actual market behavior for 
purchases of country-of-origin labeled meat products. 
Some researchers (e.g., Shin et al. 1992; Yue, Alfnes, and Jensen 2009) include a 
consumption requirement as a component of the experimental design; that is, 
participants must eat the food item they bid on to ensure that true preferences are 
revealed.  Lusk and Shogren (2007) suggest that this is an important component of value 
elicitation if a large part of the value of the good is derived from the consumption value. 
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Random lottery procedures are sometimes utilized in order to create an incentive-
compatible auction mechanism.  In such an auction, several trials of the auction are 
completed and one of the trials is randomly drawn to be binding for the subjects (e.g., 
Becker, DeGroot and Marschak 1964; Shin et al. 1992; Lund et al. 2006).  This is 
intended to control for the potential income effect as a result of a difference in the 
endowment of the subjects in subsequent trials of the auction; bias could occur when 
subjects experience changes in their endowment or in expectations of rewards from the 
beginning to the end of the experimental procedure (Grether and Plott 1979).  Holt 
(1986) criticized the use of the random lottery procedure and presented results 
supporting the conclusion that it is only appropriate to use the random lottery procedure 
when the axioms (the independence axiom, in particular) of the von-Neumann 
Morgenstern expected utility theory are not violated.  If one of these axioms is violated, 
the random lottery procedure may not ensure unbiased estimations of value.  This 
procedure has also been criticized for lack of saliency, since the expected payoff for each 
task is small (Harrison 1992; 1989).  Kagel and Roth (1992) agree that the payoff space 
may influence subjects to deviate from the dominant bidding strategy, while Merlo and 
Schotter (1992) hold that the payoff will only dominate the results of the auction 
depending on when and how much subjects learn during the auction.  Hey and Lee 
(2005) carry out a direct test of the effectiveness of the random lottery procedure and 
find no differences in expressed preferences if the questions are answered individually 
versus in a series, confirming the ―separation hypothesis‖ (that rounds of an auction are 
addressed separately instead of as a whole by subjects) of Starmer and Sugden (1991).  
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Corrigan and Rousu (2006a) also found results to be consistent across multiple rounds of 
auctions when participants were explicitly told the dominant bidding strategy. 
Placing an auction bid can be thought of as a type of lottery for the subjects.  
More specifically, subjects participating in an experimental auction face a series of 
uncertain outcomes.  They do not know who will win the auction (and win the good if 
the auction is nonhypothetical); the best estimate of the outcome would generally be 
each individual‘s own subjective probability (Lusk and Shogren 2007).  This leads to the 
question of whether Bayesian updating occurs for participants when they are provided 
with additional information.   
Subjects may submit bids that reflect what they perceive as the socially preferred 
option, rather than truthfully representing what their own buying decisions would be in 
the marketplace (Levitt and List 2007).  There has been some work to suggest that the 
use of inferred valuation to address the problem of social desirability bias may reduce 
this problem of external validity and produce more accurate predictions of market 
purchasing behavior (Fisher 1993).  This may be accomplished through the use of 
indirect questioning (Lusk and Norwood 2010); for example, asking ―How much would 
the average consumer pay for environmentally friendly goods?‖ instead of ―How much 
would you pay for environmentally friendly goods?‖  Lusk and Norwood (2009) utilize 
this strategy for both goods with a normative dimension and goods with a novel 
dimension; they find that utilization of an inferred valuation method based on indirect 
questioning may eliminate some of the gaps between laboratory and field behavior if the 
source of the gap are the social concerns of the good.  However, for a novel good with 
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minimal social concerns, Lusk and Norwood (2009) do not find significant differences 
between estimates based on direct and indirect questioning for elicitation of WTP.  
The prior information and beliefs held by consumers may also affect the results 
of experimental auctions.  Subjects who are provided with ―reference prices,‖ defined as 
the price of the good in the outside world at retail markets, were shown by Drichoutis, 
Lazaridis, and Nayga (2008) to raise estimates of WTP based on bids in Vickrey second 
price auctions.  While this finding may not hold absolutely, it does raise questions on 
whether prior information on market prices or providing such information during an 
experiment will affect value elicitation procedures.  Grunert (2005) mentions the role of 
reference prices in consumers‘ decisions on how much they are willing to pay, 
particularly in the case of novel goods.  In contrast, experimental results from Gil and 
Soler (2006) found that the decision of Spanish consumers on whether to pay a premium 
for organic olive oil was independent of whether they were provided with reference 
prices.     
In keeping with the discussion of reference prices, there are also possible effects 
of other context aspects of an experiment.  Choice heuristics and framing effects may 
influence the levels of WTP that are elicited (Bateman et al. 2008).  The ―focusing 
illusion‖ discussed in the psychology literature is also likely a contributor to possible 
problems with the external validity of WTP estimates (Schkade and Kahneman 1998).  
Lancaster‘s (1966) theory of demand proposes that the utility derived from a good is not 
derived from the good as a whole, but from the multiple attributes of the good.  
However, valuations of goods based on the division of values for different quality based 
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on this theory of demand may be susceptible to an artificial focus that is perceived by 
participants in experimental valuations procedures, causing them to inflate their 
perception of the value of the good (Bateman et al. 2008). 
 
Previous Measures of Willingness-to-Pay for Food and Horticultural Products 
Previous studies have analyzed WTP using a variety of experimental techniques.  
In one, a survey of best-worst questions was used to analyze differences in WTP for 
different types of beef (Lusk and Parker 2009).  Alternatively, real choice (RC) 
experiments can be used in which numerous price scenarios are introduced for two 
products at the time, and subjects must indicate which product they would purchase 
(Alfnes et al. 2006).  One of these scenarios is then randomly chosen to be binding to 
induce incentive compatibility in estimates of WTP.  These types of experiments closely 
match the situations consumers face in a retail store, where they must select between 
similar products with different prices. 
 Bougherara and Combris (2009) used experimental auctions to determine WTP 
for an eco-labeled product and to determine the motivations that WTP was based on.  
Subjects demonstrated an increased willingness-to-pay for both the eco-labeled and the 
control products based on the availability of more information, making the level of 
information provided an important consideration in the design of this analysis of 
willingness-to-pay.  The diversity in demographic characteristics of purchasers of 
flowering potted plants was also reflected in heterogeneity of WTP for biodegradable 
packaging of those products (Hall et al. 2010). 
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 There is evidence from conjoint analysis procedures that consumers in Kentucky 
are willing to pay more for blueberry products made from blueberries produced in 
Kentucky (Hu, Woods, and Bastin 2009).  These authors express caution in generalizing 
this result to other products and other states, but it does indicate promise for garnering a 
price premium for goods produced and marketed locally.  Darby et al. (2006) find that 
there is also a willingness by Ohio consumers to pay a premium for Ohio-grown 
strawberries, based on the results of a choice experiment and conjoint analysis.  
However, a guarantee of freshness derived a higher WTP premium than the Ohio-grown 
claim, which they suggest indicates that at least the majority of the WTP premium was 
as a result of this attribute.  Other dichotomous choice contingent valuation procedures 
have shown WTP premiums for goods produced within state in the New England region; 
further, that those premiums vary with the base price of the good (Giraud, Bond, and 
Bond 2005).  Other WTP questions found a lower willingness-to-pay for males and 
lower income respondents for locally produced foods (Adams and Adams 2008). 
 Experiments have also been conducted on whether consumers are willing to pay 
more for health benefits by analyzing WTP for dairy products with high levels of 
conjugated linoleic acid, which has been proposed as a cancer-fighting agent (Maynard 
and Franklin 2003).  Conclusions were that validation of claims from the medical 
community is necessary for statements made regarding the health benefits of food.   
 Another study by Umberger, Boxall, and Lacy (2009) utilized experimental 
auctions to determine the effects of credence and health information on consumers‘ 
WTP.  More specifically, they sought to determine the product attributes and consumer 
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characteristics that influenced the purchase decisions of United States consumers for 
Australian grass-fed beef.  They found that providing health information had a 
significant effect on consumer WTP when modeled with a two-stage Cragg model.  
Variations in WTP were analyzed for consumers who were provided with production 
and health information as well as an opportunity to taste the product offerings.   
 Several other studies also analyzed experimental auctions with the provision of 
health information and the implications of such on the development of public policy.  
Marette, Roosen, and Blanchemanche (2008) found that in both laboratory and field 
experiments, subjects showed a decrease in consumption of some types of fish when 
provided with information on possible health benefits from omega-3 fatty acids and 
possible health risks from methyl-mercury.  They suggest, based on differences in 
response to different types of fish, that lab estimates of WTP would be more useful for 
products with a large market share; they also indicate that bias may be introduced in the 
laboratory because consumer choice is artificially restricted.  In a study relating to the 
potential gains and losses from genetically modified foods, Rousu et al. (2007) analyzed 
the effects of providing consumers with positive, negative, and third-party information.  
The results of their random nth-price auction indicate that in a market with a 
controversial product and voluntary labeling requirements, providing verifiable third-
party information has the most impact and thus social value when activist groups (or 
others) are also distributing negative information in the marketplace.  They suggest that 
in the case of GM food, verifiable third-party information may have a social value of up 
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to $2.6 billion annually, and that the use of experimental techniques similar to theirs may 
allow policymakers to balance costs and benefits for information.   
 Colson, Huffman, and Rousu (2010) conducted an experimental analysis of 
consumers‘ WTP for various components of GM foods (broccoli, tomatoes, and 
potatoes).  Of particular methodological note is that the information received by 
consumers within these random nth-price auctions was randomized within each auction 
session, and that consumers were presented with both biased and factual information.  
They used estimates from the auctions to develop welfare estimates and compare these 
to the results of welfare estimates based on a single parameter for preference for GM 
products.   
Poole, Martínez, and Giménez (2007) evaluated consumer demand for citrus fruit 
using a Vickrey second price experimental auction and found that bidding behavior 
closely reflected tasting scores of mandarin oranges; they suggest that this serves to 
validate the use of auction procedures for evaluating food preferences.  Consumer 
valuations were elicited after visual appraisal, peeling the fruit, and tasting the fruit. 
These authors also contend that industry and policymakers should not focus solely on 
providing nutrition information when encouraging individuals to purchase and consume 
healthful foods and that they should also focus on promoting foods that provide the most 
consumption value from a pleasurable eating experience.  
Nalley, Hudson, and Parkhurst (2006) used an experimental auction to test the 
effects of health information and location of origin on WTP for sweet potatoes.  Results 
from that experiment indicate that both types of information studied affected the level of 
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bids.  However, the information on the location of origin not only affected the level of 
the bids, but the marginal differences in bids as well.  They further suggest that attempts 
to value separate attributes of food products may not be successful since the food is 
purchased as a whole, rather than as a sum of individual attributes.  One interesting 
question raised by these authors is if there is an ordering effect when providing subjects 
with an opportunity to taste a product and providing them with other information.  
The use of nutrition labels on processed food products was analyzed using a 
bounded dichotomous choice model by Loureiero, Gracia, and Nayga (2006).  Although 
this methodology may have more limitations than experimental auctions for value 
elicitation (as discussed previously), the qualitative findings of the study are still of 
relevance.  These authors found that consumers were willing to pay more for products 
with a nutrition label; further, they found that consumers suffering from diet-related 
health problems were more willing to pay a premium for products with a nutrition label 
than those not suffering from diet-related health problems.  
Bernard and Bernard (2009) used a variation on the Vickrey second price auction 
to analyze consumer WTP for various attributes of milk.  They found that the valuations 
for several credence attributes, including organic and no antibiotics used types, were not 
additive; this suggested a diminishing marginal utility for additional attributes.  
However, they also found differences in the demographic characteristics of consumers 
who preferred each type of milk.  They conjectured that this may allow marketers to 
segment the market and target some of these consumers with other milk products that are 
less expensive to produce.   
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Hayes et al. (1995) used an experimental auction to analyze WTP and WTA 
responses to additional food safety information for a meat sandwich. These authors 
found that marginal WTP to upgrade from a typical sandwich to a sandwich with a 
guaranteed level of safety decreased as the level of risk decreased.  They suggest that 
subjects place a high value on their prior conceptions of illness even when new 
information on the odds of illness is provided.  They also observed a tendency for some 
bids to cluster around the posted price of the previous round, a tendency called bid 
affiliation in the literature (e.g., Corrigan and Rousu 2006b).  
 Willingness-to-pay for apples elicited using a second price experimental auction 
procedure was influenced by both sensory (taste-testing) and emotional (opinion on 
information regarding length of time since harvest) aspects of freshness (Lund et al. 
2006).  Multiple-round second price auctions had previously been carried out on apples 
in relation to insecticide application, with WTP being income elastic (Roosen et al. 
1998).  Product attributes and packaging were more important than brand in WTP for 
fresh-cut melon (Mayen, Marshall, and Lusk 2007). Willingness-to-pay for food safety 
(specifically regarding Salmonella) was analyzed by Fox et al. (1995), with emphasis 
placed on the use of real food, real incentives, and multiple rounds as components of the 
auction market. 
 Consumers‘ level of health concern, ceteris paribus, did not generally affect their 
WTP a premium for organic foods, and many consumers lacked a prior knowledge of the 
National Organic Program (Batte et al. 2007).  The lack of effect from recognition of the 
organic seal raises questions on the usefulness of a national standard label for functional 
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foods, although Batte et al. (2007) concluded that the National Organic Program had 
shown a positive effect on the market for multi-ingredient organic foods.  
 Gao and Schroeder (2009) used choice experiments to evaluate the effects of the 
availability of additional information on WTP.  They found evidence that the omission 
of attribute information could influence WTP, that cue attribute information affected 
WTP more than independent attribute information when provided solely but the effect 
diminished when more attribute information was provided, and finally, that the relative 
ranking of the importance of attributes did not vary significantly when additional 
attribute information was presented regardless of changes in WTP.  Gao and Schroeder 
(2009) further suggest that marketers utilizing such information to release new products 
should emphasize the attribute that has been shown to be most important relative to its 
cost.  
 In an application of WTP valuations to analysis of changes in welfare, Lusk and 
Marette (2010) found that estimates of effects on welfare varied across the use of 
hypothetical stated preference data and nonhypothetical experimental auction data; 
however, the direction of the welfare change was consistent.  One solution to this 
problem would be to provide a range for the estimate of effects on welfare based not 
simply within a single valuation method, but across valuation methods to give a more 
robust estimate.  This is particularly important if estimates will be used to analyze the 
effect of policy changes.  
Most foods are what are known as ―experience goods.‖  That is, they are 
products for which the value of consumption cannot be fully determined prior to 
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purchase (Nelson 1970).  Consumption of new experience goods can provide value from 
consumption as well as value from information regarding potential surplus that can be 
gained in the future.  In experimental results from Vickrey auctions for new experience 
goods, optimal bids were higher than the expected consumption value and the difference 
between the two (the information value) was affected by the purchasing frequency, the 
expected future prices, and the degree of uncertainty about the consumption value 
(Alfnes 2007).  Alfnes (2007) also noted that the information value concept applies to 
other incentive compatible methods for elicitation of WTP for novel goods.  The degree 
of uncertainty about consumption value may be reduced if consumers are allowed to 
sample the new experience good prior to bidding.  
Studies of WTP for various food products are valuable for several reasons as 
discussed by Yue, Alfnes, and Jensen (2009).  These include the ability to compare WTP 
values for similar products, whereas a consumer would generally not purchase multiple 
products in the same category (i.e. different types of apples).  Further, these authors 
stated an additional benefit of auctions: the ability to compare WTP for established 
goods directly with WTP for goods that are not yet available in the marketplace.  Choice 
experiments were useful for making estimates of WTP for quality differences in a study 
on beef products (Lusk and Schroeder 2004). 
The willingness of consumers to pay for new varieties and types of fruit is of 
particular relevance to this pomegranate study.  The novelty of an unfamiliar product, 
such as mango, may influence subjects to bid relatively high price premiums as a result 
of ―preference learning,‖ defined as the desire to learn where a new good fits into an 
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individual‘s preference set (Shogren, List, and Hayes 2000).  A premium was paid for 
goods that had never been tried before, but this was reduced after trying the good.   This 
is consistent with a description of the product as having experience attributes.  Gil and 
Soler (2006) also found that the novelty of a product could bias WTP premiums upward, 
and suggest that in the case of novel goods, any reference price that is provided may also 
influence WTP premiums.  Similarly, consumers in New Zealand were willing to pay a 
premium to exchange an older variety of kiwifruit for a new, brightly-colored variety 
(Jaeger and Harker 2005).  This was an introduction of the use of experimental methods 
for application to horticultural innovation.  Moreover, if new horticultural varieties are 
very different from those on the market, experimental methods could have applications 
for new product development.   
Urala and Lähteenmäki (2007) found the best predictor of willingness-to-use 
functional foods was based on consumers‘ perceived benefits from using the functional 
foods.  In the same study, consumers were unwilling to sacrifice taste for additional 
health benefits from the food.  Participants were asked to evaluate numerous statements 
regarding these so-called ―functional foods‖ as a part of a telephone survey.  The 
researchers elected to evaluate willingness-to-use a product, rather than willingness-to-
pay, in order to establish a more reasonable comparison between established and new-to-
the-market products.  
Many functional food claims are made on the basis of compounds naturally 
occurring in food products, but many other claims are on the basis of the addition of 
bioactive ingredients to an existing product.  The use of a new coating rich in 
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antioxidants (flavonoids and stilbenes) on apples  was analyzed using a contingent 
valuation technique found a positive attitude towards functional foods in general and that 
WTP values varied with location (Markosyan, Wahl, and McCluskey 2007); these 
antioxidant compounds have the potential be used on other whole fruit products.  The 
WTP of consumers in a region of Spain for a red wine product enriched with resveratrol 
(a phenolic antioxidant in the stilbenes group) was analyzed using choice experiments; 
researchers found a 55% premium for enrichment of the wine product over the non-
enriched product (Barreiro-Hurlé, Colombo, and Cantos-Villar 2008).   However, there 
are limitations to the generalizability of such exact premium values to other products or 
other regions.  
 
Functional Foods 
There has been movement within some parts of the scientific community to 
analyze whole foods rather than summing the individual nutrients of a food to thus better 
understand the heath-nutrition interface (Jacobs and Tapsell 2007).  This has been 
coupled with the explosion of interest in so-called ―functional foods,‖ which include 
whole or enhanced foods that provide health benefits beyond the provision of essential 
nutrients (i.e. calories, fiber, vitamins, etc.) when consumed on a regular basis (Hasler 
2002).  Demand for functional foods appears to be driven, at least in part, by 1) a rising 
average age, 2) increasing healthcare costs, 3) greater availability of information 
allowing for greater individual control of health status, 4) progressing scientific evidence 
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that diet can alter disease prevalence, and 5) changes in food regulation (ADA 2004).  
Similar drivers of demand are also suggested by Siro et al. (2008).    
The range of functional food products is large, with over 1,700 functional food 
products having been introduced in Japan alone within the span from 1988 to 1998 
(Menrad 2003).  The products cited as having potential to be marketed as functional 
foods include everything from fruits and vegetables (Kaur and Kapoor 2001) to olive oil 
(Stark and Madar 2002) to enriched custard pudding dessert (Sun et al. 2007).  
The creation of marketing strategies for functional foods is complicated by the 
additional credence attributes associated with the majority of food products in the 
developed world beyond the experience attributes common in the less-developed world 
(Barrena and Sánchez 2010).  Credence attributes cannot be checked directly by the 
consumer (Darby and Karni 1973), and therefore decision-making depends on 
information the consumer possesses and that are provided in the market (Azzurra and 
Paola 2009). 
 The three largest markets for functional foods are the United States, Japan, and 
Europe (Bech-Larsen and Scholderer 2007). These markets have varying degrees of 
regulation for the use of the ―functional food‖ terminology.  In the United States there is 
no regulatory definition for the term functional food, so product labelers must only abide 
by existing regulations regarding health claims on food (Hasler 2002).  In September 
2003, the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) began accepting 
―qualified health claims‖ based on scientific evidence; this rule was proposed with the 
purpose of providing additional health information with a scientific basis to consumers 
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(FDA 2006).  However, not all groups in the United States are in support of such a 
labeling scheme (e.g., ADA 2004; Lupton 2009).  At least 15 such claims have been 
approved by the FDA to date, covering a range of health-related issues from cancer to 
cardiovascular disease to cognitive function (FDA 2009).  Still, some suggest that the 
use of health claims in this way is in fact confusing to consumers rather than a useful 
means of providing them with health information (Hasler 2008).  
In Europe, however, there are much more strict qualifications for the term as laid 
out by the European Council (EC), and sufficient scientific evidence of a product‘s 
health benefits must be provided to the European Food Safety Agency prior to making a 
claim of a beneficial effect (EC 2006).  Further, these regulations enforce a uniform set 
of standards for functional foods across all the European Union member nations, 
possibly helping to improve the acceptability and credibility of health claims to 
consumers there (Asp and Bryngelsson 2008).  Japan has a series of regulations to 
categorize food with health claims as either foods for specified health use (FOSHU) or 
foods with nutrient function claims (FNFC) based on a relatively long (since the 1980‘s) 
history of functional food use (Ohama, Ikeda, and Moriyama 2006).  Several other 
nations have either passed or are discussing the implementation of health claims 
regulations to address some of the issues associated with making health claims about 
functional foods (e.g., Tapsell 2008; Yang 2008).  
 
Scientific Basis for Functional Foods 
The chemical compounds in plants that have been shown to have positive health 
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implications but are not included in the traditional essential nutrients are broadly known 
as ―phytochemicals.‖  These compounds have been shown to appear in a range of foods, 
from garlic to tomatoes to citrus, and to have a range of health-improving properties 
including the ability to reduce the risk of certain cancers (Rafter 2002).  Polyphenols, a 
class of phytochemicals characterized as having multiple hydroxyl groups on phenolic 
rings, have been frequently referred to as having antioxidant properties based on results 
in vitro; however, their action is much more complicated in vivo (Williamson and Holst 
2008).  These compounds have not been shown to be necessary for growth and 
development, but have been shown to have positive effects for disease reduction, 
causing them to be termed ―lifespan essential‖ by Holst and Williamson (2008).  The 
antioxidant effects of phenolic compounds function most frequently by free radical 
scavenging and metal chelation activities (Shahidi 2009).  
The activity of polyphenols is believed to be in conjunction with other 
phytochemicals present in foods (Shahidi 2009).  Further, the other compounds that are 
bioingested at the same time as flavonoids, one of the most common classes of 
polyphenols, and the complexity of the food matrix may affect bioavailability 
(Williamson 2009).  Bioavailability and bioefficacy vary widely across types of 
polyphenols as well, as measured by changes in plasma concentration (Manach et al. 
2005).  Still, polyphenols have been linked to anticarginogenic activity (Duthie 2007) 
and prevention of cardiovascular disease (Wilcox, Curb, and Rodriguez 2008); however, 
both these papers indicate a need for further evidence before claims can be made 
regarding the certainty of these effects in human populations. 
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In terms of safety, it is believed that non-nutrient antioxidants are not a cause of 
health problems as they appear in the average daily diet; however, comprehensive 
studies of concentrations and effects are needed, as well as more evidence that 
polyphenols are absorbed by human subjects and distributed to the tissue in order to 
have an antioxidant effect (Diplock et al. 1998).  There is also some evidence that 
whole-food sources, including the skin and hulls (i.e. total phenolic content in wheat and 
barley- Shahidi 2009) have a greater level of bioactive compounds, but this is not always 
the case as some processed foods have higher concentrations of phytochemicals (i.e. 
lycopene in tomatoes- Rao and Ali 2007). 
 Another important note is the lack of in vivo research on the efficacy of 
phytochemicals.  A great deal of additional research is needed before sound scientific 
claims can be made regarding recommended dietary levels of these compounds, and 
polyphenols in particular, in order to prevent harmful effects (Williamson and Holst 
2008).  Westrate, van Poppel, and Verschuren (2002) list eight areas of research within 
both science and economics that have potential to yield valuable information regarding 
potential functional food products; the scientific questions include determination of 
which molecules could have potential health benefits, if those compounds are digested 
and absorbed, and if the product is effective on a human level with effects that can be 
measured quantitatively.  Although considerable research has been done in the 
functional foods area since that time, these are still relevant questions to be answered.  
The American Dietetic Association suggests that well-developed clinical trials are 
needed to further establish the benefits and clinical efficacy of functional foods (ADA 
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2004). 
 
Functional Food Market 
Functional foods, as defined previously, are a market segment that has received 
increased interest from both consumers desiring to protect their health and by those 
involved in the food industry as a potential growth sector (Rafter 2002). For an extensive 
review of the current state of the functional food market segment, please see Siró et al. 
(2008).  The global market for functional food generated $33 billion  in 2000 and $73.5 
billion in 2005 with an anticipated growth rate of 10% per annum; in the United States 
alone the market size was $27 billion in 2007 (Granato et al. 2010).  
Both food manufacturers and pharmaceuticals companies have become interested 
in the functional foods market.  Pharmaceutical companies are attracted to this market 
due to much shorter development times than pharmaceutical products.  Development 
costs are also much lower for functional food products (Siró et al. 2008).  However, 
pharmaceutical companies have been met with limited success in this market (Bech-
Larsen and Scholderer 2007), possibly due to inadequate ability to develop and market a 
consumer-accepted food product.  Also, this market segment varies by location, with 
more stringent labeling requirements in place in Europe (EC 2006) than in the United 
States (Siró et al. 2008).  One of the largest segments of the functional food market is for 
probiotics, or living bacteria that generally promote digestion and digestive health, and 
there have been some products marketed using fruits and fruit juices (Granato et al. 
2010).  This represents a potential market for pomegranates as a functional food with 
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multiple functional attributes.  
Based on a means-end approach to analysis of consumer cognitive structure for 
functional foods, Barrena and Sánchez (2010) concluded that in the case of a Bifidus 
spp. dairy product, households with children would be most affected by marketing 
emphasizing the overall health benefits and quality of the product, but households 
without children would be more concerned with ease of consumption and time savings.  
In the case of an enhanced tomato juice product, the level of demand for the functional 
food was actually reduced when the product in question had multiple functional 
attributes as opposed to a single functional attribute (Teratanavat and Hooker 2006).  A 
consumer survey in Canada found that approximately one-fourth of respondents 
expressed a decreased value for a tomato product with functional properties, although 
the mean change was a 67% increase in value for a functional conventional tomato 
product (West et al. 2002). 
 Survey data indicates that as the market size and awareness for functional foods 
has grown, the unconditional acceptance of such foods has decreased; consumers now 
place a greater emphasis on the taste of food and surprisingly, are more reluctant to 
believe that functional foods can be included as a part of a tasteful and healthy diet 
(Verbeke 2006).  However, over the same survey interval  from 2001-2004, Verbeke 
found not only an increase in perceived importance of functional foods but also a 
decrease in the assumed tradeoff between healthfulness of food and taste (2005; 2006).  
Foods with a strong health benefit claim may be an exception to the lack of willingness 
to compromise on taste (Urala and Lähteenmäki 2007).  Careful consideration should be 
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given to the taste of a functional food relative to close substitutes if experimental results 
are extrapolated to the marketplace and used to develop marketing strategies. 
 The underlying nutrient properties of the food are a determinant of consumer 
attitude towards the functional food product (Bech-Larsen and Grunert 2003).  
Consumers are more willing to accept functional foods that are plant-based rather than 
animal-based (Larue et al. 2004; West et al. 2002) but these general assumptions have 
been contradicted by some specific products (i.e. lamb versus strawberries-Traill et al. 
2008).  Functional foods seem to be evaluated by consumers as foods first and as 
functional foods second (Bech-Larsen and Scholderer 2007).  Some results indicate that 
consumers who trust innovations made in agriculture and also have a concern for the 
relationship between health and food are more likely to use a functional food product 
(specifically, antioxidant-enriched wine) (Barreiro-Hurlé, Colombo, and Cantos-Villar 
2008). Other studies of willingness to try functional foods have found innovativeness of 
the consumer to have some predictive ability of reported willingness to use new foods 
(Huotilainen, Pirttilä-Backman, and Tuorila 2006).  O‘Connor and White (2010) found 
risk dread to be a significant negative predictor of consumers who were non-users‘ 
willingness to try functional foods.  
 Siró et al. (2008) suggest that information on the health effects of specific 
products should be transmitted in a simple way through credible media in order to 
increase the knowledge base of consumers, who cannot independently check the 
credence attributes of functional foods.  West et al. (2002) further suggest that 
information on the health attributes of products should come from government officials 
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or health experts, citing a lack of trust for claims made by food manufacturers.   
Introduction of genetically modified (GM) functional foods appears to be less 
than promising, with household consumers generally avoiding purchasing GM products 
(West et al. 2002).  However, other studies found that consumers‘ attitudes on GM 
products may be affected by the type of information provided (e.g. Lusk et al. 2004; 
Hallman et al. 2003) and that consumers were not specifically concerned with how the 
functional attributes in the food had been added (Larue et al. 2004). 
 
Considerations for Developing Auction Procedures 
Lifestyle and food culture factors have been shown to impact the fruit and 
vegetable consumption of college students (Schroeter, House, and Lorence 2007), and 
therefore these are important consideration for an experimental auction used to 
determine whether an increase in WTP would be seen for additional health benefits in 
food.  A number of other factors may also influence the decisions that consumers make 
regarding food purchases.  Hallman et al. (2003) found consumers‘ attitudes towards 
biotech foods to be influenced by their inclination to avoid risk, which was in addition to 
their immediate economic interests.  Based on survey data for consumers in China, 
purchasing decisions for biotech foods are influenced by age (both young and old vs. 
middle), income, and residence in a large city (Chen, Zhong, and Zhou  2009).  
Although the health benefits of food are not equivalent to the issues of biotech food and 
labeling, many of the positive health benefits of functional foods may be the opposite 
end of a continuum from some consumers‘ concerns with biotech food, resulting in the 
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need to account for these factors in an experimental auction.  Further, providing 
information on the benefits of a product can influence the willingness-to-accept (WTA) 
value of consumers, depending on the location, type of information provided, and the 
previously-held beliefs of the subjects (Lusk et al. 2004).  On the other hand, the 
provision of positive and/or negative information can affect WTP, with negative 
information generally dominating positive information regardless of the source (Fox, 
Hayes, and Shogren 2002).  
 The randomization of treatments is a necessary component of experiments where 
multiple goods are auctioned in sequence in order to prevent bias in estimates of WTP 
(Huffman et al. 2003).  Randomization can also have other positive effects to prevent 
bias (Shogren, List, and Hayes 2000).  
 There is also the consideration of the ability of subjects to learn how the auction 
mechanism works.  Auctions that are too complex in their design may be difficult to 
implement and result in valuations that take longer to converge to equilibrium (Lusk and 
Shogren 2007).  Milkman et al. (2008) examined a mechanism they refer to as a 
―clamped second price auction mechanism‖ and compare it to a standard second price 
auction.  While they find that certain types of learners performed better with the 
alternative mechanism, they found values to converge to equilibrium faster in the 
standard mechanism.  Therefore, mechanisms that seem theoretically to be more likely 
to converge quickly do not always follow such a pattern, and experimenters have 
numerous factors to account for in their auction design, not the least of which is clearly 
communicating how the auction works.   
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 Differences in WTP were found for information on the genetically modified 
status and allowing tasting in the kiwifruit study mentioned previously, and there was 
some tendency for differences based on an individual‘s desire to try new foods (Jaeger 
and Harker 2005).  In addition, the characteristics of the product being auctioned are not 
the only factors that should be considered.  Depending on what the goals of the 
experiment are, the number of winning bids preferred by the experimenters, a desire to 
maintain the interest of subjects, a minimum sample size needed, and the number and 
types of treatments applied can all shape the auction mechanism and bidding approach 
that are selected (Hoffman et al. 1993).  For example, experimental auctions may be 
selected over posted-price markets if obtaining values for price data is the goal of the 
experiment (Menkhaus et al. 1992).  
 Difficulty arises in generalizing the data obtained for one particular product to 
other types of functional foods.  As demonstrated by de Jong et al. (2003), the 
determinants of consumption of functional foods depend on each individual product, in 
addition to gender, age, education, and vegetable intake.  Barrena and Sánchez (2010) 
also warn of the limited generalization potential of results for one particular functional 
food to the whole category, especially when the results are based on a limited geographic 
area or small sample size.  One theory suggested by Teratanavat and Hooker (2006) to 
explain this limited ability to generalize consumer preferences and WTP for functional 
foods is that as scientific evidence in favor of the health benefit of certain foods develops 
and the offering of products in the marketplace grows, more consumers are attracted to 
these products as a means of enhancement of health; those consumers vary in knowledge 
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level, product familiarity, motivation, and health conditions.  They find that even for a 
single functional food product there can be significant heterogeneity among subjects in 
WTP.  However, oversimplification of characteristics of functional foods and consumers 
of such is treacherous territory and may lead to inaccurate conclusions. 
 
Econometric Modeling of Preference Elicitation Procedures 
 A number of econometric models have been utilized in analysis of experimental 
auction results.  These include linear models, tobit models, and the Cragg double-hurdle 
model (1971) to name a few.  Such models may be used to estimate demographic and 
behavioral characteristics that influence willingness-to-pay, as well as product 
characteristics that can be predictors of WTP.  Depending on the nature of the data, 
practitioners may need to account for bid censoring when selecting an econometric 
model (Lusk and Shogren 2007).  Aggregating bids for multiple products or made by the 
same bidder on multiple occasions may result in a need for further modifications of the 
model (Greene 2003).  The selection of a particular econometric modeling procedure for 
the auction results may be directed by the actual data obtained from the study.   
In models for discrete choice data, multinomial logit or probit models would fail 
to account for the ordered nature of the data (Greene 2003).  Greene (2003) further 
suggests the use of an ordered logit or probit model to account for the ordered nature of 
the data, which in this case would be applicable to any rankings.  However, Greene 
(2003) reminds the users of such a model that the coefficients in ordered models should 
be interpreted with caution.   
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 Beggs, Cardell, and Hausman (1981) first introduced the rank-ordered logit 
model for use in analyzing ranking data in an assessment of the potential demand for 
electric cars; the derivation of the model is on the basis of the random-utility model.  
Chapman and Staelin (1982) further develop the ―explosion‖ of ranking data by 
decomposing rankings into a series of unranked and statistically independent choice 
decisions for a multinomial logit (MNL).  Such a procedure provides additional 
information when compared to a single choice decision.  Hausman and Ruud (1987) 
developed two alternative estimators for the rank-ordered logit model.  First, the rank-
ordered logit can be generalized to allow for heteroskedasticity at different levels of the 
rankings; more specifically, it allows for more preciseness in the top-ranked choices than 
in the bottom-ranked choices.  Second, Hausman and Ruud (1987) also introduce a 
consistent estimator that alleviates problems of misspecification of the distribution for 
the rank-ordered logit.  Train (2003) describes the use of a model to relax the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption that is required by multinomial 
models; this is accomplished by using a mixed logit model, also commonly called the 
random parameters logit (RPL) model.  For further clarification of the necessity of 
relaxing this assumption, it is necessary to further investigate the implications of IIA.  
The independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption, as stated by McFadden (1974; 
109) says, ―The relative odds of one alternative being chosen over a second should be 
independent of the presence or absence of unchosen third alternatives.‖  Train (2003) 
describes further details of the IIA assumptions and gives examples of situations where 
the assumption would and would not hold.  
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 Srinivasan, Bhat, and Holguin-Veras (2006) describe the use of a panel rank-
ordered mixed logit model that is approximated using a quasi-Monte Carlo procedure; 
parameter estimation was conducted using a maximum simulated log-likelihood (MSL) 
estimation procedure.   
 A more specialized version of the rank-ordered logit is the latent class rank-
ordered logit (LCROL).  This is a specific version of the rank-ordered logit introduced 
by Van Dijk, Fok, and Paap (2007) intended to use all observed rankings while also 
taking into account a lack of complete reflection of true preferences in the rankings.  The 
use of the latent class type of model allows a researcher to control for heterogeneity of 
ranking-abilities; such a procedure increases the efficiency of the model.  In discussion 
of the LCROL, it is pointed out that relaxation of the IIA assumption would require the 
use of rank-ordered probit or mixed logit models (Van Dijk, Fok, and Paap 2007).  
 Other versions of logit models have frequently been used to compensate for 
certain characteristics and assumptions of the multinomial logit model. The first of these 
is the random parameters logit (RPL) model, also called the ―mixed‖ logit model. The 
RPL model allows for variation in preferences for product attributes within a sample 
population (preference heterogeneity).  Also, the RPL model relaxes the IIA assumption 
mentioned previously (Abidoye et al. 2011).   
 In designing an experimental auction methodology for valuation of WTP, Davis 
and Holt (1993) recommend consideration of possible outcomes that would either 
confirm or dispute the hypotheses of interest.  They recommend that the decision of 
which structural test to use should be structured based on 3 factors: the data type (binary, 
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discrete, or continuous), the structure of the hypothesis (regarding a single parameter, 
multiple parameters, or the entire distribution), and whether the sample contains matched 
or independent observations.  Davis and Holt further suggest that although both 
parametric and nonparametric tests may be used, it may be useful to focus on 
nonparametric tests which are less restrictive in their underlying assumptions on the 
nature of the distributions tested.  Experimental data may frequently have distributions 
other than normal (Gaussian), and nonparametric methods may be more useful for 
analysis, and finally, nonparametric methods can be particularly useful in estimation for 
categorical data.  Specific tests that are suggested depend on the nature of the data and of 
the sample design, but include binomial tests, χ2 tests, Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, and 
Wilcoxon tests.   
 There is an extensive literature relevant to value elicitation for novel functional 
food products.  Much research has been conducted previously, but there are many 
questions left to be answered regarding experimental design and interpretation of results. 
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CHAPTER III 
POMEGRANATES AND THE POMEGRANATE INDUSTRY 
 
The Pomegranate 
Pomegranate (Punica granatum L.) is a fruit-bearing large shrub to small tree 
that has been prized for many years for its sweet fruit; the common name ‗pomegranate‘ 
in English derives from ―Pomum granatum‖ (the plant‘s name in the Middle Ages) and 
literally means ―seeded apple‖ (Hodgson 1917).   In general, areas with hot, dry 
summers and cool winters will produce the largest yields (Dubois and Williamson 2008).  
Some fruiting may begin in rare cases as early as the first year, but full production 
generally starts between three and five years (Glozer and Ferguson 2008).  The life of an 
orchard is estimated to be 25 years (Day et al. 2005). 
The native range of the pomegranate is from Iran to northern India, and it was 
cultivated throughout the Mediterranean region in very early times (Morton 1987); some 
estimates are that Iran is the native range and that the pomegranate was spread later 
(Islamic Republic of Iran 2009).  Its history dates back to references in ancient Greek 
and Roman literature, the Old Testament (Hodgson 1917), and the Qur‘an (Mohseni 
2009).  The current distribution of the pomegranate is worldwide, but mainly in the 
tropics and sub-tropics; arid to semi-arid conditions are the preferred production 
environment (Stover and Mercure 2007).  Some varieties of pomegranate can withstand 
temperatures down to 12°F, but lower temperatures cause severe damage to the plant 
(Morton 1987).   
  
91 
Pomegranate has historically been categorized in the family Punicaceae, but 
more recent genetic analysis provides evidence that it should be classified in the family 
Lythraceae (e.g., Huang and Shi 2002; Currò et al. 2010).  The plant is typically 
deciduous in subtropical to temperate climates, but may be evergreen in tropical climates 
(Glozer and Ferguson 2008).  The plants may have more or less thorns and grow to a 
mature height of 12-20 feet (Stover and Mercure 2007), although mature heights of up to 
30 feet occur in rare instances (Morton 1987).  Leaves are oblong-lanceolate, and stems 
are short (Hodgson 1917).  The plants sucker abundantly from the base and roots and 
grow in a shrub form unless trained (Morton 1987).   
Pomegranate fruits may be yellow to deep red in color and are generally less than 
five inches in diameter (Glozer and Ferguson 2008).  Each fruit is generally round and 
has a prominent calyx or ―crown‖ that is maintained through maturity, giving the 
pomegranate fruit its distinctive shape.  Botanically, the pomegranate fruit is 
characterized as a berry (Kader 2006).  The pomegranate fruit consists of a tough outer 
husk surrounding a cavity filled with angular sacs called arils that develop from the seed 
coat.  The edible parts of the fruit are the arils; they are the juicy, pulpy surroundings of 
each seed.  Arils may range in color from crimson to deep red in the ‗Wonderful‘ 
cultivar commonly grown in California to whitish pink in the ‗Mollar‘ cultivar grown in 
Spain (Kader 2006).  The peel of the fruit is smooth and leathery, and just inside the 
outer peel is the spongy layer where the arils attach; the rind of the fruit is typically 
called the husk (Morton 1987).  The peel and the spongy membrane are collectively 
known as the pericarp (Lansky and Newman 2007).  The arils are bright red in color in 
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the most widely planted cultivars, but can range from dark red to nearly colorless (Stover 
and Mercure 2007).  Arils can be eaten fresh, pressed into juice, made into syrup, or 
preserved in a number of other ways.  The membranous divisions (septal membranes) of 
the fruit that divide the cavity into sections are bitter and not recommended for fresh 
consumption (Stover and Mercure 2007).  
The pharmaceutical properties of the tree have also been of value, with historical 
references to the medicinal properties of the pomegranate (Lansky and Newman 2007 
and sources therein).  Additionally, secondary products of the pomegranate tree, 
including but not limited to the bark and peel, are sources of tannins and dyes 
(Mirdeghan and Rahemi 2007).  
 Based on data in the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) National 
Nutrient Database for Standard Reference, one 4 inch diameter pomegranate (weight of 
282 g, California Wonderful variety) has 234 Calories, 4.7 g of protein, and 3.3.g fat 
(USDA 2009a).  It also contains 28.8 mg of Vitamin C, or 48% of the recommended 
daily value (FDA 2008).  The nutrition information of pomegranate fruit (Wonderful 
variety) is detailed in Table 2.  
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Table 2. Pomegranate Nutrition Information 
 
         Source: United States Department of Agriculture, 2009a. 
Nutrient Units
Value per 
100 
grams
1 Pomegranate 
Fruit, 4 inch 
diameter
One-half 
cup arils
Weight 100 g 282 g 87 g
Water g 77.93 219.76 67.8
Energy kcal 83 234 72
Protein g 1.67 4.71 1.45
Total lipid (fat) g 1.17 3.3 1.02
Carbohydrate g 18.7 52.73 16.27
Fiber, Total dietary g 4 11.3 3.5
Sugars, total g 13.67 38.55 11.89
Calcium, Ca mg 10 28 9
Iron, Fe mg 0.3 0.85 0.26
Magnesium, Mg mg 12 34 10
Phosphorous, P mg 36 102 31
Potassium, K mg 236 666 205
Sodium, Na mg 3 8 3
Zinc, Zn mg 0.35 0.99 0.3
Copper, Cu mg 0.158 0.446 0.137
Manganese, Mn mg 0.119 0.336 0.104
Selenium, Se mcg 0.5 1.4 0.4
Vitamin C, total ascorbic acid mg 10.2 28.8 8.9
Thiamin mg 0.067 0.189 0.058
Riboflavin mg 0.053 0.149 0.046
Niacin mg 0.293 0.826 0.255
Pantothenic acid mg 0.377 1.063 0.328
Vitamin B-6 mg 0.075 0.211 0.065
Folate, total mcg 38 107 33
Folic acid mcg 0 0 0
Folate, food mcg 38 107 33
Folate, DFE mcg_DFE 38 107 33
Choline, total mg 7.6 21.4 6.6
Vitamin B-12 mcg 0 0 0
Vitamin D IU 0 0 0
Vitamin D (D2 + D3) mcg 0 0 0
Vitamin A IU 0 0 0
Vitamin A, RAE mcg_RAE 0 0 0
Vitamin E mg 0.6 1.69 0.52
Vitamin K mcg 16.4 46.2 14.3
Lipids, Total Saturated Fatty Acids g 0.12 0.338 0.104
Lipids, Total Trans Fatty Acids g 0.009 0.025 0.008
Cholesterol mg 0 0 0
Note: The nutritional information above is for whole pomegranate fruit with 44% 
refuse (husk and membrane) for a California Wonderful variety pomegrante fruit.
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Chemical Composition 
 In addition to carbohydrates, fats, and proteins, pomegranate also contains many 
phytochemicals; these include several classes of phenols and organic acids that may 
have flavor and health implications (Mirdeghan and Rahemi 2007).  Polyphenols present 
include flavonoids (e.g., flavonols, flavanals, and anthocyanins), hydrolyzable tannins 
(e.g., ellagitannins and gallotannins), and condensed (nonhydrolyzable) tannins (e.g., 
proanthocyanidins) (Seeram et al. 2006a).  Specific compounds present in pomegranate 
fruit include gallic acid, catechin, chlorogenic acid, protecatechuic acid, caffeic acid, 
ferulic acid, o-coumaric acid, p-coumaric acid, phloridzin, and quercetin (Poyrazoğlu, 
Gökmen, and Artɩk 2002). 
 There is significant variability in the chemical composition of pomegranates by 
cultivar (Poyrazoğlu, Gökmen, and Artɩk 2002), as well as by growing site (e.g.; 
Melgarejo, Salazar, and Artés 2000; Al-Maiman and Ahmad 2002; Poyrazoğlu, 
Gökmen, and Artɩk 2002).  Composition of the fruit may also be affected by maturity 
and cultural practices, resulting in potential changes in the phenolic and mineral contents 
(Mirdeghan and Rahemi 2007).  
 The chemical components of pomegranates that have been of the most interest 
are the antioxidants contained both in the fruit and the rest of the plant.  These properties 
and the implications of such are discussed in more detail later. 
 
Pomegranates and Antioxidants 
Several major human health problems have been shown to be related to free 
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radicals and reactive oxygen species, as discussed by Kehrer (1993).  He continued by 
describing some of the important terminology pertinent to such a discussion: Any 
molecule that contains unpaired electrons is considered a radical, and radicals are a 
normal byproduct of several metabolic pathways.  However, when these radicals exist in 
a free form they can interact with tissue and cause dysfunction. The interaction with 
tissue that alters the prooxidant-antioxidant balance towards prooxidants and potentially 
leads to damage is termed ―oxidative stress.‖  ―Reactive oxygen species‖ include 
chemicals with oxygen-containing functional groups that are not necessarily radicals nor 
necessarily react with tissue through radical reactions; these reactive oxygen species are 
not always good oxidizing agents so that terminology would be incorrect in some cases. 
The list of diseases that have been implicated as having a free radical mechanism of 
action is extensive and includes diseases of the lungs, brain, heart and cardiovascular 
system, kidney, liver, gastrointestinal tract, blood, eye, skin, and muscle, in addition to 
general inflammation and aging.  Despite these links, it has been difficult to establish 
some free radical interactions with tissue as a cause (versus a consequence) of disease.  
Nonetheless, many studies have indicated a link between the two, suggesting further 
interest in the connection between free radicals, reactive oxygen species, antioxidants, 
and disease.  
Antioxidants are generally described as molecules that inhibit oxidation 
reactions.  In more specific terms, antioxidants must meet two conditions described by 
Rosenblat and Aviram (2006).  One, they have the ability to neutralize (by delaying, 
retarding, or preventing) autooxidation or free-radical-mediated oxidation when they are 
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present at a low concentration relative to that of the substrate to be oxidized.  Two, the 
resulting molecule that is formed must be stable in order to disrupt the oxidation chain 
reaction.  Vitamin C and Vitamin E are two commonly known antioxidants in fruits and 
vegetables that play an important role in human health; however, the main antioxidant 
effects of fruits and vegetables may be from other chemicals (including polyphenols) 
also found in the fruits and vegetables (Wang, Cao, and Prior 1996).  Cao et al. (1998) 
rejected a hypothesis that increased plasma antioxidant capacity as a result of 
consumption of a diet rich in fruits and vegetables could be explained by increases in α-
tocopherol (form of Vitamin E) and carotenoid (related to Vitamin A) in the plasma.  
Tsao and Deng (2004) suggest that this and other evidence have led to the focus on 
research on the roles of antioxidant phytochemicals.  However, these authors also 
indicate the difficulty in separating and detecting the large number (thousands) of such 
compounds in order to elucidate specific effects.  
Pomegranates have a high level of antioxidants (e. g., Kelawala and 
Ananthanarayan 2004; Lansky and Newman 2007).  Important polyphenols that have 
been noted in pomegranate include two main types: hydrolyzable tannins and flavonoids 
(McCutcheon, Udani, and Brown 2008).  Hydrolyzable tannins present include 
ellagitannins, gallotannins, and gallagoyl esters (Gil et al. 2000).  Flavonoids found in 
pomegranate include members of the classes of flavan-3-ols, anthocyanidins, flavanol 
glycosides, flavonols, and anthocyanins (Lansky and Newman 2007), with the first three 
of these being the most common (McCutcheon, Udani, and Brown 2008).  Anthocyanins 
are the most important group of water-soluble plant pigments and give red, blue, and 
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purple colors to flowers and fruits (Rosenblat and Aviram 2006).  Specific flavonoids 
present include catechin, quercetin, and phloridzin (Poyrazoğlu, Gökmen, and Artɩk 
2002).  Hydrolyzable tannins (HT) are found predominantly in the husk of the fruit.  In 
pomegranate juice made from pressing the whole pomegranate fruit, hydrolyzable 
tannins account for 92 percent of pomegranate juice‘s antioxidant activity, with the HT 
punicalagin accounting for about half the antioxidant capacity of pomegranate juice 
made from the whole fruit (Seeram et al. 2006a).     
The total polyphenol concentration of pomegranate juice is higher than that of 
several other fruit juices, including apple, cranberry, grape, grapefruit, orange, peach, 
pear, and pineapple juices (Rosenblat and Aviram 2006).  Figure 1 diagrams the 
relationship between the different categories of phytochemicals.   
The suggested health benefits of these antioxidants range from reductions of 
atherosclerosis indicators and blood pressure in humans (Aviram et al. 2004) to 
improvements in prostate cancer indicators (specifically, prostate specific antigen 
doubling time) in prostate cancer patients (Pantuck et al. 2006), in addition to the many 
health effects on diabetes, cancer, and other diseases as shown in animal studies (e.g., 
Huang et al. 2005; Shiner, Fuhrman, and Aviram 2007).  Inflammation and cancer are 
the most common discussions of application of pomegranate to treat disease (Lansky and 
Newman 2007).  This is in addition to the recent explosion in literature on the in vitro 
benefits of pomegranate-based substances as prevention or treatment techniques for 
everything from breast cancer (Syed, Afaq, and Mukhtar 2007) to influenza (Haidari et  
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Figure 1. Relationship among Types of Phytochemicals 
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al. 2009).  Hartman et al. (2006) suggest that the large number of compounds in 
pomegranate fruit and possible synergism of these compounds may yield a preference 
for dietary supplementation of the whole fruit or juice rather than with isolated 
components of pomegranate.  Seeram et al. (2006a) further discuss that most in vivo 
research has focused on whole fruit or whole fruit products; therefore there is less 
evidence for the effects of each specific pomegranate phytochemical on health. 
Pomegranate juice has been effective at decreasing amyloid load and improving 
behavior in mouse models of Alzheimer‘s Disease (a common cause of dementia in 
humans, particularly in older populations) (Hartman et al. 2006).  The consumption of 
polyphenols may increase cellular signaling and neuronal communication, thus 
producing anti-inflammatory activity (Joseph, Shukitt-Hale, and Casadesus 2005).   
Although much work remains to be done on the biological mechanisms of 
phytochemical activity in vivo, certain actions have been more commonly seen.  These 
include increased apoptosis, decreased metastasis and invasion, and decreased 
inflammation (Lansky and Newman 2007).  
The presence of polyphenols in pomegranates that have in vivo antioxidant 
activity does not guarantee that consumption of pomegranate products will ensure these 
effects in human subjects.  These compounds must be absorbed in the digestive tract and 
moved to other parts of the body for these effects to be realized.  Results on the 
bioavailability of ellagitannin were mixed in the detection of the free ellagic acid in 
human plasma four hours after consumption (Seeram, Lee, and Heber 2004; Cerdá et al. 
2004).  Other studies found ellagitannin metabolites in human urine following 
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consumption of pomegranate juice (Seeram et al. 2006b).  Specific work on the 
bioavailability of anthocyanins and procyanidins from pomegranate products either has 
not been carried out or does not offer enough evidence to draw conclusions on the 
metabolic rate for these compounds; however, there have been studies of the 
bioavailability of these compounds from other sources (Tomás-Barberán, Seeram, and 
Espín 2006).  
Although pomegranates are widely consumed and have been for thousands of 
years, the focus on them as beneficial to human health may cause pomegranate and 
pomegranate byproduct consumption to rise above historic levels.  This leads to the 
question of toxicity to humans of pomegranate.  There have been some cases of allergic 
reactions from eating the fruit (Hegde and Venkatesh 2004), as well as other adverse 
effects, such as severe gastric inflammation and congestion of internal organs (Lansky 
and Newman 2007 and sources therein).  However, the reports of such adverse effects 
are rare. 
Most studies regarding the effects of polyphenols are in vitro or in animal 
models, and a significant amount of research remains to be done in human subjects 
before the benefits of polyphenols can be predicted with certainty (Hartman et al. 2006).  
The precise role of antioxidants in mediating or preventing disease is still unclear, and 
further biological research is needed to verify the effects of polyphenols and antioxidants 
in pomegranates (Lansky and Newman 2007).  Such research will be necessary to 
guarantee an increase in consumer WTP.  Case in point, the juice company POM 
Wonderful, LLC. has launched a $34 million campaign of medical research to support its 
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pomegranate juice product, POM Wonderful® (POM 2010) and subjected such studies 
to peer review (McCutcheon, Udani, and Brown 2008).  
 
Pomegranate Production 
Pomegranate production in the world is led by Iran with 63,733 hectares (ha) in 
production in year 2005, followed by India, the United States, Turkey, and Spain 
(Islamic Republic of Iran 2009).  Other estimates place China between India and the 
U.S. in area in production (Holland and Bar-Ya‘akov 2008).  Iran had an export value of 
$17.8 million in 2005 for approximately 27,000 metric tons of exports of pomegranates 
(Islamic Republic of Iran 2009).  Again, these estimates vary across sources.  Holland 
and Bar-Ya‘akov (2008) estimated a global production of pomegranates of 1.5 million 
metric tons (1.5 billion kg); estimates for production and exports for Iran were 600,000 
metric tons (600 million kg) and 60,000 metric tons (60 million kg), respectively.  
The primary growing region for pomegranates in the United States is California; 
production in other states is currently very limited.  Pomegranates were introduced into 
California by Spanish settlers in 1769 (Morton 1987), but they had previously been 
grown in the United States in Florida and Georgia (Stover and Mercure 2007).  In 
reference to current production trends, estimates of the number of pomegranate trees in 
California rose from 12,000 acres (4,856 ha) in year 2006 to 29,000 acres (11,735 ha) in 
year 2009 (―Pomegranate Acreage‖ 2009).   
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Pre-Planting 
There are a number of factors that should be considered prior to planting a 
pomegranate orchard, including cultivars to be grown, propagation, soil type, climate, 
soil preparation, pre-plant fertilization, irrigation system, weed control, and plant 
spacing.  This is not an exhaustive list, but lists the primary factors that most 
pomegranate growers would need to consider.  
 
Cultivars 
The main commercial cultivar in California is ‗Wonderful;‘ it is the industry 
standard by which other varieties are judged (Palou, Crisosto, and Garner 2007).  
Wonderful originated in Florida and was propagated in California in 1896 (Hodgson 
1917).  Wonderful is known for its balance of quality and yields of up to 6000 
kilograms/acre (Palou, Crisosto, and Garner 2007).  ‗Foothill Early‘ and ‗Early 
Wonderful‘ cultivars are widespread and mature  six to eight weeks earlier than 
Wonderful, but these cultivars are not as sweet (―Pomegranate Acreage‖ 2009).  Other 
cultivars grown in California include ‗Ambrosia,‘ ‗Eversweet,‘ ‗Grenada,‘ ‗Kashmir,‘ 
‗Red Silk,‘ and ‗Sweet Pomegranate‘ (Glozer and Ferguson 2008), and other varieties 
are grown in other regions of the world.  More than 500 named varieties exist, but many 
of these are likely the same botanically but called by different cultivar names in different 
areas (Stover and Mercure 2007).  In particular, the same variety grown in different 
locations may vary in husk and aril color, making distinctions more difficult to make 
(Stover and Mercure 2007).   Initial trials of cultivars in Texas have included varieties 
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such as Kandahar, Texas Pink, Sumbar, Purple, Mridula, Salavatski, and Pecos; these 
cultivars vary in their maturity, color, seed-hardness, and sweetness (Ashton 2010).   
 
 
Figure 2. Examples of the Variability in Pomegranate Cultivars 
 
 
The physical variability in fruit appearance among pomegranate cultivars that 
can be seen in Figure 2 is matched with additional variability in other physical, 
chemical, and production characteristics.  Cultivars should be selected that are adapted 
to the climate where the orchard is to be planted.  This includes differences in cold 
hardiness and salt tolerance among cultivars, as well as preferences in fruit color and 
seed hardness in the target market (Stover and Mercure 2007).  Possible cultivars in 
Spain have been evaluated for variations in the following: seed hardness (soft preferred), 
sweetness, fruit size, and yield (Martínez et al. 2006).  Each of these criteria should 
influence the market acceptability and potential profits from a pomegranate orchard.  
 
Propagation 
Pomegranate seeds will germinate and grow, but they do not come back true to 
type (Hodgson 1917).  Hardwood cuttings are best done in late winter to early spring and 
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are the preferred method of propagation for general seedling production (Larue 1977).  
Cuttings of 6 to 8 inches in length and greater than ¼ inch in diameter should be placed 
directly in the ground with the top node exposed and left to grow in nursery beds for one 
to two years (Dubois and Williamson 2008).  Glozer and Ferguson (2008) suggest that 
one year is generally sufficient prior to planting in a permanent orchard.  Seedlings can 
also be grown using regeneration from cotlyedonary nodes (Naik, Pattnaik, and Chand 
2000). 
 
Soil 
Pomegranates can adapt to a wider range of soils than many other types of fruit 
trees; deep loam is preferred but suitable yields are produced on sandy or clay soils.  The 
tree also tolerates mildly alkali soils or mildly poor drainage; extremes of either of these 
two will severely affect yields (Larue 1977).  Optimal growth is on deep, fairly heavy 
soils with a pH of 5.5-7.0 (Dubois and Williamson 2008). 
 
Climate and Microclimate 
 Pomegranate is a drought tolerant plant, growing well in some desert regions; 
however, fruit production is very limited under such conditions (Hodgson 1917).  
Pomegranates grow well in full sun, and this is the preferred planting location (Glozer 
and Ferguson 2008).  Areas with high humidity or large amounts of rain in the late 
summer to fall (during fruit development, ripening, and harvest) may be unsuitable for 
production (Özgüven and Yilmaz 2000).  
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 Glozer and Ferguson (2008) suggest that in general, and particularly in areas at 
the northern and southern extremes of the pomegranate growing region, care should be 
taken to site the orchard so that it is protected as possible from a late frost that would 
damage emerging plant growth in the spring.  The plants are susceptible to cold damage 
from the emergence of the first leaf tissue through the bloom period. The coldest 
planting locations are open areas with exposure to prevailing winds; trees planted in such 
areas are more likely to be damaged by frost.  Therefore, these areas should be avoided 
if possible.  Also, cold air settles in low-lying areas and basins; planting in these areas 
should also be avoided.  Siting the orchard on a north-facing hill (in the northern 
hemisphere) reduces the direct sunlight exposure of the trees and will generally 
encourage the plants to bloom later in the spring, thus protecting from loss due to frost 
damage.  Maintaining bare ground around the trees allows the soil to capture heat during 
the day and can thus be useful in reducing cold damage.  Proper irrigation practices can 
also be valuable for limiting frost injury.  Cold hardiness of the varieties to be planted 
should also be considered with respect to the siting of the orchard.   
 
Soil Preparation, Irrigation System, and Weed Control 
Soil preparation generally requires plowing and harrowing of soil to ensure that 
any hard pan is broken up and that soil is properly conditioned prior to planting.  
Previous crop matter or residual weeds should also be removed and/or harrowed under 
prior to planting (Day et al. 2005).  These weeds, if allowed to grow, would compete 
with young pomegranate seedlings. 
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Application and incorporation of lime (calcitic or dolomitic agricultural 
limestone) to raise the soil pH or sulfur (elemental sulfur or aluminum sulfate) to lower 
the soil pH to the acceptable range should be completed prior to orchard establishment.  
Any pre-plant fertilization that is needed should also be completed at that time (Glozer 
and Ferguson 2008). 
 The irrigation system should be in place prior to or immediately following 
planting because seedlings generally require additional water at planting (Stover and 
Mersure 2007).  Irrigation may be furrow style, overhead, or drip (e.g., Day et al. 2005, 
Özgüven and Yilmaz 2000).  Water supply should be adequate to meet irrigation 
requirements when rainfall is insufficient to meet water requirements of the 
pomegranates.  Although pomegranate is drought-tolerant in that it has an ability to 
survive in semi-arid regions with limited rainfall, it should certainly not be considered a 
drought-tolerant plant in commercial production; repeated or prolonged periods of water 
stress are likely to significantly reduce yields (Still 2006). 
 
Planting Design 
Pomegranate orchards may be planted to facilitate either tree growth or bush 
growth, depending on plant spacing.  Spacing of 15 to 18 feet between rows and similar 
spacing between trees is common in orchards (Dubois and Williamson 2008).  Bush 
planting spacing is a smaller distance in row, for example 14 feet by 8 feet (Cline 2008). 
However, spacing varies considerably by location, and may be closer than those listed 
even for the tree form (Bryant 2003).  Suggested spacings for planting in Texas include a 
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14-foot in row spacing with a 17-foot between row spacing for the plants with a larger 
mature size but with a 10 foot-in row spacing for the smaller cultivars (Ashton 2010).  
Spacing also depends on the type and fertility of the soil (Morton 1987).  The main 
objective is that trees be planted where there is adequate space to meet the light, 
moisture, and nutrient requirements of the specific pomegranate cultivar and allow 
movement of workers and equipment through the orchard with ease.   
 
Planting 
 Pomegranates are planted in late winter, after the coldest temperatures have 
passed but prior to leaf emergence to allow for root growth.  In California, the suggested 
planting period is January (Day et al. 2005).  Others suggest a late winter to early spring 
planting in California to take advantage of abundant soil moisture (Stover and Mercure 
2007).  Pomegranates to be grown in the tree form are topped (‗headedback‘) at planting 
(Day et al. 2005).  This practice encourages the development of three to five main 
branches and should be done at a height of 2.5-4 feet to keep fruit from touching the 
ground on low hanging limbs but also prevent toppling over when the tree is heavy with 
fruit (Glozer and Ferguson 2008; Hodgson 1917).  Damage to the bark from sunburn or 
freezing can be prevented or reduced by painting the trunk white at planting time (Larue 
1977).  The painting of the trunk is commonly used in production of other tree fruit 
crops and is also useful in preventing insect damage.   
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Pruning 
To grow in a tree form, pomegranate must be pruned; otherwise the pomegranate 
will develop in a shrub form.  In general, pruning of fruit trees develops stronger 
branches that can hold a heavier fruit load without breaking, brings young trees into 
production sooner, and allows for light and spray penetration into the canopy.  
Pomegranates may be trained into a single trunk, or they may be trained into multiple 
trunks if cold damage is of significant concern as this reduces the likelihood of total loss 
of the tree in a freeze (Stover and Mercure 2007).  In the first year, trees are pruned at 
planting and suckered in early summer (Day et al. 2005).  The removal of the lower 
branches allows for the production of a clear main stem (Morton 1987).  Different 
specific pruning methods should be followed depending on the desired growth habit of 
the pomegranate (Larue 1977).   
 
Fertilization 
Pomegranate should not require large amounts of nitrogen during establishment, 
but recommendation range around 17 pounds N/ acre (Day et al. 2005) during the first 
year.  Depending on the soil composition, pre-plant fertilization may be sufficient to 
meet the nutrient requirements of the pomegranate during establishment.  Fertilization of 
young trees should take into account the initial size and age of the tree.  If applied, 
fertilizer should be done in mid-spring and/or mid-summer; fertilization in the fall is 
discouraged (Ashton 2010). 
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Orchard Management 
Pomegranate production once the orchard is established requires regular 
management.  The pomegranate must be irrigated, fertilized, and pruned as needed.  
Problems from disease, insects, and weeds must also be prevented when possible and 
managed if problems arise.  
 
Irrigation 
Water requirements for pomegranate are similar to those for citrus trees at about 
50-60 inches per year (Larue 1977).  Dubois and Williamson (2008) suggest irrigating 
every seven to ten days in the absence of sufficient rainfall.  Pomegranates can be 
irrigated with furrow, overhead, or drip irrigation; drip irrigation is the most water-
efficient but also the most expensive of these methods.  Research in India found drip 
irrigation to produce higher yield of both high and low grades of pomegranates (and thus 
higher total yield) than basin irrigation systems (Sulochanamma, Reddy, and Reddy 
2005).  Cracking and splitting of the fruit may be a result of either under- or over-
watering (Özgüven and Yilmaz 2000).  Another reason pomegranates may crack as they 
mature is cool night-time temperatures (Ashton 2010).  Larue (1977) emphasizes the 
importance of irrigation in the period immediately prior to harvest, including late 
summer and early fall, as a means to reduce the number of split fruit.  However, 
irrigation late into the fall can induce late season growth or delay the onset of dormancy, 
making trees more susceptible to cold damage (Day, Klonsky, and De Moura 2010; 
Glozer and Ferguson 2008).  More recent descriptions of commercial pomegranate 
  
110 
production practices suggest that pomegranates need 36 acre inches of water per year, 
but 80 percent efficiency for furrow irrigation requires the application of 45 acre inches 
for orchards using that irrigation system (Day, Klonsky, and De Moura 2010).   
 
Pruning  
Regular pruning and suckering is done in the winter, with additional suckering in 
early summer.  Pomegranates sucker aggressively from the base of the plant, and these 
should be removed if pomegranates are grown in the tree form (Hodgson 1917).   Light 
annual pruning encourages growth of fruit-bearing spurs, but heavy pruning will reduce 
yield (Larue 1977).  Pruning should be done with the intent of leaving strong, healthy 
branches and removing dead or diseased plant material.  The canopy of the tree should 
be kept open for optimal fruit development (Glozer and Ferguson 2008).  Some growers 
prune three to six weeks prior to harvest to improve fruit color (Day, Klonsky, and De 
Moura 2010). 
 
Fertilization 
Mature pomegranate trees have an annual nitrogen requirement of one-half to 
one pound of actual nitrogen per tree (Larue 1977).  This may be applied in a single 
winter application or in a split application, depending on whether the soil is heavy or 
light in texture (Larue 1977).  Applications of phosphorous and potassium are not 
necessary in most cases in California (Larue 1977; Day et al. 2005), although potassium 
is supplemented in some other growing areas such as Israel (Blumenfield, Shaya, and 
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Hillel 2000).  Zinc deficiency has been noted as a rare but possible problem; it is most 
common in young trees or in pomegranates grown in alkaline soils (Glozer and Ferguson 
2008), and this deficiency should be treated with foliar application of zinc only if needed 
(Larue 1977; Day et al. 2005).  
Management practices that encourage vegetative growth rather than fruit set, 
such as excessive fertilization or irrigation, may cause fruit drop; this is true particularly 
in young trees.  Such practices may also delay fruit maturity and affect fruit quality 
(Larue 1977). 
 
Frost Protection 
As a primary means of frost protection, pomegranate orchards should not be sited 
in frost-prone areas.  However, additional management techniques can reduce the danger 
of late (spring) or early (fall) frost to the trees if they are not fully dormant.  Dormancy 
should be maintained throughout the winter; thus, there should be no late summer or fall 
fertilization or pruning that would encourage plant growth (Glozer and Ferguson 2008).  
Overhead irrigation is used for watering and frost-protection in some California orchards 
(Morton 1987).  The additional considerations mentioned previously in the description 
of the microclimate should also be followed.  Irrigation for frost protection may be 
needed in early spring for frost protection of blooms and emerging leaves or in the 
winter if temperatures drop below 23-25°F (Day, Klonsky, and De Moura 2010). 
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Pest Management 
Pest management issues are not typically severe in pomegranate cultivation.  
However, there are some considerations for disease, weeds, and insects.  Proper attention 
to these issues can prevent or greatly reduce yield reduction from pests.   
 
Disease 
Alternaria rot (also known as ‗black heart‘ or ‗heart rot‘) is caused by Alternaria 
spp.; Aspergillus niger causes similar symptomology and can cause fruit loss to 
pomegranate growers (D‘Aquino et al. 2009).   In Alternaria rot, the interior of the fruit 
is partly or completely decayed and black in color, but the husk of the fruit is unaffected; 
the infection seems to take place in the bloom and progress to the central cavity of the 
fruit (Larue 1977).  Significant yield losses have been reported due to Alternaria rot in 
Greece (Tziros, Lagopodi, and Tzavella-Klonari 2007).  Botrytis cinera is also a disease 
of pomegranate, although this disease is generally not of serious economic consequence 
until the post-harvest stage (Day et al. 2005).  However, pomegranates are not generally 
threatened by serious disease in production in the United States (Day, Klonsky, and De 
Moura 2010).  Application of copper hydroxide is an option for control of fungal 
diseases (Ashton 2010). 
 
Insects 
With limited pomegranate production in the state of Texas, most available 
information on pest management is based on problems that have been reported in 
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California.  Carroll et al. (2006) offer a review of some California pomegranate pests.  
Aphids are one of the most commonly discussed pests, with the cotton aphid (Aphis 
gossypii) and a yet unidentified species of aphid unofficially known as the ‗pomegranate 
aphid‘ (Carroll et al. 2006).  Biological control of these pests is generally effective.  
Grape mealybug (Pseudoccus maritimus) can cause damage to the fruit, and Citricola 
scale (Coccus pseudomagnoliarum) and black scale (Saissetia oleae) both occur on 
pomegranate and can cause superficial damage to the fruit that results in the quality 
being downgraded.   The greenhouse whitefly (Trialeurodes vaporariorum) and the ash 
whitefly (Siphoninus phillyreae) have also been known to cause problems.  They can be 
controlled biologically with parasites; Admire® (imidacloprid) and Lannate® 
(methomyl) are effective means of chemical control.  Other pests of pomegranates in 
California include the omnivorous leaf roller (Platynota stultana), leaf-footed plant bugs 
(Leptoglossus clypealis), false chinch bug (Nysius raphanus), and flat mite (Brevipalpus 
lewisi).  Both the flat mite and the leafroller cause checking and scarring on the fruit.  
Thrips are not commonly reported as a problem in the San Joaquin Valley, California, 
but they have been a cause of damage in pomegranates grown in India (Ananda, Kotikal, 
and Balikai 2009).    
There are a few other insects that are of particular importance in other areas of 
pomegranate production.  The pomegranate butterfly (Virachola livia) and the 
Mediterranean fruit fly (Ceratits capitata) cause damage to pomegranate and can be 
present in large numbers (Holland and Bar-Ya‘akov 2008).  Good general cleanliness 
practices such as removal of all fruit from trees and mowing of weeds in the orchard has 
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shown some effectiveness at managing pest populations.  An example of the visual 
effects of insect damage on the outer husk of the pomegranate fruit can be seen on the 
pomegranate fruits in Figure 3.  Such damage makes fruit less marketable as a whole 
fruit product due to limited acceptability by consumers.   
 
 
Figure 3. Example of Insect-Damaged Pomegranate Fruits 
 
 
Weeds 
 Weeds can serve as a harbor for harmful insects and plant pathogens, so 
management of weed populations is of economic importance.  Recommendations for 
California orchards are to control weeds in the orchard row with pre-emergence 
herbicides in the winter and in the row middles throughout the summer with multiple 
applications of a burndown chemical (e.g., glyphosate) (Day et al. 2005).  Spot treatment 
of in-row weeds should be completed as needed in the summer.  Recommendations for 
use in Texas by the Texas Pomegranate Growers Cooperative include oryzalin (e.g., 
Surflan 4 AS®) as a pre-emergent weed control, oxyfluorfen (e.g., Goal 2 XL®) to 
control broadleaf weeds, and glyphosate (e.g., Roundup Ultra Max®) as a burndown 
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chemical (Ashton 2010).  (Note that none of these or any other chemicals listed in other 
sections or subsections are endorsed; trade names are included only as a convenience to 
the reader).  
 
Pomegranate Pest Management Issues 
With pomegranates being a minor crop in California, there are very few 
pesticides that are labeled for use in this crop.  Lannate® and Admire® (for whiteflies) 
are two that have met the labeling requirements in California.  However, there are some 
reduced-risk or tolerance-exempt chemicals that can be used on any crop, including 
pomegranate.  Those include Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) sprays, insecticidal soaps such 
as M-Pede®, and pyrethrins (Carroll et al. 2006). 
One treatment that offers benefits for control of certain insects also offers 
benefits for fruit quality; application of kaolin clay (i.e. Surround ®) deters fruit sunburn 
and results in more brightly colored fruit (Ashton 2010).   An example of the result of 
sun scald on a pomegranate fruit can be seen in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4. Example of Scald on a Pomegranate Fruit Caused by Sun Damage 
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Harvest 
On average it takes three to six months from the time of pomegranate bloom until 
fruit maturity (Glozer and Ferguson 2008).  The harvest period for the ‗Wonderful‘ 
cultivar is from September to November in California, and there has been great interest 
in extending the postharvest life until at least the Christmas holiday season, when 
demand is greater and prices are higher (Palou, Crisosto, and Garner 2007).  Similar 
concern has been shown in Israel, where there is interest in extending the time frame of 
pomegranate exports to the Christmas season in Europe (Nerya et al. 2006).  
 Harvest of pomegranates is done by hand and should occur when the fruit is 
highly colored (for Wonderful cultivar, dark red) (Glozer and Ferguson 2008).  At 
maturity, the fruit should also have a hollow, metallic sound when tapped (Morton 
1987).  A maturity index can be used to describe the readiness for harvest based on a 
calculation of total suspended solids (TSS) divided by titratable acidity (TA) (Elyatem 
and Kader 1984; Artés, Marín, and Martínez 1996).  Pomegranate fruits should be 
handled carefully to prevent scarring of the skin; the skin of the pomegranate fruit is 
easily disfigured by scratches and blemishes, although such damage does not affect the 
fruit inside (Glozer and Ferguson 2008).  Cutting of the fruits from the trees may be 
preferred to pulling the fruit off the tree (Ashton 2010) in order to prevent external 
blemishing of the fruit because such damage may make the fruit more susceptible to 
later infection by postharvest pathogens (Palou, Crisosto, and Garner 2007).  Most 
worldwide pomegranate fruit harvest is done by hand, but a mechanical harvester for 
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pomegranates has been used on a trial basis in the San Joaquin Valley of California 
(Cline 2008). 
 Yield estimates for the cultivar Wonderful are from 6,000 kg per hectare (Palou, 
Crisosto, and Garner 2007) to over 33,000 kg per hectare (Bryant 2003); yield estimates 
for other cultivars vary considerably as well (Sulochanamma, Reddy, and Reddy 2005).  
A moderate range of yield for Wonderful cultivar in California would be 6,200 kg/ha to 
11,700 kg/ha (Day et al. 2005).  The average yield for Tulare County, California (a 
major area for US pomegranate production) in 2009 was 12,620 kg/ha (Kinoshita 2010).  
These estimates may depend on whether only top-quality fruits suitable for fresh-market 
are included in this estimate or total fruit production (suitable for juicing) is the basis.  
Harvest may begin by the second or third year after propagation, but mature yields are 
not attained until five to six years after propagation (Stover and Mercure 2007).  Harvest 
estimates for Texas varieties are in the range of 11,208 kg/ha (10,000 pounds/acre), but 
this is expected to vary with growing season, location, and cultivar.   
 
Post-Harvest 
Pomegranate fruit is characterized as being nonclimacteric, meaning that the 
fruits do not ripen after harvest (Artés, Marín, and Martínez 1996).  Pomegranates 
should therefore be harvested when color meets a minimum standard and titratable 
acidity is within the appropriate range (Elyatem and Kader 1984) since ethylene 
treatment is not effective at inducing ripening.  The storage life of pomegranate is 
similar to that of the apple; estimates range from 7 months at 80% humidity and 32 to 
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41° F (Morton 1987) to a range of 8 weeks to 20 weeks in atmosphere controlled 
conditions at 45°F (Palou, Crisosto, and Garner 2007), depending on the effects of 
postharvest pathogens.   A review of the state of the pomegranate industry in 2008 
suggested a storage period of 4 to 5 months was possible with modified storage practices 
(Holland and Bar-Ya‘akov 2008).  Some post-harvest issues may arise after a long 
storage period as described below; still, storage has been found by some to increase the 
red color of pomegranate juice (Artés, Marín, and Martínez 1996), although this change 
was not observed by Palou, Crisosto, and Garner (2007).    
 Two of the most common post-harvest physiologic issues for pomegranate are 
husk scald and chilling injury.  Both of these are external to the fruit but can greatly 
reduce marketability.  Chilling injury is possible below temperatures of 41°F (Elyatem 
and Kader 1984).  Symptomology of chilling injury includes skin discoloration, surface 
pitting, and accelerated fungal growth (Paull 1990).  The severity of the injury due to 
chilling injury is dependent on the storage temperature, duration, and whether the 
pomegranate fruits are stored in air or in an atmosphere-controlled environment (Kader 
2006).  Husk scald is characterized by superficial browning that develops from the stem-
end of the fruit; this increases the susceptibility of the fruit to decay (Defilippi et al. 
2006).  Husk scald appears to be more severe on fruit harvested later in the season, but 
treatment with a controlled atmosphere (CA) of 5 kPa O2 + 15 kPa CO2 (balance N2)  at 
7°C (44.6°F) and 90-95% relative humidity was effective at reducing the incidence of 
husk scald (Defilippi et al. 2006).   
  
119 
 The high environmental humidity which reduces chilling injury and weight loss 
of pomegranates also creates ideal conditions for microorganism development and decay 
(D‘Aquino et al. 2009).  Gray mold caused by Botrytis cinera Pers.: Fr. is a considerable 
economic threat to pomegranate in California (Tedford, Adaskaveg, and Ott 2005).  
Other common problems include heart rot (as discussed earlier) and penicillin rot caused 
by Penicillin spp. (D‘Aquino et al. 2009).  Fludioxonil (trade name Scholar®) was 
approved by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2005 for use 
as a postharvest fungicide on pomegranate (EPA 2005).  Fludioxonil has shown to be a 
useful tool for reducing post-harvest decay with activity against Botrytis cinera and 
Penicillin spp.; there are some estimates of a large impact on profitability that 
fludioxonil has had as a post-harvest treatment for pomegranate fruit (D‘Aquino et al. 
2010; Tedford, Adaskaveg, and Ott 2005).  
Minimally processing and using polymeric film packaging for arils to produce a 
ready-to-eat product has the effect of reducing browning and allowing storage for up 14 
days at 3.5-4.5°C while maintaining physical, chemical, and microbiological quality 
(Sepúlveda et al. 2000).  Other types of packaging resulted in a storage life of 15 days 
for a low oxygen atmosphere packaging treatment and 18 days for air, nitrogen, and 
enriched oxygen atmospheres (Ayhan and Eştürk 2009).  Minimal processing includes 
washing with sanitizing agents to reduce microbial counts, use of antioxidant agents, 
control of temperature, and making pH modifications, while the semi-permeable 
polymeric film serves to create a modified atmosphere packaging (MAP) that reduces 
the respiratory intensity and prevents and slows the growth of contaminating 
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microorganisms (Sepúlveda et al. 2000).  López-Rubira et al. (2005) found differences in 
the storability of arils from pomegranate fruit harvested early in the season (14 days) 
versus pomegranate fruit harvested late in the season (10 days), both in terms of 
microbial counts and sensory acceptability. 
 
Current State of the Industry 
Recent developments and needed research in the pomegranate industry are 
related to growing, storage, and processing practices; they include the development of 
new cultivars and irrigation techniques to generate more yields of higher quality, 
technologies to market a ―ready-to-eat‖ arils product, the addition of pomegranate as an 
ingredient to a wide spectrum of consumer products, and modifications to storage 
practices to allow longer storage times (Holland and Bar-Ya‘akov 2008).  Blumenfield, 
Shaya, and Hillel (2000) have also pointed out the need for a ready-to-eat aril product 
that can be mass-produced in order to increase the market for fresh pomegranate fruit.  
Several companies have gotten involved in the marketing of pomegranate 
products.  For example, POM Wonderful, LLC is a vertically integrated pomegranate 
marketer with a wide range of pomegranate products that are sold fresh and used to 
make juices, teas, bars, pills, and other supplements; the company is supplied with 
pomegranates from over 18,000 acres of trees in the San Joaquin Valley, California 
(POM Wonderful 2010).  Simonian Fruit Company is also a California-based supplier of 
pomegranates and a member of the Pomegranate Council (Schrak 2010).  Large global 
marketers have also gotten involved in pomegranate juice products, including Welch‘s®, 
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Tropicana® (owned by PepsiCo), and Minute Maid® (owned by The Coca-Cola 
Company).  Pomegranate markets are driven by consumption of fresh fruit as well as 
processed products with pomegranate ingredients (Martínez et al. 2006).  Seeram, 
Zhang, and Heber (2006) offer a listing of over 25 suppliers in the United States of fresh 
fruit, juice, and/or botanical extracts made from pomegranates. 
Pomegranate movement in the United States was 13.76 million pounds from the 
San Joaquin Valley (California) district, according to United States Department of 
Agriculture estimates for the year 2009, down from 15.44 million pounds in 2008 
(USDA 2009b).  The movements recorded by USDA have also varied over the last 
several years.  Since 1998, movements range from 18.63 million lbs. for the 2003 season 
to 7.39 million lbs. for the 1998 season, with reported movements of 14.28 million lbs. 
for the 2009 season (USDA 2010).  The seasonal movements of pomegranates for a ten 
year timespan can be seen in Figure 5.   
 
 
Figure 5. Total Seasonal Movements of Pomegranate Fruits within the United 
States.  (USDA 2010) 
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These results are based on movements of fresh fruit within the United States.  As an 
additional note on the status of the industry, the USDA recently moved to allow 
importation of pomegranates from the country of Chile (APHIS 2010a).  Chile joins 
Argentina, Colombia, Greece, Haiti, Israel, and fruit fly free areas of Mexico as areas 
from which pomegranate fruit may be imported into the United States.  Additionally, the 
import of arils from all counties is allowed subject to inspection by the Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service of the USDA (APHIS 2010b).  
Average shipping point prices have varied from seasonal averages of $15.53 per 
22-lb. carton in the 2001 season to $25.04 per 22 lb. carton in the 2006 season.  The 
average price per carton for the 2009 season was $24.54 (USDA 2010).  Please see 
Figure 6 for average shipping point prices by season.  These prices varied by variety, 
time of year, and size.   
 
 
Figure 6. Season Average Shipping Point Pomegranate Fruit Prices ($/22 lb. 
carton). (USDA 2010) 
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 The season average shipping point prices can be further decomposed into the 
weekly average shipping point prices.  The plot of these prices given in Figure 7 reveals 
that although there has been a positive trend in shipping point prices from 1999 to 2009, 
there has also been considerable variation within each season.  The prices are typically 
highest at the beginning of the season, and decline throughout the season as larger 
quantities of pomegranate fruits are shipped.  However, the size of the range from 
minimum average shipping point price to maximum average shipping point price has 
varied from a minimum of $4.93 for the season to a maximum of $14.67 for the season 
for the average price for 22 lb. cartons of pomegranate fruits.  The seasonal ranges in 
average weekly prices for 2006-2009 were all larger than $10.00, indicating that growers 
should expect seasonal variations in prices.   
   
 
Figure 7. Weekly Shipping Point Prices for Pomegranate Fruits ($/22 lb. carton). 
Note: The linear trendline over time is indicated. (USDA 2010) 
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Products 
Pomegranates are marketed in a number of ways, including as whole fresh fruits, 
minimally processed as arils, and further processed into juice and a number of other 
products.  
 The introduction of minimally processed arils as a ready-to-eat marketing device 
in recent years has offered an opportunity to expand the market for pomegranates 
(Ayhan and Eştürk 2009).  These products offer greater convenience for consumers than 
eating the fruit fresh, since, as pointed out in materials from the Pomegranate Council, it 
is sometimes difficult to separate the arils from the membrane and husk (PC 2007).  
Lopez and Rubira (2005) note that the marketing of pomegranate arils in modified 
atmosphere packaging also offers the opportunity to market fruit that is cracked or 
otherwise superficially blemished and that would not be acceptable for the fresh market 
as a whole fruit. 
 The assortment of pomegranate-based products on the marketplace is astounding.  
There are pomegranate husk extracts, weight-loss pills, tea, fermented wine and vinegar, 
seed oil, powder, body wash, dried seeds, jelly and cattle feed, to name a few.  Even 
more pomegranate products are likely on the way.  Examples of proposed pomegranate 
products include the use of a powder made from pomegranate rind as a natural additive 
to prevent oxidation of fresh ground meat (Devatkal and Naveena 2010) and 
pomegranate extract as a chemotherapeutic agent (Longtin 2003).  
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Marketing Challenges 
Pomegranates as a fresh fruit are generally less familiar than many other fruits to 
United States consumers.  Additionally, they have a tough outer husk, seeds that are 
somewhat difficult to eat, and juice that readily stains clothing.  The Pomegranate 
Council even suggests a three step method for opening the pomegranate to minimize the 
need for cleanup.  The steps are as follows: 1) Remove the crown and cut the 
pomegranate into sections; 2) In a bowl of water, separate the arils from the membrane 
and discard everything but the arils; and 3) Strain out the water and eat the arils 
(including the seeds) (PC 2007).  
 Further, pomegranate is a crop with a substantial acreage grown outside the 
United States, as described by Holland and Bar-Ya‘akov (2008).  These authors further 
express several factors that could help or hinder pomegranate markets.  Included are 
mechanical aril separators for marketing of a ready-to-eat aril product, development of 
additional high-yielding cultivars, more efficient irrigation techniques, and longer 
storage periods for pomegranate fruits.  Pomegranate juice concentrate can easily be 
imported; therefore, some members of the industry have suggested that farmgate prices 
for pomegranates will decline as more acres of pomegranates come into production 
(Cline 2008).  There are now multiple companies with fully-automated mechanical aril 
separators on the market.  Time will tell whether demand for pomegranate products will 
match pomegranate production.   
 Pomegranates are a crop that has been cultivated by humans for thousands of 
years; however, their popularity in the western world has grown tremendously in the last 
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decade.  This growth has been spurred by a combination of factors, including the interest 
in healthful eating in general and functional foods in particular.  Pomegranate fruit and 
other plant components of pomegranate are known to have high levels of antioxidants, 
particularly hydrolyzable tannins and flavonoids.  A number of health benefits have been 
proposed for those who consume these polyphenols, particularly in the areas of reduced 
cardiovascular disease and reduced risk of certain cancers.  Worldwide pomegranate 
production is expanding in order to meet the increasing demand for pomegranate fruits.  
The primary production area in the world is Iran, where the pomegranate is believed to 
have originated.  Within the United States, California accounts for the overwhelming 
majority of production.  A number of cultural practices must be considered for 
pomegranates, including fertilization and irrigation practices and management of insects 
and disease.  Recent innovations have led to a boom of pomegranate products in the 
marketplace, including pomegranate juice, ready-to-eat fresh fruit products, and 
everything from lotion to energy supplements with pomegranate as an ingredient.  
Despite this, there are still a number of challenges within the pomegranate market.  
These include the need for further research to verify health claims on pomegranate, the 
potential for lower prices as supplies increase, further development of best production 
practices, and overcoming the novelty of the pomegranate fruit for many consumers.  
The pomegranate industry is poised for growth, but growth will not come without 
innovation as well as scientific and crop management developments.  
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
 
There are a number of important considerations when applying experimental 
economics methods to elicit values for pomegranate fruits and other pomegranate 
products.  Many of these were outlined in the literature review chapter.  However, 
several of these are re-emphasized here as they apply to this experimental auction and 
ranking procedure, with justification for the procedure used.  In general, and in keeping 
with the suggestions of Lusk and Shogren (2007), the methods and analysis were 
maintained with a balance between the control and context of the experiment.  This was 
done with the goal of obtaining the most meaningful results that were relevant to the 
questions under investigation in the study. 
 
Auction Description and Estimation Overview 
The study was designed to elicit the effects of health information on willingness-
to-pay (WTP) for pomegranate products.  The study also proposes a value elicitation 
mechanism that, to the author‘s knowledge, has not been previously implemented in this 
specific form by combining incentive compatible and nonhypothetical mechanisms for 
both discrete choice rankings and experimental auctions.  A brief overview of the 
procedures is included here with more detail provided later.  Subjects participated in 
sessions in which whole pomegranate fruits, other pomegranate products, and a control 
fruit product were available for bidding.  Subjects were given extensive instructions and 
  
128 
examples of auction procedures and were informed that both the ranking and auction 
procedures were nonhypothetical.  Following the instructions, subjects participated in 
practice rounds of ranking and bidding for non-target products.  After the instructions, 
subjects participated in one practice ranking round and one practice auction round each 
for soft drinks and for assorted snack products.  Between the rounds for the two types of 
products, subjects were given a brief quiz on the auction procedures and were then given 
the correct answers.  The winning (11
th
) price for each product was posted only in the 
practice rounds to ensure participants understood how winners were determined.  
Subjects were also provided with an opportunity to ask questions if they were uncertain 
about any of the ranking or auction procedures.  Next, subjects completed a brief 
demographic survey and answered preliminary questions on buying behaviors.  
Subjects then participated in a series of ranking and auction rounds for fruit 
products, first without any additional information and then with 3 additional information 
treatments.  The first round (referred to as the ―baseline round‖) was to establish a 
starting point for WTP and preferences based on the information that subjects had when 
they began the study.  Each subsequent round involved some additional information 
treatment.  The order of these treatments was randomized among sessions to control for 
any order effects.  The three additional information treatments were: 1) an opportunity to 
taste all of the products in the auctions and rankings, 2) information on the nutrition and 
health value of each type of product, and 3) specific information on the anti-cancer 
properties of pomegranates that are currently the focus of medical research.  Also, a 
portion of subjects were given a reference price; this price was based on the current 
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purchase price of the products in local retail stores.   
Subjects were asked to both rank and bid on all products. For the fruit product 
rounds, subjects ranked 8 options (7 fruit products and the option of no product).  The 
option of no product was necessary in the rankings to accommodate match the rankings 
procedure to the bidding behavior and bids of $0.00.  The auction used was an 11
th
 price 
sealed-bid modified-Vickrey auction.  The 11
th
-price is near the median price for the 
auction, and thus should elicit WTP in a way similar to that of the 2
nd
 price auction while 
engaging a wider range of bidders.  (In an 11
th
 price auction, the ten highest bidders all 
pay the 11
th
 highest price for the product).  Prices were not posted during the fruit 
product rounds in an effort to avoid bid affiliation problems and to avoid confounding 
effects with the additional information treatments.   
Despite the criticisms that single-round auctions lack market feedback, if 
information on the winning bids had been provided it could have been difficult to 
distinguish among the effect of the auction price information and the other information 
treatments (e.g., tasting information, health and nutrition information, and anti-cancer 
information) that were applied between rounds.  Prior to the experimental session, it was 
announced that only one round of the ranking and bidding for the fruit products would 
be binding, and it was explained to the subjects how the actual purchasers of the binding 
products were selected.  The likelihood of a product being drawn was proportional to the 
subjects‘ ranking of that item; thus, there should be an incentive to truthfully rank the 
most preferred product the highest and so on until the least preferred product is ranked 
lowest.  Subjects completed a consumer survey following the end of the rounds of  
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Figure 8. Experimental Procedures. 
Note: Steps 7, 8, and 9 were conducted in a randomized order for each session such that 
every participant submitted 4 total rounds of rankings and bids 
Step 1. Instructions  (How Bids and Rankings are 
Submitted; How Prices and Winners are  Determined) 
Step 2. 1st Practice Round Rankings and Bids 
(Soft Drink Products) 
Step 3. Short Knowledge Quiz Completed and Correct 
Answers Discussed 
Step 4. 2nd Practice Round Rankings and Bids  
(Snack Products) 
Step 5. Complete 1st Demographic Survey 
Step 6. Baseline Round of Rankings and Bids 
Steps 7, 8, 9. Information Treatment Followed by 
Additional Round of Rankings and Bidding for (Tasting, 
Health and Nutrition, and Anti-Cancer Information), 
Repeat for All Information Treatments 
Step 10. Second Demographic/ Behavioral Survey 
Step 11. Receive Payments and Purchase Products 
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ranking and bidding on fruit products while payments were calculated.  Subjects were 
compensated in cash with payments of $35 for their participation in the study, less any 
purchases they made during the auction.  The series of steps that each participant 
followed as a part of the experimental auction are given in Figure 8.  A more detailed 
explanation of the auction procedures is given following the theoretical framework 
subsection.   
 
Theoretical Framework for Combined Experimental Auction and Ranking Mechanism 
Consider an experimental auction mechanism for an individual i of n total 
individuals who must submit bids on J products with S information treatments applied 
between rounds of bidding.  Assuming that no reserve price is imposed and that bidders‘ 
private values are independent (and thus follow the independent private values 
paradigm), the equilibrium bid function for bidder i who has valuation Vi has the form  
 
(1)       (   )       
 
 where β(Vi) is the vector of equilibrium bid functions (Paarsch and Hong 2006).  
The expected utility to an individual based on rankings can be understood using 
the random utility framework applied to rankings by McFadden (1974).  Thus, an 
individual i‘s utility from product j can be given by the addition of a deterministic (Vij) 
and a random (εij) component as given in equation 2, 
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(2)                 
 
where     can be defined as the utility experienced by an individual i from product j that 
is unobserved to the researcher.  
Further, consider a ranking mechanism for the same individual i who must also 
submit rankings on L = (J+1) product options with S information treatments applied 
between rounds of bidding.  The J+1 product options are the same J products from the 
bidding, with the added option of no product; these products are specified as L.  As 
proposed by Beggs, Cardell, and Hausman (1981), a rank-ordered logit model can be 
applied as follows.  Individual i is asked to rank L product options that differ in terms of 
a vector of attributes xl.  The systematic portion of utility derived from product l by 
individual i is  
 
(3)            
 
where βi is a vector of marginal utilities.  In the ranking decision process, individual i 
ranks a choice set C with L products, with each product l ranked higher than k for 
            if        .  
Within the ranking procedure, the probability that any product would be chosen 
as binding was modeled following the procedure in Lusk, Fields, and Prevatt (2008).  As 
these authors describe, the chance of any product l with ranking r being drawn 
(randomly selected as binding) can be given by the following function:  
  
133 
(4)  
      
∑      
      
 
 
If the product l is selected, then participants would pay the price Pl based on the 
binding price in the auction procedures of that product to purchase that item.  This 
function makes it more likely that higher-ranked products are selected, and less likely 
that lower-ranked products are selected as the items for purchase by participants.  But, 
there is a 100% chance that one product will be selected.  Thus, each participant‘s 
expected utility (EUi) for ranking L products option is described by:  
 
(5)       ∑(
      
∑      
)
 
   
    
 
 
This shows that each individual has an expected utility from product l that is 
equal to the sum of the probability that a product is received multiplied with the 
individual utility that would be received from purchasing that product.  In order to 
maximize expected utility, an individual should rank the products such that product l =1 
is ranked highest, product l =2 is ranked next highest, and so on.  As Lusk, Fields, and 
Prevatt (2008) detail, this implies that the individual cannot improve his or her expected 
utility by assigning a higher numerical rank (implying it is less preferred) to a more 
preferred product, and thus the mechanism is itself incentive compatible using the 
expected utility framework.  Further, under the prospect theory of Kahneman and 
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Tversky (1979) in which individuals misperceive probabilities such that low 
probabilities are overweighted and high probabilities are underweighted, the equation 
above is still maximized where the most preferred product is ranked first down to the 
least preferred product ranked last, and therefore such a mechanism is indeed incentive 
compatible.   
The selection of which product would be purchased may seem at first glance to 
be difficult to implement in a laboratory setting.  However, the likelihood of any ranking 
being chosen was calculated prior to the experimental sessions, and the percentages were 
available if participants had further questions beyond the basic premise that an item 
ranked first would be most likely to be randomly selected as binding, an item ranked 
second would be next most likely to be selected, and so on until the item ranked last 
would be the least likely to be selected as the item to be purchased.   
 
Procedural Details and Justification 
 While an introduction to the procedures used in this study was included 
previously, a number of specific details can help guarantee or bring into question the 
validity of the results of an experimental auction and/or preference ranking procedure.  
Therefore, more specific details of the auction procedures as well as the justification for 
the procedures that were used are provided. 
 
Auction Procedures 
For the study, a total of 203 participants were recruited from the Bryan-College 
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Station area of Texas.  Participants were assigned to sessions based on age and gender 
demographics of U.S. grocery shoppers (please see Carpenter and Moore 2006) and the 
overall Texas population.  Such a subject sample was preferred over the commonly-used 
participant base consisting exclusively of university students due to the nature of the 
question being addressed.  Information on potential long-term health benefits would be 
less of a concern for a younger demographic (in general), not to mention anticipated 
differences in grocery purchasing behavior within a student population versus the overall 
Texas grocery-shopper demographic.  The sessions were held at various times during the 
day in an attempt to capture more variability in population factors such as employment.   
These participants were recruited using advertisements in the local newspaper 
and other local online and print media to attend one of a total of eight sessions over the 
course of three days to be held at the Texas A&M University Horticultural Gardens 
Classroom.  The newspaper advertisement that was used to recruit participants is 
included in Appendix A.  Subjects were informed that they would be participating in a 
study on the decision-making process for fruit purchases and were told that they would 
be paid $35 for their participation in a 1.5 hour long session, less any purchases that they 
made during the session.  (The recruited sample was not intended to be representative of 
all possible buyers, as it was expected that only individuals who were interested in such 
a study would respond to the advertisement.)  Individuals who agreed to participate were 
emailed directions to the facility, as well as a reminder of their agreement to participate 
within one week prior to the study.  Individuals who did not have email addresses were 
provided directions via telephone or postal mail.   
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The intent was to recruit twenty-five subjects each of eight study sessions over 
three consecutive days, for a total of 200 participants in the experimental auction.  
However, there was a range (n=19 to n=35) in the number of participants who were 
present on the day of the auction due to last minute cancellations by participants.  
However, a total of 203 participants were recruited in total to participate in the eight 
sessions over three days.  
Upon arrival to their designated session, participants were provided with an 
instructional packet and a packet of bid and ranking sheets.  They were randomly 
assigned an identification number to be used throughout the experimental session to 
maintain anonymity.  The participants were then asked to sign a consent form as 
required by the Texas A&M University Institutional Review Board (IRB).  Participants 
were instructed to review the procedures for the first two stages of the auction.  A 
session monitor read these instructions aloud, describing the auction and ranking 
procedures, as well as how bids and rankings were submitted.  The session monitor then 
provided information on how winners were selected for the auctions and rankings.  It 
was made explicitly clear that both types of preference elicitation procedures were 
nonhypothetical in nature and that any participant would have to pay actual money for 
any good that he or she purchased during the session.  It was also made clear that there 
would be ten winners who actually purchased fruit items based on the results of the 
auctions and ten winners who purchased fruit products based on the results of the 
rankings for each session. 
The instructions for the procedures were adapted from examples given in Lusk 
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and Shogren (2007); Lusk, Fields, and Prevatt (2008); Lusk and Schroeder (2006), 
Umberger, Boxall, and Lacy (2009), and Rousu et al. (2007).  The verbal instructions 
that subjects were given included more specific details and are provided in Appendix B.  
Additionally, the full written instructions that subjects received for this study can be 
found in Appendix C.  Subjects were provided with both verbal and numerical examples 
of auctions to help them understand the 11
th
-price auction mechanism and 
nonhypothetical ranking procedure in which they would participate.  The participants 
then engaged in practice rounds, submitting rankings and bids for four common soft 
drink products: Pepsi®, Coke®, Diet Coke®, and Dr. Pepper®.  After one round of 
ranking and one round of bidding in which the market price (the 11
th
-highest price) was 
posted, subjects completed a five-question quiz.  The session monitor went over the 
answers to the quiz and answered any questions.   
Subjects then participated in another round of practice, with one ranking and one 
round of bidding.  The second practice round was for four snack products that varied in 
their familiarity: a package of chips, a package of cheese puffs, an individually-wrapped 
cookie, and a package of a less-common flavor of snack crackers.  Following the 
completion of the practice rounds of the auction, the participants completed a consumer 
survey over their purchasing habits and demographic characteristics.  The questionnaire 
was broken into smaller segments to be worked on at different stages to reduce 
participant fatigue.  The 11
th
-price for each product in the two practice rounds were 
posted to ensure that participants understood how the winning price was selected.   
Subjects were next given verbal and written instructions on the procedures for 
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the fruit product portion of the session.  The fruit products were: California Wonderful 
Pomegranate, Texas Pomegranate 1 (Variety Salavatski), Texas Pomegranate 2 (Variety 
Texas Red), Ready-to-Eat California Pomegranate Arils, Ready-to-Eat Texas 
Pomegranate Arils, Mixed Pomegranate Juice, and Pineapple (as a control fruit product).   
A control fruit product was included because it was assumed that many individuals 
would be unfamiliar with pomegranates but would be more familiar with pineapple.  
Further, a product that would have a similar reference price for a single unit was 
preferred for use as a reference product over a product with a dissimilar price for a single 
unit.  The cultivars of pomegranates were selected based on the industry standard variety 
(California Wonderful) and two varieties thought to have commercial potential in Texas 
(Texas Red and Texas Salavatski).   
Many study designs suggest that an orthogonal approach to the different product 
characteristics of the products be included as one of several important components of the 
study design; however, in some cases such a comparison would lose sight of the question 
of control versus context for the experiment.  For example, claiming that a pineapple 
product from Texas was commercially available would have been discredited by 
participants, and including a California and two Texas varieties of each form of the 
pomegranate products would have resulted in too large of a selection of products to 
expect subjects to accurately and carefully rank them.  Also, the varieties that were 
included as Texas varieties are cultivars that have shown promise for commercial 
cultivation in Texas, and it would have been unrealistic to separate the growing location 
of Texas, the physical appearance of the product, and the flavor of the product just for 
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the purpose of estimating the specific size of these effects.  These novel products were 
novel because of the unique combination of these attributes that they provided.  Further, 
the appearance of the products was not identical across varietal cultivars; nevertheless, 
the products that subjects bid on were representative of the typical appearance of that 
cultivar.  Images of these products can be found in Appendix D.     
Subjects were given an opportunity to closely examine the fruit products and 
were then asked to submit ordered rankings of the 7 products and the option of ―no 
product‖ (8 total product options and to also submit a sealed bid for each of the 7 
products.  The option of ―no product‖ was included to allow for a comparison of the 
rankings and bids, since subjects also had the option of bidding $0.00 for any of the 
products.  Examples of the ranking and bidding sheets provided to participants are 
included in Appendix E.  Five of the eight (n=138) subject sessions were provided with a 
reference price of $3.50 per item as the retail price for all of the fruit products, based on 
the current prices of the products in College Station retail stores.  This was done in order 
to control for the effects of reference prices in the magnitude of the submitted bids.  
However, all participants were informed that the products available sold at retail for the 
same price.  Each of these sessions received three additional information treatments, 
with the order of these treatments randomized among sessions.  
Following the ―baseline round‖ (no information provided) of bidding, subjects 
were provided with a series of three randomized information treatments.  All subjects 
received all three information treatments by the end of the session; in each of these they 
could gain more information on the products before submitting additional rankings and 
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bids.  The order of the additional information treatments were randomized across 
sessions.  These treatments were as follows: 1) Tasting: subjects tasted small 
(approximately 2 oz.), equally-sized samples of each product and the method for 
removing the husk of a whole pomegranate fruit was described, 2) Health and Nutrition 
Information: subjects were provided with health and nutrition information for all fruit 
products, and 3) Anti-Cancer Information: subjects were provided with specific 
information on the potential anticancer properties of pomegranates.  Information on how 
to remove the husk of the pomegranate was included because it was assumed that in a 
setting outside the experimental auction, subjects would need this minimal amount of 
information in order to consume any of the whole fruit products.  The full details of 
these informational treatments are included in Appendix F; in general, the health and 
nutrition information provided the specific nutrition facts of the products in the standard 
consumer nutrition label format and gave additional background on the role that 
antioxidants can play in human health.  This text was written in plain language to 
facilitate subject understanding.   
Similarly, the anti-cancer information that was given on pomegranates was 
provided on a written handout to subject participants during the appropriate round of 
preference ranking and bidding. The anti-cancer information that was provided was 
titled as ―Pomegranate Health Information‖ to avoid unintentionally biasing the results 
with a title of ―Pomegranate Anti-Cancer Information,‖ which may have alerted 
participants to what type of health information effects were being measured.  The 
information included some of the information from the health and nutrition information 
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treatment, but also included more specifics on potential anti-cancer properties.  Clear 
warnings were given on the need for further clinical research into specific anti-cancer 
effects of pomegranates in human subjects. 
 The anti-cancer information that was provided was based on research of the 
potential benefits of consuming pomegranate products as discussed in the pomegranate 
chapter, and every effort was made to provide information that could potentially be 
provided to consumers as point-of-purchase materials or in other types of 
advertisements.  All claims made were verifiable based on scientific studies.   
When consumers are exposed to a new food product, there are certain types of 
information that are generally gained, including both experience and credence attributes.  
Consumers gain information on the basic nutrition of the products, as well as any health 
claims that are made by marketers.  Many attributes of food products can only be 
determined when the good is consumed, and this is often valuable information to the 
consumer to decide whether to purchase the item again in the future.  Marketers often 
make claims on other attributes of products in addition to the basic nutrition, but these 
may or may not serve as valuable information to consumers. 
Following the completion of all rounds of ranking and bidding, the round of the 
auction bidding (baseline, tasting, health information, or anti-cancer information) that 
was to be binding was drawn by a session subject with equal probability for each round 
and was announced to the session participants. The product that would be binding for the 
bidding rounds was randomly drawn prior to each session and placed in a sealed 
envelope.  The binding product from the sealed envelope was also announced to session 
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participants following the completion of all rounds of ranking and bidding.  Based on the 
11
th
-price auction mechanism, there were ten subjects in each round who bid higher than 
the 11
th
-highest price and who purchased the binding product at the 11
th
-price for that 
product in the binding round of auction bids.  Then, of subjects who did not win in the 
auction, ten subjects purchased an item based on their respective rankings.  These items 
were purchased at the 11
th
-price for that good for the binding round of the auction.  All 
ranks and bids were entered into a template in Microsoft Office Excel® that was 
developed to sort the bids for each product, pick the 11
th
 price for each product, and 
break any ties to randomly pick winners.   
Subjects received cash compensation of $35 for their participation in the study, 
less any purchases that they made based on the auction or ranking procedures.  Any 
subjects who purchased any of the items received those items once all results of the 
auction and rankings were tabulated.  The subjects signed a receipt of payment form, and 
the session was complete.      
 
Experimental Auction and Preference Ranking Design Considerations 
  Participants were not aware that pomegranates would be a part of the study, as 
pomegranates are a novel good and the investigators wanted to ensure that the previous 
level of exposure reported by participants as a part of the consumer survey was 
indicative of the novelty of the product prior to the subjects‘ agreement to participate in 
the experimental auction.  Subjects were told only that they would be participating in a 
study to evaluate fruit-purchase decision-making.  Participants were also unaware that 
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there would be the opportunity to taste the products as a part of the experimental 
procedures.  Lusk and Shogren (2007) suggest that it is critical to make efforts to 
enhance the validity and the independence of data from each phase; making participants 
unaware of additional opportunities to taste and/or gather additional information on the 
products was intended to assist in this effort.  If participants were aware of later 
information-gathering opportunities, they may have discounted bids in earlier rounds and 
biased the experimental results.    
The opportunity to taste the goods was important to make a more thorough 
evaluation of consumers‘ WTP for pomegranates after their initial purchase.  This was 
also important for identifying differences in taste preference for the pomegranate 
varieties. Specifically, the novelty of pomegranates meant that participants may have 
been unfamiliar with the fruit, and giving them the opportunity to taste the good 
increased their familiarity with the good.  Since the value of food products is derived at 
least in part, if not primarily, from the consumption value, then the opportunity to 
consume the good was important to the external validity of the auction results.  On the 
opposite hand, it was just as important that participants be unaware of the opportunity to 
consume the good as a part of the study.  This is because, given knowledge of the 
opportunity to obtain further information at a later time, it is likely that participants 
would submit initially lower bids for the goods in anticipation of gaining further 
information at a later time.  However, since participants were previously unaware of the 
requirement to consume the good, individuals who refused to taste the good were still 
compensated for participation; they were not allowed to participate in further ranking 
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and bidding rounds of the study.  (There were no recruited subjects who refused to 
consume the fruit products.) 
It was determined to be impractical to require participants to consume the 
product they purchased onsite as was done in some previous WTP studies for food 
products (i.e. Shin et al. 1992; Fox et al. 1995; Gimalva, Bailey, and Redfern 1997); it 
requires some amount of effort to remove the husk of pomegranates and the fruits are 
larger than most consumers would eat in a single sitting.  However, they do not require 
short-term refrigeration so no alternative pick-up requirements were made as in Lusk, 
Feldkamp, and Schroeder (2004).  
Only one fruit product could be purchased by any participant, and this was 
emphasized to subjects.  This was accomplished by randomly drawing which round of 
the auction and which product within that round was binding.  Winners for the ranking 
procedure were then selected from non-winners in the auction.  Such a procedure is 
useful in avoiding demand reduction over multiple rounds of the auction, as well as 
diminishing marginal utility in analysis of consumer WTP.  
The effects of posting prices within experimental auctions have been debated.  
One faction suggests that posting of prices causes affiliation of bids among subjects, and 
they indicate that a single-shot auction mechanism is preferable.  The opposite faction 
indicates that repeated rounds encourage learning of the auction mechanism and that the 
influence of the market effect stabilizes bids made by subjects.  Further, some indicate 
that the problem of bid affiliation is not necessarily solved by a single-shot auction 
mechanism as there are other indicators besides a posted price that may cause bids to 
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become affiliated.  Additionally, there is a lack of evidence that bids are not affiliated 
before subjects begin the study and that bids are not affiliated in the outside marketplace.  
Therefore, a single round auction mechanism was selected.  The imposition of product 
information treatments throughout the study may have been compounded with repeated 
rounds, and the bidding information feedback may have made it difficult to determine if 
changes in measured prices were due to bid affiliation or a result of the preference 
updating of consumers that should occur when new information is received.  
In terms of which auction mechanism was preferred, a uniform n
th
-price auction 
avoids the primary emphasis on only the highest value bidders in a standard Vickrey 2
nd
-
price auction while also avoiding the emphasis on low value bidders in a random nth-
price auction.  (A uniform nth-price auction selects a single nth-price for all rounds, 
while a random nth-price auction selects a different random nth-price for every round of 
the auction).   For instance, in a 2
nd
-price auction there is only one winner, so bidders 
with lower individual values for the product may be ―disinterested‖ in the auction 
outcome.  A price in which approximately one-half of participants were winners would 
eliminate some of the imbalances in the incentives to under- or over-bid for participants.  
As described by Lusk and Shogren (2007), the expected monetary loss from 
―misbidding‖ (where an individual‘s bid does not equal that same individual‘s WTP for 
that product) varies depending on the specifics of the mechanism.  However, none of 
these auction mechanisms (and no others for that matter) guarantees that subjects will 
bid exactly their true WTP; rather, the auction mechanisms vary in the degree to 
deviation from the dominant strategy is punished and the mechanisms that do this the 
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best are generally the ones that are selected for WTP elicitation procedures.  
Lusk, Alexander, and Rousu (2007) provide a generalization on the cost of bids 
that deviate from a bidder‘s value (designated as Valuei) of the product in the auction.  
Following their discussion, the expected payoff for an individual (Payoffi) is given by  
 
(6)  E[Payoff   (Value  E[Price|(winning|bid )  P   (winning )|bid     
 
where E is the expectations operator, Prob is the probability operator.  Thus, an 
individual expects to earn the value of the good minus the expected purchase price 
(conditional on winning the auction, which is conditional on the submitted bidi 
multiplied by the probability of winning the auction given bidi. Using this notation, if an 
individual‘s bids are equal to that individual‘s value for each product, then the auction 
mechanism is incentive compatible.  As several different fixed nth price auctions have 
previously been discussed, Lusk, Alexander, and Rousu (2007)authors further extend the 
payoff function to any nth price auction where the expected payoff function is defined 
based on the formula for the probability density function (pdf) and cumulative density 
function (cdf) for any given order statistic as:  
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where n is the designated nth winning price in the auction at which (n – 1) winning 
bidders of N total bidders pay the nth highest price.     denotes the individual value, G 
denotes the cumulative density function, and g denotes the probability density function.  
Here the function is maximized at bidi = Vi and assumes that all bidders other than 
bidder i are well-behaved and bid their true value.  
Lusk and Shogren (2007) further define the expected cost of misbehavior, or 
when an individual submits a bid that is not equivalent to an individual‘s value, as 
         |                      |             which takes a value of zero if the 
bid is equal to the true value and is a positive value for the dollar loss expected from 
suboptimal bidding as the bid moves away from the true value.  This can be used to 
show that the expected cost of misbehavior for a 2
nd
-price auction is higher when an 
individual‘s private value for the product is higher (relative to the private values of other 
bidders).  Further comparisons can be made with other values of n for n
th
 price auctions, 
and the results of an (N -1)
th
 auction would impose higher costs for underbidding than 
for overbidding.  Note that following the convention of auction literature, here n
th
 refers 
to the n
th
 highest of all the ordered bids, and (N-1)
th
 refers to the bid that is one above the 
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lowest (the N
th
) bid. These conclusions are more straightforward when a uniform 
distribution of private values is assumed, but can be shown to generally be similar for 
other distributions of private values (i.e. normal, pseudo-normal, left-skewed, right 
skewed) as well (Lusk, Alexander, and Rousu 2007).  For a 5
th
 price auction with N=10, 
these authors found results that varied depending on the distribution that was specified 
and whether bidders were underbidding or overbidding.  However, the main point to be 
drawn from this discussion is as follows:  the expected cost of deviating bids from true 
values was highest when a fixed price auction was specified where n was somewhere 
near the middle range of N.   
A uniform n
th
-price (specifically an 11
th
-price) modified-Vickrey auction was 
used for the experimental auction portion of this study.  There have been a number of 
discussions of which price should be selected as the binding price in these types of 
auctions.  For this study, the target products were generally novel to the participants.  
There has also been discussion in the literature on the use of endowed versus full-
bidding methods for novel products.  With a good that is unfamiliar to subjects, an 
approach where subjects have no opportunity for further learning is preferable.  This is 
typically implemented as an endowed approach; however, use of the combined ranking 
and bidding mechanism guaranteed that most subjects would purchase a product during 
the sessions but avoided the inherent difficulty in assessing WTP based on bids to 
upgrade if full bid values are not collected.    
Also, a full bidding approach is generally preferred if preferences are expected to 
be heterogeneous.  The full-bidding approach allows for positive and negative 
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differences in values between two products.  Lusk and Shogren (2007) indicate that the 
endowed approach is preferable because differences in WTP are the most reliable 
estimates from auction data; therefore, the implied differences in the full bidding results 
for each subject were also included in the analysis.  However, auction procedures that 
ensured that subjects left with a good would have similar advantages to the endowed 
approach of preventing future learning about the good while at the same utilizing a full-
bidding approach that allows for more realistic differences in valuation.  Thus, with a 
targeted study size of 20-35 participants per session, an 11
th
-price auction would ensure 
that ten subjects were product purchasers based on the nonhypothetical auction, and 
another ten subjects were purchasers based on the nonhypothetical ranking portion of the 
procedure.  This was done to guarantee that most participants had no future option for 
learning about the products when they made their bids and preference decisions.   
Anonymity of subjects was ensured by the use of randomized identification 
numbers and the use of a sealed bid auction mechanism.  Envelopes were also used to 
disperse payments, and care was taken not to allow other participants to see the amount 
of an individual‘s payment for participation in the study.   
Practice was required in order to teach the auction procedures and mechanisms to 
subjects prior to the auction rounds for the target products.  This was accomplished in 
several ways.  The subjects were provided with explicit written instructions on how the 
auction mechanism worked.  Further, subjects were given descriptive examples of the 
auction procedures as well as explicit numerical examples.  An explanation of the 
dominant bidding strategy was provided and it was explicitly stated that it was in each 
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person‘s best interest to bid truthfully.  Further, subjects participated in two 
nonhypothetical practice rounds of auctions, one for common soft drink products and 
one for snack products that varied in novelty.  In between the two rounds of practice, 
subjects were given a brief quiz in which they answered questions about the auction and 
ranking mechanisms.  
An important consideration in the experimental design is that there is a necessary 
tradeoff between the external validity of the auction procedures and the degree of control 
that can be obtained.  The design of this experiment was undertaken giving careful 
attention to these two conflicting goals.  An auction setting in a classroom or laboratory 
is already quite distinct from an actual purchase interaction that would occur in the day-
to-day lives of most consumers.  Given this, great efforts were taken to balance these 
differences and elicit the most accurate WTP estimates from the experimental procedure. 
For example, consumers neither submit bids for goods they purchase in a retail 
store nor submit an actual ranking for the goods they might consider purchasing.  
However, consumers must implicitly answer these types of questions by selecting which 
price and product combination is their most preferred option.  As described in the 
literature review, the use of auctions is generally thought to produce more conclusive 
WTP results than choice experiments.  Combining the ranking procedure with the 
auction was done with the intent of providing additional information on consumer 
preferences.  
Separation of the imposed effects from the specific goods to be auction was 
achieved in several ways.  Since all of the goods up for auction during the procedure are 
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related in consumption, only one good was randomly chosen to be a binding purchase.  
Further, an additional product that is somewhat novel in preparation and consumption 
(fresh pineapple fruit) was included to account for specificity of health effects to a 
particular product.  A pineapple fruit is similarly priced to all of the pomegranate 
products that were included but was anticipated to be more familiar to participants than 
pomegranate products.  
In order to avoid specific effects of a number of components of the experimental 
procedures, randomization was utilized to avoid a systematic effect on the experimental 
results.   The ordering of the additional information treatments was randomized among 
each of the eight sessions.  
The effects of information as measured by such an experiment are subject to a 
focusing effect.  More specifically, there is the potential for subjects to identify the 
effects of health information as one of the targets of the study and increase their bids 
because they anticipate higher bids to be the expected result of the study.  Another 
implication of providing additional information is the potential effect of preference 
learning (Shogren, List, and Hayes 2000) on the outcome of the study.  If participants 
believe that they will have the opportunity to gain information on the product by 
purchasing it and having the opportunity to consume it (particularly for a novel product), 
then this might introduce upward pressure on their bids.  However, once information has 
been gained on the product during the course of the experiment, then this upward 
pressure from the information effect may be reduced or eliminated.  Therefore, the final 
WTP bids after participants have received all information treatments should reflect a 
  
152 
state of full information on the good, particularly since most participants would be 
taking home a product as a result of either their rankings or bids. 
Subjects were informed that they were allowed to submit zero or negative bids.  
However, no subjects actually submitted negative bids.  Subjects may not have felt 
comfortable with submitting negative bids since they would be uncharacteristic of a 
traditional retail setting.  There were a high percentage of zero bids, as described by the 
censoring results presented later.  Allowing subjects to make zero or negative bids in the 
auction rounds was mimicked in the ranking rounds by allowing a preference for the 
option of ―no product.‖  Beyond allowing subjects to submit zero or negative bids, if all 
submitted bids are zero or above then the econometric model must be adjusted to 
account for this.  These considerations are discussed further in the model estimation 
subsection.  
Subjects participated in one round of ranking and one round of bidding for two 
sets of practice products in order to become familiar with the auction mechanism; 
consequently, they participated in two total rounds of practice for each of the ranking 
and bids.  This was in addition to extensive descriptions of the procedures and 
opportunities to answer questions.  Then, subjects submitted a total of 4 additional 
rankings and 4 additional rounds of bidding for the fruit products that were the target of 
the auction.  Further rounds would have increased subject fatigue, as well as causing the 
total time for the session to be long relative to subjects‘ attention spans. 
The possibility of varying the base of $35 for the participation fee was 
considered; however, a variation in such an endowment would have needed to be large 
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in size to be substantial in relation to participants‘ total income.  This was determined to 
be unrealistic for the experimental auction setting.  Also, all subjects received the same 
endowment, so the premiums that each individual would pay for one product over 
another should all be based relative to that endowment.  
The ranking experiment included was modeled after a profile ranking procedure 
introduced by Lusk, Fields, and Prevatt (2008) and a nonhypothetical ranking procedure 
introduced by Chang, Lusk, and Norwood (2009).  The rankings were included in the 
practice rounds to give participants additional practice with the procedures.  Further, the 
ranking has the potential to either confirm or dispute the results of the auction 
mechanism.  Due to the number of questions that still surround the mechanisms of 
experimental auctions, the addition of another mechanism to measure preferences may 
allow a balance between some of the problems of each approach in isolation.  
Prior to the actual study sessions, the experimental auction and preference 
ranking procedures were tested with a group of graduate students from Texas A&M. 
Based on the results of the practice study, modifications to the procedures were made to 
increase the clarity of instructions and reduce the amount of time required to complete 
the bidding and ranking procedures.  
 
Econometric Model 
The experimental design described above led to a need to accommodate a 
number of factors in the econometric modeling of bidding and ranking behavior.  The 
use of rankings and biddings are generally done separately.  This could either be 
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accommodated with a single model for both procedures, or it could be accommodated 
with two separate models best suited for each type of data.  Those types are continuous 
data that is censored from below for the auction bidding and a series of choice decisions 
for the ranking procedure.  
The goal of modeling WTP was to gain a better understanding of which factors 
may influence consumer WTP for pomegranate fruits and other pomegranate products.  
If possible, such a model would also have some ability to predict consumer WTP based 
on these characteristics.  The models that are used should, if possible, allow for 
comparisons of the two value elicitation mechanisms.   
The models that have been used in the past in application to WTP are quite 
diverse, and many of these are applied to this data.  Considerations are given to the 
benefits and drawbacks of each model in their application to this particular dataset.   
 
Econometric Model for Experimental Auction Bids 
The WTP for products in this study is modeled as a function of an individual‘s 
demographic characteristics, behavioral characteristics, the reference price, the order that 
information treatments are received. 
Thus, each individual has a WTP that is described as the following equation:  
 
(8)  
     (                                          
                                                )  
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The included factors are as follows: product characteristics of the variety of fruit product 
(California Wonderful, Texas Red, and Texas Salavatski), the form of the product 
(whole fruit, ready-to-eat arils, or juice), and the type of fruit (pomegranate or 
pineapple).  To compare the specification of the model, several models were estimated 
that eliminated one or more of these types of variables.  If the types of variables are 
further broken down, the previous equation with all included independent variables of 
interest is given by:  
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where each variable v is assigned its own    coefficient.   
The dummy variables (sometimes called indicator variables) for this analysis 
were coded such that the levels of the variables are compared to some base level of that 
variable by excluding the base level variable from the estimation.  For example, for three 
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possible age categories, the results would be coded such that there were three age 
variables, with a value of one being assigned to a variable if an individual was in that 
age category and a value of zero being assigned otherwise.  Then one of the dummy 
variables was removed for each characteristic of interest in order to avoid the dummy 
variable trap.  This procedure was followed for all included dummy variables.   
The variable names and descriptions are given in Table 3.   
 
Table 3. Demographic and Behavioral Variables 
 
 
 
For example, age is described by two dummy variables: DAGE2 takes a value of 
1 if the individual was between 30 and 49 years of age and 0 otherwise, and DAGE3 
takes a value of 1 if the individual was over 50 years of age and 0 otherwise.  These 
divisions of the age variable were included because it was expected that these categories 
of ages may be possible levels where differences in attitudes on preferences may vary.  
Type Abbreviation Meaning
Dummy DAGE2 Dummy for ages 30 to 49 years of age
Dummy DAGE3 Dummy for ages more than 50 years of age
Dummy DEDU2 Dummy for education x , where: high school degree < x  ≤ 4-year college degree
Dummy DEDU3 Dummy for education of more than a 4-year college degree
Continuous HOUSE Household size (number of individuals)
Dummy FEMALE Dummy for female gender
Dummy DMAR Dummy for married individuals
Dummy DINC2 Dummy for household income x , where: $50,000 < x  < $99,999
Dummy DINC3 Dummy for household income greater than $100,000
Continuous SPENDFV Weekly household spending on fruits and vegetables
Continuous FPOH Paired sum of pounds of fresh fruit and pounds of fresh vegetables on hand
Dummy POMFRUITP Dummy for previous purchase of a pomegranate fruit
Dummy ILLNESS Dummy for having a health issue considered serious by the subject
Continuous TOBACCO Percentage of days per year that the individual uses tobacco products
Continuous EXERCISE Percentage of days per year that the individual exercises for 20 minutes or more
Dummy PRICE Dummy for whether the individual was given a reference price for the fruit products
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As an example of a continuous variable, fruit and vegetable spending (SPENDFV) was a 
dollar amount of total weekly spending on fruits and vegetables.  The variables listed in 
the table above are coded similarly to these examples.  
During the course of the experiment, each individual submitted a total of 28 bids 
for fruit products as bids for seven products for each of four information treatments.  
These bids could be treated in several ways.  First, the bids could be estimated separately 
for each product and each information treatment with a separate equation for each.  In 
this manner, the WTP was estimated for each of the seven included products.  The WTP 
was also estimated for the following information treatments: Baseline (BASE) - baseline 
at the beginning of the study, Tasting (TASTE) - subjects were allowed to taste a small 
sample of all products, Health (HEALTH) - subjects were given health and nutrition 
information for all products, and Anti-Cancer (CANCER) - subjects were given 
information on the anti-cancer properties of pomegranates.  In addition, estimation of the 
WTP for the full information set (FULL) was conducted based on an individual‘s bids 
following all three information treatments.  Thus, 35 equations were used to estimate 
WTP based on the full bids made by subjects in the study for this technique. 
The WTP for the fruit products could also be estimated in some combination of 
aggregated bids (multiple bids made by an individual aggregated into one sample), either 
aggregated by information treatment, product, or both.  Thus, several additional models 
were developed to do this.  To accommodate the aggregated bids, other variables were 
needed to identify the information treatments and product characteristics.  The variables 
for the imposed information treatments are included in parentheses above; aggregated 
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models did not include the bids for the full information set as these bids were reflected in 
one of the other information rounds.  The product characteristic variables that were 
included are: Texas Red (TXR) took a value of 1 for Texas Red variety products and 0 
otherwise; Texas Salavatski (TXS) took a value of 1 for Texas Salavatski Variety 
products and 0 otherwise; RTE took a value of 1 for all ready-to-eat product forms and 0 
otherwise, JUICE took a value of 1 for the juice product and 0 otherwise, and 
PINEAPPLE took a value of 1 for the pineapple fruit and 0 otherwise.   
There were a number of models that have been applied to auction and rankings 
data.  Several of these were applied and the benefits and drawbacks of each are 
presented as they apply to the specific results of this study.   
 
Ordinary Least Squares Model 
A number of possible models were considered to evaluate the WTP for the 
included products based on the subjects‘ bids.  A basic ordinary least squares model was 
first considered.  Such a model can be estimated in a number of ways.  An ordinary least 
squares model can be estimated as above by adding a constant term and calculating the 
parameters for each variable.  However, given the nature of auction bidding, it was 
anticipated that there would be a number of censored observations.  Although 
participants were informed that they had the option of bidding $0.00 or negative values, 
it was anticipated that censoring would need to be accounted for in the estimation of the 
parameters.  Even so, an ordinary least squares model was estimated for comparison 
purposes. 
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Tobit Model 
The potential for bid censoring led to consideration of using a tobit model to 
estimate consumer WTP for the targeted products.  Although participants were informed 
that they could submit zero bids, the overall distribution could still be censored at $0.00.  
The tobit model was first introduced by Tobin (1958); since that time it has been 
frequently used for modeling of censored and truncated dependent variables (McDonald 
and Moffitt 1980).    A distinction should be made between truncated and censored 
variables.  Truncation is seen when a researcher needs to draw conclusions about a full 
population that is based on a sample that is drawn from only a restricted portion of the 
population.  On the other hand, censoring occurs when values in a certain range of the 
distribution are reported as a single value (Greene 2003).  
Greene (2003) provides a modern explanation of the tobit model (also known as 
the censored regression model), which is summarized below.  First, to explain the need 
for a tobit model the distribution of the data of interest should first be assessed.  Tobit 
models are highly useful for describing censored variables.  Censored variables can (but 
do not have to) be understood by starting with a normal probability distribution.  For 
convenience, the censoring will be assumed to be at zero.  When data are censored, the 
distribution that applies to the censored data is described by a mixture of continuous and 
discrete distributions.  In order to analyze such a distribution, a new variable can be 
defined such that  
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If it is assumed that y* is approximately normally distributed with mean µ and variance 
σ2, the distribution that applies is  
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and if y* > 0, then y has a density given by y*.  For this distribution, the total probability 
is still one, but instead of a full continuous distribution, the full probability in the 
censored region is assigned to the censoring point (which in this discussion is set to be 
zero).  Tobin (1958) proposed a censored regression model which came later to be 
known as the tobit model.  The mean in the following distribution can be defined for 
distributions which are censored at zero as  
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If this mean is allowed to correspond with the mean in a classical regression model, the 
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following equations are obtained:  
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where    are explanatory variables for each individual that are hypothesized to influence 
bids,   is a vector of coefficients, and    is the error term that is randomly distributed 
with mean zero and variance    as described by Greene (2003).  Since censoring was 
hypothesized at $0.00, left-censored bids and uncensored bids would be expected to be 
observed.  Here, for the index variable (also known as the latent variable), the  
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Using the equations above, any observation randomly drawn from the population may or 
may not be censored; for such observations, the expected value of the observed value y 
is given by  
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(Greene 2003).  It is further pointed out that the marginal effects are different than in a 
standard regression model.  The marginal effects of the index variable are given as  
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However, since   
  is unobserved, then for    the general result given in Greene (2003) is 
shown to reduce to  
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for distributions censored at zero with a normal distribution.  A useful interpretation of 
this result is provided by the decomposition done by McDonald and Moffitt (1980) that 
split the previous equation into two components such that  
 
(20)  
     |   
   
           (
     |         
   
)   
    |         (
           
   
) 
 
 
where the first component is an effect on the conditional mean of   
  in the positive part 
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of the distribution and the second component is an effect on the probability that the 
observation will fall in that part of the distribution.  Then, to estimate the model the 
likelihood function can be given as 
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The marginal effects from the tobit model can either be averaged across all levels 
of the variable, or they can be specified to be calculated at the mean of the variable.  The 
currently accepted practice in estimating the marginal effects from the tobit model is to 
use the marginal effects averaged across all levels of the variable (Greene 2003).   
Based on this discussion of tobit models, a number of possible variables were 
considered for possible inclusion in the WTP tobit models.  A series of 35 separate 
equations were estimated for each of seven products in the baseline round, the three 
information treatment rounds, and the full information.  Models were estimated based on 
the actual WTP bids made by participants.  However, these will not all be described 
here.  A set of equations for one such model (i.e. an estimation of bids for one product 
given one information treatment will be described in Chapter V, and the complete 
estimation results can be found in Appendix G.  Besides a full description of one model, 
additional results of interest will also be highlighted in the description of the results.   
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Random Effects Tobit Model 
However, individual preferences are likely to be heterogeneous, and full bids are 
also likely to be censored at zero.  A number of models have been developed to account 
for individual heterogeneity as described by Greene (2003), including fixed effects, 
random effects, random parameters models, and covariance structures.  In each of these, 
the underlying individual heterogeneity is addressed in the model in some way.  A full 
coverage of each of these is not pertinent to the topics under investigation in this study; 
however, a few components of these models will be addressed.  A simple pooled 
regression can be assumed to be biased and inconsistent if the individual effects are 
correlated with the included regressors, but such a problem can be addressed with a fixed 
effects model such that there is a constant term specific to each group in the regression 
(Greene 2003).    
On the other hand, a random effects model assumes that the individual 
heterogeneity is not correlated with the included variables but that there is a random 
element specific to each group such that the differences between units are strictly 
parametric shifts of the function being estimated.  A random effects model can be 
specified following Greene (2003) as  
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where   is a constant term and    is a group-specific random element that is similar to 
the random error term except that there is only one draw from the distribution for each 
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member of the group.   
Greene (2003) cautions against out-of-sample applications of such a model.  He 
suggests that estimates may be inconsistent if the assumption of the distribution for the 
random effects is incorrect.   
Nevertheless, a random effects tobit model was investigated for application to the 
bids of study participants.  If the random effects are thought of as differences in 
individuals, then the random effects model given in the preceding equation can be 
combined with the tobit model previously specified in Equation 14 to give 
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where     
  is as before, a latent variable only observed for bids above the level of 
censoring that is specific to the i
th
 individual, j
th
 product, and s
th
 information treatment. 
The assumption made by a random effects model of no correlation of individual 
heterogeneity with the regressors in the model may be not be correct, and therefore other 
models to account for individual heterogeneity were also considered.   
 
Mixed Linear Model 
Another method suggested by Greene (2003) for dealing with individual 
heterogeneity is the random parameters model; this model is also frequently called a 
mixed model or a random coefficients model.  The ―mixed‖ name comes from the fact 
that the random parameters model is generally considered a combination of the fixed 
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effects model and the random effects model.  The phrase ―random parameters‖ refers to 
allowing the model to account for unobserved heterogeneity in the data by allowing the 
parameters to vary following a specified distribution.  A normal distribution for the 
random parameters is allowed; however, the model is able to account for several other 
distributions.  Thus, the IIA assumption can be relaxed for the estimation.  To start with 
an explanation of the mixed linear model, subject bids can be modeled as 
 
(24)                                
 
where   is a set of coefficients for the regressors that are constant for all bids,   is the 
intercept for all bidders,    allows for variation in the individual intercept,        allows 
for variation in the values of the regressors for each individual, and      is distributed as 
before.  This gives an equation that is similar to that in the random effects model while 
also allowing for changes across individuals for any specified regressors through the 
       term.  The error introduced by the terms that are correlated with each individual 
are independently distributed of the overall error term    .  Notice that here the mixed 
linear model is not specified with the subject bid as a latent variable as in the previous 
tobit models, so bids below zero would be possible.    
 
Models for Bid Differences across Goods and Treatments 
 Recent attention has been given to the value of the differences in paired bids 
(multiple bids by an individual) before and after information treatments or across similar 
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goods in experimental auctions (i.e., Alfnes 2009; Kanter, Messer, and Kaiser 2009).  
The use of novel products in experimental auctions allows greater opportunity for bids of 
$0.00 than for more familiar products since the bidders may have no experience, positive 
or negative, with the product being auctioned. 
Differences in WTP across information treatments but within each individual are 
labeled following the terminology of Lusk, Feldkamp, and Schroeder (2004); these 
calculated differences are called ―implied differences.‖  That is, for any individual i the 
―implied difference‖ would be defined as  
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where       .  For example, the ―implied difference‖ in WTP by individual with 
identification number 4 for product 1 between a baseline round bid of $2.00 and a tasting 
information round of $3.00 would be calculated as          (     )        
               
 In estimating any model based on the implied differences, the interpretation of 
the parameter estimates must be undertaken cautiously.  The equation for the implied 
difference in WTP can also be written as  
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where C is a constant and X is a vector of product characteristics, demographic and 
behavioral features, and information treatments.  The constant can be re-specified as a 
single constant value, and factoring out the explanatory variables gives  
 
(27)                (        )( )   
 
Any parameters estimated based on implied differences for products are actually the 
changes in the parameters from the baseline to the later information treatment. 
Unlike the full bids for the products, the implied differences in WTP are not 
censored at a value of $0.00, as participants were free to vary their bids positively or 
negatively from the baseline round following the information treatments.  (For example, 
it was expected that some individuals might have an increase in WTP following the 
tasting information round if they enjoyed the taste of the product, but if an individual 
disliked the taste of the product they might have a decrease in WTP for that product in 
the tasting information round.)  Thus, the tobit models used for the full bids were no 
longer appropriate to apply here.   
 The ―implied differences‖ across rounds could be of four types, as described by 
Rousu et al. (2007).  These types of differences and the information each provides are 
included in Table 4.  Thus, any instances of zero bids by an individual for both the 
baseline round and the later round could be removed from the analysis of the implied 
differences because those bids, described as Case 4 in the table, do not provide any 
information on the differences in WTP from one round to another.    
  
169 
Table 4. Four Cases for Differences in Bids 
 
 
 
 
 Further, the analysis of models based on the implied differences in bids is of 
particular value when the question to be answered involves questions of the size of those 
differences.  For example, and particularly in the case of a novel product where there is 
likely to be individual heterogeneity not only in individual bids but also in the size of the 
changes in those bids across products and information treatments, consider an individual 
bidder for several products.  If those products have similar outside substitutes and are 
similarly valued, then these differences will cancel out when the difference of the two 
bids is taken.  This is true for the within-subject differences in bids for each product, as 
the relevant outside substitutes are assumed to remain constant for each product across 
multiple rounds.  On the other hand, this is not the case for calculating differences in 
overall bids for each product because the outside alternatives for a product for one 
individual are not necessarily the same as those for any other individual.  Alfnes (2009) 
previously discussed this issue in relation to a full-bidding or endowed approach.  
Bid for Baseline 
(Round or 
Product)
Bid for 
Comparison 
(Round or 
Product)
Sign of Bid 
Difference
Presence of Censoring Effect on Bid Difference
Case 1 Positive (+) Bid Positive (+) Bid
Negative (-) or 
Positive (+)
Uncensored
Difference in value is equal to 
the difference measured
Case 2 Zero (0) Bid Positive (+) Bid Positive (+) Censored from Below
Difference is absolutely larger 
than the difference measured
Case 3 Positive (+) Bid Zero (0) Bid Negative (-) Censored From Above
Difference is absolutely larger 
than the difference measured
Case 4 Zero (0) Bid Zero (0) Bid Zero (0) Not Defined
Does not provide any 
information on difference
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However, the dialogue can be extended to the value elicitation procedures for novel 
products.  In the case of a novel product, individuals lack familiarity with the 
characteristics of the product, and there are likely to be even greater differences among 
individuals in regards to which products are considered relevant outside substitutes.  
These substitutes will differ in product characteristics and are likely to differ in price as 
well; both of these types of information can then influence the bids that are submitted by 
an individual.   
 However, the use of bid differences for estimation of WTP models allows the 
outside substitutes for each product to cancel out when the difference in the two are 
taken.  Therefore, the differences in WTP should provide additional useful comparisons 
because the difference in value across two consumers is not necessarily the same as the 
difference in value within a single consumer due to differences in what each individual 
perceives as the outside substitutes for each product.   
 Since the overall set of implied differences is not restricted to values that are only 
positive or negative, the model for the implied differences was estimated using a mixed 
linear model that was previously described.   
 
Econometric Model for Preference Rankings 
Discrete choices are often modeled using a logit model.  As pointed out by Train 
(2003), the functional form for the choice probabilities in a logit model has a closed 
form.  In addition, the interpretation of the logit model is more straightforward than that 
of some alternative models.  (For the purposes of clarity, we specify L products here to 
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avoid confusion with the product options presented in the models for the auction bids.)  
Using             , each εil is assumed to be independently and identically distributed 
(IID) extreme value.  Train (2003) also points out that the key assumption of the logit 
model is not so much the shape of the distribution, but rather the independence of the 
errors.  Econometric methods to analyze choice experiments include conditional logit 
and mixed logit models to estimate WTP (e.g., Teratanavat and Hooker 2006; Hu, 
Woods, and Bastin 2009). 
In the standard logit model, it is assumed that any unobserved utility from one 
product is independent of the unobserved utility from any other product.  This can be 
avoided with a well specified model in which Vil is sufficient to describe the majority of 
variation in the utility that the individual obtains, and the error term for one product does 
not provide additional information on the error term for any other product.  If this cannot 
be achieved, then some other model which allows for correlated errors should be used.  
A multinomial logit, which allows for more than two discrete choice outcomes, is not a 
good candidate for the rankings data due to the fact that it fails to account for the ordinal 
nature of the rankings data (Greene 2003).  Rather, the choice decisions made by each 
individual that result in ordered data provide more information to the researcher than a 
single choice of the most preferred option.   The rank-ordered logit model, which is in 
essence a series of multinomial logit models multiplied together, can be applied to the 
rankings data (Lusk, Fields, and Prevatt 2008).     
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Rank-Ordered Logit Model 
In using ordered models, the model is built around a latent regression described 
by Greene (2003).  In this case, a general model of the form given in  
  
(28)                
 
where Uil is unobserved and εil are unobserved factors (alternatively interpreted as 
random disturbances); this equation can be used as a starting point for building a model 
that accounts for the ordered nature of the data.  Following Calfee, Winston, and 
Stempski (2001), let each individual i submit a response ri = {ri1, ri2, ri3,. . . ., riL}, which 
is a ranking of the choice set in order of descending preference.  Then, each survey 
response would have a probability given by 
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this can be further expanded to the probability expression  
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This illustrates that a ranking response for L alternatives has an equivalent expression as 
(L – 1) binary choice decisions.  Thus, more preferred elements of the choice set are 
censored as subsequent ranks are assigned.  This application of the model is sometimes 
referred to as ―exploding‖ the data, allowing the researcher to make full use of all 
information by repeatedly applying whichever model is used (i.e. probit, standard logit, 
mixed logit).  As these authors suggest, a standard ordered probit or a rank-ordered logit 
model are easier to estimate due to their closed form solutions.  If the products are 
indexed such that  
 
(31)              (   )        
 
then for a rank-ordered logit, the logit probability is  
 
(32)         (   )   
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Then, by ―exploding‖ the series of L -1 ranking decisions and assuming the error terms 
    are distributed type I extreme value (Gumbel) distribution (Greene 2003), the 
probability for the entire ranking of L – 1 decisions is simply the product of L – 1 
multinomial logit models (Lusk, Fields, and Prevatt 2008) and is given by  
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With N individuals in the sample where each individual‘s    is independent and 
identically distributed, the log-likelihood function maximized is then given by  
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With parameter variation across individuals (heterogeneity), the model estimated by 
rank-ordered logit is subject to misspecification.  Hensher and Jones (2007) suggest that 
the multinomial model should be estimated first as a baseline comparison to other 
models; in the case of rank-ordered data, the baseline model is simply the product of 
several multinomial logit models.   
More specifically, the rank-ordered logit makes an assumption of uncorrelated 
stochastic components across alternatives; therefore if these errors are correlated 
estimates of the parameters and WTP are inconsistent.  In this case, a mixed (random 
parameters) logit would be a good candidate.  The mixed logit model is more flexible 
than, and avoids certain limitations of, the standard logit model.  A mixed logit model 
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allows for correlation in unobserved factors (an issue discussed above), has unrestricted 
substitution patterns, and allows for random taste variation (Train 2003).   
 
Mixed Multinomial Logit Model 
McFadden and Train (2000) develop the properties of the mixed multinomial 
logit as a model for discrete response, particularly as applied to random utility theory 
and the use of maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) estimation.  Train (2003) further 
provides a thorough discussion of the mixed logit model and readers are referred there 
for additional information.  However, a brief summary is included here to describe the 
model that will be used for estimation of the ranking data.  When the standard logit 
model is integrated over a density of parameters, a mixed logit model is obtained.  More 
specifically, mixed logits are any models where the choice probabilities can be described 
as  
 
(35)      ∫   ( ) ( )   
 
 
where Lik is the logit probability evaluated at β as given by   
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f(β) is the density function, and Vik is the observed utility which depends on the 
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parameters β for a particular product k.  If utility is assumed to be linear in parameters, 
then  
 
(37)     ( )         
 
and the probability takes the form  
 
(38)      ∫
      
∑        
 ( )    
 
 
Thus, the mixed logit probability is based on weighting the average of the logit 
formula at various parameter values β using the density f(β) to describe the weights.  
Statistics literature would call f(β) the mixing distribution.  In the case where a mixed 
logit is specified, but none of the exclusions from the three assumptions key to a 
standard logit are needed, the probability function of the mixed logit simplifies to that of 
the standard logit.  The mixed logit is most commonly interpreted from a random 
coefficients theory, where the random coefficients refer to a vector of coefficients 
representing an individual‘s taste and are allowed to vary across individuals in the 
population.  The mixed logit model can also be used based on an error components 
theory, with a representation of the correlations among utilities for different alternatives 
as the error components.   Under such an interpretation, the stochastic portion of the 
utility can be interpreted as a random coefficient plus the product of a vector of random 
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terms that sum to zero and the error components.  Mixed logit is also free from the IIA 
assumption discussed earlier in the literature review.  Mixed logit models can be 
estimated using simulated maximum likelihood estimation or Bayesian procedures.  
Greene (2003) suggests that the mixed logit model be estimated using simulation of the 
log-likelihood function rather than direct integration, as the mixture distribution based 
on the error term and the random part of the coefficient is unknown to the researcher.  
On this basis, a mixed logit model can be applied to the ranking decisions made 
by individual participants in the study.  However, the mixed logit model alone is not 
equipped to handle to ordering issues presented in the description of the rank-ordered 
logit model.  Hence, estimation under a rank-ordered framework with a mixed logit 
model allows errors to be correlated.   
The preceding discussion points towards the use of a rank-ordered mixed logit 
model that accounts for the ordinal nature of the data as well as avoiding the IIA 
assumptions of the standard logit model.  In such a model, if the stochastic terms are 
used to represent deviations from the mean tastes, then the errors can be allowed to be 
correlated across product alternatives.  Returning to the random utility model, again let l 
correspond to the alternatives to be ranked, with L – 1 choice decisions to be made.  The 
model can now be specified as  
 
(39)                    
 
 where            .  In order to allow the correlation across multiple products, the 
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random utility function can be modified with further specification of βi.  Recall that βi is 
the unobserved vector of coefficients for each individual that is randomly distributed 
with a conditional probability density function given by  (  | 
 ) where θ* represents 
the true parameters of the distribution (Calfee, Winston, and Stempski 2001); θ* can also 
be understood as the vector of parameters of the density function (Wong, Wong, and Sze 
2008).  The stochastic source of error      remains uncorrelated with    and      and is 
distributed i.i.d. extreme value as before.  The β coefficient vector more specifically 
takes on a form of         where b is the population mean and ηi are individual 
deviations from the average tastes for the population (Calfee, Winston, and Stempski 
2001).   Now, utility can be specified as  
 
(40)  
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where the stochastic portion of utility is now correlated across alternatives through the 
attributes in the model.  Thus, the model no longer imposes IIA.  The conditional 
probability that individual i will choose alternative k is  
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The conditional probability of assigning a given full ranking of all possible alternatives 
of                     such that, for example, alternative l1 is ranked first, l2 is ranked 
second, and so on for a given set of information s can be calculated as the product of the 
conditional probability for all choice decisions:   
 
(42)        ( 
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 (      )
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this is the probability of the series of binary choice decisions that are ―exploded‖ from 
the full rankings in order to take advantage of all possible information (Srinivasan, Bhat, 
and Holguin-Veras 2006).  As a final step, to obtain the unconditional probability that a 
given alternative l will be selected, the conditional probability must be integrated over 
all possible values of βi, where the parameters θ* define the distribution of βi.  Then, the 
unconditional probability is given by  
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Thus, with an objective of estimating θ*, which are the parameters defining the 
distribution of coefficients βi, the log-likelihood function to be maximized is 
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[A monotonic transformation of the likelihood function preserves the maximum, so 
taking the logarithm of the likelihood function is the method that is generally preferred 
for estimation (Paarsch and Hong 2006)].  
The integral to be maximized has no closed-form solution (Calfee, Winston, and 
Stempski 2001).  Therefore, it is not possible to maximize the log-likelihood function in 
its true form (Greene 2003).  Thus, as further described by Greene (2003), a procedure 
for random sampling from the vector that describes individual heterogeneity can be 
applied in conjunction with an appropriate law of large numbers.  This permits 
substitution of this approximation for the expectation into the log-likelihood function.  
With a sufficient number of draws, the estimation procedure is able to approximate the 
true function.  Therefore, estimation is most often done by using simulation techniques.    
In the output of the maximum simulated likelihood estimation and as a result of the 
model used, the marginal effects of the regressors x as given in          are not 
equivalent to the coefficients β, but the marginal effects are the measures which should 
have explanatory power in this model.  (Please see Calfee, Winston, and Stempski 2001 
and Srinviasan, Bhat, and Holguin-Veras 2006 for further development of the rank-
ordered mixed logit model).    
The rankings data were expanded in STATA/ IC 11.0 © to create a series of (L - 
1) decisions for each individual, where in each decision one product was chosen over all 
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remaining choices.  This procedure has been described by others using a mixed rank-
ordered logit model, including Srinivasan, Bhat, and Holguin-Veras (2006) and in the 
example given by Rabe-Hesketh, Pickles, and Skrondal (2001).   
Consider an example of the following rankings given in Table 5.  This was the 
format of the data prior to ―exploding‖ it, and this format indicates a single instance of 
ranking each product by one individual with one information treatment.   
 
Table 5. Example of Rankings Data before "Exploding" Data 
 
 
 
The rankings of each product are indicated by the column titled ―Ranking.‖  
Thus, the mixed pomegranate juice was ranked first, the RTE Texas product was ranked 
second, and so on, until the option of no product was ranked last.   
 Now consider the exploded data as given in Table 6.  The data now show the 
implied decisions made in assigning each rank.  First, the subject decided that he 
preferred the mixed pomegranate juice to all other options.  Then, the subject decided 
that he preferred the RTE Texas product out of all the remaining product options.  This 
ID Information Product Key Ranking
101 Baseline Cal Wonderful 6
101 Baseline TX Red 4
101 Baseline TX Sal. 3
101 Baseline RTE CA 5
101 Baseline RTE TX 2
101 Baseline Juice 1
101 Baseline Pineapple 7
101 Baseline No Product 8
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continued until there were only two product options remaining, and the subject chose the 
option of pineapple over the option of no product.  Note that only (L - 1) decisions need 
to be included because the ranking of the final product is implied in the (L - 1)
th
 decision. 
 
Table 6. Example of Rankings Data after "Exploding" Data 
 
 
 
The rankings models were then estimated using the --mixlogit-- command in 
STATA/ IC 11.0 ©.  The --mixlogit-- command was developed by A. R. Hole (2007).  
ID Information Product Key Ranking Chosen
101 Baseline Cal Wonderful 1 0
101 Baseline TX Red 1 0
101 Baseline TX Sal. 1 0
101 Baseline RTE CA 1 0
101 Baseline RTE TX 1 0
101 Baseline Juice 1 1
101 Baseline Pineapple 1 0
101 Baseline No Product 1 0
101 Baseline Cal Wonderful 2 0
101 Baseline TX Red 2 0
101 Baseline TX Sal. 2 0
101 Baseline RTE CA 2 0
101 Baseline RTE TX 2 1
101 Baseline Pineapple 2 0
101 Baseline No Product 2 0
101 Baseline Cal Wonderful 3 0
101 Baseline TX Red 3 0
101 Baseline TX Sal. 3 1
101 Baseline RTE CA 3 0
101 Baseline Pineapple 3 0
101 Baseline No Product 3 0
101 Baseline Cal Wonderful 4 0
101 Baseline TX Red 4 1
101 Baseline RTE CA 4 0
101 Baseline Pineapple 4 0
101 Baseline No Product 4 0
101 Baseline Cal Wonderful 5 0
101 Baseline RTE CA 5 1
101 Baseline Pineapple 5 0
101 Baseline No Product 5 0
101 Baseline Cal Wonderful 6 1
101 Baseline Pineapple 6 0
101 Baseline No Product 6 0
101 Baseline Pineapple 7 1
101 Baseline No Product 7 0
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The mixed logit model is estimated using maximum simulated likelihood.  Simulations 
sometimes use a pseudo-random number generator as the basis for the simulation.  
However, this method has relatively high discrepancy, which refers to the fact that the 
draw is far from the uniform distribution.  To address this and use an alternative that has 
a better ―worst discrepancy‖ from a series of draws, Halton draws are used as a more 
uniform alternative (Wanscher and Sørensen 2006).  Henscher and Train (2003) describe 
the usefulness of Halton draws as applied to mixed models, and suggest that with greater 
complexity (more random parameters and treatment of preference heterogeneity) 
increases the number of draws required.  Train (1999) finds a lower simulated variance 
in the estimated parameters when using 100 Halton numbers than when using 1,000 
Halton numbers.  This result is important because the estimation procedure is faster 
when fewer Halton draws are used.  One hundred Halton draws were used for the model 
estimation.   
 One important note of caution is provided by Greene (2003) for discrete choice 
modeling.  Both logit and probit models are susceptible to two important specification 
issues, which were previously described by Yatchew and Griliches (1985).  First, if a 
variable is omitted from the model when it should not be, even if the omitted variable is 
uncorrelated with the included variables the coefficients on the included variables will 
be inconsistent.  Second, if the disturbances in the underlying regression are 
heteroskedastic then maximum likelihood estimators will be inconsistent.   
However, despite the constraints and distributional assumptions of the logit 
model and its modified versions, as pointed out by Greene and Hensher (2010), the use 
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of fully nonparametric in applications is rare.  While nonparametric techniques avoid the 
distributional assumptions of parametric models for ordered choices, they are also 
therefore less informative to the practitioner in terms of estimation results.  Semi-
parametric approaches are something of a compromise between the two in which the 
estimator of the probability function is done using a kernel density estimator.  Greene 
and Hensher (2010) further call attention to the fact that although the application of 
semi-parametric methods from single choice models to ordered choice models has taken 
place almost entirely in the 21
st
 century.   
 
Comparison of Preferences Based on Bids and Rankings 
It is likely that consumers prefer to avoid instances of cognitive dissonance as 
described by Alfnes, Yue, and Jensen (2010).  However, a comparison of the preference 
rankings and the ordered bids collected in this study lead to some questions about such 
an assertion.  The auction and bidding mechanisms used here are a novel combination; 
however, since both were incentive compatible and nonhypothetical, it was hypothesized 
that the two mechanisms would produce similar results.  Olsen, Donaldson, and 
Shackley (2005) addressed the issue of explicit versus implicit rankings data in terms of 
public preference for health care programs.  In this case, the implied rankings are the 
ordered bids, and the explicit rankings are the actual preference rankings submitted by 
subjects.  Economic theory suggests that rational subjects would respond to either of 
these ranking situations in the same way.  The experimental design for this study offers a 
unique opportunity to compare the two methodologies and look at the issue of 
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consistency; that is, whether the implied and explicit rankings produce convergent 
results.  The opportunity to analyze this issue differs in this case from that of Olsen, 
Donaldson, and Shackley (2005) because subjects for this study were asked to submit 
bids and rankings for a product which is typically purchased on an individual level and 
has a private value unique to each individual; the Olsen, Donaldson, and Shackley 
(2005) paper addressed preference ranking and partial WTP values for health care 
programs that benefit the general public.   
Economic theory suggests the two methodologies should produce similar results 
on the basis that as a product increases in desirability to an individual from less preferred 
to more preferred, that individual would be willing to give up larger and larger sums 
(have a higher WTP) in exchange for that item.  However, the question to be addressed 
is whether this economic theory of two types of preference elicitation that are related in 
their general purpose and in their theoretical underpinnings are related in practical 
settings.   
 Two distinct methods of preference elicitation were utilized as a part of this 
study, each of which lends itself to a different type of analysis.  However, one primary 
goal of the study was to compare the results of each of the two preference elicitation 
procedures.  This was done by ordering the bids (given in dollars) such that the product 
with the highest bid was assigned a rank of one, the next highest bid was assigned a rank 
of two, and so forth until the lowest bid was assigned a rank of 8.  Two particular issues 
were addressed in assigning these rankings.  First, let equivalent bids (ties) be considered 
participant indifference between two or more products.  In the event of a tie, the products 
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with the tied bids were assigned the same ranking and the product with the next highest 
bid was assigned the rank of the number of products that were above it plus one.  For 
example, if a subject submitted bids for four products of $2.00, $1.75, $1.75, and $1.50, 
the rankings assigned to the ordered bids would be 1, 2, 2, and 4, respectively.  For the 
rank-ordered logit model, ties in the rankings were addressed using the exact marginal 
likelihood for indifference in alternatives (StataCorp 2009).  Second, as a part of the 
experiment subjects submitted bids for seven fruit products during the experimental 
auction rounds, but for the ranking they were asked to rank their preferences for seven 
products and the option of no product, with 1 being the most preferred product and 8 
being the least preferred product.  Thus, there was one less product bid than there was 
product option ranking.  Nevertheless, while submitting bids, subjects had the option of 
submitting bids of $0.00.  For the ordered bids, the option of no product was assigned 
the appropriate ranking based on the ordered bids (OB) as                    
   (                                 )      Any products that had bids of 
$0.00 were assigned ordered ranks based on                             
                      The preference models for the ordered bids were then 
estimated using the same model used for the preference rankings.   
 
Variation in Ranking Ability 
 Both the preference rankings and the ordered bids were modeled using the full 
information set for all eight product options.  However, Calfee, Winston, and Stempski 
(2001) follow Hausman and Ruud (1987) in considering the possibility of respondents 
  
187 
who rank more preferred alternatives more carefully than less preferred ones.  If this is 
the case, there should be less variance in the rankings for the most preferred alternatives 
and vice versa, and the parameter estimates based on such models should be affected by 
the change in the model from including all rankings to including only the top half of the 
rankings.  The model with only the top half of the rankings will be referred to here as the 
partially-ranked model.  This was done first for the preference rankings data.  The 
ordered bid rankings were also estimated using the partially-ranked model for the top 
four rankings to check the models for heterogeneity in ranking ability.   
 If the preference ranking parameters are sensitive to estimation with a full- 
versus partially-ranked model, then a scaling parameter can be estimated based on the 
specific dataset.  This procedure would be useful if there is more noise in the rankings 
for the less preferred products than the more preferred products.  One example of such a 
technique is demonstrated by Lusk, Fields, and Prevatt (2008).   
 In summation, the econometric techniques applied to the dataset collected from 
the experimental procedures were determined at least in part by the nature of the data 
itself.  This allows for accommodation of any issues which may not have been 
anticipated in the experimental design.   
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The study design was somewhat complex in order to allow for testing a number 
of different hypotheses; still, attention to detail during the study design process yielded 
results on a number of issues of interest.  These results can be broadly categorized as a 
discussion of the demographic and behavioral characteristics of those included in the 
sample, results of the various models used to estimated WTP based on the experimental 
auction, and results of the preference rankings.  Further comparisons among these results 
were also made, and specific characteristics of this particular data set were addressed.   
 
Demographics and Behavioral Characteristics 
 A total of 203 individuals participated in the study.  Of these, 198 submitted 
complete and usable demographic information and auction bids.  The socioeconomic 
characteristics of the study sample are described in Table 7.  Participants were assigned 
to sessions to ensure that there was a similar demographic representation in each of the 
eight sessions.   It was assumed that this sample would be reflective of those who were 
interested in the advertised topic of the study and who were also willing and able to 
participate in the designated study sessions for the designated compensation amount.   
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Table 7. Socioeconomic and Behavioral Characteristics of Experiment Subjects 
 
 
 
 
 In analyzing the demographics of the population sample, it should first be noted 
that 88.00% of participants reported themselves to be the primary shopper for their 
household.  Per the recruitment conditions of the study, all other participants reported 
that they carried out at least a portion of the household shopping responsibilities.  The 
Variable Category Mean Std. Dev.
Age (years) 42.84 17.51
Under 29
30-39
40-49
50-59
60-69
70 and over
Household Size (individuals) 2.24 1.15
Education High School Diploma or Less
More than High School up to 4-year 
College Degree
Graduate Courses or More
Gender Female
Male
Marital Status Married
Not Married
Annual Household Income Less than $50,000/year
$50,000- $99,999/year
More than $100,000/year
Primary Shopper Primary Shopper
Secondary Shopper
Household Spending on Food ($/week) 109.13 75.49
Household Spending on Fruits and  Vegetables ($/week) 25.13 17.72
Fresh Fruits and Vegetables on Hand (lbs.) 6.37 4.65
Previous Purchase of Pomegranate Fruit Yes
No
Have a Serious Health Issue Yes
No
Tobacco Use (% of days per year smoked)
20.79 57.77
Exercise (% of days per year exercised) 43.52 38.97
24.62%
75.38%
28.50%
71.50%
34.83%
11.94%
14.43%
21.89%
7.46%
9.45%
45.77%
53.77%
35.18%
11.06%
88.00%
12.00%
54.23%
11.44%
60.70%
27.86%
68.66%
31.34%
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mean age for the sample was 42.84 years of age, younger than the age of the average 
shopper (47 years of age) in the United States (Goodman 2008).  Over 68% of the 
respondents were female, and participants reported an average annual household income 
of $53,693.  Of this income, the weekly household spending on all food purchases 
(including restaurants and other purchases outside the home) was reported by 
participants with a mean of $109.  Of that weekly household spending on food, 
participants reported a mean of $25 per week spending on all fruits and vegetables.  
Also, participants reported to have an average of 6.4 pounds of fresh produce (including 
fruits and vegetables) on hand at home at the time of the study.  This was measured to 
judge any effects that current home stocks may have had on WTP for additional fruit as 
measured by the experimental auctions.  As anticipated, most participants were 
unaccustomed to purchasing pomegranate fruits, with just 24.5% of subjects reporting 
that they had previously purchased a pomegranate fruit.  This lends itself to the 
interpretation of pomegranates as a novel product for the majority of participants in the 
study.   
 A series of health questions were also posed to participants after they had 
submitted all rankings and bids.  Of all the study participants, 28.5% reported having a 
health issue that they considered to be serious.  The average tobacco use by subjects was 
77 days (or 21%) of the year, while the average percentage of days exercised per year 
was 161 (or 44%).  These health characteristics were measured to allow for further 
investigation into possible relationships between the effects of such behaviors and the 
information treatments imposed throughout the course of the study.   
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 The number of participants per session and the assigned treatments for each 
session are included in Table 8.  The number of subjects per session ranged from 19 to 
35 due to a large number of no-show participants in some of the sessions.   
  
Table 8. Sessions, Information Treatments, and Reference Price 
 
 
 
 
Each of these sessions received the three additional information treatments, with 
the order of these treatments randomized; five of these sessions (n=138; 70% of 
participants) were given a reference price for the current retail price of the fruit products.  
However, all participants were informed that the products available sold at retail for the 
same price.   
 The general buying behaviors, particularly for fruits and vegetables, of 
participants were surveyed in order to gather more information on possible behaviors or 
beliefs that could influence purchases.  The buying behaviors of participants are given in 
Table 9.  Although the more general of these were pointed out in subject characteristics, 
a few others will be pointed out here.  The average percent of all fruit and vegetable 
N (Total N=198)
1st Information 
Treatment
2nd Information 
Treatment
3rd Information 
Treatment
Given Reference 
Price
Session 1 22 Tasting Health and Nutrition Anti-Cancer No
Session 2 19 Health and Nutrition Tasting Anti-Cancer Yes
Session 3 22 Health and Nutrition Tasting Anti-Cancer No
Session 4 21 Anti-Cancer Tasting Health and Nutrition Yes
Session 5 19 Health and Nutrition Anti-Cancer Tasting No
Session 6 27 Tasting Anti-Cancer Health and Nutrition Yes
Session 7 34 Anti-Cancer Health and Nutrition Tasting Yes
Session 8 34 Anti-Cancer Tasting Health and Nutrition Yes
Note: Five participants failed to submit complete bids and demographic information, and were not included in the 
analysis.  The total number of participants recruited for the study was 203.  
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purchases that were for fresh fruits and vegetables was 71%.  For this response, 
participants were asked to exclude purchases of canned fruit, frozen fruit, fruit juices, 
and fruit-flavored products.  The primary purchase location for fruit and vegetable 
purchases was reported to be a grocery store or supermarket by 86.4% of participants, 
with just 8.5% of consumers doing the majority of their shopping at a mass merchandiser 
or supercenter.  These figures are somewhat disproportionate with the national averages 
reported by the USDA‘s Economic Research Service for the types of stores where 
consumers do their grocery shopping, with values of 67.1% at grocery store and 
supermarkets versus 19.7% for warehouse clubs, supercenters, and mass merchandisers 
for the year 2009 (Kaufman and Kumco 2010).  This could be an artifact of the subject 
selection procedures or attributed to regional variation in retail availability of groceries.   
 
 
Table 9. Participant Survey Responses on Fruit and Vegetable Buying Behaviors 
 
 
 
 
Mean Std. Dev. %
Primary Shopper 88.00%
Weekly Food Expenditures 109.13 75.49
Weekly Fruit and Vegetable Expenditures 25.13 17.72
Percent Fresh  Fruits and Vegetables of All Fruit and Vegetable Purchases 0.71 0.37
Location of Fruit and Vegetable Purchases
Grocery Store/ Supermarket 86.43%
Mass Merchandiser/ Supercenters 8.54%
Farmers Market or Other Location 5.03%
Length of Time Since Last Visit (days) 3.00 2.81
Frequency of Fruit and Vegetable Purchases (Days Between Purchases) 8.63 6.28
Fresh Fruit on Hand (lbs.) 3.29 2.72
Fresh Vegetables on Hand (lbs.) 2.39 1.09
Fresh Produce on Hand (Paired Sums of Fruits and Vegetables) (lbs.) 6.37 4.65
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 The mean length of time since a participant‘s last visit to the retail establishment 
where he or she purchased groceries was 3.00 days, with a reported typical length of 
time between fruit and vegetable purchases of 8.63 days.  These were both hypothesized 
to influence a subject‘s bidding behavior and his or her perception of outside substitutes 
and the transactions costs of delaying a purchase in the laboratory setting until the time 
of their next trip to purchase groceries.   
 In terms of the quantity of fruits and vegetables on hand at the time of the study, 
a few items are notable.  First, the mean weight of fruit on hand for subjects was 3.29 
pounds, and the mean pounds of vegetables on hand was somewhat lower, at 2.39 
pounds.  However, the paired sums of fruits and vegetables on hand for each subject 
were 6.37 pounds, which is larger than the 5.67 pounds that the sum of the unpaired 
means gives.  This can be interpreted to mean that although there may be some outliers 
in terms of either the fruit or vegetables on hand for each individual, the total fresh 
produce on hand was higher than would be predicted by either of these measures alone. 
These amounts were elicited from consumers in order to test whether current ―stocks‖ of 
fruits and vegetables on hand would have any influence on the WTP for pomegranate 
products.     
 The pomegranate has received a great deal of recent attention as a so-called 
―functional food‖ due to the health benefits beyond basic nutritional value that the fruit 
have been reported to have.  One goal of the study was to gain a general understanding 
of the product awareness that participants had for functional food products.  Thus, 
subjects were surveyed on their familiarity with functional foods, as well as their 
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familiarity with some common and some less-common functional food products.  
Somewhat surprising was the result that only 16% of participants were familiar with the 
term ―functional foods.‖  Nevertheless, a much larger percentage of subjects reported 
previously purchasing a variety of functional food products; ranging from 21.5% for 
wine with added polyphenols to 85.5% for breakfast cereal for heart health.  These 
results, further detailed in Table 10, suggest that although consumers may not be readily 
familiar with the terminology that is used for such products, they are aware of these 
products in the marketplace, and in many cases they are purchasing these functional food 
products.   
 
 
Table 10. Subject Familiarity with Functional Foods 
 
 
 
 
 Since the preferences for pomegranate fruits and other pomegranate products 
were elicited on the basis of the pomegranate as a novel product, subjects were also 
asked about their familiarity with these products.  As shown in Figure 9, there were 
Percentage (%)
Heard of Functional Foods
Yes 16.00%
No 65.50%
Unsure 18.50%
Previously Purchased Functional Food Products:
Breakfast Cereal for Heart Health 85.50%
Yogurt with Probiotics 79.00%
Green Tea 68.00%
Fish with Omega-3 Fatty Acids 65.00%
Tomatoes for Lycopene 64.50%
Wine with Added Polyphenols 21.50%
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similarities among the two forms of pomegranate juice and the whole pomegranate fruit; 
however, participants were generally unfamiliar with the RTE pomegranate products and 
the pomegranate-flavored products.  This was expected considering that RTE 
pomegranate products are relatively new and much less common in the marketplace than 
juice or whole fruit products.  Only 7.53% of participants indicated that they currently 
had any pomegranates on hand.   
 
 
Figure 9. Familiarity with Pomegranate Products 
 
Participants who indicated that they had previously purchased whole 
pomegranate fruits were asked to indicate when those purchases were made.  The 
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responses to these questions, given in Figure 10, further indicated that either participants 
were unfamiliar with the pomegranate products or that they were not highly aware of the 
times of year that pomegranates were in season and thus available for purchase.  Over 
70% of individuals who had previously made a purchase of the whole pomegranate fruit 
products indicated that they did not know or did not remember when those purchases 
had been made.  Admittedly, for those who indicated knowledge of when pomegranates 
were purchased, this knowledge could have been affected by the month of the year when 
the study was held. 
 
 
Figure 10. Of Participants Who Previously Purchased Whole Pomegranate Fruits, 
Percentages Who Purchased Pomegranate Fruits in a Particular Month 
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The subjects in the study were also surveyed as to which of the following factors 
were most important in making fruit and vegetable purchases: convenience, freshness, 
growing location, nutrition, price, production practices, size, and visual appearance.  
Production practices refer to any of several growing methods that are advertised at the 
point-of-sale for the item, such as organic, no pesticides, or any other production 
practices.   These factors were measured in two separate question formats.  Several items 
in the responses to these questions should be noted.  First, the factors that were important 
in fruit and vegetable decision-making were measured in an effort to capture the 
qualities that play a role in consumer decision-making in regards to fruit and vegetable 
purchases.  These factors were also measured to provide a comparison to the behaviors 
of participants in the nonhypothetical experimental auctions and ranking procedures.  
For the first measurement of these factors, subjects selected which of three factors were 
the most important in their fruit and vegetable purchasing decisions.  However, one 
caution with this type of analysis is that a subject‘s answers could be influenced by what 
he or she perceives as social norms or the socially acceptable answer; a bias of this sort 
is termed as ―social desirability bias‖ by Lusk and Norwood (2009).  For instance, a 
subject may claim that he had a strong preference for growing location, but his bidding 
and ranking behavior should indicate whether the factors he cited as important actually 
had an influence on his bidding behavior.   
In an effort to capture some portion of the possible social desirability bias, 
subjects were asked which factors were important to them as well as which factors they 
perceived to be important to the average American.  An example of how this was 
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phrased in the survey questions is as follows: ―Which of these factors do you consider 
most important in making fruit and vegetable purchase decisions? (Please select up to 3 
options).‖  This was followed by the question, ―Which of these factors do you believe 
the average American considers most important in making fruit and vegetable purchase 
decisions? (Please select up to 3 options).‖  Thus, subjects were freed from an obligation 
to report an answer that they saw as socially desirable by answering the second question.  
Of the provided factors, the most commonly cited factor was Price for both 
individuals and for the predictions for average Americans.  Thus, regardless of the health 
benefits or other experience attributes of a product, the cost items was confirmed to still 
play an important role in purchasing decisions. 
However, the results differed for the remainder of the factors between the 
individual vs. average American predictions, with predictions for average Americans 
being more common for visual appearance, size, convenience, and production practices.  
The most striking of these was for convenience, being cited 2.75 times more often for 
the prediction for average Americans than for the individual‘s reported behavior.  More 
individuals indicated that their own purchase decisions were based on freshness, 
growing location, and nutrition than what was predicted for average Americans.  This 
lends support to the hypothesis by Lusk and Norwood (2009) that behaviors considered 
by some to be more socially acceptable behaviors, such as choosing fresh produce based 
on a growing location, freshness, or nutrition were more commonly cited for individual 
behavior than for the prediction for the average American.  This behavior could also be 
because an individual believes he or she is more knowledgeable or has more information 
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than the ―average American‖ that he or she is being compared against.  Still, the 
overriding factor in purchase decision-making was price, indicating that any product 
offering should be done with this factor in mind.  Also, the fact that the results of the two 
questions are not identical does not indicate that either set of results is wrong; if study 
participants differ in some way from the average American in terms of these 
characteristics, then the results of the two questions would be expected to differ.   
  
Table 11. Factors Cited as Important in Fruit and Vegetable Purchasing Decisions 
 
 
 
 
 In an alternative method of gauging the factors that might influence price, 
subjects were also asked to rate a similar list of factors on a rating scale from 1 to 4, 
ranging from 1 = Not important at all to 4 = Very Important.  There was an important 
difference between the previous list and this list of factors; a factor for Taste was 
included.  The previous list included only information that could be gained by 
consumers by information observed during the buying process.  This could include 
Individuals
Individual Anticipations for 
"Average Americans"
Factor Percentage Citing as Important 
(a)
Percentage Citing as Important
Price 78.97% 84.93%
Freshness 69.74% 43.72%
Visual Appearance 50.26% 62.31%
Nutrition 34.87% 21.11%
Growing Location 18.46% 4.52%
Size 16.41% 22.61%
Convenience 15.90% 43.72%
Production Practices 6.67% 7.54%
(a)
 Based on top 3 factors selected by participants.
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information they assessed themselves (i.e. visual appearance, size, and freshness) or 
information that might be provided at the point-of-sale (i.e. growing location, production 
practices, and nutrition).  In the rating scale question, subjects were also asked to rate an 
experience attribute factor that can only be determined with consumption of the product: 
taste.  On this rating scale, taste and freshness were cited as the top two factors in 
purchase decision making for fruits and vegetables; these were followed by price and 
then nutrition as the next highest in importance.   
 
Table 12. Relative Importance of Factors in Fruit and Vegetable Purchase 
Decisions Based on a Rating Scale 
 
 
 
In the rankings, the mean for importance for individuals was lowest for growing 
location, and then slightly higher for production practices and convenience.  Although 
Factor Mean 
(a)
Std. Dev.
Interpretation of 
Importance
(a)
Taste 3.835 0.385 Very Important
Freshness 3.835 0.411 Very Important
Price 3.465 0.686 Somewhat Important
Nutrition 3.345 0.706 Somewhat Important
Visual Appearance 3.265 0.767 Somewhat Important
Size 2.739 0.760 Somewhat Important
Convenience 2.693 0.773 Somewhat Important
Production Practices 2.470 0.951 Not Very Important
Growing Location 2.360 0.998 Not Very Important
(a)
 Subjects were asked to rank all of these factors on a scale of 1 to 4; 1 = 
Not important at all, 2 = Not Very Important, 3 = Somewhat Important, 
and 4 = Very Important.
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these results are similar to the results measured based on selecting the top 3 factors, they 
confirm that the taste value gained from consuming the food is one of the most important 
factors influencing purchasing decisions for fruits and vegetables.  There was also less 
variability in this response than in the responses for the two lowest rated factors.  The 
results from the two measures of the factors involved in fruit purchasing decisions are 
summarized in Table 11 and Table 12.   
 The responses to these survey questions can be used to make interesting 
predictions about what the responses to the information treatments that are imposed 
during the study will be.  Also, if the results of these factor selection and ratings 
responses are convergent with the results of the ranking and/or bidding model, then they 
will provide confirmation of subject awareness of factors that influence their utility 
maximization.  If the results are divergent, then the issue of which responses are of value 
in predicting economic behavior may be explored in greater detail.   
 
WTP Models for Full Experimental Auction Bids 
 The full bids for the products included in the experimental auction and ranking 
procedure are summarized in Table 13.  Note that there were zero bids for all products in 
all rounds, but that the maximum bid also exceeded the current retail price of $3.50 for 
all products in all rounds, regardless of whether participants were provided with this 
reference price.   
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Table 13. Summary Statistics: Full Bids for Pomegranate and Other Fruit Products
 
 
 
Product Type Mean Bid Std. Dev. Minimum Median Maximum
Difference in Mean Bid 
From Baseline Product 
(a)
A. Bids - Baseline Round
California Wonderful Pomegranate Fruit 0.83 0.85 0.00 0.50 4.00 0.00 (Baseline Product)
Texas Red Pomegranate Fruit 0.80 0.84 0.00 0.50 4.05 -0.03
Texas Salavatski Pomegranate Fruit 0.81 0.80 0.00 0.63 4.00 -0.02
Ready-to-Eat Pomegranate Arils - California Wonderful 1.14 1.07 0.00 1.00 6.00 +0.31
Ready-to-Eat Pomegranate Arils - Texas Salavatski 1.16 1.06 0.00 1.00 6.00 +0.33
Mixed Pomegranate Juice 1.60 1.14 0.00 1.50 5.00 +0.77
Pineapple 1.87 1.15 0.00 2.00 5.00 +1.05
B. Bids - Tasting Round
California Wonderful Pomegranate Fruit 1.06 1.06 0.00 0.77 6.40 +0.23
Texas Red Pomegranate Fruit 1.13 1.10 0.00 1.00 6.35 +0.30
Texas Salavatski Pomegranate Fruit 1.07 1.06 0.00 0.88 6.50 +0.24
Ready-to-Eat Pomegranate Arils - California Wonderful 1.22 1.16 0.00 1.00 6.25 +0.39
Ready-to-Eat Pomegranate Arils - Texas Salavatski 1.30 1.18 0.00 1.00 6.00 +0.47
Mixed Pomegranate Juice 1.41 1.13 0.00 1.00 7.00 +0.58
Pineapple 1.89 1.17 0.00 2.00 6.00 +1.06
C. Bids - Health and Nutrition Information Round
California Wonderful Pomegranate Fruit 1.00 1.02 0.00 0.75 6.35 +0.17
Texas Red Pomegranate Fruit 1.04 1.06 0.00 0.75 6.25 +0.21
Texas Salavatski Pomegranate Fruit 1.02 1.10 0.00 0.78 8.00 +0.19
Ready-to-Eat Pomegranate Arils - California Wonderful 1.20 1.11 0.00 1.00 6.50 +0.37
Ready-to-Eat Pomegranate Arils - Texas Salavatski 1.26 1.12 0.00 1.00 6.75 +0.43
Mixed Pomegranate Juice 1.44 1.16 0.00 1.25 6.95 +0.61
Pineapple 1.93 1.20 0.00 2.00 7.00 +1.10
D. Bids - Anti-Cancer Information Round
California Wonderful Pomegranate Fruit 0.94 0.98 0.00 0.70 6.75 +0.12
Texas Red Pomegranate Fruit 0.99 1.01 0.00 0.75 6.50 +0.16
Texas Salavatski Pomegranate Fruit 0.98 0.98 0.00 0.75 6.25 +0.15
Ready-to-Eat Pomegranate Arils - California Wonderful 1.27 1.19 0.00 1.00 8.00 +0.44
Ready-to-Eat Pomegranate Arils - Texas Salavatski 1.33 1.12 0.00 1.00 7.00 +0.50
Mixed Pomegranate Juice 1.57 1.14 0.00 1.50 6.00 +0.74
Pineapple 1.86 1.13 0.00 2.00 5.00 +1.03
E. Bids - Full Information
California Wonderful Pomegranate Fruit 1.05 1.06 0.00 0.75 6.35 +0.22
Texas Red Pomegranate Fruit 1.13 1.09 0.00 1.00 6.25 +0.30
Texas Salavatski Pomegranate Fruit 1.07 1.06 0.00 0.83 6.00 +0.24
Ready-to-Eat Pomegranate Arils - California Wonderful 1.24 1.17 0.00 1.00 6.50 +0.41
Ready-to-Eat Pomegranate Arils - Texas Salavatski 1.30 1.20 0.00 1.00 6.75 +0.47
Mixed Pomegranate Juice 1.39 1.11 0.00 1.05 6.95 +0.56
Pineapple 1.99 1.19 0.00 2.00 7.00 +1.16
(a)
 The baseline product is assigned to the California Wonderful Pomegranate Fruit from the Baseline Information Round.
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There was a large degree of variance in the bids that were submitted.  In some cases the 
standard deviations of the bids for a product are as large as the bids for the products 
themselves; this is even more noticeable given the censoring that was anticipated at zero 
for the novel products.   
The mean bids for all products in all rounds are lower than the retail price of the 
included products.  All included products sold at retail for approximately $3.50 per item.  
For products that were not as readily available, the price that the item would sell for was 
approximated based on items available in other markets.  The two more familiar 
products, mixed pomegranate juice and pineapple, had higher mean and median bids for 
all rounds.  Further, there were large variations in the mean bids for all products; the 
95% confidence interval for all products would include a bid of $0.00.  Also included in 
this table are the differences in the mean bids from the baseline product of the California 
Wonderful pomegranate fruit in the Baseline information round.  This is also the 
baseline product that will be used in the later estimation of WTP for the fruit products.  
This makes it clear that based on the mean bids, individuals had a higher WTP for both 
RTE products in comparison to the baseline product and the whole pomegranate fruit 
products.  The control product that was included, the pineapple fruit, had the highest 
mean WTP of the included fruit products for every round.  This could be true based on 
familiarity with the product for the baseline round, but the persistence of this premium 
even when additional information (on taste, nutrition and health, and additional health 
benefits) for the pineapple suggests possible differences in the underlying tastes and 
preferences for the fruit products as well.   
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The information for the median bids and conditional mean bids can be visualized 
in Figure 11 and Figure 12, respectively.  In comparing these, slightly different stories of 
the effects of information treatments on the bids for each of the products emerge, as do 
differences in consumer preferences for each type of product. The mean bids are 
conditional on the bid not equaling zero; therefore, the censored bids are removed in this 
plot.   
 
 
 
Figure 11. Conditional Mean Bids for Fruit Products by Information Treatment 
 
 
 
Although there are some exceptions, the mean bids in the baseline information 
round were generally lower than the mean bids in the subsequent information rounds.  
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This was true for all of the entirely pomegranate products.  Secondly, the full 
information mean bids closely mirror the mean bids for the tasting round for all products 
except the mixed pomegranate juice and pineapple.  The largest range in mean bids 
across information treatments were for the three whole pomegranate fruits and the mixed 
pomegranate juice.  However, the direction of the change in mean bid across information 
treatments was opposite for the whole pomegranate fruit products (positive change) and 
the mixed pomegranate juice (negative change).   This suggests that one of the biggest 
hurdles in pomegranate marketing may be just getting consumers to initially try the 
products.   
 
 
 
Figure 12. Median Bids for All Fruit Products by Information Treatment (Baseline, 
Tasting Information, Health and Nutrition Information, Anti-Cancer Information, 
and Full Information) 
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As can be seen in Figure 12, there are differences in the median bids for the fruit 
products across information treatments as well as in comparison to the mean bids 
previously presented.  Three things should be highlighted about this plot.  First, the 
median bid for the baseline round is the lowest of all information treatments for the 
whole pomegranate products and the highest for the juice and pineapple; the two RTE 
products have the same median bid for all rounds.  Second, the bids for the full 
information closely follow the tasting information as in the plot of the means.  Finally, 
while there was an initial price premium for the RTE products, this price premium 
decreased as study participants gained information on the products.   
While the summary statistics for each set of products and information treatments 
are useful, it is also instructive to look at the distributions of the bids.  Two ways this can 
be done are with histograms or with kernel density smoothed probability density 
functions.  For added simplicity, the bids are plotted on separate graphs for each 
information treatment, allowing for visual comparison of the distributions of bids for 
each product.  The probability density functions shown were estimated using a Gaussian 
kernel density distribution in Simetar©.   
Kernel density estimation is a nonparametric way to estimate the probability 
density function.  The plot of the estimated kernel density function is similar to a 
histogram in that it allows the researcher to visualize the distribution of the data; 
however, in an estimated kernel density distribution each observed point in the data is 
assigned a specified distribution, and the sum of all of the distribution for all observed 
points is used to reflect the overall distribution.  By using a Gaussian (normal) kernel 
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density distribution, if the bids are normally distributed they should appear normally 
distributed in the probability density function estimates.   
 
 
 
Figure 13. Distribution of Baseline Round Bids for Fruit Products in Dollars as 
Estimated with a Gaussian Kernel Density Distribution 
 
 
 There are three basic groups of distributions with similar characteristics that can 
be distinguished in Figure 13.  The three whole fruit pomegranate products appear to 
have the highest degree of censoring at zero, with another clustering for the bids for the 
two ready-to-eat pomegranate products with somewhat less censoring at zero, and then 
the least amount of censoring for the juice and pineapple products.   
 The clustering effect that was seen for the baseline information round in Figure 
13 is much less visible in Figure 14 in the bids for the tasting information treatment.  
However, the most frequent bids are still well under $1.00 for all of the products except 
the juice and the pineapple.   
  
208 
 
Figure 14. Distribution of Tasting Information Round Bids for Fruit Products in 
Dollars as Estimated with a Gaussian Kernel Density Distribution 
 
 
 While the estimated probability density functions are similar across information 
treatments, it was necessary to compare all distributions for all products.  It would have 
been imprudent to assume that the distribution of bids for each product across the 
information treatment remained unchanged; it was possible that the information 
treatment would affect not only the location of the bids, but also the shape of the bid 
distribution.   
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Figure 15. Distribution of Health and Nutrition Information Round Bids for Fruit 
Products in Dollars as Estimated with a Gaussian Kernel Density Distribution 
 
 
 
 The distribution of the bids when compared across products reveals several 
points of interest.  First, the two products that subjects were expected to be more familiar 
with, juice and pineapple, are generally seen to have less censoring at zero than the other 
pomegranate fruit products; the means for these two products are shifted to the right 
relative to the other products.  It is also clear that the distribution of bids is not centered 
at the reference price of $3.50 for any of the products. 
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Figure 16. Distribution of Anti-Cancer Information Round Bids for Fruit Products 
in Dollars as Estimated with a Gaussian Kernel Density Distribution 
 
 
 The clustering of the estimated probability density functions among classes of 
products appears again in the health and information treatment and the anti-cancer 
information treatment plots (Figure 15 and Figure 16, respectively).  There is also some 
clustering in the estimated probability density functions for the full information set; 
these distributions can be seen in Figure 17.  However, more differences in the estimated 
distribution shapes are seen when participants had the full information set than in the 
other individual information treatments.  The shapes of the distributions also led to the 
question of whether the bids are normally distributed.  The question of the shape of the 
bid distribution will be addressed in further detail later.   
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Figure 17. Distribution of Full Information Bids for Fruit Products in Dollars as 
Estimated with a Gaussian Kernel Density Distribution 
   
 
Bid Censoring 
These figures visualize the bid censoring that occurred for the bids of the auction 
participants.  The percentages of the bids that are censored are included in Table 14.  
This result was not unexpected; it would have been extremely foreign for study 
participants to submit negative values for a good that would regularly be purchased for a 
positive value from a retail establishment.  Negative bids by subjects would have 
implied that they would require payment to accept the product in question.  This type of 
behavior would be expected in studies of products which varied significantly in subject 
reaction, such as irradiated meat or genetically modified food products (Parkhurst, 
Shogren, and Dickinson 2004).  Many studies which anticipate large percentages of 
negative values utilize either an endowed approach where subjects are endowed with a 
product with negative traits and asked to bid to upgrade (i.e. Lusk et al. 2001b). 
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Alternatively, products with potential negative values can be valued using willingness-
to-accept procedures rather than WTP (e.g. NOAA 1994).  
  
Table 14. Bids Censored at $0.00 and Bids above Reference Price, by Round 
 
 
 
 
 Also included in Table 14 are the percentage of bids over the given reference 
price.  Five of the eight study sessions (n = 135) received reference price information for 
the current retail price (Price = $3.50) of all of the included products.  Economic theory 
would suggest that a rational consumer would not submit a bid for the product that 
exceeded the sum of the retail price of the good and any associated transaction costs less 
any additional utility received from obtaining additional information on a novel product 
immediately.  Fewer participants in the sessions that were not given reference prices 
(n=63) reported bids higher than the retail price of the products in local stores ($3.50) at 
the time of the study.  However, the lack of familiarity with pomegranate products 
would not indicate that there were few bids above this particular price because of a bid 
censoring effect.  Rather, it suggests that those subjects who received reference price 
information were influenced by that value.   Therefore, given the percentages of 
Baseline Tasting Health and Nutrition Anti-Cancer
Percentage of bids censored at $0.00 19.59% 17.19% 18.46% 17.71%
Percentage of bids ≥ $3.50, if participants 
given reference price
6.03% 7.30% 7.30% 6.67%
Percentage of bids ≥ $3.50, if participants 
NOT given reference price
0.91% 1.13% 0.91% 1.36%
Information Treatment
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participants that submitted auction bids above the given reference price, it was 
concluded that an upper limit for the tobit model would not be appropriately based on 
the retail price of the products.  Thus, a lower-limit only tobit model was applied to the 
full bids for all products and all rounds of information.  Also, despite subjects being 
provided with a reference price, the mean bids were much lower for the fruit products 
than that reference price.  This suggests that in the marketplace the average participant 
would not purchase the product at the market price.  However, additional estimation was 
needed to determine what product, demographic, and behavioral characteristics might 
influence this WTP, regardless of whether it was lower than the reference price.   
 
Tobit Models for Each Product and Round 
 As discussed in the methods chapter, the WTP for pomegranates and other fruit 
products was estimated using 35 tobit models, with each model being specific to a 
particular product as well as to a particular information set received by subjects.  For 
purposes of brevity, each of these will not be fully detailed here.  Rather, the results from 
one set of models will be explained in detail, and the results of interest from the other 
models will be noted.  Full parameter estimates and marginal effects from the separate 
tobit models from these models can be found in Appendix G.  The results for the full 
information set are presented here and only the results for one product (Texas Red 
pomegranate fruit) for the full information set are interpreted here.   
First, the demographic variables that were included are explained in Table 3.  
These variables were introduced to account for possible differences in WTP for the 
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pomegranate and other fruit products based on differences in socioeconomic or 
behavioral characteristics.   
 The estimates provided in Table 15 suggest that the second education level 
dummy variable (education of more than high school up to and including a four-year 
college degree) is significant (P < 0.05) in predicting an increase in WTP for the Texas 
Red pomegranate fruit.  In a similar manner, previous purchase of a pomegranate 
product and being provided with a reference price also increased WTP for the Texas Red 
pomegranate fruit.  The estimated standard error of the regression is indicated by σ. 
However, the β coefficients that are estimated in the tobit model should not be 
interpreted in the same way as the β coefficients in a standard ordinary least squares 
(OLS) model estimation.  Rather, as pointed out by McDonald and Moffitt (1980), β 
actually reflects two components: 1) the change in the dependent variable (here, yi) of 
those values above the censoring limit and weighted by the probability of being above 
the censoring limit, and 2) the change in the probability of being above the limit, 
weighted by the expected value of yi if above the limit.  A change in β is only equal to 
the effect of a change in x on yi when x is equal to infinity.  Therefore, the results that are 
of economic interest from the tobit model are the marginal effects for each independent 
variable.  Estimation of marginal effects allows for comparison of the effects of the 
included regressors on the observed bids.   
As discussed in Chapter IV, the tobit model that is estimated is based on a 
censored distribution of bids; thus, the marginal effects of interest are the expected 
changes in bids given bid censoring at the specified level (here, for censoring at $0.00) 
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for a one unit change in the parameter of interest.  Marginal effects were calculated 
using the Delta method.  Estimates for marginal effects are given in Table 16.  (Note that 
marginal effects for dummy variables are calculated as a change from the base level of 
zero to a value of one.)   
In looking at the predicted marginal effects for changes in the variables in the 
tobit model for the Texas Red pomegranate, we conclude that an individual who has 
more than a high school education but less than a graduate education would be willing to 
pay a $0.42 premium over someone with a high school degree or less.  Similarly, an 
individual who had previously purchased a pomegranate fruit would pay $0.48 more for 
the Texas Red pomegranate fruit, and individuals who were provided with a reference 
price were willing to pay a $0.49 premium over those not given a reference price.  The 
results in this table for other products as well as those for other information treatments 
can be interpreted similarly. 
The tobit model estimations presented are useful in that they allow for 
comparisons of the parameter estimates and marginal effects for each product under each 
information treatment.  However, this limits generalizing the results to less specific 
products and   to make comparisons across information treatments and products.  By 
pooling all of the bids made by each individual with indicator variables for the 
information treatment and product that each bid was made for, further models may be 
estimated to provide additional insight. 
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Table 15. Tobit Models for WTP by Product, Full Information 
 
California 
Wonderful 
Pom. Fruit
Texas Red 
Pom. Fruit
Texas 
Salavatski 
Pom. Fruit
Ready-to-
Eat 
California 
Pom. Arils
Ready-to-
Eat Texas 
Pom. Arils
Mixed 
Pom. Juice
Pineapple
Parameter 
(Std. Error)
Parameter 
(Std. Error)
Parameter 
(Std. Error)
Parameter 
(Std. Error)
Parameter 
(Std. Error)
Parameter 
(Std. Error)
Parameter 
(Std. Error)
Constant -0.244 
(0.389)
-0.076 
(0.399)
-0.080 
(0.401)
0.309 
(0.436)
0.318 
(0.460)
0.603 
(0.405)
0.830** 
(0.382)
Demographics/ Behaviors
DAGE2 0.312 
(0.243)
0.203 
(0.249)
0.064 
(0.250)
0.092 
(0.273)
0.002 
(0.288)
0.028 
(0.255)
0.523** 
(0.240)
DAGE3 0.158 
(0.231)
0.126 
(0.235)
0.035 
(0.236)
-0.147 
(0.258)
-0.033 
(0.272)
0.256 
(0.241)
0.069 
(0.228)
DEDU2 0.430 
(0.275)
0.651** 
(0.279)
0.579** 
(0.280)
0.444 
(0.306)
0.604* 
(0.321)
0.320 
(0.286)
0.427 
(0.268)
DEDU3 0.410** 
(0.199)
0.314 
(0.204)
0.384* 
(0.204)
0.409* 
(0.223)
0.403* 
(0.235)
0.004 
(0.207)
0.117 
(0.197)
HOUSE -0.093 
(0.085)
-0.116 
(0.086)
-0.113 
(0.087)
-0.245** 
(0.096)
-0.193* 
(0.100)
-0.204** 
(0.088)
-0.223*** 
(0.082)
FEMALE 0.203 
(0.193)
0.008 
(0.197)
0.027 
(0.198)
0.364* 
(0.216)
0.128 
(0.226)
0.214 
(0.201)
0.236 
(0.189)
DMAR 0.131 
(0.227)
0.166 
(0.230)
0.102 
(0.232)
0.179 
(0.254)
0.132 
(0.265)
0.178 
(0.237)
0.018 
(0.222)
DINC2 -0.022 
(0.219)
-0.016 
(0.223)
0.083 
(0.224)
0.040 
(0.245)
0.129 
(0.257)
0.164 
(0.228)
0.369* 
(0.215)
DINC3 0.138 
(0.310)
-0.053 
(0.317)
0.073 
(0.318)
0.337 
(0.347)
0.187 
(0.364)
0.193 
(0.324)
0.584* 
(0.303)
SPENDFV 0.003 
(0.005)
0.004 
(0.005)
0.004 
(0.005)
0.005 
(0.006)
0.005 
(0.006)
0.002 
(0.005)
0.006 
(0.005)
FPOH 0.004 
(0.021)
0.013 
(0.021)
0.017 
(0.021)
0.017 
(0.023)
0.030 
(0.024)
0.028 
(0.021)
0.014 
(0.020)
POMFRUITP 0.855*** 
(0.193)
0.752*** 
(0.198)
0.757*** 
(0.199)
0.713*** 
(0.217)
0.594*** 
(0.229)
0.485** 
(0.203)
0.392** 
(0.193)
ILLNESS -0.125 
(0.200)
-0.044 
(0.203)
-0.104 
(0.205)
-0.268 
(0.224)
-0.250 
(0.236)
0.237 
(0.206)
0.238 
(0.195)
TOBACCO 0.400 
(0.266)
0.310 
(0.272)
0.301 
(0.273)
0.204 
(0.299)
0.318 
(0.314)
0.641** 
(0.277)
0.460* 
(0.262)
EXERCISE -0.051 
(0.280)
-0.130 
(0.284)
-0.128 
(0.286)
-0.002 
(0.312)
-0.252 
(0.327)
-0.277 
(0.289)
0.165 
(0.274)
Price Information 0.749*** 
(0.183)
0.896*** 
(0.188)
0.840*** 
(0.189)
0.641*** 
(0.204)
0.770*** 
(0.215)
0.438** 
(0.189)
0.684*** 
(0.178)
σ 1.117*** 
(0.065)
1.142*** 
(0.067)
1.143*** 
(0.068)
1.249*** 
(0.073)
1.316*** 
(0.078)
1.174*** 
(0.067)
1.123*** 
(0.059)
Log-Likelihood -277.626 -282.051 -278.682 -297.095 -304.215 -294.845 -300.604
Full Information
Note: Single (*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks are used to denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
levels, respectively.  Standard errors are given in parentheses.
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Table 16. Tobit Models by Product Marginal Effects on WTP, Full Information 
 
California 
Wonderful 
Pom. Fruit
Texas Red 
Pom. Fruit
Texas 
Salavatski 
Pom. Fruit
Ready-to-
Eat 
California 
Pom. Arils
Ready-to-
Eat Texas 
Pom. Arils
Mixed 
Pom. Juice
Pineapple
∂y/∂x       
(Std. Error)
∂y/∂x       
(Std. Error)
∂y/∂x       
(Std. Error)
∂y/∂x       
(Std. Error)
∂y/∂x       
(Std. Error)
∂y/∂x       
(Std. Error)
∂y/∂x       
(Std. Error)
Demographics/ Behaviors
DAGE2 0.183 
(0.146)
0.121 
(0.151)
0.037 
(0.144)
0.055 
(0.164)
0.001 
(0.170)
0.019 
(0.167)
0.434** 
(0.201)
DAGE3 0.092 
(0.135)
0.075 
(0.141)
0.020 
(0.135)
-0.087 
(0.151)
-0.019 
(0.160)
0.169 
(0.161)
0.057 
(0.187)
DEDU2 0.265 
(0.180)
0.423** 
(0.197)
0.361* 
(0.189)
0.280 
(0.204)
0.385* 
(0.221)
0.218 
(0.203)
0.362 
(0.234)
DEDU3 0.246** 
(0.124)
0.191 
(0.128)
0.228* 
(0.126)
0.252* 
(0.142)
0.245* 
(0.148)
0.003 
(0.136)
0.096 
(0.163)
HOUSE -0.054 
(0.049)
-0.069 
(0.051)
-0.065 
(0.050)
-0.145** 
(0.057)
-0.114* 
(0.059)
-0.133** 
(0.058)
-0.183*** 
(0.067)
FEMALE 0.115 
(0.108)
0.005 
(0.116)
0.016 
(0.113)
0.211* 
(0.122)
0.075 
(0.131)
0.138 
(0.128)
0.191 
(0.152)
DMAR 0.076 
(0.130)
0.098 
(0.136)
0.058 
(0.132)
0.106 
(0.150)
0.078 
(0.156)
0.116 
(0.154)
0.015 
(0.181)
DINC2 -0.013 
(0.126)
-0.009 
(0.132)
0.048 
(0.129)
0.024 
(0.146)
0.077 
(0.153)
0.108 
(0.151)
0.305* 
(0.179)
DINC3 0.082 
(0.187)
-0.031 
(0.185)
0.042 
(0.186)
0.210 
(0.226)
0.113 
(0.226)
0.129 
(0.223)
0.500* 
(0.270)
SPENDFV 0.002 
(0.003)
0.002 
(0.003)
0.002 
(0.003)
0.003 
(0.003)
0.003 
(0.003)
0.001 
(0.003)
0.005 
(0.004)
FPOH 0.002 
(0.012)
0.008 
(0.012)
0.010 
(0.012)
0.010 
(0.014)
0.018 
(0.014)
0.018 
(0.014)
0.011 
(0.017)
POMFRUITP 0.539*** 
(0.133)
0.480*** 
(0.135)
0.468*** 
(0.132)
0.452*** 
(0.146)
0.369** 
(0.149)
0.330** 
(0.144)
0.328** 
(0.165)
ILLNESS -0.071 
(0.113)
-0.026 
(0.120)
-0.059 
(0.115)
-0.156 
(0.127)
-0.145 
(0.134)
0.158 
(0.140)
0.197 
(0.163)
TOBACCO 0.231 
(0.154)
0.184 
(0.162)
0.172 
(0.156)
0.121 
(0.177)
0.188 
(0.185)
0.418** 
(0.181)
0.376* 
(0.214)
EXERCISE -0.029 
(0.162)
-0.077 
(0.168)
-0.073 
(0.164)
-0.001 
(0.185)
-0.149 
(0.193)
-0.181 
(0.189)
0.135 
(0.224)
Price Information 0.407*** 
(0.095)
0.494*** 
(0.098)
0.449*** 
(0.096)
0.364*** 
(0.112)
0.431*** 
(0.115)
0.278** 
(0.117)
0.545*** 
(0.137)
Full Information
Note: Single (*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks are used to denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01 levels, respectively.  Standard errors are given in parentheses.
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  However, it is noteworthy that the individual tobit models avoid some of the 
issues that arise from pooling the bids made by an individual for multiple products and 
under multiple information treatments.  One such problem is a lack of independence 
among the multiple bids submitted by an individual subject.  Relationships that an 
individual‘s bids have among different product characteristics in the same round (same 
information treatment) or for the same product with different information treatments are 
included.  A model that is for a single product and a single information treatment 
circumvents this by only making estimates based on one bid for each individual. 
 
Ordinary Least Squares Model 
The pooled bids for the pomegranate and other fruit products are first modeled 
using an ordinary least squares (OLS) model to provide a baseline for comparison for the 
other models.  Using an OLS model for all of the bids by all individuals for all products 
ignores the problem of censoring of bids at $0.00 that was discussed earlier.  Further, it 
ignores possible relationships between an individual‘s bids across products and across 
information treatments.  Therefore, it was hypothesized that the bids for the OLS model 
would be biased and that the models discussed later would address some of the causes of 
that bias.   However, OLS models are frequently estimated as a baseline comparison for 
the models presented later. 
The results for the OLS model are presented in Table 17.  The table includes the 
results of five sets of variable specifications for comparison purposes.  A total of 5,544 
observations were included in the OLS models.  The R
2
 values ranged from 0.08 to 0.22, 
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but each of the regressions gave an F-test value of 0.000, rejecting the null hypothesis 
that all the model coefficients in a single regression equation were equal to zero.   
Several points about these results are notable.  First, the variety of the two Texas 
pomegranate varieties was never significant in relation to the baseline variety of 
California Wonderful, regardless of the other regressors that are included in the model.  
Second, the product forms as well as the information treatments are significant (P < 
0.01) for all the models in which they are included.  The demographic results are the 
same for the two models that contain them; however, not all of the demographic 
variables are predicted to have a significant effect on the bids for the products included 
in the experimental auctions.  In including the demographic variables, an attempt was 
made to create a model that would have greater explanatory power.   
Many of the hypothesized factors that influence bidding behavior were not found 
to be significant in the OLS regression.  Those that were not significant include the older 
age grouping, the middle income bracket, whether an individual had an illness that he or 
she considered serious, and the frequency with which an individual exercised.  However, 
given the lack of familiarity with several of the products in the auction, it was surprising 
that so many of the demographic factors were significant.  Finally, the estimates for 
Models 4 and 5 may look similar.  However, the estimated parameter for the constant is 
found to be negative in the final model, although it is not significant (and therefore can 
be excluded); the constant value is positive for all other OLS estimations.   
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Table 17. Ordinary Least Squares Model Results for WTP for Fruit Products Using 
Pooled Experimental Auction Bids 
 
 
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Constant 0.948*** 0.033 0.515*** 0.038 0.433*** 0.045 0.079 0.069 -0.002 0.073
Variety
1: Texas Red 0.041 0.051 0.041 0.049 0.041 0.049 0.041 0.047 0.041 0.047
2: Texas Salavatski 0.031 0.038 0.031 0.037 0.031 0.037 0.031 0.035 0.031 0.035
Product Form
Ready-To-Eat (RTE) 0.272*** 0.038 0.272*** 0.037 0.272*** 0.037 0.272*** 0.035 0.272*** 0.035
Juice 0.557*** 0.051 0.557*** 0.049 0.557*** 0.049 0.557*** 0.047 0.557*** 0.047
Pineapple 0.942*** 0.051 0.942*** 0.049 0.942*** 0.049 0.942*** 0.047 0.942*** 0.047
Price Information 0.635*** 0.030 0.635*** 0.030 0.603*** 0.030 0.603*** 0.029
Additional Information
Tasting 0.124*** 0.039 0.124*** 0.038
Health and Nutrition 0.097** 0.039 0.097*** 0.038
Anti-Cancer 0.103*** 0.039 0.103*** 0.038
Demographics/ Behaviors
DAGE2 0.169*** 0.040 0.169*** 0.040
DAGE3 0.044 0.038 0.044 0.038
DEDU2 0.351*** 0.045 0.351*** 0.045
DEDU3 0.191*** 0.033 0.191*** 0.033
HOUSE -0.117*** 0.014 -0.117*** 0.014
FEMALE 0.187*** 0.031 0.187*** 0.031
DMAR 0.076** 0.037 0.076** 0.037
DINC2 0.056 0.036 0.056 0.036
DINC3 0.247*** 0.050 0.247*** 0.050
SPENDFV 0.004*** 0.001 0.004*** 0.001
FPOH 0.012*** 0.003 0.012*** 0.003
POMFRUITP 0.517*** 0.032 0.517*** 0.032
ILLNESS 0.043 0.032 0.043 0.032
TOBACCO 0.231*** 0.044 0.231*** 0.044
EXERCISE -0.036 0.045 -0.036 0.045
Note:
 
Single (*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks are used to denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Model 1 : Product 
Characteristics Only
Model 2: Product 
Characteristics and Price 
Info
Model 3: Product 
Characteristics, Price 
Information, Additional 
Information
Model 5: Product 
Characteristics, Price 
Information, Additional 
Information, 
Demographics
Model 4: Product 
Characteristics, Price 
Information,  
Demographics
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Tobit Model for Pooled Bids 
The censoring that is ignored in the OLS regressions is included in the tobit 
models presented in Table 18.  The same five models that are estimated in the OLS 
regressions are used.  The estimated standard deviation of the residual is given by the σ 
value indicated, and the maximized log-likelihood value is also given.  The likelihood 
ratio test suggests whether each model fits better than a model with no predictors.  
Additionally, the marginal effects for the tobit models are presented in Table 19.  
The differences between the two types of models presented thus far, OLS and 
tobit, are reflected in the parameter estimations.  A few contrasts are pointed out here, 
and the tables can be used for further comparisons.  In terms of the parameter estimates, 
the constant is significant for all tobit models, even with a negative value for the two 
models with demographic variables included.  This may initially be a cause for concern; 
still, if the characteristics of the average consumer are fit to the model then the estimated 
WTP for the baseline product is given by evaluating the respective model at the means 
for the demographic characteristics, then the WTP for the baseline product is positive.  
This can be done using the actual mean values for each variable and using only the 
variables that are significant at P < 0.05.  If this is done, the estimated value is $1.10 for 
both Model 4 and Model 5.  The value at the means can also be evaluated by calculating 
the means for each variable and then assigning values of 0 or 1 based on the means to 
the dummy variables in the model.   
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Table 18. Standard Tobit Model Parameter Estimates for WTP for Fruit Products 
Using Experimental Auction Pooled Bids 
 
 
If this alternative method is followed, the values predicted are $1.32 for the 
baseline product of California Wonderful pomegranate fruit based on Model 4 and $1.23 
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Constant 0.770*** 0.040 0.304*** 0.046 0.211*** 0.055 -0.265*** 0.083 -0.360*** 0.088
Variety
1: Texas Red 0.040 0.062 0.039 0.059 0.039 0.059 0.041 0.056 0.041 0.056
2: Texas Salavatski 0.030 0.046 0.029 0.045 0.029 0.044 0.030 0.042 0.030 0.042
Product Form
Ready-To-Eat (RTE) 0.314*** 0.046 0.314*** 0.045 0.314*** 0.045 0.316*** 0.042 0.317*** 0.042
Juice 0.645*** 0.061 0.644*** 0.059 0.644*** 0.059 0.648*** 0.056 0.649*** 0.056
Pineapple 1.081*** 0.061 1.077*** 0.058 1.077*** 0.058 1.082*** 0.055 1.082*** 0.055
Price Information 0.691*** 0.036 0.691*** 0.036 0.668*** 0.036 0.667*** 0.036
Additional Information
Tasting 0.149*** 0.047 0.150*** 0.045
Health and Nutrition 0.111** 0.047 0.112** 0.045
Anti-Cancer 0.114** 0.047 0.116*** 0.045
Demographics/ Behaviors
DAGE2 0.202*** 0.048 0.202*** 0.048
DAGE3 0.069 0.045 0.069 0.045
DEDU2 0.433*** 0.053 0.433*** 0.053
DEDU3 0.256*** 0.039 0.256*** 0.039
HOUSE -0.147*** 0.016 -0.147*** 0.016
FEMALE 0.232*** 0.038 0.233*** 0.038
DMAR 0.095** 0.044 0.095** 0.044
DINC2 0.133*** 0.043 0.132*** 0.043
DINC3 0.260*** 0.060 0.260*** 0.060
SPENDFV 0.005*** 0.001 0.005*** 0.001
FPOH 0.016*** 0.004 0.016*** 0.004
POMFRUITP 0.640*** 0.038 0.640*** 0.038
ILLNESS 0.014 0.039 0.014 0.039
TOBACCO 0.285*** 0.052 0.285*** 0.052
EXERCISE -0.051 0.054 -0.051 0.054
σ 1.271*** 0.014 1.222*** 0.013 1.220*** 0.013 1.159*** 0.013 1.158*** 0.013
Log-Likelihood -8526.628 -8350.207 -8344.637 -8057.457 -8051.162
Likelihood Ratio Test 433.390*** 786.240*** 797.370*** 1371.740*** 1384.330***
Degrees of Freedom for LR Test 5 6 9 21 24
Note: Single (*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks are used to denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Model 1 : Product 
Characteristics Only
Model 2: Product 
Characteristics and Price 
Info
Model 3: Product 
Characteristics, Price 
Information, Additional 
Information
Model 4: Product 
Characteristics, Price 
Information,  
Demographics
Model 5: Product 
Characteristics, Price 
Information, Additional 
Information, 
Demographics
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based on Model 5.  Thus, we would not generally expect the model to predict negative 
WTP for products once individual demographics are included in Models 4 and 5.  
However, when the lowest possible values for the demographic characteristics are 
included in this model, the estimated value is negative, implying that an individual 
would have to be paid to take a California Wonderful pomegranate fruit.  Even so, since 
the tobit model is estimated to allow for conclusions to be drawn about utility based on 
willingness-to-pay, a negative value indicates that an individual with the lowest values 
would have a negative utility for the baseline product (California Wonderful 
pomegranate fruit).  Furthermore, we are more interested in the results of the marginal 
effects estimations (which do not include the constant) than in the actual parameter 
estimates for the tobit model.   
The demographic effects that are significant from the OLS model are also 
significant for the pooled tobit models.  Further, the Texas varieties are not shown to be 
significant in any of the tobit models, indicating subjects were indifferent between the 
California and Texas varieties on the basis of this model.  There was a significant and 
positive effect from the two further-processed fruit forms (RTE and juice), as well as for 
the pineapple fruit and the price information.  Individually each of these indicates a 
positive relationship between WTP and each respective product characteristic.  Taken 
together, this suggests that the lack of familiarity of subjects with the pomegranate fruit 
may have influenced bids for the products.  For example, if a subject lacked knowledge 
on how to remove the husk from a whole pomegranate fruit, he or she may have 
preferred the product forms that were easier to consume.  Of course, this positive 
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correlation between each product form and WTP could have also been a result of 
preference for ease of consumption, shelf life, or any number of other factors.   
 
 
Table 19. Marginal Effects for Standard Tobit Model for WTP for Fruit Products 
Using Pooled Experimental Auction Bids 
 
b All of the tobit models had 1,020 observations that were left censored at $0.00, and 4,524 observations that were not censored, 
where                                   . 
 
 
∂y/∂x
Standard 
Error
∂y/∂x
Standard 
Error
∂y/∂x
Standard 
Error
∂y/∂x
Standard 
Error
∂y/∂x
Standard 
Error
Variety
1: Texas Red 0.024 0.037 0.024 0.036 0.024 0.036 0.025 0.035 0.025 0.035
2: Texas Salavatski 0.018 0.028 0.018 0.027 0.018 0.027 0.019 0.026 0.019 0.026
Product Form
Ready-To-Eat (RTE) 0.187*** 0.028 0.190*** 0.027 0.191*** 0.027 0.196*** 0.026 0.196*** 0.026
Juice 0.383*** 0.036 0.391*** 0.036 0.391*** 0.036 0.402*** 0.035 0.402*** 0.035
Pineapple 0.643*** 0.036 0.654*** 0.036 0.654*** 0.036 0.670*** 0.034 0.671*** 0.034
Price Information 0.399*** 0.020 0.399*** 0.020 0.395*** 0.020 0.395*** 0.020
Additional Information
Tasting 0.090*** 0.029 0.093*** 0.028
Health and Nutrition 0.067** 0.028 0.068** 0.028
Anti-Cancer 0.069** 0.028 0.071*** 0.028
Demographics/ Behaviors
DAGE2 0.126*** 0.030 0.126*** 0.030
DAGE3 0.043 0.028 0.043 0.028
DEDU2 0.285*** 0.037 0.285*** 0.037
DEDU3 0.162*** 0.025 0.162*** 0.025
HOUSE -0.091*** 0.010 -0.091*** 0.010
FEMALE 0.142*** 0.023 0.142*** 0.023
DMAR 0.059** 0.027 0.059** 0.027
DINC2 0.083*** 0.027 0.083*** 0.027
DINC3 0.167*** 0.040 0.167*** 0.040
SPENDFV 0.003*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.001
FPOH 0.010*** 0.002 0.010*** 0.002
POMFRUITP 0.421*** 0.026 0.421*** 0.026
ILLNESS 0.009 0.024 0.009 0.024
TOBACCO 0.177*** 0.032 0.177*** 0.032
EXERCISE -0.031 0.034 -0.031 0.034
a 
Single (*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks are used to denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Model 1 : Product 
Characteristics Only
Model 2: Product 
Characteristics and Price 
Info
Model 3: Product 
Characteristics, Price 
Information, Additional 
Information
Model 4: Product 
Characteristics, Price 
Information,  
Demographics
Model 5: Product 
Characteristics, Price 
Information, Additional 
Information, 
Demographics
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Pineapple was included as a control product because it is a substitute for 
pomegranates that subjects were expected to be more familiar with; the higher WTP for 
the pineapple fruit could have been a result of greater product familiarity or other 
differences in the products, such as flavor and size preferences.  The positive marginal 
effect of the price information variable (with a value of 0.40) indicates that providing a 
reference price to consumers significantly influenced the bids that they submitted.  
Providing a reference price would not be give valuable or significant information to 
individuals who were familiar with the current retail price of the good; however, the 
survey of buying behavior indicated that most subjects had not purchased a pomegranate 
fruit before and therefore may have been unaware of the market price.   
In comparing the marginal effects based on the tobit model estimation, the 
differences between the marginal effects and the parameter estimates are indicative of 
why the parameter estimates should not be used for comparisons of changes in the 
values of the regressors.  Only one of the demographic/ behavioral characteristics has a 
negative marginal effect on bids: household size.  However, this result is not necessarily 
unexpected; larger households may be making purchases based on quantity and be 
seeking less expensive fruit substitutes.  The results across the 5 tobit models similar in 
terms of the size of the effects, and are generally robust to controls for the demographic 
and behavioral attributes of subjects.  The only notable exception to this is the constant 
term, but this was addressed previously.   
In order to determine which of the specifications of the tobit model would be 
preferred, three tests were considered.  First, a likelihood ratio test was conducted to 
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compare Model 1 through Model 4 to Model 5.  The likelihood of a function gives the 
probability of the data given the parameter estimates.  A likelihood ratio test is based on 
the assumption that one of the models is a restricted form of the other model (the 
―unrestricted‖ model).  Alternatively, the test assumes that the restricted model can be 
nested within the unrestricted model by assuming that the coefficients on the variables 
not included in the restricted model follow a smooth constant pattern.   The likelihood 
ratio test statistic is calculated as  
 
(45)           (
  
  
)        (  )    (  )  
 
 
where LU is the likelihood function value of the unrestricted model and LR is the 
likelihood function value of the restricted model.  The null hypothesis of the test is that 
the restrictions imposed on the model do not significantly impact the overall fit of the 
model.  The likelihood ratio test statistic is distributed χ2 with degrees of freedom equal 
to the number of restrictions placed on the model.  The results of the likelihood ratio 
tests comparing each restricted model to Model 5 are given in Table 20. 
The results of two additional specification tests are also provided.  The Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) are given for 
comparison.  These two measures of goodness of fit are similar except that the Bayesian 
Information Criterion includes a more severe penalty for including additional variables 
in order to help prevent overspecification of the model. 
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Table 20. Specification Test Values, Standard Tobit Models Using Pooled 
Experimental Auction Bids 
 
 
 
The likelihood ratio test rejects the restrictions of Models 1-4 (P < 0.01).  Using 
the results of the AIC and BIC, Models 4 and 5 should both be considered based on 
economic theory.  Combining these results indicates that both Models 1-3 should not be 
used for a tobit model of the pooled bids.  Finally, the comparison of the tobit model 
versus the OLS model shows a high number of observations (1,020 censored 
observations of 5,544 total bids) at the censoring level of $0.00, which indicates that an 
OLS model is inappropriate for the bids. 
 
Random Effects Tobit Models 
The random effects tobit model is then applied to the auction bids to address 
another problem with original OLS and tobit regression models.  The pooled bids 
contain 28 bids submitted by each individual: bids for seven fruit products across the 
baseline and three additional information treatments.  It is likely that these bids are 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Likelihood Ratio Test Statistic 
(a) 950.93 598.09 586.95 12.59 ---
P-Value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0056 ---
Degrees of Freedom 19 18 15 3 ---
AIC 17,067.26 16,716.41 16,711.27 16,160.91 16,154.32 
BIC 17,113.60 16,769.38 16,784.10 16,313.18 16,326.46 
(a)
 Likelihood ratio test statistics are all calculated compared to Model 5. 
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related across products and across rounds.  The random effects tobit model that was 
discussed previously can be applied to the bids submitted by study participants in order 
to account for a random effect from each individual.  Thus, the model specified as  
    
    
               (Equation 22) in the discussion of the random effects tobit 
model is fit, allowing random variation for each individual with a Gaussian (normal) 
distribution.  The random effects tobit model parameter estimates for each of the five 
sets of explanatory variables are included in Table 21.  There are several results of 
interest from these models, particularly in comparison with the standard tobit model 
specification.  
The first is that the only model that has a significant and negative value for the 
constant is the model with all of the included explanatory variables (Model 5).  
However, this can be addressed as mentioned in the discussion of the tobit model, and 
the linear value of the function can be calculated at the means.  The estimated WTP from 
the random effects tobit model at the means are less than those from the pooled tobit 
model, with a value of $0.67 for Model 4 and $0.77 for Model 5 for the prediction at the 
mean values.  When values of 0 or 1 are assigned to the dummy variables based on the 
means, the predicted WTP for the baseline product of the California Wonderful 
pomegranate is $0.80 in both Model 4 and Model 5.  The significance of the product 
forms and the information treatments is robust to any of the presented model 
specifications for regressors; however, the two Texas varieties still did not have a 
significant impact on the bids that were submitted for the fruit products.     
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Table 21. Random Effects Tobit Model Results for WTP for Fruit Products Using 
Pooled Experimental Auction Bids 
 
Parameter
(a)
Standard 
Error
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Constant 0.725*** 0.082 0.243* 0.135 0.149 0.137 -0.450 0.329 -0.544* 0.330
Variety
1: Texas Red 0.043 0.037 0.043 0.037 0.043 0.037 0.043 0.037 0.043 0.037
2: Texas Salavatski 0.035 0.028 0.035 0.028 0.035 0.028 0.035 0.028 0.035 0.028
Product Form
Ready-To-Eat (RTE) 0.330*** 0.028 0.330*** 0.028 0.330*** 0.028 0.330*** 0.028 0.330*** 0.028
Juice 0.681*** 0.036 0.680*** 0.036 0.681*** 0.036 0.680*** 0.036 0.681*** 0.036
Pineapple 1.116*** 0.036 1.115*** 0.036 1.116*** 0.036 1.116*** 0.036 1.116*** 0.036
Price Information 0.709*** 0.162 0.709*** 0.162 0.679*** 0.153 0.679*** 0.153
Additional Information
Tasting 0.149*** 0.029 0.150*** 0.029
Health and Nutrition 0.110*** 0.029 0.110*** 0.029
Anti-Cancer 0.117*** 0.029 0.117*** 0.029
Demographics/ Behaviors
DAGE2 0.306 0.206 0.307 0.206
DAGE3 0.104 0.196 0.104 0.196
DEDU2 0.485** 0.230 0.486** 0.230
DEDU3 0.276 0.169 0.276 0.168
HOUSE -0.163** 0.071 -0.163** 0.071
FEMALE 0.259 0.163 0.259 0.163
DMAR 0.120 0.190 0.120 0.190
DINC2 0.190 0.184 0.190 0.184
DINC3 0.287 0.260 0.287 0.260
SPENDFV 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.004
FPOH 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017
POMFRUITP 0.688*** 0.165 0.688*** 0.165
ILLNESS 0.017 0.167 0.018 0.167
TOBACCO 0.336 0.225 0.336 0.225
EXERCISE -0.002 0.235 -0.002 0.235
σ(u) (b) 1.099*** 0.059 1.046*** 0.056 1.046*** 0.056 0.955*** 0.051 0.954*** 0.051
σ(e) (c) 0.735*** 0.008 0.735*** 0.008 0.733*** 0.008 0.735*** 0.008 0.733*** 0.008
ρ 0.691*** 0.023 0.669*** 0.024 0.671*** 0.024 0.628*** 0.025 0.629*** 0.025
Log-Likelihood -5998.493 -5989.326 -5974.5369 -5971.4906 -5956.687
Likelihood ratio test 
(d)
5066.64*** 4797.20*** 4746.83*** 4171.93*** 4188.95***
(a) 
Single (*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks are used to denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
(b)
 Standard deviation of individual-specific error.
(c)
 Standard deviation of overall error.
(d) Likelihood ratio test that σ(u) = 0.
Model 1 : Product 
Characteristics Only
Model 2: Product 
Characteristics and Price 
Info
Model 3: Product 
Characteristics, Price 
Information, Additional 
Information
Model 4: Product 
Characteristics, Price 
Information,  
Demographics
Model 5: Product 
Characteristics, Price 
Information, Additional 
Information, 
Demographics
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Furthermore, there were differences in the significance of the demographic 
variables when the tobit model was specified to allow for random effects.  When 
demographic variables were included (Models 4 and 5), the random effects model only 
suggests an influence on subject bids from the demographic/ behavioral characteristics 
of having a 4-year college degree, household size, and previous purchase of a 
pomegranate fruit.  This suggests that for the novel fruit product of pomegranate there 
may have been less of an influence on WTP of standard demographic characteristics 
than would be expected for more familiar products.   
Specification of the random effects tobit model also provides additional 
regression statistics which can be useful in determining whether the model is 
appropriate.  The standard deviation of the individual specific error as σ(u) is provided, 
and this can be tested against a standard tobit model in which σ(u) = 0 using a likelihood 
ratio test.  The results of the likelihood ratio test are given in the final row of Table 21.  
Also provided is the value labeled ρ; this value is the percent of the overall variance that 
is contributed by the individual variance.  Therefore, ρ takes on values from zero to one, 
with a value of zero indicating that none of the variance comes from the individual 
random effects and a value of one indicating that all of the variance in the overall model 
comes from the individual effects.   
The likelihood ratio test rejects a specification of no individual specific error for 
all five variable specifications (P < 0.001).  Thus, if the assumptions of the model are 
correct, the conclusion is that there are individual specific effects and that the standard 
tobit model would be inappropriate.   
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As with the tobit model, the marginal effects of the random effects tobit are 
useful in comparing one-unit changes for any regressor.  The marginal effects are 
presented in Table 22.  
The random effects tobit model indicates a slightly greater increase in bids based 
on the tasting information treatment when compared to the other two additional 
information treatments.  However, each information treatment indicates an increase of 
less than $0.10 from the baseline bid.  The product forms and price information had 
larger marginal effects on the bid that was submitted.  In looking at the demographic and 
behavioral characteristics, a subject with a four-year university degree is estimated to be 
willing to pay $0.31 more than an individual without a 4-year university degree.  
However, this effect is still smaller than that of previous purchase of a pomegranate 
fruit, which is estimated to increase the bid of a subject by $0.44 versus someone who 
has not previously purchased a pomegranate fruit product.  The final relevant 
demographic/ behavioral marginal effect is for household size, which is estimated to 
decrease bids by $0.10 for each additional member of the household.  This could be 
interpreted as a relationship of the tastes and preferences of individuals with larger 
families, or a tradeoff in the quantity versus quality of food products that a larger 
household with an income constraint must purchase. 
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Table 22. Marginal Effects for Random Effects Tobit Model for WTP for Fruit 
Products Using Pooled Experimental Auction Bids 
 
 
 
A comparison of the random effects tobit models for pooled bids is presented in 
Table 23.  The likelihood ratio test statistics can be calculated in a similar manner as 
with the standard tobit models.  Thus, the likelihood ratio test indicates that Models 1, 2, 
and 4 should be rejected for Model 5.  We fail to reject the null hypothesis for Model 3.  
However, in this case the AIC and BIC do not entirely confirm that conclusion.  The 
∂y/∂x
Standard 
Error
∂y/∂x
Standard 
Error
∂y/∂x
Standard 
Error
∂y/∂x
Standard 
Error
∂y/∂x
Standard 
Error
Variety
1: Texas Red 0.025 0.021 0.025 0.022 0.025 0.022 0.026 0.022 0.026 0.022
2: Texas Salavatski 0.020 0.016 0.021 0.016 0.021 0.016 0.021 0.017 0.021 0.017
Product Form
Ready-To-Eat (RTE) 0.191*** 0.017 0.194*** 0.017 0.195*** 0.017 0.199*** 0.018 0.199*** 0.018
Juice 0.394*** 0.025 0.401*** 0.025 0.401*** 0.025 0.410*** 0.025 0.411*** 0.025
Pineapple 0.646*** 0.030 0.657*** 0.029 0.657*** 0.029 0.673*** 0.029 0.673*** 0.029
Price Information 0.397*** 0.087 0.397*** 0.087 0.391*** 0.084 0.391*** 0.084
Additional Information
Tasting 0.087*** 0.017 0.090*** 0.018
Health and Nutrition 0.064*** 0.017 0.065*** 0.018
Anti-Cancer 0.068*** 0.017 0.070*** 0.018
Demographics/ Behaviors
DAGE2 0.188 0.128 0.188 0.128
DAGE3 0.063 0.119 0.063 0.119
DEDU2 0.313** 0.158 0.313** 0.158
DEDU3 0.170 0.106 0.170 0.106
HOUSE -0.098** 0.043 -0.098** 0.043
FEMALE 0.153 0.095 0.153 0.095
DMAR 0.072 0.114 0.072 0.114
DINC2 0.116 0.114 0.116 0.114
DINC3 0.180 0.170 0.180 0.170
SPENDFV 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
FPOH 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
POMFRUITP 0.442*** 0.113 0.442*** 0.113
ILLNESS 0.011 0.101 0.011 0.101
TOBACCO 0.203 0.136 0.203 0.136
EXERCISE -0.001 0.142 -0.001 0.142
Note: Single (*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks are used to denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Model 1 : Product 
Characteristics Only
Model 2: Product 
Characteristics and Price 
Info
Model 3: Product 
Characteristics, Price 
Information, Additional 
Information
Model 4: Product 
Characteristics, Price 
Information,  
Demographics
Model 5: Product 
Characteristics, Price 
Information, Additional 
Information, 
Demographics
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AIC still suggests that Model 3 and 5 should both be considered, but the BIC actually 
suggests that Models 1-3 would be preferred because the additional variables included in 
Models 4-5 are not shown to substantially improve the fit of the model.  However, this 
result is not unexpected since the random effects tobit model controls for the 
characteristics of each individual and the demographic and behavioral characteristics are 
specific to each individual.   
 
Table 23. Specification Test Values, Random Effects Tobit Models for Pooled 
Auction Bids 
 
 
  
Mixed Linear Models 
The mixed (random parameters) linear model was applied to the participant bids 
to account for possible correlations in the repeated bids of each individual (individual 
heterogeneity).  It is perhaps an unjustified assumption to presume that there is no 
individual heterogeneity across products and across rounds.  The mixed linear models 
were estimated using maximum likelihood estimation.   
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Likelihood Ratio Test Statistic 
(a) 54.01 35.67 6.09 29.61 ---
P-Value 0.0000 0.0020 0.9113 0.0000 ---
Degrees of Freedom 19 18 15 3 ---
AIC 12,012.99 11,996.65 11,973.07 11,990.98 11,967.37 
BIC 12,065.95 12,056.24 12,052.52 12,149.87 12,146.13 
(a)
 Likelihood ratio test statistics are all calculated compared to Model 5.
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In examining the results for Models 1-5 as specified in the previous models 
reported in Table 24, there are a number of points of comparison with the models 
already reported.  The results for the two Texas varieties are robust to this model 
specification in that they are not significant in a mixed linear model.  Again, the product 
forms are all significant (P < 0.01) regardless of whether the demographic and/or 
information variables are included in the model.  While there is a tendency for an 
influence of a college degree on bids, the only effects on the bids that we can expect are 
a negative effect for household size and a positive effect on bids from previous 
purchases of pomegranate fruit.  The likelihood of this can be given by the log-
likelihood value.  Also included in Table 24 are the estimated standard deviations for the 
random effects specified at the individual level, reported as  ̂ 
 .    
A likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis H0 (linear regression model) versus 
HA (mixed linear model) was conducted for each set of regressors.  The results are listed 
as the last line in Table 24.  The null hypothesis of a linear regression model was 
rejected for all sets of explanatory variables.  This indicates that there are effects within 
the model which can be accounted for by using a random parameters specification better 
than can be accounted for using a standard linear regression. 
For the mixed linear model, an additional specification was also estimated to 
allow for further comparisons.  In Model 6 given in Table 24, the model was extended to 
allow for random effects on the terms for the information treatments.  This can be 
interpreted as variation in the effect that any particular information treatment might have 
had on an individual.  Thus, while an individual‘s preferences may have given him a 
  
235 
different intercept than another individual in the study, the information treatments may 
have influenced his subsequent bids differently as well.   
 
 
Table 24. Mixed Linear Model Results for WTP for Fruit Products Using 
Experimental Auction Bids 
 
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Constant 0.948*** 0.065 0.515*** 0.105 0.433*** 0.106 0.079 0.256 -0.002 0.257 -0.002 0.144
Variety
1: Texas Red 0.041 0.030 0.041 0.030 0.041 0.030 0.041 0.030 0.041 0.030 0.041 0.030
2: Texas Salavatski 0.031 0.023 0.031 0.023 0.031 0.023 0.031 0.023 0.031 0.023 0.031 0.022
Product Form
Ready-To-Eat (RTE) 0.272*** 0.023 0.272*** 0.023 0.272*** 0.023 0.272*** 0.023 0.272*** 0.023 0.272*** 0.022
Juice 0.557*** 0.030 0.557*** 0.030 0.557*** 0.030 0.557*** 0.030 0.557*** 0.030 0.557*** 0.030
Pineapple 0.942*** 0.030 0.942*** 0.030 0.942*** 0.030 0.942*** 0.030 0.942*** 0.030 0.942*** 0.030
Price Information 0.635*** 0.125 0.635*** 0.125 0.603*** 0.119 0.603*** 0.119 0.603*** 0.063
Additional Information
Tasting 0.124*** 0.025 0.124*** 0.025 0.124 0.080
Health and Nutrition 0.097*** 0.025 0.097*** 0.025 0.097 0.080
Anti-Cancer 0.103*** 0.025 0.103*** 0.025 0.103 0.080
Demographics/ Behaviors
DAGE2 0.169 0.161 0.169 0.161 0.169** 0.085
DAGE3 0.044 0.153 0.044 0.153 0.044 0.081
DEDU2 0.351* 0.181 0.351* 0.181 0.351*** 0.095
DEDU3 0.191 0.132 0.191 0.132 0.191*** 0.069
HOUSE -0.117** 0.055 -0.117** 0.055 -0.117*** 0.029
FEMALE 0.187 0.127 0.187 0.127 0.187*** 0.067
DMAR 0.076 0.149 0.076 0.149 0.076 0.078
DINC2 0.056 0.144 0.056 0.144 0.056 0.076
DINC3 0.247 0.203 0.247 0.203 0.247** 0.107
SPENDFV 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004** 0.002
FPOH 0.012 0.014 0.012 0.014 0.012 0.007
POMFRUITP 0.517*** 0.130 0.517*** 0.130 0.517*** 0.068
ILLNESS 0.043 0.131 0.043 0.131 0.043 0.069
TOBACCO 0.231 0.176 0.231 0.176 0.231** 0.093
EXERCISE -0.036 0.184 -0.036 0.184 -0.036 0.097
 (b) 0.862*** 0.044 0.809*** 0.042 0.809*** 0.042 0.748*** 0.039 0.748*** 0.039 0.579*** (d) 0.032
Log-Likelihood -5856.337 -5582.911 -5829.101 -5828.554 -5813.421 -6278.248
LR Test : (c) 4874.4*** 4462.69*** 4481.60*** 3967.35*** 3984.65*** 3054.99***
(a) Single (*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks are used to denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
(b) Estimated standard deviation for the random effects specified at the individual level. 
(c) Likelihood Ratio Test of Mixed Linear Model versus Linear Regression.
(d) Estimated standard deviation for random effects for information treatment nested within each individual.
Model 1 : Product 
Characteristics Only
Model 2: Product 
Characteristics and Price 
Info
Model 3: Product 
Characteristics, Price 
Information, Additional 
Information
Model 4: Product 
Characteristics, Price 
Information,  
Demographics
Model 5: Product 
Characteristics, Price 
Information, Additional 
Information, 
Demographics
Model 6: Product 
Characteristics, Price 
Information, Additional 
Information, Demographics, 
with Random Effects by 
Information Treatment
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For example, it was anticipated that the anti-cancer information might have a 
greater effect on individuals with serious health conditions or who smoked on a regular 
basis than those who did not.  As another example, it was considered probable that the 
tasting treatment would have a range of effects on the bids submitted, from strongly 
negative to strongly positive, depending on whether that individual found the taste of 
each product desirable or undesirable.   
The values of the estimated parameters for the demographic model with a 
random intercept only (Model 5) and the demographic model with a random intercept 
and random coefficients (Model 6) for the information treatments are equal in this case.  
However, looking at only the estimated parameters does not tell the full story of the 
differences between these two models.  The explanatory variables that would actually be 
included in predictions of WTP would be very different for the two models.  When the 
information effect is allowed to vary for each individual, the additional information 
treatments no longer has predictive ability in this model.  However, the demographic 
characteristics gain additional significance.  Here, the 30-49 year old age group, a 
college degree, completion of at least some graduate school, being a female, having a 
household income greater than $100,000, having higher spending on fruits and 
vegetables, and using tobacco products all increased the bids for the fruit products; only 
a larger household size decreased the WTP for the fruit products.   
This begs the question of which model specification for the mixed linear models 
is more correct, given that either could be based on a relevant economic interpretation of 
the results.  First, a comparison of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the 
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Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) for goodness of fit for the model for all 6 mixed 
linear models favored selection of Model 3 over the others; these results are included in 
Table 25.  BIC imposes a greater penalty based on the number of variables included in 
the model to correct for overspecification of the model.   
 
 
Table 25. Goodness of Fit Comparison for Specifications of Mixed Linear Models 
 
 
 
 
Additionally, a likelihood ratio test can indicate differences in mixed models that 
have the same fixed effects specifications.  Of the models that were estimated, Models 4 
and 6 can be compared as they have the same fixed effects (Model 6 has the addition of 
a random effect for each information treatment).  Conducting a likelihood ratio test 
under the assumption of Model 6 nested within Model 4, the likelihood ratio χ2 has a 
value of -899.39 with 3 degrees of freedom; therefore the null hypothesis of Model 4 
Degrees of 
Freedom
Akaike 
Information 
Criterion
Bayesian 
Information 
Criterion
Model 1 : Product Characteristics Only 8 11,728.67 11,781.64
Model 2: Product Characteristics and Price Info 9 11,706.47 11,766.05
Model 3: Product Characteristics, Price 
Information, Additional Information
12 11,682.20 11,761.65
Model 4: Product Characteristics, Price 
Information,  Demographics
27 11,680.84 11,859.59
Model 5: Product Characteristics, Price 
Information, Additional Information, 
Demographics
24 11,705.11 11,864.00
Model 6: Product Characteristics, Price 
Information, Additional Information, 
Demographics, with Random Effects by 
Information Treatment
27 12,610.50 12,789.25
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(the simpler model) cannot be rejected.  These two tests would indicate that using AIC, 
Model 4 is preferred to Model 6.  Further results of AIC indicate that Models 1, 2, and 6 
are not preferred.  Models 3 and 4 are close in their values and so should both be 
considered.  Alternatively, using the Bayesian Information Criterion suggests that the 
first 3 models are all similar but that Model 6 is less desirable.  Based on consideration 
of the purposes of this study in describing the product characteristics, information 
treatments, and demographic variables that may have a role in the WTP for pomegranate 
fruit products, Model 5 allows for additional relationships with demographics to be 
included and will be used for further comparisons. 
If the model including all variables and all information treatments (Model 5) is 
chosen based on expected differences in relevant demographic behavioral characteristics 
and information treatments, then this model can be used to address other interesting 
questions based on the bids submitted by study participants. 
 
Unengaged vs. Engaged Bidders 
 The novelty of the fruit products investigated in this study led to the hypothesis 
that there would be a number of bidders who were completely unengaged in the auction 
process.  That is, these ―unengaged bidders,‖ despite being recruited for a study that 
expressly dealt with fruit purchase decisionmaking, were disinterested in the bidding for 
one or more of the fruit products, or the entire study.  These subjects were identified as 
those who submitted bids of $0.00 for a particular product for all four (Baseline, Tasting, 
Health and Nutrition, and Anti-Cancer) information treatment rounds.  The treatment of 
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unengaged bidders has been previously described by Lusk and Fox (2003) and Roosen, 
Marette, and Blanchemanche (2010), who both report results for estimations based on 
both engaged and unengaged bidders.   
 The underlying theory for which population of bidders, engaged or unengaged, 
are the ones that provide economic information of interest is of value.  The results 
presented thus far have referred to the entire population of bidders, both those who are 
engaged and those who are unengaged.  Estimates based on the entire population of 
bidders may be more reflective of the general population; given the novelty of the 
included fruit products, it was unlikely that all bidders actually purchase all included 
products in a real world setting on a regular basis.  Therefore, further comparisons of the 
previous model estimates suggest that they are likely to be more representative of the 
general population of shoppers.   
 However, the population of potential buyers of fruit products is also of economic 
interest.  It should be useful to review what portion of the study participants were 
unengaged in each product, as well as the implications of removing the unengaged 
bidders from the sample prior to estimation of the models described earlier.  The counts 
and percentages of unengaged bidders for each fruit product are included in Table 26. 
The numbers of unengaged bidders varies considerably from ten for the control 
product of pineapple to 3.5 times as many unengaged bidders for the two Texas 
pomegranate fruits.  This supports our hypothesis on the greater familiarity of the 
pineapple, and in a secondary manner the juice product, versus the whole pomegranate 
fruits.  In comparing these products, the number of bidders who were unengaged for any 
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seven of the fruit products (―Any Product‖) was counted at n = 44 and the number of 
bidders who were unengaged for every product in every round (―All Products‖) was 
much lower, at n= 6.  
 
 
Table 26. Count of Unengaged Bidders for Each Fruit Product 
 
 
 
Several of the models presented for the WTP based on the bids were re-estimated 
and compared for the entire sample versus only the engaged bidders; these results are 
included in the following pages.  The rank-ordered tobit model parameter estimates are 
presented first in Table 27.  
Product
Count of Unengaged 
Bidders 
(a)
Percentage of 
Unengaged Bidders 
(a)
California Wonderful Pomegranate Fruit 33 16.67%
Texas Red Pomegranate Fruit 35 17.68%
Texas Salavatski Pomegranate Fruit 35 17.68%
Ready-to-Eat Pomegranate Arils - California Wonderful 28 14.14%
Ready-to-Eat Pomegranate Arils - Texas Salavatski 28 14.14%
Mixed Pomegranate Juice 16 8.08%
Pineapple 10 5.05%
Any Product 
(b) 44 22.22%
All Products
 (c) 6 3.03%
(a)
 Unengaged bidders are those who submitted bids of $0.00 for all rounds for the specified fruit product.
(b)
 "Any product" refers to bidders who were unengaged for any  one of the  seven included fruit products.
(c)
 "All products" refers to bidders who were unengaged for all  seven of the seven included fruit products.
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Table 27. Comparison of Random Effects Tobit Model WTP Parameter Estimates 
for Levels of Bidder Engagement 
  
Parameter
(a) Standard Error Parameter Standard Error Parameter Standard Error
Constant -0.544* 0.330 -0.156 0.311 0.419 0.272
Variety
1: Texas Red 0.043 0.037 0.043 0.037 0.056 0.036
2: Texas Salavatski 0.035 0.028 0.035 0.028 0.057** 0.027
Product Form
Ready-To-Eat (RTE) 0.330*** 0.028 0.331*** 0.028 0.320*** 0.027
Juice 0.681*** 0.036 0.682*** 0.036 0.567*** 0.036
Pineapple 1.116*** 0.036 1.119*** 0.036 0.948*** 0.036
Price Information 0.679*** 0.153 0.637*** 0.141 0.723*** 0.134
Additional Information
Tasting 0.150*** 0.029 0.150*** 0.029 0.172*** 0.029
Health and Nutrition 0.110*** 0.029 0.110*** 0.029 0.137*** 0.029
Anti-Cancer 0.117*** 0.029 0.118*** 0.029 0.145*** 0.029
Demographics/ Behaviors
DAGE2 0.307 0.206 0.105 0.191 0.038 0.171
DAGE3 0.104 0.196 0.042 0.182 -0.062 0.161
DEDU2 0.486** 0.230 0.356* 0.211 0.281 0.192
DEDU3 0.276 0.168 0.192 0.155 0.219 0.141
HOUSE -0.163** 0.071 -0.124* 0.065 -0.120** 0.059
FEMALE 0.259 0.163 0.186 0.151 0.115 0.138
DMAR 0.120 0.190 0.127 0.176 0.016 0.162
DINC2 0.190 0.184 0.045 0.171 -0.047 0.155
DINC3 0.287 0.260 0.214 0.243 0.469** 0.231
SPENDFV 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.003
FPOH 0.017 0.017 0.014 0.016 0.002 0.014
POMFRUITP 0.688*** 0.165 0.580*** 0.151 0.376*** 0.133
ILLNESS 0.018 0.167 0.037 0.155 0.094 0.142
TOBACCO 0.336 0.225 0.204 0.206 0.058 0.183
EXERCISE -0.002 0.235 -0.158 0.217 -0.015 0.198
σ(u) (e) 0.954*** 0.051 0.867*** 0.046 0.706*** 0.042
σ(e) (f) 0.733*** 0.008 0.733*** 0.008 0.670*** 0.008
ρ 0.629*** 0.025 0.583*** 0.026 0.526*** 0.030
Log-Likelihood -5956.687 -5928.639 -4681.491
Likelihood ratio test 
(g)
4188.95*** 3796.60*** 2652.20***
N (individuals) 198 192 154
(b)
 Unengaged bidders are those who submitted bids of $0.00 for all rounds for the specified fruit product.
(c)
 "Any product" refers to bidders who were unengaged for any  one of the  seven included fruit products.
(d)
 "All products" refers to bidders who were unengaged for all  seven of the seven included fruit products.
(e)
 Standard deviation of individual-specific error.
(f)
 Standard deviation of overall error.
(g)
 Likelihood ratio test that σ(u) = 0.
(a)
 Single (*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks are used to denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
All Bidders
Excluding Bidders Who Are 
Unengaged for Any  Product 
(b) (d)
Excluding Bidders Who Are 
Unengaged for All  Products 
(b) (c)
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The results for ―all bidders‖ are the same as those for Model 5 in the original 
rank-ordered tobit model estimates.  These are compared to models where either 
individuals who were unengaged for all products are removed or where individuals who 
were unengaged for any product are removed.  In the former case, those individuals who 
were unengaged for all products indicated with their bids that they would be unwilling to 
purchase any of the fruit products, regardless of the product characteristics and 
regardless of the additional information that was provided.  There is a lack of 
information provided by these bids in terms of understanding whether the information 
treatments or individual characteristics influenced their preferences for the products 
since all bids were reported as zero.   
On the other hand, excluding bidders who were unengaged for ―any product‖ 
removes a larger portion of the sample, but also removes those individuals who were 
unengaged for any of the bids that are included in the regression.  Thus, there should be 
no bidders who were unengaged for any product included in the latter model.   
 In the model excluding bidders who were unengaged for all products, the only 
demographic or behavioral characteristic that still has predictive power is whether or not 
the individual has made previous purchases of pomegranate fruits.  As a consequence, 
the model including all bidders may have a suggestion as to which bidders will submit 
zero bids, regardless of whether they are engaged; this may not be true of bidders that 
were engaged for at least one product.  
The models in which bidders who were unengaged for any product were 
removed are a more interesting comparison.  These models can be thought of as models 
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of those individuals who would actually purchase each product in at least one round of 
the experimental auctions.  There is a significant effect (P < 0.05) for the Texas 
Salavatski Pomegranate variety.   
This is the only model discussed so far in which there has been any effect due to 
the growing location of any of the pomegranate fruit products.  If individuals are willing 
to buy the pomegranate products, then the random effects model that accounts for 
unengaged bidders suggests there is a positive price premium for the Texas Salavatski 
variety.  
 To determine the size of such an effect, the marginal effects are again used and 
are presented in Table 28.  Thus, although it is not a large sum, there is expected to be a 
$0.04 premium in WTP for the Texas Salavatski pomegranate over the California 
Wonderful baseline product.  Also in looking at the marginal effects, the magnitude of 
the effect of the information treatments is larger when unengaged bidders are removed, 
as would be expected; all of the bidders whose bids were removed had no change in bids 
(from $0.00) across any information treatments.  Similarly, there is a larger effect from 
the product characteristics on WTP because the individuals whose bids were excluded 
may have been unengaged for more than one product, and thus differences in WTP 
predicted by product characteristics would be masked to some extent. The effect of price 
information is also larger on engaged versus unengaged bidders.   
  
244 
Table 28. Comparison of Random Effects Tobit Model WTP Marginal Effects 
Estimates for Levels of Bidder Engagement 
  
 
 
A comparison of the effect of prior experience with the product as measured by 
the previous pomegranate fruit purpose variable showed a decrease in the size of the 
marginal effect as more unengaged bidders were removed, from premiums of $0.44 to 
∂y/∂x(a) Standard Error ∂y/∂x Standard Error ∂y/∂x Standard Error
Variety
1: Texas Red 0.026 0.022 0.028 0.024 0.043 0.027
2: Texas Salavatski 0.021 0.017 0.023 0.018 0.043** 0.021
Product Form
Ready-To-Eat (RTE) 0.199*** 0.018 0.211*** 0.019 0.243*** 0.021
Juice 0.411*** 0.025 0.436*** 0.026 0.431*** 0.029
Pineapple 0.673*** 0.029 0.716*** 0.030 0.720*** 0.032
Price Information 0.391*** 0.084 0.389*** 0.083 0.525*** 0.093
Additional Information
Tasting 0.090*** 0.018 0.095*** 0.019 0.130*** 0.022
Health and Nutrition 0.065*** 0.018 0.070*** 0.019 0.103*** 0.022
Anti-Cancer 0.070*** 0.018 0.074*** 0.019 0.109*** 0.022
Demographics/ Behaviors
DAGE2 0.188 0.128 0.068 0.123 0.029 0.130
DAGE3 0.063 0.119 0.027 0.117 -0.047 0.122
DEDU2 0.313** 0.158 0.239 0.148 0.221 0.155
DEDU3 0.170 0.106 0.125 0.102 0.169 0.110
HOUSE -0.098** 0.043 -0.080* 0.042 -0.091** 0.045
FEMALE 0.153 0.095 0.118 0.094 0.087 0.103
DMAR 0.072 0.114 0.081 0.112 0.012 0.123
DINC2 0.116 0.114 0.029 0.110 -0.036 0.118
DINC3 0.180 0.170 0.141 0.165 0.378* 0.195
SPENDFV 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.003
FPOH 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.001 0.011
POMFRUITP 0.442*** 0.113 0.390*** 0.107 0.294*** 0.106
ILLNESS 0.011 0.101 0.024 0.100 0.072 0.109
TOBACCO 0.203 0.136 0.131 0.132 0.044 0.139
EXERCISE -0.001 0.142 -0.101 0.139 -0.011 0.150
(b)
 Unengaged bidders are those who submitted bids of $0.00 for all rounds for the specified fruit product.
(c)
 "Any product" refers to bidders who were unengaged for any  one of the  seven included fruit products.
(d)
 "All products" refers to bidders who were unengaged for all  seven of the seven included fruit products.
(a)
 Single (*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks are used to denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
All Bidders
Excluding Bidders Who Are 
Unengaged for All  Products 
(b) (c)
Excluding Bidders Who Are 
Unengaged for Any  Product 
(b) (d)
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$0.39 to $0.29.  Of those bidders who were engaged, the marginal effect of the 
additional information treatments was relatively larger and the marginal effect of 
previous purchase of pomegranate fruit products was relatively smaller when compared 
to models including all bidders.  This model also suggested a tendency (P < 0.10) of a 
bid premium of $0.38 for subjects who had annual household incomes of greater than 
$100,000 over individuals with an annual household income of less than $50,000.   
The mixed linear model including the pooled product bids was also re-estimated 
to account for unengaged bidders; please see Table 29.  Again, the product forms, price 
information, and additional information treatments all have a significant effect (P < 
0.01) on estimated WTP, with the size of these effects increasing in the model for 
entirely engaged bidders for the information variables.   
In a similar manner to the previously estimated models, there is an inverse 
relationship between household size and observed bids for the fruit products.  Further, 
the influence of previous experience with the products also decreases as more unengaged 
bidders are removed from the sample.  Consequently, the previous experience with the 
product (as indicated by POMFRUITP) should be a predictor of whether the individual 
will be engaged in the experimental auction.   
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Table 29. Comparison of Mixed Linear Model WTP Parameter Estimates for 
Levels of Bidder Engagement 
  
Parameter 
(a) Standard Error Parameter Standard Error Parameter Standard Error
Constant -0.002 0.257 0.129 0.266 0.438 0.268
Variety
1: Texas Red 0.041 0.030 0.042 0.031 0.053 0.035
2: Texas Salavatski 0.031 0.023 0.032 0.024 0.054** 0.026
Product Form
Ready-To-Eat (RTE) 0.272*** 0.023 0.280*** 0.024 0.308*** 0.026
Juice 0.557*** 0.030 0.574*** 0.031 0.555*** 0.035
Pineapple 0.942*** 0.030 0.972*** 0.031 0.930*** 0.035
Price Information 0.603*** 0.119 0.604*** 0.121 0.725*** 0.132
Additional Information
Tasting 0.124*** 0.025 0.128*** 0.025 0.158*** 0.028
Health and Nutrition 0.097*** 0.025 0.100*** 0.025 0.128*** 0.028
Anti-Cancer 0.103*** 0.025 0.106*** 0.025 0.136*** 0.028
Demographics/ Behaviors
DAGE2 0.169 0.161 0.100 0.164 0.057 0.168
DAGE3 0.044 0.153 0.026 0.156 -0.057 0.159
DEDU2 0.351* 0.181 0.309* 0.180 0.278 0.189
DEDU3 0.191 0.132 0.159 0.132 0.210 0.139
HOUSE -0.117** 0.055 -0.109* 0.056 -0.116** 0.059
FEMALE 0.187 0.127 0.159 0.129 0.104 0.136
DMAR 0.076 0.149 0.090 0.150 0.015 0.159
DINC2 0.056 0.144 0.005 0.147 -0.038 0.153
DINC3 0.247 0.203 0.239 0.208 0.469** 0.227
SPENDFV 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.003
FPOH 0.012 0.014 0.009 0.014 0.002 0.014
POMFRUITP 0.517*** 0.130 0.480*** 0.130 0.367*** 0.131
ILLNESS 0.043 0.131 0.044 0.133 0.106 0.140
TOBACCO 0.231 0.176 0.185 0.176 0.067 0.180
EXERCISE -0.036 0.184 -0.096 0.185 -0.015 0.195
 
(e) 
0.748*** 0.039 0.551*** 0.058 0.483*** 0.057
Log-Likelihood -5813.421 -5694.734 -4523.360
LR Test 
(f)
3984.65*** 3753.29*** 2756.57***
N (individuals) 198 192 154
(b)
 Unengaged bidders are those who submitted bids of $0.00 for all rounds for the specified fruit product.
(c)
 "Any product" refers to bidders who were unengaged for any  one of the  seven included fruit products.
(d)
 "All products" refers to bidders who were unengaged for all  seven of the seven included fruit products.
(e)
 Estimated standard deviation for the random effects specified at the individual level. 
(f)
 Likelihood Ratio Test of Mixed Linear Model versus Linear Regression.
(a)
 Single (*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks are used to denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
All Bidders
Excluding Bidders Who Are 
Unengaged for All  Products 
(b) (c)
Excluding Bidders Who Are 
Unengaged for Any  Product 
(b) (d)
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There are three additional results that are of primary interest in the mixed linear 
model that includes only engaged bids by engaged bidders: those for the Texas varieties, 
those for the upper income dummy variable, and those for the constant.  This model 
predicts a $0.05 premium for the Texas Salavatski variety as compared to the baseline 
California Wonderful variety.  The P-value for the Texas Red variety in the model that 
excluded any individual who was unengaged was P = 0.12.   
With an estimated size of the effect that is the same for either Texas variety over 
California Wonderful, the difference in significance was hypothesized to likely be due to 
the fact that there were two products included in the experimental auction that were the 
Texas Salavatski variety and only one product that was Texas Red, so there would be 
twice as many bid observations for the Texas Salavatski variety.  (Some of the original 
standard tobit models including all demographic and behavioral variables were estimated 
using a single variable for the Texas varieties and they generally produced results that 
were not significant for an effect of the Texas varieties.)    
The random effects tobit and the mixed linear model that removed any 
unengaged bidders were re-estimated to test such a hypothesis, and the results for those 
two models are included in Appendix H in Table 56 -Table 58.   The estimations of these 
models give coefficients that are the same for all other included variables, excepting the 
Texas varieties.  However, the value for the single ―Grown in Texas‖ variable is the 
same as that previously estimated for the Texas Salavatski variety, but the standard error 
is smaller.  This would lead us to conclude that there is an effect of the Texas variety in 
general but that effect can be further divided into a specific contribution from the Texas 
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Salavatski variety in this experiment.  However, this does not reject the idea that there 
could be an increase in WTP for the Texas Red variety as well; rather, we fail to reject 
the hypothesis that there is no change in WTP for the Texas Red variety.    
The next point of interest from the comparison of engaged versus unengaged 
bidders is the result for the upper income (annual household income greater than 
$100,000) dummy variable.  In the model for bidders who were engaged for every 
product, a $0.47 increase in WTP was predicted for the included fruit products by 
individuals who fit this demographic category.  Thus, of individuals who were engaged 
for every product, the expected positive relationship between higher income and higher 
WTP was seen, but this distinction could not be made when unengaged bidders were 
included.   
The third result of interest is that in the estimations that include bidders who 
were engaged for every product, the constant estimates (although still not significant at P 
< 0.05) are now positive for the baseline product.  This is expected, since engaged 
bidders were those who had a positive value for the product regardless of their 
demographic characteristics.   
The comparisons of the models for all bidders, bidders who were engaged for at 
least one product, and bidders who were engaged for all products allow for valuable 
comparisons of the general population of shoppers versus bidders who would actually 
make purchases of pomegranate fruit products.  This is akin to the exclusion of non-
shoppers from WTP and discrete choice studies in terms of the relevance of results.  
Nonetheless, a number of the included products were novel (unfamiliar) in nature and 
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excluding bidders who were not fully engaged for every product in every round could 
result in reports of effects of information treatments and product characteristics that do 
not account for those consumers who purchase a novel product either before or after 
gaining new information on that product.  This information can also be useful to 
marketers of novel products who want to know the maximum that currently engaged 
buyers would be willing to pay for a product.  Such information can also indicate the 
factors that influence the decisions of consumers who are not current purchasers of a 
product but would be willing to purchase a novel product once they have gained more 
information on the novel product.  In effect, these differences in the models for 
unengaged versus partially engaged versus fully engaged bidders suggest that there is 
value in all three types of sample selection, depending on the question that is to be 
addressed by researchers.  Also, considering all these estimates is particularly important 
for an unfamiliar product. 
 
Comparison of Models for Full Bids 
Each of the models described previously has some benefit in regards to 
understanding the relative value placed on the included products by consumers.  
However, each is also paired with drawbacks in terms of predicting WTP and 
subsequent buying behavior.  The individual tobit models are perhaps the most 
straightforward in their interpretation; however, the ability to generalize them across 
information treatments and products is limited in comparison to a model that includes all 
bids.  However, although the OLS and mixed linear models include all products and 
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information treatments, they ignore bid censoring; on the other hand, the tobit and 
random effects tobit models include bid censoring in the model but do not account for 
individual variation in the effects of each product characteristic and/or information 
treatment.   
However, even given these drawbacks there are results that are robust across 
models.  The product forms of RTE, juice, and the type of fruit (pineapple versus 
pomegranate) were generally significant predictors of WTP.  However, the Texas 
varieties versus the industry standard variety were not always significant, indicating that 
the product form was more important in predicting WTP than the location of origin or 
the specific variety.  Also, having a reference price for the products and previous 
experience with the products were generally indicators of an increase in WTP for the 
fruit products included in this study.  The rest of the demographic and behavioral 
characteristics varied in whether they were good predictors of WTP, depending on the 
model that was used.   
It is not entirely surprising that this analysis does not suggest a strong ability of 
demographic characteristics to predict willingness-to-pay.  The usefulness of 
demographics in predicting consumer willingness-to-pay has been found to be limited or 
insignificant by other studies, including by Umberger and Feuz (2004) in predicting 
WTP for quality-differentiated beef and by Lusk et al. (2001b) in evaluating beef 
tenderness.   Other studies have excluded demographic attributes from the modeling of 
WTP (e.g., Abidoye et al. 2011).  However, overall the results on the importance of 
demographic factors in predicting WTP have been mixed.  For example, in a recent 
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study on WTP for grass-fed beef Xue et al. (2010) found that several demographic 
factors, including household size, nutritional knowledge, consumption behavior, and 
health status were all predictors of WTP.  Thus, consideration of demographic 
characteristics is useful, but there is no guarantee that they will be predictors of WTP for 
every product.   
In terms of specific model comparisons, the evaluation of which of the random 
effects tobit models and the mixed linear models are preferred is not straightforward.  
Comparisons of the log-likelihood values are not valid because the models are not nested 
inside one another.  A Hausman test could be used to compare two models; however this 
test assumes that one of the models is efficient while the other model is consistent.  The 
choice of which model is consistent should be based on the use of whichever model is 
expected to converge at the true value of the parameters.  However, the Hausman test is 
not necessarily appropriate for the comparison of these two types of models.  This leaves 
the consideration of which model is more theoretically appropriate.  This can be debated 
as each of the random effects tobit models and mixed linear models have their own 
drawbacks.   
 
Bid Differences across Information Treatments 
One important question to be answered regarding the information treatments is 
whether there was a difference in the bids subjects submitted for each product following 
each information treatment.  The difference in the bids across treatments were compared 
using paired t-tests and two-tailed non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on the 
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differences in bids for each product from the baseline round to the specified information 
round.  (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are also known as Mann-Whitney-U tests and are 
specified here for paired differences among individuals.)  These tests have been used in 
previous experimental auction studies with information treatments to compare the results 
for different treatments (e.g., Huffman et al. 2003; Lusk et al. 2004, Corrigan and Rousu 
2006a).  The Wilcoxon signed rank test is used based on the assumption that the values 
for individual WTP are often non-parametrically distributed.  The results for the paired t-
tests are given in Table 30, and the results of the Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are given in 
Table 31.   
 
 
Table 30. Test of Information Treatment Effects: Paired t-Tests 
 
 
 
 
Using a conservative assumption of non-parametric data, the majority of the 
product and treatment combinations showed a significant effect (P ≤ 0.001) for the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests.  This was true for all three varieties of whole pomegranate 
California 
Wonderful 
Pomegranate 
Fruit
Texas Red 
Pomegranate 
Fruit
Texas 
Salavatski 
Pomegranate 
Fruit
Ready-to-Eat 
California 
Pomegranate 
Arils
Ready-to Eat 
Texas 
Pomegranate 
Arils
Mixed 
Pomegranate 
Juice
Pineapple
p-values p-values p-values p-values p-values p-values p-values
Tasting Information 0.0001
(a) 0.0000 0.0000 0.1469 0.0093 0.0033 0.6816
Health and Nutrition 
Information
0.0008 0.0000 0.0002 0.2900 0.0552 0.0040 0.2116
Anti-Cancer Information 0.0166 0.0000 0.0001 0.0166 0.0009 0.5291 0.6983
Full Information 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0789 0.0136 0.0013 0.0203
(a) 
Tests are paired t-tests of the null hypothesis H0: WTPbaseline = WTPtreatment
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fruits for all rounds.  However, there were only significant differences (P ≤ 0.05) in 
WTP for the California ready-to-eat pomegranate arils for the anti-cancer information 
round, but for the ready-to-eat Texas products all information treatments were 
significant (P ≤ 0.05).  The results for the mixed pomegranate juice were somewhat 
different with significance for all information treatments other than the anti-cancer 
information.  As expected, there was no significant effect for each of the information 
treatments for pineapple, but there was significance (P ≤ 0.01) for the full information 
set versus the baseline.   
 
 
Table 31. Test of Information Treatment Effects: Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Tests 
 
 
 
 
The Wilcoxon signed-rank tests (Table 31) suggest that there was generally an 
information effect for all the products that were labeled as being grown in Texas, while 
this was not the case for similar products that were grown in California.  Given that the 
participants were residents of College Station, Texas and surrounding areas, providing 
California 
Wonderful 
Pomegranate 
Fruit
Texas Red 
Pomegranate 
Fruit
Texas 
Salavatski 
Pomegranate 
Fruit
Ready-to-Eat 
California 
Pomegranate 
Arils
Ready-to Eat 
Texas 
Pomegranate 
Arils
Mixed 
Pomegranate 
Juice
Pineapple
p-values p-values p-values p-values p-values p-values p-values
Tasting Information 0.0001
(a) 0.0000 0.0000 0.1258 0.0072 0.0016 0.2252
Health and Nutrition 
Information
0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.1734 0.0259 0.0004 0.0612
Anti-Cancer Information
0.0095 0.0000 0.0000 0.0013 0.0004 0.6322 0.6101
Full Information 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0752 0.0181 0.0001 0.0043
(a) 
Tests are two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Tests of the null hypothesis H0: WTPbaseline = WTPtreatment
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additional information on ―Texas-grown‖ products may have a greater impact than 
products not labeled as being grown in Texas.  However, this needs to be further tested 
in other geographic locations to determine if such an effect is applicable to other 
growing locations and consumers.  If the subject responses to the survey questions on 
purchasing preferences are reviewed, this result comes as a surprise; the average subject 
indicated that the growing location of a product was ―not very important‖ and that 
growing location was not one of the top three factors that were considered in making 
fruit purchasing decisions.    
In the discussion thus far, only WTP based on the ―full bids‖ for the fruit 
products in the study have been estimated using econometric models.  While the ―full 
bids‖ for the products in the auction were of interest, it is perhaps more instructive to 
compare differences in WTP across information treatments but within each individual.   
One surprising result of a comparison of individual bids for a single product 
across information treatments is the number of bids that decreased for a product when an 
individual had more information on the item.  These results are included in Table 32.  
While it was hypothesized that some individuals may dislike the taste of an item and 
therefore discount the amount that they would be willing to pay for them product in 
subsequent rounds, it was unexpected that a large portion of the participants also 
decreased the amount that they were willing to pay for products following the health and 
information treatment and the anti-cancer information treatment.  Also, of the 
possibilities to increase, decrease, or have no change in WTP for a product, the most 
common result for each of the information treatments was to have no change.  This 
  
255 
would indicate that the additional information subjects were provided with regarding the 
products did not influence the utility they would receive from purchasing and consuming 
the product.  However, despite the number of bids that showed no change from the 
baseline to the later round, almost 60% of bids submitted by participants were either an 
increase or decrease (positive or negative change) from the baseline bid for that same 
product.  Thus, for the majority of participants the information treatment had some effect 
on WTP.   
 
Table 32. Proportions of Positive, Negative, and Zero Differences for Changes in 
WTP from Baseline Information Treatment, Summed for All Products 
 
 
 
 
The summary statistics for the implied bid differences are presented in Table 33. 
While the mean results could actually be calculated using the values given in the 
summary statistics for the full bids, the median results and the comparisons among the 
effects on bid differences of each information treatment are useful.   
 
Type of Bid 
Difference
Calculation
Percentage of 
Negative 
Differences
Percentage of 
Zero 
Differences
Percentage of 
Positive 
Differences
DeltaBidTaste WTPTasting ‒ WTPBaseline 22.03% 40.75% 37.23%
DeltaBidHealth WTPHealth Information ‒ WTPBaseline 19.99% 48.35% 31.67%
DeltaBidCancer WTPAnti-Cancer Information ‒ WTPBaseline 19.28% 48.28% 32.44%
DeltaFullBid WTPFull Information ‒ WTPBaseline 22.38% 40.18% 37.44%
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Table 33.  Summary Statistics for Implied Bid Differences 
 
 
Product Type
Mean Bid 
Difference
Std. Dev. Minimum Median Maximum
Difference in Mean Bid From 
Baseline Product within a Round, 
Based on Implied Bid Differences
(a)
A. Implied Bid Differences - Tasting Round
California Wonderful Pomegranate Fruit 0.23 0.80 -2.45 0.00 5.40 (Baseline Product)
Texas Red Pomegranate Fruit 0.33 0.68 -2.25 0.15 3.50 +0.10
Texas Salavatski Pomegranate Fruit 0.26 0.72 -2.75 0.00 3.75 +0.03
Ready-to-Eat Pomegranate Arils - California Wonderful 0.09 0.83 -3.95 0.00 3.90 -0.15
Ready-to-Eat Pomegranate Arils - Texas Salavatski 0.14 0.78 -3.90 0.00 3.95 -0.09
Mixed Pomegranate Juice -0.19 0.91 -3.75 0.00 3.00 -0.43
Pineapple 0.02 0.69 -3.00 0.00 3.10 -0.21
B. Implied Bid Differences - Health and Nutrition Information Round
California Wonderful Pomegranate Fruit 0.17 0.70 -2.45 0.00 5.35 (Baseline Product)
Texas Red Pomegranate Fruit 0.24 0.61 -2.50 0.00 3.00 +0.07
Texas Salavatski Pomegranate Fruit 0.21 0.74 -2.75 0.00 7.10 +0.04
Ready-to-Eat Pomegranate Arils - California Wonderful 0.06 0.71 -3.95 0.00 3.90 -0.12
Ready-to-Eat Pomegranate Arils - Texas Salavatski 0.10 0.70 -3.90 0.00 3.95 -0.08
Mixed Pomegranate Juice -0.16 0.78 -3.75 0.00 2.95 -0.33
Pineapple 0.06 0.64 -3.00 0.00 3.15 -0.12
C. Implied Bid Differences - Anti-Cancer Information Round
California Wonderful Pomegranate Fruit 0.12 0.69 -2.45 0.00 5.75 (Baseline Product)
Texas Red Pomegranate Fruit 0.19 0.62 -2.50 0.00 3.00 +0.07
Texas Salavatski Pomegranate Fruit 0.17 0.58 -2.75 0.00 3.00 +0.06
Ready-to-Eat Pomegranate Arils - California Wonderful 0.13 0.73 -3.95 0.00 3.95 +0.01
Ready-to-Eat Pomegranate Arils - Texas Salavatski 0.17 0.72 -3.90 0.00 3.90 +0.06
Mixed Pomegranate Juice -0.03 0.76 -3.75 0.00 2.50 -0.15
Pineapple -0.02 0.58 -3.00 0.00 3.00 -0.13
D. Implied Bid Differences - Full Information Round
California Wonderful Pomegranate Fruit 0.22 0.79 -2.45 0.00 5.35 (Baseline Product)
Texas Red Pomegranate Fruit 0.33 0.69 -2.50 0.10 3.50 +0.11
Texas Salavatski Pomegranate Fruit 0.26 0.70 -2.75 0.00 3.75 +0.04
Ready-to-Eat Pomegranate Arils - California Wonderful 0.10 0.82 -3.95 0.00 3.90 -0.12
Ready-to-Eat Pomegranate Arils - Texas Salavatski 0.14 0.81 -3.90 0.00 3.95 -0.08
Mixed Pomegranate Juice -0.21 0.93 -3.75 0.00 2.95 -0.44
Pineapple 0.12 0.70 -3.00 0.00 3.15 -0.11
(a)
 The baseline product is assigned to the California Wonderful Pomegranate Fruit but is specific to each information treatment.
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There is only one product that has a median that does not have a value of zero: 
the Texas Red whole pomegranate fruit.  This implies that for the median subject, the 
information treatments did not cause a change in WTP except for that particular product 
with the tasting information treatment.  However, regardless of whether the median 
consumer showed a change in WTP, there may still be valuable information in analyzing 
factors that indicate which consumers show changes in the levels of their bids.  The 
minimum and maximum values make it clear that there were some individuals who had 
significant changes in bids for a product from the baseline round to one of the additional 
information rounds.  This was particularly true for what is referred to as the ―full 
information;‖ that is, the round in which participants had received all 3 of the other 
information treatments.  Thus, the results for the full information would be expected to 
show some combination of the previous three results.   
These results can also be plotted using a boxplot to visualize and compare the 
general densities of the distributions.  Such a plot is provided in Figure 18. 
Although the distributions are generally centered at a difference of $0.00 from 
the baseline to the information treatment, the box plot shows that some of the 
distributions are either skewed negatively (e.g., mixed pomegranate juice) or skewed 
positively (e.g., Texas Red pomegranate fruit).  The plots also show that while there 
were larger and smaller values for the implied bid differences, the majority of values had 
a much smaller range.   
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Figure 18. Box Plot of Implied Bid Differences 
 
 
 
The approach taken in modeling the ―implied differences‖ for the products in the 
experimental auction started with an approach of simplicity and as models were rejected 
for various reasons, the model required to properly model the data became more 
complex.  First, an ordinary least squares model was estimated for each of the seven 
products and for each of the three information treatments, as well as the full information 
round (four total).  These estimations were conducted using the same dependent 
variables as in the original estimations of the full bids.  However, results of these 
estimations led to the conclusion that the residuals from the regression were non-normal 
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on the basis of the skewness and kurtosis of the residuals, as determined by a Jarque-
Bera test shown in Table 34.   
 
 
Table 34. Jarque-Bera Test Statistics for Normality of Residuals from OLS 
Estimates of Implied Differences 
 
 
 
 
 The implied differences were also tested using Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for 
normality of the distributions.  This is a nonparametric test of the null hypothesis that the 
implied differences are normally distributed.  The results for this test are in Table 35.  To 
summarize, the results of both the Jarque-Bera tests and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests 
indicate that the implied differences are not normally distributed (P ≤ 0.001) for any of 
the products or across any of the information treatments. 
 
 
Information Treatment
California 
Wonderful 
Pomegranate 
Fruit
Texas Red 
Pomegranate 
Fruit
Texas 
Salavatski 
Pomegranate 
Fruit
Ready-to-Eat 
California 
Pomegranate 
Arils
Ready-to Eat 
Texas 
Pomegranate 
Arils
Mixed 
Pomegranate 
Juice
Pineapple
Tasting 462.824*** 153.689*** 162.356*** 196.583*** 259.617*** 37.665*** 379.245***
Health and Nutrition 1100.46*** 225.642*** 8764.41*** 705.518*** 465.112*** 123.618*** 494.833***
Anti-Cancer 2833.59*** 396.934*** 215.261*** 394.636*** 435.314*** 209.335*** 246.622***
Full Information 527.248*** 161.63*** 205.857*** 254.079*** 200.906*** 27.951*** 226.391***
*** indicates significance at the P = 0.001 level
Product
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Table 35. Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests for Normality of Errors for OLS Regression 
of Bid Differences 
 
 
 
 
The number of unengaged bids (vs. bidders) can also be calculated for the 
differences in bids.  Extending the framework discussed previously, any implied 
differences in bids should be excluded from the model if the individual submitted a bid 
of zero in the baseline round as well as bidding zero in the respective treatment round.  
This is because although the implied difference is zero, both the baseline and the 
treatment bids may be censored and thus do not provide any information on the direction 
or magnitude of any possible change in WTP that occurred across information 
treatments.  Therefore, for the estimation of the implied bid differences models, any 
observations that were ―case four‖ for that product and round were excluded.  The count 
of the number of excluded bids for each product and round are included in Table 36.  
 
California 
Wonderful 
Pomegranate 
Fruit
Texas Red 
Pomegranate 
Fruit
Texas 
Salavatski 
Pomegranate 
Fruit
Ready-to-Eat 
California 
Pomegranate 
Arils
Ready-to Eat 
Texas 
Pomegranate 
Arils
Mixed 
Pomegranate 
Juice
Pineapple
Tasting Information 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Health and Nutrition 
Information
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Anti-Cancer Information 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Full Information 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000
Note: All values in this table are significant at the P < 0.001 level. 
p-values
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Table 36. Counts of Unengaged Bids for Implied Bid Differences, by Product and 
by Information Treatment 
 
 
These results indicate that overall 15.36% of the bids submitted were unengaged 
ranging from 5.02% for the health and nutrition information treatment for pineapple up 
to 23.12% for the anti-cancer information for the Texas Red Fruit.  This result indicates 
that there were more unengaged bidders depending on the familiarity of the product, and 
this must therefore be accounted for when analyzing bid differences for novel products.  
The mean number of implied bids that were considered unengaged (bids of zero in 
baseline and in the information treatment round are given in Figure 19. 
 
Product
Tasting 
Information
Health and 
Nutrition 
Information
Anti-Cancer 
Information
Total Unengaged 
Bids by Product
Full 
Information
California Wonderful Pomegranate Fruit 33 39 43 115 34
Texas Red Pomegranate Fruit 35 43 46 124 37
Texas Salavatski Pomegranate Fruit 35 44 44 123 38
Ready-to-Eat Pomegranate Arils - California Wonderful 30 32 32 94 30
Ready-to-Eat Pomegranate Arils - Texas Salavatski 31 31 30 92 31
Mixed Pomegranate Juice 20 22 18 60 20
Pineapple 12 10 12 34 10
Total Unenegaged Bids by Information Treatment 196 221 225 642 200
Total of Engaged and Unengaged Bids 1386 1386 1386 4158
Note: For each product and round, there were a total of 198 bids per product per round.  
Information Round
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Figure 19. Unengaged Implied Bids: Averages across Tasting, Health and 
Nutrition, and Anti-Cancer Information Treatments 
 
 
 A mixed linear model was applied to account for individual heterogeneity in 
preferences using the implied bid differences.  Once bids where a single individual 
submitted bids of zero for a particular product in both the baseline and subsequent 
information treatment were excluded, the estimation of the mixed linear model gave the 
results in Table 37.  This exclusion is somewhat different from that discussed previously 
in that in this case only the actual bids that are unengaged are excluded, rather than all 
results for that bidder.  Thus, the number of observations per individual varied from 3 to 
21, depending on how many products (of 7 total products) and rounds (of 3 information 
treatments) for which they have engaged implied bid differences.    
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Table 37. Mixed Linear Model Results for Experimental Auction Data, Implied 
Differences in WTP for Fruit Products 
 
 
 The results of the mixed linear model for the implied bid differences gives results 
that must be interpreted differently than the mixed linear model estimated for the full 
bids.  Since the dependent variable is the difference in bids from the baseline round to 
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Variety
1: Texas Red 0.147*** 
(a) 0.033 0.108*** 0.035 0.096*** 0.035 0.100*** 0.035 0.098*** 0.035
2: Texas Salavatski 0.090*** 0.025 0.064** 0.026 0.057** 0.026 0.060** 0.026 0.059** 0.026
Product Form
Ready-To-Eat (RTE) -0.071*** 0.025 -0.098*** 0.026 -0.106*** 0.026 -0.105*** 0.026 -0.106*** 0.027
Juice -0.294*** 0.032 -0.335*** 0.034 -0.347*** 0.034 -0.344*** 0.034 -0.346*** 0.035
Pineapple -0.133*** 0.032 -0.175*** 0.033 -0.187*** 0.034 -0.183*** 0.034 -0.185*** 0.034
Price Information 0.235*** 0.051 0.124 0.084 0.150* 0.080 0.135 0.084
Additional Information
Tasting 0.132* 0.074 0.121 0.185
Health and Nutrition 0.109 0.074 0.100 0.185
Anti-Cancer 0.123* 0.074 0.112 0.185
Demographics/ Behaviors
DAGE2 0.104 0.091 0.063 0.114
DAGE3 0.070 0.096 0.041 0.108
DEDU2 0.075 0.124 0.065 0.125
DEDU3 0.149* 0.088 0.132 0.092
HOUSE 0.013 0.036 0.005 0.039
FEMALE -0.069 0.080 -0.093 0.090
DMAR 0.040 0.104 0.038 0.104
DINC2 -0.068 0.100 -0.078 0.102
DINC3 -0.103 0.144 -0.105 0.144
SPENDFV -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002
FPOH 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.010
POMFRUITP -0.017 0.089 -0.023 0.089
ILLNESS -0.003 0.091 -0.013 0.092
TOBACCO 0.322*** 0.119 0.303** 0.123
EXERCISE -0.165 0.123 -0.188 0.129
 (b) 0.300*** 0.033 0.273*** 0.030 0.269*** 0.030 0.251*** 0.028 0.251*** 0.028
Log-Likelihood -3372.180 -3361.992 -3360.105 -3338.803 -3338.257
LR Test : (c) 1542.18*** 1499.89*** 1491.620*** 1359.71*** 1358.02***
AIC 6758.359 6739.984 6742.21 6723.605 6728.515
BIC 6801.556 6789.353 6810.092 6865.402 6888.807
(a) Single (*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks are used to denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
(b) Estimated standard deviation for the random effects specified at the individual level. 
(c) Likelihood Ratio Test of Mixed Linear Model versus Linear Regression.
Model 1 : Product 
Characteristics Only
Model 2: Product 
Characteristics and 
Price Info
Model 3: Product 
Characteristics, Price 
Information, Additional 
Information
Model 4: Product 
Characteristics, Price 
Information,  
Demographics
Model 5: Product 
Characteristics, Price 
Information, Additional 
Information, 
Demographics
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the respective information treatment round, the parameter estimates are also the 
differences in the parameters for the information treatment round and the baseline round.  
For example, the first estimate in Table 37 indicates that in Model 1, the estimated 
difference in the effect of the Texas Red variety from the baseline to the information 
treatment is an increase of 14.7¢ in value.  The interpretation follows similarly for all 
other dummy variables in the model; for continuous variables such as tobacco use the 
estimated change in WTP for a product for any individual attributed to that variable 
would be the value of that variable times the estimated parameter.  Thus, the trend in 
Model 4 for tobacco use would indicate a $0.14 increase in WTP for an individual who 
used tobacco products every day, but only a $0.07 increase in WTP for an individual 
who uses tobacco on average every other day.   
 Comparing the results of the mixed linear model for the implied differences in 
bids to the mixed linear models for the full bids in Table 24, there are a number of 
differences in the results.  This would indicate that the predictors for the levels of the 
actual bids for an individual under a certain information treatment are not necessarily the 
same as the predictors for how an individual‘s bids will change when an information 
treatment is applied.  Thus, the model for the implied differences should indicate the 
product and/or demographic factors that are relevant when information treatments are 
applied.  This type of information is economically relevant when information treatments 
(i.e. advertisement, product promotional materials, etc.) are applied with the aim of 
increasing WTP for a product.  For the implied differences models, all product 
characteristics were significant (P < 0.05), and this result was robust across all Models 1 
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to 5.  However, the sign of these effects for the product form characteristics (RTE, juice, 
and pineapple) was negative for the models based on implied differences.  This indicates 
that for any of these product form characteristics, the change in WTP attributed to that 
characteristic decreased from the baseline round to the information treatment rounds, 
while the positive values on the two Texas varieties variables indicates that the effect of 
those product varieties on WTP increased from the baseline to the information treatment 
rounds.   
Depending on whether AIC or BIC is used in comparing the model 
specifications, Model 2 or 4 would be preferred of these model options.  In contrast to 
the other models examined for predicting WTP, the price information effect was not 
robust across all specifications of this model.  This indicates that although price 
information had an effect on the level of individual bids, it did not necessarily have an 
effect on the size of the change in bids due to an information treatment.  This result is of 
interest for two reasons.  First, reference prices and their effects on the level of bids have 
been the topic of much discussion in the literature, but the application of a model based 
on implied bid differences may avoid some of the problems that the presence or absence 
of a reference price may cause.  However, since this result was dependent on which 
variables were included in the model of the change in WTP, further investigation will be 
needed to confirm or disprove this result.  Second, and again in contrast to the models 
based on the full bids, there was generally not significance for the implied differences in 
bids for the information treatment indicator variables.  This is interpreted to mean there 
was not a specific effect due to any one of the particular information treatments, and the 
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changes in WTP could be more correctly attributed to the product characteristics.  Also, 
note that in these mixed linear models a constant was not estimated in order to allow for 
the calculation of differences due to all three information treatments, which were the 
tasting, health and nutrition, and anti-cancer information treatments included in the 
model.  In the models for implied bid differences that included demographic variables, 
the only effect that was significant was for tobacco-users the size of the effect due to the 
information treatments was larger than for nonsmokers.   
 For the various test statistics for the model, based on the size and standard error 
of the estimated standard deviation for the individual there were significant random 
effects specified at the individual level.  Note that it is less surprising that the 
demographic and behavioral characteristics were not estimated to be relevant because 
the random effects were specified as individual-specific effects.  The likelihood ratio test 
of the mixed linear model versus an ordinary least squares linear model also rejected the 
null hypothesis of the OLS model.   
 The use of the implied bid differences instead of the full bids gives quite 
different results in terms of which variables are statistically significant.  If researchers 
and marketers are interested in predicting what type of information on which products 
will cause consumers to be willing to pay more for novel products, the use of full bids 
could lead to dramatically different results than using the paired differences in bids.  It 
may not be sufficient to compare the differences in the means for the products and 
information treatments and may therefore be preferable to utilize paired differences in 
bids before and after additional information on the novel product is provided.  If paired 
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differences are not used for such comparisons, then the conclusions that are drawn may 
be contradictory to those from full bids.  With no paired responses, the outside 
substitutes for each product for each individual may not cancel with those of others, and 
the differences in bids may not be the same as the differences in value.  Of course, the 
differences in value are why the study was originally undertaken.  
 
Preference Models for Rankings 
 Each participant submitted a ranking of seven products and the option of no 
product, for a total of eight possibilities that were to be ranked.  For the rankings, the 
frequency and percentage of each ranking for each product for the full information are 
described in Figure 20; the percentage of participants who assigned a given ranking for 
each information treatment and each product are given in Table 38.   
 
 
 
Figure 20. Frequency of Each Ranking for Each Product, Full Information  
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
P
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
(%
) 
Rank 
California Wonderful
Pomegranate Fruit
Texas Red Pomegranate Fruit
Texas Salavatski
Pomegranate Fruit
Ready-to-Eat California
Pomegranate Arils
Ready-to Eat Texas
Pomegranate Arils
Mixed Pomegranate Juice
Pineapple
No Product
  
268 
Table 38. Percentages of Participants Who Assigned Each Ranking to Each 
Product in Each Round 
 
California 
Wonderful 
Pomegranate 
Fruit
Texas Red 
Pomegranate 
Fruit
Texas 
Salavatski 
Pomegranate 
Fruit
Ready-to-Eat 
California 
Pomegranate 
Arils
Ready-to Eat 
Texas 
Pomegranate 
Arils
Mixed 
Pomegranate 
Juice
Pineapple
No 
Product
Rank
1 6.91% 1.60% 2.66% 5.85% 4.26% 16.49% 53.19% 9.04%
2 6.38% 6.91% 6.38% 10.11% 12.77% 27.66% 18.62% 11.17%
3 9.04% 11.17% 10.64% 14.36% 25.00% 16.49% 4.26% 9.04%
4 11.70% 9.04% 13.83% 25.00% 21.28% 7.98% 5.32% 5.85%
5 18.62% 17.55% 15.43% 19.15% 11.17% 7.45% 3.19% 7.45%
6 17.02% 19.68% 28.72% 11.70% 10.64% 3.19% 5.85% 3.19%
7 12.77% 28.72% 17.02% 9.57% 10.11% 14.89% 3.72% 3.19%
8 17.55% 5.32% 5.32% 4.26% 4.79% 5.85% 5.85% 51.06%
1 5.32% 7.98% 3.19% 4.79% 4.79% 10.11% 60.11% 3.74%
2 9.57% 12.23% 9.04% 12.23% 18.62% 21.81% 9.57% 8.56%
3 14.36% 20.21% 14.89% 14.36% 18.62% 9.04% 3.72% 5.35%
4 11.17% 14.89% 26.60% 14.89% 18.09% 6.38% 5.32% 1.60%
5 12.77% 17.02% 16.49% 23.40% 14.36% 6.38% 3.72% 5.35%
6 18.62% 14.89% 17.55% 15.43% 13.30% 6.38% 7.98% 5.35%
7 15.96% 11.70% 10.64% 10.11% 9.04% 31.91% 6.91% 3.21%
8 12.23% 1.06% 1.60% 4.79% 3.19% 7.98% 2.66% 66.84%
1 5.32% 4.79% 3.19% 5.32% 7.98% 7.98% 61.17% 4.79%
2 11.17% 11.17% 5.85% 13.83% 13.83% 23.94% 7.98% 12.23%
3 10.11% 13.30% 13.83% 17.55% 25.53% 9.04% 5.32% 4.79%
4 11.70% 14.36% 17.55% 19.68% 20.21% 10.11% 3.19% 3.19%
5 16.49% 19.15% 19.15% 18.09% 8.51% 8.51% 2.13% 7.98%
6 18.09% 14.89% 24.47% 13.83% 10.11% 6.91% 8.51% 3.72%
7 14.36% 20.21% 11.70% 7.98% 10.64% 21.28% 7.45% 6.38%
8 12.77% 2.13% 4.26% 3.72% 3.19% 12.23% 4.26% 56.91%
1 5.32% 6.38% 2.13% 9.04% 5.85% 18.09% 46.81% 6.38%
2 6.91% 9.04% 6.38% 11.17% 21.81% 22.34% 14.89% 7.45%
3 14.36% 12.23% 14.36% 14.89% 22.87% 11.17% 4.79% 5.32%
4 6.91% 17.55% 17.55% 20.21% 18.09% 9.04% 6.38% 4.26%
5 15.43% 15.96% 22.87% 14.89% 13.83% 4.79% 4.26% 7.98%
6 21.28% 17.55% 20.74% 15.96% 4.79% 6.91% 8.51% 4.26%
7 15.43% 18.62% 12.23% 9.04% 10.64% 19.15% 9.57% 5.32%
8 14.36% 2.66% 3.72% 4.79% 2.13% 8.51% 4.79% 59.04%
1 4.79% 6.91% 3.19% 6.38% 6.91% 7.98% 60.11% 4.26%
2 10.11% 10.11% 9.04% 13.30% 17.55% 21.28% 10.11% 9.04%
3 13.30% 18.62% 14.89% 12.77% 22.87% 8.51% 3.72% 5.85%
4 10.64% 15.96% 22.34% 20.21% 16.49% 6.38% 3.72% 3.19%
5 12.77% 17.55% 20.21% 22.34% 14.36% 5.85% 2.13% 4.26%
6 20.74% 17.02% 19.15% 13.30% 10.11% 6.38% 9.04% 4.79%
7 16.49% 12.77% 9.04% 8.51% 8.51% 31.38% 7.45% 5.85%
8 11.17% 1.06% 2.13% 3.19% 3.19% 12.23% 3.72% 62.77%
Note: The percentages of participants who assigned a particular ranking to a particular product in a particular round are given 
here.
Baseline Information
Tasting Information Treatment
Health and Nutrition Information Treatment
Anti-Cancer Information Treatment
Full Information
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For the rankings models, the number of individuals who submitted usable 
responses was 188 due to several individuals who failed to rank one or more products in 
one or more rounds.   
A comparison of the preference rankings may be somewhat simplified by 
comparing whether a product was ranked in the top half of bids.  Although this does not 
directly depict the lower half of the data, it allows for a simpler visualization of whether 
the product was likely to be one of the more favored products in the study.  The bids that 
were ranked in the lower half (5
th
-8
th
) of the rankings are implied by the difference 
                                                                   These 
results are shown in Figure 21.  It is clear that the information treatments had little effect 
on the overall frequencies of the rankings for some products while the effect was greater 
for other products.  In comparing this plot to the plot of the individual rankings given in 
Figure 20, the changes from one information treatment to another are more clearly 
revealed, as is a more direct comparison of overall preference for a particular product.   
To address the rankings data further, the average rank for each product for each 
information treatment is given in Figure 22.  Note that on average, pineapple was the 
most preferred product for all information treatments and the no product option was the 
least preferred for all information treatments.  Also, when the control product and the no 
product option are excluded, the Texas Salavatski RTE arils were the most preferred for 
any additional information treatment and the California Wonderful pomegranate fruit 
was the least preferred product for any of the additional information treatments.  
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Figure 21. Percentage of Subjects Who Ranked a Particular Product in the Top 
Half of All Products 
 
Also notable is that for the anti-cancer information round, the ranking for the 
pineapple dropped; this result confirmed the suggestion that the anti-cancer information 
regarding one product ingredient (pomegranate) would have an effect relative to 
products without those health benefits (pineapple).   
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Figure 22. Average Preference Ranking by Product and by Information Treatment.  
Note: Preferences were ranked from 1-8 for the product option, with a ranking of 1 being 
the most desirable and a ranking of 8 being the least desirable   
 
 
Rank-Ordered Logit Model 
The rank-ordered logit model estimations were done in STATA/ IC 11.0 ©.  
Prior to estimation the rankings data were ―exploded‖ as described previously, giving an 
implied L-1 choice decisions for each participant.  The respondents were asked to rank 
the products in order of descending preference, but the rank-ordered logit model is not 
symmetrical in the estimation of ascending versus descending preferences; therefore 
simply reversing the sign of the marginal effects for a rank-ordered logit for ascending 
ranks would not give equivalent estimates.  However, the software includes an option in 
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
6.0
6.5
7.0
R
a
n
k
in
g
 
Information Treatment 
California Wonderful
Pomegranate Fruit
Texas Red Pomegranate
Fruit
Texas Salavatski
Pomegranate Fruit
Ready-to-Eat Pomegranate
Arils - California Wonderful
Ready-to-Eat Pomegranate
Arils - Texas Salavatski
Mixed Pomegranate Juice
Pineapple
No Product
Product Options 
  
272 
the rank-ordered logit estimation procedure to handle such ―reversed‖ ranks (StataCorp 
2009).  The product characteristics that were included for the rank-ordered mixed logit 
models are the cultivar of the product (California Wonderful, Texas Red, and Texas 
Salavatski) and the product form (RTE, juice, pineapple, and no product).   
After the traditional fully-ranked models were estimated, the models were re-
estimated using partial rankings to check for possible differences in ability to rank less-
preferred versus more-preferred product options.  The results of this estimation are given 
in Table 39.  
 The first portion of the table includes estimates for the changes in ranking due to 
the product characteristics.  Each model was estimated separately for each information 
treatment.  In interpreting the parameter estimates, a product would be more preferred 
due to a characteristic if it has a positive value, and less preferred due to that 
characteristic if there is a negative value for the parameter estimate.  Thus, in the 
baseline ranking round, there was no effect on preference for a product if the product 
was either of the two Texas varieties, but items were more preferred if they were RTE, 
juice, or pineapple.  Of these, the largest relative effect on preference was pineapple, 
followed by juice, and then RTE.  The option of no product was discounted in the 
rankings.   
The estimates of the models for tasting, health and nutrition, anti-cancer, and full 
information will not be described individually.  However, points of interest in each and 
across models will be discussed.  In the Tasting Information round, the ranking of the 
juice product no longer differed significantly from the baseline.  However, once subjects 
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tasted all of the products there was a greater preference for the Texas varieties of 
pomegranate fruit products as compared to the California product; the Texas Red variety 
was more preferred than the Texas Salavatski variety.  In general, all products were 
more preferred over the option of ―no product,‖ which was discounted even more with 
the full information set than in the baseline round.   
 
 
Table 39. Rank-Ordered Logit Models for Explicit Preference Rankings for Fruit 
Products by Information Treatment, Fully- and Partially-Ranked Models 
 
 
 
 
 In the health and nutrition information round, the Texas Red variety was still 
preferred over the Texas Salavatski variety, and there was also still a preference for RTE 
products over whole fruit products.  There was less of a preference for the two Texas 
Product Characteristics
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Variety
1: Texas Red 0.039 0.106 0.444*** 0.108 0.212** 0.106 0.284*** 0.106 0.363*** 0.106
2: Texas Salavatski 0.116 0.081 0.282*** 0.084 0.149* 0.081 0.258*** 0.082 0.257*** 0.083
Product Form
Ready-To-Eat (RTE) 0.520*** 0.088 0.216*** 0.083 0.407*** 0.086 0.474*** 0.085 0.316*** 0.084
Juice 0.747*** 0.117 -0.118 0.118 0.016 0.118 0.379*** 0.117 -0.243** 0.119
Pineapple 1.431*** 0.123 1.181*** 0.121 1.142*** 0.121 0.952*** 0.120 1.085*** 0.122
No Product -0.692*** 0.132 -1.536*** 0.151 -1.108*** 0.137 -1.058*** 0.139 -1.409*** 0.145
Variety
1: Texas Red -0.086 0.172 0.426*** 0.139 0.258* 0.149 0.376** 0.151 0.364*** 0.142
2: Texas Salavatski 0.127 0.108 0.313*** 0.105 0.182* 0.104 0.253** 0.106 0.270*** 0.104
Product Form
Ready-To-Eat (RTE) 0.691*** 0.113 0.190* 0.105 0.594*** 0.108 0.686*** 0.109 0.389*** 0.105
Juice 1.215*** 0.144 0.288** 0.147 0.522*** 0.146 0.930*** 0.144 0.236 0.150
Pineapple 1.957*** 0.147 1.583*** 0.139 1.722*** 0.143 1.515*** 0.143 1.622*** 0.141
No Product 0.180 0.166 -0.804*** 0.195 -0.390** 0.181 -0.338* 0.185 -0.591*** 0.185
a 
Single (*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks are used to denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Rankings, Fully Ranked (1-8)
Baseline Information Tasting Information
Health and Nutrition 
Information
Anti-Cancer 
Information
Full Information
Rankings, Partially Ranked (1-4)
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varieties of pomegranate over the California pomegranate fruit under this information 
treatment; however, this result was expected because the health and nutrition 
information was for the fruit products in general and was not variety specific.   
In the anti-cancer Information round, the changes in preference ranking due to 
the Texas variety product characteristics was nearly the same for Texas Red and Texas 
Salavatski.  This is in contrast to the results of the Tasting Information treatment; 
suggesting that although there may be a consumer preference for the taste of the Texas 
Red variety over the Texas Salavatski variety, the preference for either one can be 
increased by providing information on the anti-cancer properties of the fruit products.  
Also, in this round the preference for the pineapple fruit in comparison to the 
pomegranate products was less than in other rounds, which was expected since pineapple 
is not known for having the same potential anti-cancer benefits as pomegranates and 
pomegranate products.  The juice product was still not as preferred in the anti-cancer 
round as in the baseline, but it was more preferred than in the other two information 
rounds.   
The full information estimation provides insight into the net sum effect of all of 
the information treatments on individual preferences.  The results suggest that on the 
whole, there is a greater preference for the Texas Red than the Texas Salavatski variety.  
Also, with the full information set there was a preference for RTE products over whole 
fruit products and a discount for the mixed pomegranate juice product in relation to the 
fresh fruit products.  However, the ―no product‖ option was discounted the most heavily, 
indicating that most subjects preferred to have any one of the included products over the 
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option of having no product.  The largest effect for the full information set was due to 
the product characteristic of pineapple (versus pomegranate); this indicates that even 
when subjects were given additional information on the pomegranate products to 
decrease the novelty of the good, the more familiar pineapple product was still preferred.  
However, the difference in the pomegranate versus pineapple products was not as large 
as in the baseline round, and thus to relative degree to which the more familiar pineapple 
product was preferred over the novel pomegranate products was decreased.   
Table 39 includes the estimations for both the fully-ranked and partially-ranked 
models.  The parameter estimates are different across treatments, with generally more 
variance in the partially-ranked model.  In the partially-ranked model, the parameter for 
the ―no product‖ option was not significant for the baseline round, nor were the Texas 
varieties.  Although the rankings are all on a relative scale, the magnitude of the 
parameter estimates does indicate a relative degree of preference among product 
characteristics.  The largest preference in the baseline round for the partial rankings is 
clearly for the pineapple.  Therefore, in comparison to the fully-ranked model, it was 
clear that the partially ranked-model has more predictive ability for the products that 
were most frequently ranked at the top of the rankings and less predictive ability for the 
products that were more commonly at the bottom of the rankings.   
The differences in the parameter estimates could be interpreted in two ways, 
depending on whether it is believed that individuals are less able to accurately rank the 
less-preferred products or, alternatively, it is assumed that individuals devote equal 
amounts of attention to ranking all products from the least preferred to the most 
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preferred.  The former situation would be interpreted as heterogeneity in an individual‘s 
ability to rank the products, while the latter assumes that the rankings are done 
homogeneously across all preference levels by all respondents.   
 
Mixed Rank-Ordered Logit Model 
 Combining the mixed logit and rank-ordered logit framework provides the 
following results.  The preference data were exploded as described by Rabe-Hesketh, 
Pickles, and Skrondal (2001) and Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2005) and the mixed 
rank-ordered logit model was then estimated using the –mixlogit– command in STATA/ 
IC 11.0 © developed by Hole (2007).  A series of different specifications are provided 
for comparison of these models.  A model similar to the first rank-ordered logit model 
was first estimated.  As seen in Table 40, such a model provides estimated parameters 
and standard errors for those parameters, but it also provides estimated standard 
deviations and standard errors for the standard deviations.  This is because the model 
allows each individual to have their own slope for each parameter in the model.  Thus, if 
the standard deviation is significant then we would expect that there are differences in 
each variable that depend on each individual.  More precisely, the standard deviations of 
the β parameters accommodate the presence of preference heterogeneity in the sample 
(Hensher and Greene 2003). 
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Table 40.  Mixed Rank-Ordered Logit Models for Preference Rankings, Estimated 
Coefficients and Standard Deviations of Coefficients 
 
 
Parameter
(a) Standard 
Error
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Variety
1: Texas Red 0.369*** (0.058) 0.281*** (0.066) 0.379*** (0.067) 0.337*** (0.067) 0.071 (0.114)
Std. Deviation 0.062 (0.068) 0.058 (0.082) 0.055 (0.077) 0.042 (0.076) 0.037 (0.099)
2: Texas Salavatski 0.286*** (0.046) 0.259*** (0.053) 0.318*** (0.053) 0.257*** (0.053) 0.195** (0.088)
Std. Deviation 0.059 (0.131) 0.171* (0.095) 0.163* (0.099) 0.205** (0.083) 0.060 (0.090)
Product Form
Ready-To-Eat (RTE) 0.704*** (0.096) 0.828*** (0.094) 0.715*** (0.092) 0.675*** (0.101) 0.959*** (0.132)
Std. Deviation 1.748*** (0.088) 1.567*** (0.084) 1.625*** (0.092) 1.625*** (0.126) 1.500*** (0.112)
Juice 0.542*** (0.160) 0.695*** (0.124) 0.571*** (0.126) 0.289** (0.127) 1.536*** (0.216)
Std. Deviation 2.900*** (0.201) 3.121*** (0.163) 3.100*** (0.180) 3.002*** (0.167) 3.320*** (0.235)
Pineapple 2.921*** (0.189) 3.026*** (0.182) 2.919*** (0.171) 3.166*** (0.172) 4.286*** (0.403)
Std. Deviation 4.499*** (0.206) 3.630*** (0.153) 3.606*** (0.165) 3.614*** (0.171) 4.062*** (0.266)
No Product -1.739*** (0.209) -1.198*** (0.168) -1.451*** (0.165) -1.471*** (0.162) -0.527* (0.304)
Std. Deviation 5.250*** (0.320) 4.844*** (0.218) 4.822*** (0.223) 4.838*** (0.226) 5.795*** (0.516)
Information Treatment Interactions
Info Trt. x Variety 1: Texas Red 0.461*** (0.138) -0.039 (0.133) 0.127 (0.134) 0.583*** (0.165)
Std. Deviation 0.164 (0.118) 0.088 (0.114) 0.083 (0.110) 0.061 (0.115)
Info Trt. x Variety 2: Texas Salavatski 0.169 (0.107) -0.085 (0.104) 0.143 (0.104) 0.262** (0.129)
Std. Deviation 0.054 (0.096) 0.038 (0.086) 0.093 (0.085) 0.215* (0.118)
Info Trt. x Ready-To-Eat (RTE) -0.403*** (0.114) 0.023 (0.116) 0.271** (0.117) -0.353** (0.146)
Std. Deviation 0.182 (0.115) 0.081 (0.114) 0.256** (0.119) 0.004 (0.148)
Info Trt. x Juice -0.945*** (0.175) -0.482*** (0.174) 0.587*** (0.171) -2.080*** (0.241)
Std. Deviation 0.507*** (0.160) 0.334 (0.207) 0.057 (0.188) 0.837*** (0.213)
Info Trt. x Pineapple 0.096 (0.196) 0.237 (0.191) -0.648*** (0.191) -0.746*** (0.264)
Std. Deviation 0.393** (0.200) 0.091 (0.258) 0.079 (0.213) 0.510** (0.223)
Info Trt. x No Product -1.025*** (0.216) -0.044 (0.204) 0.062 (0.202) -2.353*** (0.305)
Std. Deviation 0.159 (0.213) 0.051 (0.196) 0.250 (0.187) 0.690* (0.415)
Log Likelihood -5845.995 -5847.638 -5894.849 -5877.829 -3090.089
(c)
(a)
 Single (*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks are used to denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
(c)
 The model for the full information is based on only observations in the first and last rounds of preference rankings.
(b)
 The models for the baseline, tasting, health and nutrition, and anti-cancer information treatments are based on the observations for all four rounds of preference 
rankings.
Full Information 
Interactions
(c)
Preference Rankings, Fully Ranked (1-8)
No Interactions
(b)
Tasting Information 
Interactions
(b)
Health and Nutrition 
Information 
Interactions
(b)
Anti-Cancer 
Information 
Interactions
(b)
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Thus, in the first model which includes no interactions, all included product 
characteristics are significant predictors of preference rankings (P < 0.001).  However, 
the comparison of the two Texas varieties and their standard deviations indicates that in 
this model there is not a significant individual component to the prediction and these 
were generally uniform across the population when differences in individual 
characteristics for the other product characteristics were controlled.   
These models were also estimated to include interaction effects of each 
information treatment with each product characteristic.  These estimations should 
indicate whether receiving the additional information had an individual interaction with 
the product characteristics.  It would not be expected that all individuals would have the 
same response to all product characteristics since it was possible that they would enjoy 
the taste of one product and dislike the taste of another product.  This could similarly 
hold for the other information treatments.  In comparing the models for each of the three 
additional information treatments, the product forms and varieties were all still 
significant (P <0.001) predictors of the preference rankings.   
However, these models suggest that the presence of individual-level interaction 
terms varied from one type of information treatment to the next.  The tasting information 
treatment had a positive significant effect on the Texas Red variety but a negative effect 
on the RTE and juice product forms.  For the juice this information interaction was also 
significant on the individual level.  This was not entirely surprising as the RTE form is in 
comparison to the baseline of the whole fruit product, so the tasting information reduced 
the premium for the RTE product in comparison to the whole fruit product.  Since 
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participants were also told how to remove the husk from the whole fruit product, this is 
not an unreasonable result.  There was not a significant interaction effect of tasting 
information on the pineapple product, which was expected since most participants were 
expected to be familiar with pineapple.   
For the health information, the effects were generally not a result of an 
interaction of product characteristics with the information other than for the juice 
product.  Additionally, none of the interactions terms had a significant effect at the 
individual level.  For the anti-cancer information, there were effects for all of the product 
forms and varieties, and all of these varied significantly with the individual except for 
the Texas Red variety.  There were interaction effects between the anti-cancer 
information and RTE, juice, and pineapple product forms, but only the RTE form had 
significant preference heterogeneity for the interaction term. 
The final model presented in Table 40 was a comparison of the baseline 
information treatment and the full information treatment.  This model generally predicts 
more individual variation in preferences and greater effects from the interaction of the 
product characteristics and having the full information set.  Although only the Texas 
Salavatski variety was important alone, both Texas pomegranate varieties were 
important when the interaction of those varieties and the full information was 
considered.   
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Changes in Rankings 
 The rankings that were submitted by subjects following each information 
treatment offer an opportunity to quantify effects of the information treatments.  
Although comparisons of aggregated rankings before and after an information treatment 
are useful, it is perhaps more instructive to compare the change that each individual has 
in his or her preference rankings for the product, and then to compare those changes.  
For example, large changes in preference by one individual may be lost in the overall 
comparisons if they are offset by equally large changes in the opposite direction by 
another individual.  Thus, the changes for each product across each information 
treatment are included in the subsequent pages.  
 First, in looking at Table 41, the effects of the tasting information treatment on 
the relative preference rankings, more of the participants showed an improvement in the 
ranking for the two Texas varieties of whole pomegranate fruits than the California 
variety of pomegranate fruit.  This could have been a result of less familiarity with the 
Texas varieties prior to the tasting actual differences in the tastes of the three whole fruit 
products.   On the other hand, the changes in rankings for the ready-to-eat products were 
very similar for the RTE California arils and the RTE Texas arils.  Of all the products, 
the mixed pomegranate juice had the most participants who ranked it worse following 
the tasting round.  Confirmation of the hypothesis that participants would be more 
familiar with the pineapple product is seen in the much higher proportion of participants 
whose ranking stayed the same relative to the other products.  The means and standard 
deviations for the ranking changes are provided here, but the standard deviation is large 
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for all products included and therefore the median change is also provided.  In 
comparing the medians, the only product that showed a change in the product ranking is 
the Texas Red Pomegranate Fruit which improved by one rank. 
  
 
Table 41. Changes in Explicit Preference Rankings by Product (Tasting 
Information Rank ‒ Baseline Rank) 
 
 
 
 The next information treatment interactions to be addressed are for the health and 
nutrition information treatment; these results are in Table 42.  The changes in the 
ranking across this information indicate fewer improved rankings and more rankings that 
stayed the same as the baseline for the three whole pomegranate fruit products.  This was 
California 
Wonderful 
Pomegranate 
Fruit
Texas Red 
Pomegranate 
Fruit
Texas 
Salavatski 
Pomegranate 
Fruit
Ready-to-Eat 
California 
Pomegranate 
Arils
Ready-to Eat 
Texas 
Pomegranate 
Arils
Mixed 
Pomegranate 
Juice
Pineapple No Product
Ranking improved 
(lower ranking 
number)
69 114 92 61 65 34 38 13
% 36.70% 60.64% 48.94% 32.45% 34.57% 18.09% 20.21% 6.91%
Ranking worsened 
(higher ranking 
number)
66 30 46 69 66 86 35 57
% 35.11% 15.96% 24.47% 36.70% 35.11% 45.74% 18.62% 30.32%
Ranking the same 53 52 54 63 62 76 122 126
% 28.19% 27.66% 28.72% 33.51% 32.98% 40.43% 64.89% 67.02%
Mean -0.2340 -1.1915 -0.6543 0.1223 -0.0479 1.1011 0.0053 0.8883
Std. Error 2.2225 1.9029 1.8651 1.9184 1.8217 2.5845 1.6851 2.2116
Interpretation improved improved improved worsened improved worsened worsened worsened
Median 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Interpretation no change improved no change no change no change no change no change no change
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also the case for the ready-to-eat aril products.  More individuals worsened their ranking 
for the mixed pomegranate juice than either improved or maintained their ranking.  
Again in this information treatment the standard errors of the sample is larger than the 
mean, but regardless of which product is considered, the median value indicates no 
change in preference ranking for any product. 
 
 
Table 42. Changes in Explicit Preference Rankings by Product (Health and 
Nutrition Information Rank ‒ Baseline Rank) 
 
 
 
 
The anti-cancer information treatment results are included in Table 43.  The 
results for the whole pomegranate fruits are very similar to those for the health and 
California 
Wonderful 
Pomegranate 
Fruit
Texas Red 
Pomegranate 
Fruit
Texas 
Salavatski 
Pomegranate 
Fruit
Ready-to-Eat 
California 
Pomegranate 
Arils
Ready-to Eat 
Texas 
Pomegranate 
Arils
Mixed 
Pomegranate 
Juice
Pineapple No Product
Ranking improved 
(lower ranking 
number)
57 76 60 51 63 28 39 18
% 30.32% 40.43% 31.91% 27.13% 33.51% 14.89% 20.74% 9.57%
Ranking worsened 
(higher ranking 
number)
50 29 38 47 45 88 28 45
% 26.60% 15.43% 20.21% 25.00% 23.94% 46.81% 14.89% 23.94%
Ranking the same 81 52 54 63 62 76 122 126
% 43.09% 27.66% 28.72% 33.51% 32.98% 40.43% 64.89% 67.02%
Mean -0.2074 -0.6915 -0.2872 -0.1170 -0.2181 0.9894 0.0532 0.4947
Std. Error 1.8743 1.6156 1.5417 1.6045 1.6644 2.1693 1.7934 2.0040
Interpretation improved improved improved improved improved worsened worsened worsened
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Interpretation no change no change no change no change no change no change no change no change
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nutrition information in terms of proportions that improved, worsened, or maintained 
their ranking.  There was less change (more rankings that stayed the same) for the Texas 
ready-to-eat pomegranate arils than for the two previously discussed treatments, and the 
number of participants that worsened their relative ranking for the Texas RTE 
pomegranate arils was less than for the tasting treatment in particular.   
 
Table 43. Changes in Explicit Preference Rankings by Product (Anti-Cancer 
Information Rank ‒ Baseline Rank) 
 
 
 
The percentage of rankings that decreased was less for the mixed pomegranate 
juice than for the Tasting Information and Health and Nutrition Information treatments.  
California 
Wonderful 
Pomegranate 
Fruit
Texas Red 
Pomegranate 
Fruit
Texas 
Salavatski 
Pomegranate 
Fruit
Ready-to-Eat 
California 
Pomegranate 
Arils
Ready-to Eat 
Texas 
Pomegranate 
Arils
Mixed 
Pomegranate 
Juice
Pineapple No Product
Ranking improved 
(lower ranking 
number)
56 78 68 54 60 41 16 10
% 29.79% 41.49% 36.17% 28.72% 31.91% 21.81% 8.51% 5.32%
Ranking worsened 
(higher ranking 
number)
52 28 39 47 33 49 43 48
% 27.66% 14.89% 20.74% 25.00% 17.55% 26.06% 22.87% 25.53%
Ranking the same 80 52 54 63 62 76 122 126
% 42.55% 27.66% 28.72% 33.51% 32.98% 40.43% 64.89% 67.02%
Mean -0.0266 -0.6702 -0.2872 -0.0904 -0.3617 0.4255 0.4734 0.6170
Std. Error 1.7411 1.7049 1.5996 1.5878 1.5433 2.2083 1.8426 2.0271
Interpretation worsened improved improved improved improved worsened worsened worsened
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Interpretation no change no change no change no change no change no change no change no change
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This could possibly be attributed to differences in what types of prior information 
subjects had for the product.  Finally, for the control product (pineapple), the anti-cancer 
information was provided only for pomegranate products.  This was done in order to 
simulate an advertising campaign or news report that focused on the positive health 
attributes of one type of product while giving no mention (neither positive nor negative) 
of substitute products.  This suggests that additional information on the anti-cancer 
attributes of pomegranates improved the preference ranking for many subjects relative to 
a substitute product.  However, as previously, the median indicates no change in 
preference ranking for any product. 
 The full information set relative to the baseline information interactions are 
provided in Table 44.  Here more participants improved their preference ranking for the 
two Texas varieties of whole pomegranate fruits relative to the California pomegranate 
fruit.  Two things should be re-emphasized here: 1) the full information set designation 
refers to whichever round of information was the last information presented 
(alternatively, the ranking reported by subjects when they had received all three 
information treatments) and 2) that the study sample was not intended to give results that 
would reflect the same opinions across the United States, as it is possible that the 
opposite result would be true in other states.  
 There was less improvement and more worsening for both of the ready-to-eat 
products relative to the Texas whole fruit products with the full information set.  Mixed 
pomegranate juice showed the most worsening of relative preference rankings.  There 
were more rankings that did not change from the baseline round for two products 
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relative to the rest of the products: pineapple and no product.  It is instructive to look at 
the sum effect of all the information treatments that participants are exposed to in order 
to get a better gauge of what their response to gaining several types of information on a 
single product might be.  The only products with a median that showed any change in 
ranking is the Texas Red pomegranate fruit with an improvement and the mixed 
pomegranate juice with a worsening in rank.   
 
Table 44. Changes in Explicit Preference Rankings by Product (Full Information 
Rank ‒ Baseline Rank) 
 
 
 
 
California 
Wonderful 
Pomegranate 
Fruit
Texas Red 
Pomegranate 
Fruit
Texas 
Salavatski 
Pomegranate 
Fruit
Ready-to-Eat 
California 
Pomegranate 
Arils
Ready-to Eat 
Texas 
Pomegranate 
Arils
Mixed 
Pomegranate 
Juice
Pineapple No Product
Ranking improved 
(lower ranking 
number)
68 105 91 66 77 31 40 18
% 36.17% 55.85% 48.40% 35.11% 40.96% 16.49% 21.28% 9.57%
Ranking worsened 
(higher ranking 
69 30 40 60 56 96 33 57
% 36.70% 15.96% 21.28% 31.91% 29.79% 51.06% 17.55% 30.32%
Ranking the same 51 52 54 63 62 76 122 126
% 27.13% 27.66% 28.72% 33.51% 32.98% 40.43% 64.89% 67.02%
Mean -0.2021 -1.0213 -0.6011 -0.0851 -0.2234 1.3191 0.0638 0.7394
Std. Error 2.2088 1.7458 1.8107 1.8682 1.7802 2.4019 1.8575 2.2111
Interpretation improved improved improved improved improved worsened worsened worsened
Median 0 -1 0 0 0 1 0 0
Interpretation no change improved no change no change no change worsened no change no change
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Comparison of Bidding and Ranking Results 
Subjects expressed their preferences for the fruit products in two distinct yet 
conceptually-related ways.  Did these two methods of preference elicitation yield 
compatible results, and if not, which method is preferred?  It was expected that the two 
methods would produce similar, yet not identical results due to inconsistencies or human 
error in decision processes, failure to remember previous responses, and so on.  Even so, 
a rational decisionmaker would be predicted to submit rankings and bids that expressed 
the same order of preferences. 
However, results on the convergence of the two methods for preference 
elicitation were mixed.  There were a total of 142 individuals expressing at least one 
preference reversal.   Preference reversals have been previously discussed by Tversky 
and Thaler (1990).  For this description, preference reversals are defined as a difference 
between rankings and ordered bids for the same round.  This suggests that the 
preferences expressed in the rankings indicate different preferences than the preferences 
expressed by the same subjects‘ actual bids.  The term preference reversal will 
specifically exclude changes in rankings or biddings across rounds, as it is expected that 
those could occur due to preference updating based on the additional information that 
subjects received across rounds.  The numbers of individuals with at least one preference 
reversal among the product alternatives within any single round are listed in Table 45.   
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Table 45. Count of Individuals per Round with at Least One Preference Reversal 
between Explicit Rankings and Implied Ordered Bids 
 
 
 
There are several possible reasons for the high incidence of preference reversals 
between the rankings and ordered bids.  There were several product options, so there 
was greater complexity in the decision-making process than there would have been for 
fewer products.  Also, the ―no product‖ option which has been commonly used in the 
literature for rankings may not have cognitively equated with bids of $0.00 for subjects.  
Another hypothesized reason for the preference reversals is that the products in question 
were novel products.  If subjects were unfamiliar with the products, they may have been 
less able to consistently rank and bid on products.  However, the degree of differences is 
surprising since subjects did not have to submit bids and rankings at different times.  All 
subjects ranked the products and submitted bids on those products at the same time, and 
had the opportunity to check that all their implied ordered bid rankings and their actual 
preference rankings were the same.  While there has been extensive review in the 
literature of similarities and differences among discrete choice rankings and bids 
submitted in experimental auctions, the presence of so many preference reversals 
suggests that at least in this case, the two methods of preference elicitation do not 
Baseline
Tasting 
Information
Health and 
Nutrition 
Information
Anti-Cancer 
Information
Full 
Information
Individuals with at 
least one reversal
142 
(a) 141 132 133 137
(a)
 Preference reversals are defined here as instances when an individual ranked the goods in an order for 
the preference ranking portion of the experiment which differed from the ranking implied by his or her 
ordered bids.
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provide identical results.  This hypothesis was further tested by estimating the ordered 
bid rankings models using the two Texas product varieties, the form of the product (RTE 
arils or juice), and the type of product (pomegranate, pineapple, or no product); these 
were the same product characteristics used in the previous estimation of the preference 
rankings models.  These results were given in Table 39.    
There were two models estimated for the ordered bids following the estimation 
of a fully-ranked and partially-ranked model for the rankings data.  The estimates for the 
ordered bids are included in Table 46.   
 
 
Table 46. Rank-Ordered Logit Models for Implied Preference Rankings Using 
Ordered Bids for Fruit Products, by Information Treatment, Fully-Ranked and 
Partially-Ranked Models 
 
 
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Variety
1: Texas Red -0.112 0.137 0.169 0.130 0.032 0.132 0.087 0.135 0.210 0.131
2: Texas Salavatski 0.024 0.099 0.175* 0.097 0.106 0.098 0.129 0.099 0.129 0.098
Product Form
Ready-To-Eat (RTE) 0.739*** 0.105 0.424*** 0.098 0.538*** 0.101 0.741*** 0.103 0.460*** 0.100
Juice 1.323*** 0.138 0.496*** 0.130 0.632*** 0.133 1.028*** 0.136 0.409*** 0.132
Pineapple 1.997*** 0.144 1.566*** 0.136 1.766*** 0.141 1.544*** 0.138 1.776*** 0.140
No Product -1.342*** 0.151 -1.515*** 0.152 -1.452*** 0.151 -1.309*** 0.149 -1.466*** 0.149
Variety
1: Texas Red -0.153 0.174 0.261* 0.150 0.094 0.156 0.217 0.162 0.244 0.149
2: Texas Salavatski 0.036 0.112 0.241** 0.108 0.098 0.109 0.157 0.111 0.170 0.108
Product Form
Ready-To-Eat (RTE) 0.906*** 0.117 0.582*** 0.109 0.692*** 0.111 0.913*** 0.115 0.567*** 0.110
Juice 1.597*** 0.150 0.799*** 0.143 0.848*** 0.145 1.351*** 0.150 0.699*** 0.145
Pineapple 2.298*** 0.156 1.929*** 0.148 2.021*** 0.151 1.876*** 0.151 2.019*** 0.150
No Product -0.823*** 0.194 -1.123*** 0.198 -1.057*** 0.197 -0.912*** 0.198 -1.102*** 0.193
a 
Single (*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks are used to denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Ordered Bids, Fully Ranked (1-8)
Ordered Bids, Partially Ranked (1-4)
Information Treatment
Baseline Tasting Health and Nutrition Anti-Cancer Full
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For the fully ranked ordered bids, the magnitude of the estimated parameters for 
the rank-ordered logit model differs from that of the estimated parameters for the 
rankings model.  However, for the baseline information round, in both models there was 
no preference effect for either Texas variety.  In order of increasing preference, there 
were positive effects for RTE, juice, and pineapple.  In both cases there was a negative 
effect for the no product option.  In the tasting round, the implied rankings from the 
ordered bids indicate a tendency for a preference for the Texas Salavatski variety (P < 
0.10); the Texas Red variety was preferred by the explicit rankings (Table 39) over 
either Texas Salavatski or California Wonderful.  Not only is this a difference in 
magnitude of the parameters, this difference would lead to opposite conclusions in 
selecting one variety or the other.  This is a cause for concern in marketing research in 
terms of which product is the one that is actually preferred and would be purchased by 
consumers.  The preferences for the remaining product characteristics are similar for 
RTE, pineapple, and no product, but there was no significant effect in the preference 
ranking for the juice while there was a preference for juice over the whole fruit products.  
In fact, other than the product fruit cultivars, the ordered bids indicated increasing 
preference, in order, for RTE, juice, and pineapple, with a discounted preference for no 
product for the baseline and all information treatment rounds.  In contrast, when subjects 
had full information the RTE product was preferred to juice for the full ranked implied 
rankings.  For the Texas varieties, there was a trend towards a preference for the Texas 
Red variety over the Texas Salavatski variety.  This result is similar to the estimates of 
the rank-ordered logit model for the explicit preference rankings; however, in this case 
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the result is a change from tasting round of the experimental auction bidding.  It would 
be unusual but not impossible for the implied preference to vary from the tasting round 
to the full information set, since subjects had already tasted the product for the full 
information round.   
Again, although the values of the estimated parameters are not identical for the 
partially-ranked implied rankings, there was a slight preference for the Texas Salavatski 
variety.  Overall a comparison of the implied preferences from the baseline round to the 
full information set showed an increase in the relative discount for option of no product 
along with less strong preferences for RTE, juice, and pineapple.  This was most 
noticeable for the juice, where the decrease in relative preference was approximately 1.5 
times less in the full information set.   
Comparing the fully ranked ordered bid model to the partially-ranked model 
reveals several patterns and trends.  The relative size of the effects is generally larger for 
the product characteristics in the partially ranked model.  However, as pointed out in the 
comparison of the explicit ranking decisions, the size of the discount for no product is 
much less than that in the fully ranked model.  Based on the distributions of the 
preference rankings, this result is not unexpected.  With the majority of the ―no product‖ 
options ranked as the lowest rank, discarding the four lowest ranks was almost 
guaranteed to underestimate the parameters for the no product option and any other 
product that was consistently among the lowest ranked products; in discarding the lowest 
ranks, relevant information on some of the products is discarded.  Calfee, Winston, and 
Stempski (2001) state that if subjects have paid less attention to the lower ranked 
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products, noise will be introduced into the data and give inconsistent estimates if a fully 
ranked model is used.  However, the results here suggest that this is not the only reason 
that there may be differences in results from the two types of models, and products that 
are consistently in the lower portion of the rankings may be incorrectly discarded using 
partially ranked models.  In this case, the fully ranked model should provide greater 
insight into the rankings for all products, not just those that are consistently preferred.   
 
 
Figure 23. Probability of a Particular Fruit Product Being Ranked Most Preferred 
Based on Rank-Ordered Logit Model Estimates. 
Note: The probability of a product being ranked first was calculated based on the rank-
ordered logit models for 5 information treatments (baseline, tasting information, health 
and nutrition information, anti-cancer information, and full information) for each of 4 
selections of rankings data (fully-ranked preference rankings, partially-ranked preference 
rankings, fully-ranked ordered bids, and partially-ranked ordered bids)   
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The rank-ordered logit model can also be used to predict the probabilities that a 
particular product will be ranked first based on the product characteristics.  These 
probabilities are graphed in Figure 23, and the values of each probability are included in 
Appendix I.   
The general trends in these probabilities is that the probability of the California 
Wonderful whole fruits was consistent across information treatments, while for the 
Texas varieties of whole pomegranate fruits there was the greatest likelihood of being 
ranked first in the tasting information treatment.  For the baseline rounds the likelihood 
of any of the fresh pomegranate products being ranked first was the lowest of all the 
information levels.  Also, there is a general increase in the probability of the mixed 
pomegranate juice being ranked first in the anti-cancer information round.  Thus, it is 
useful to consider the multiple ways in which a product may be novel to a consumer.  A 
product may be novel in terms of its taste characteristics, its nutritional value, the 
production practices that are used, and a number of other categories.  Thus, these 
differences indicate the potential for differences in the novelty of products in regards to 
the information that was presented.  Most consumers were expected to be unfamiliar 
with the taste of the Texas varieties of pomegranates.  Relative to the novelty of the taste 
of the juice product, consumers may have been more unfamiliar with the health benefits 
of the juice product.  This could have led to differences in changes that were seen across 
information treatments.  For the fresh fruit products, there was very little difference 
between the results for anti-cancer information and for health and nutrition information.   
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Table 47. Mixed Rank-Ordered Logit Models for Ordered Bids, Estimated 
Coefficients and Standard Deviations of Coefficients 
 
 
Also, the fully-ranked preference rankings generally indicated the greatest 
probability that the fresh pomegranate fruit products would be ranked first, while the 
Parameter
(a) Standard 
Error
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Variety
1: Texas Red -0.136 (0.123) -0.246 (0.150) -0.059 (0.148) -0.206 (0.152) -0.508* (0.271)
Std. Deviation 0.156 (0.148) 0.207 (0.165) 0.289* (0.174) 0.610*** (0.179) 0.831*** (0.245)
2: Texas Salavatski -0.024 (0.096) -0.126 (0.116) -0.027 (0.111) -0.057 (0.119) -0.146 (0.189)
Std. Deviation 0.096 (0.130) 0.525*** (0.127) 0.329*** (0.110) 0.364** (0.182) 0.454*** (0.170)
Product Form
Ready-To-Eat (RTE) 0.963*** (0.147) 0.500*** (0.171) 0.134 (0.162) 0.692*** (0.174) 0.970*** (0.262)
Std. Deviation 2.239*** (0.155) 2.563*** (0.285) 2.272*** (0.164) 1.773*** (0.146) 1.878*** (0.219)
Juice 2.771*** (0.194) 1.325*** (0.341) 1.425*** (0.254) 2.902*** (0.242) 4.144*** (0.478)
Std. Deviation 3.485*** (0.202) 5.669*** (0.453) 5.596*** (0.373) 4.396*** (0.276) 6.738*** (0.684)
Pineapple 3.758*** (0.266) 5.820*** (0.390) 5.799*** (0.346) 5.435*** (0.343) 7.701*** (0.809)
Std. Deviation 6.061*** (0.354) 5.526*** (0.350) 5.339*** (0.323) 6.630*** (0.425) 8.618*** (0.930)
No Product -1.129*** (0.206) -3.609*** (0.419) -2.755*** (0.356) -4.875*** (0.469) -3.007*** (0.526)
Std. Deviation 4.867*** (0.330) 4.673*** (0.315) 5.227*** (0.351) 7.123*** (0.595) 7.429*** (0.958)
Information Treatment Interactions
Info Trt. x Variety 1: Texas Red 0.463 (0.285) 0.059 (0.287) -0.058 (0.295) 0.656* (0.366)
Std. Deviation 0.440 (0.365) 0.024 (0.290) 0.105 (0.266) 0.268 (0.295)
Info Trt. x Variety 2: Texas Salavatski 0.200 (0.213) -0.001 (0.216) -0.032 (0.217) 0.275 (0.268)
Std. Deviation 0.182 (0.186) 0.072 (0.219) 0.416** (0.205) 0.287 (0.223)
Info Trt. x Ready-To-Eat (RTE) -0.237 (0.252) -0.089 (0.262) 0.024 (0.255) -0.497 (0.371)
Std. Deviation 0.272 (0.213) 0.392* (0.237) 0.087 (0.237) 1.432*** (0.415)
Info Trt. x Juice -1.247*** (0.353) 0.055 (0.343) 0.312 (0.333) -1.300*** (0.495)
Std. Deviation 1.648*** (0.369) 0.276 (0.381) 0.044 (0.336) 2.192*** (0.342)
Info Trt. x Pineapple -0.260 (0.379) 0.476 (0.387) -0.470 (0.369) 0.487 (0.573)
Std. Deviation 1.500*** (0.462) 0.956** (0.376) 0.971** (0.387) 2.982*** (0.512)
Info Trt. x No Product -0.618* (0.348) 0.326 (0.350) 0.079 (0.352) -0.001 (0.480)
Std. Deviation 0.438 (0.330) 0.151 (0.322) 0.422 (0.346) 0.634* (0.360)
Log Likelihood -1957.470 -1859.692 -1873.132 -1868.864 -1072.361
(c)
(a)
 Single (*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks are used to denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
(c)
 The model for the full information is based on only observations in the first and last rounds of preference rankings.
(b)
 The models for the baseline, tasting, health and nutrition, and anti-cancer information treatments are based on the observations for each of the four rounds of 
preference rankings.
Ordered Bids, Fully Ranked (1-8)
No Interactions
(b)
Tasting Information 
Interactions
(b)
Health and Nutrition 
Information 
Interactions
(b)
Anti-Cancer 
Information 
Interactions
(b)
Full Information 
Interactions
(c)
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partially-ranked explicit preference rankings were closer to the predictions of the 
estimations based on implied rankings.  In all cases, the whole pomegranate fruits were 
more likely to be ranked first given the full information set than for the baseline round.  
This was not always true for the RTE pomegranate products.  The likelihood of the juice 
product being ranked first is lower in all cases from the baseline to the full information. 
The rank-ordered bid models have been discussed thus far, and the focus now 
shifts to the rank-ordered mixed logit models for the ordered bids.  The results for the 
implied preference rankings (ordered bids) are given in Table 47; the preference 
rankings models were shown previously in Table 40.   
The results of the application of the mixed rank-ordered logit model to the 
ordered bids provide somewhat similar results to the explicit preference rankings 
models.  The trend is for significance of both the coefficient and the individual 
preference heterogeneity for the product form attributes. For the interaction effects, in 
the tasting information model there were interactions and preference heterogeneity for 
the interaction of juice and tasting information, and the juice was less preferred as a 
result of the tasting information. For the health and nutrition information and anti-cancer 
information rounds, the interaction terms did not have predictive ability but they led to 
an interesting contrast with the model in which only the baseline and full information 
rounds were included, and interaction effects between those two were compared.  
When the full information set was compared to the baseline by using interaction 
effects of the information treatment and the product characteristics, there was trend for a 
penalty on the Texas Red variety but a trend for an individual specific interaction effect 
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with the full information in which the Texas Red variety was more preferred.  
Participants indicated a decreased preference for the juice product when they had 
received the full information set.  The signs on the product form characteristics with no 
interaction terms were as expected: preferences for RTE, juice, and pineapple with a 
negative preference for the no product option.  One note of caution is needed in 
comparing these results to the rank-ordered logit models estimated previously.  The 
rank-ordered logit model is equipped to handle ties in the rankings; however, in the 
process that was followed for ―exploding‖ the data, ties imply that the same choice was 
made at the same time when in fact there were most likely equal probabilities that the 
subject would select either of the two options.   
The choice of which method, discrete choice preference ranking or experimental 
auctions, is more relevant for use in preference elicitation is one for which economic 
theory does not provide a direct answer.  Particularly since both methods were incentive 
compatible in nature, the bias that those differences in hypothetical versus 
nonhypothetical responses should be eliminated and subjects would be expected to 
provide more convergent answers.  Olsen, Donaldson, and Shackley (2005) used a 
measure of ―convergent validity‖ as a percentage of respondents who equally preferred 
different options over explicit and implied rankings.   
For the pomegranate fruit products study, there were a few differences between 
the preference rankings and WTP elicitation to be considered in a comparison of the two 
results.  One, although participants were informed that all of the products were currently 
marketed for the same price, it is possible that subjects either chose not to believe this or 
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knew of outside options and price levels which may have influenced their rankings of all 
of the products for the same price (the rankings) differently than it influenced their 
preferences for the products when they could specify their own maximum price 
(auctions).  However, subjects did not actually pay the price they bid, and therefore 
rationality would still suggest that the products be ordered in the same way, regardless of 
which method was used.  Secondly, although detailed explanations, quizzes, multiple 
practice rounds, and question and answer sessions took place, it is impossible to rule out 
the possibility that there were differences in the understandings of the two preference 
elicitation mechanisms that were used; this could have subsequently produced 
differences in the explicit and implied ordered results.   For example, subjects may have 
different preferences when the product options have a single specified price than when 
those goods vary in price.  However, the use of products with similar retail prices should 
have eliminated this possibility in this comparison of rankings and bids.   
There were a number of similarities in the trends among information levels 
between the sets of ranking data that were used, and this robustness is reassuring in 
terms of drawing conclusions on the direction of the effects of the information 
treatments.  However, the differences in the parameter estimates based on using 
partially- or fully-ranked models and implied or explicit rankings is a cause for concern 
in predicting the magnitude of these changes based on product characteristics.  Further, 
the number of preference reversals between the ordered bids and the rankings, along 
with the differences in the estimated preference models, suggests that one of the two 
mechanisms may not be an accurate reflection of true consumer preference.  Which of 
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these is more useful should depend on the context of the research question.  If 
researchers are trying to determine the price that consumers would pay for a product in a 
retail setting, the experimental auction procedures may provide more relevant results, but 
if the question of interest is what type of product should even be offered for sale in a 
retail setting, then the preference ranking procedures may be more relevant.  Therefore, 
caution in designing and implementing experiments is necessary to ensure that the 
question of interest can accurately be addressed with the results that are obtained.  To 
obtain the full STATA coding for the estimates presented in this chapter, please refer to 
Appendix J.   
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 This study provided meaningful results on many levels.  First, the information 
regarding pomegranates and the pomegranate industry can be used by those who are 
considering growing or marketing pomegranates.  Second, the procedures for a 
combined nonhypothetical ranking and bidding preference elicitation mechanism 
developed and used here allow for other applications of the field of experimental 
economics.  Third, the results of the econometric estimations provide insights into not 
only the econometric differences in the models but also the implications of the 
differences in product characteristics and information treatments.  Each of these will be 
briefly summarized, and several key conclusions based on the summation of this 
information will also be presented.  This discussion also leaves a number of research 
questions that could be the subject of additional research, and some of these are 
mentioned briefly.   
 
Summary 
Pomegranates and the Pomegranate Industry 
 Pomegranate (Punica granatum L.) typically grows best in warm, semiarid 
environments, with most scholars attributing its location of origin to the region in and 
around Iran.  The large shrubs to small trees begin full production at an age of around 3 
to 5 years, with an orchard lifespan of around 25 years.  The pomegranate fruit are round 
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to oblate with a prominent calyx and with a color range of deep yellow to dark red, 
depending on the cultivar.  The tough outer husk is filled with small juice sacs called 
arils that are separated into compartments within the fruit by septal membranes.  
Estimates of the nutritional value of pomegranates as well as the chemical composition 
of the different plant components have been made, but these characteristics have also 
been shown to vary considerably with cultivar and growing location.   
 Pomegranates contain a number of plant-specific compounds known as 
phytochemicals, and these are the compounds that give the fruits their unique flavor as 
well as their potential health implications.  One group of phytochemicals, the 
polyphenols, is present in a number of forms including flavonoids, hydrolyzable tannins, 
and condensed tannins.  These compounds are more concentrated in certain parts of the 
fruit and plant depending on the compound, with those that have antioxidant properties 
being the most commonly cited as having potential human health implications.  Diseases 
that have been described to have a free radical method of action include general 
inflammation and aging, along with diseases that affect the brain, heart, kidney, liver, 
lungs, gastrointestinal tract, blood, eyes, skin, and muscles; antioxidants act to interfere 
with destructive pathways that free radicals are involved in.  Although it has been 
difficult to establish causality links for these properties in humans, these properties have 
been tested extensively in laboratory settings with non-human subjects.  Nevertheless, 
the diseases that pomegranates in particular have been linked to reducing  based on 
either in vitro or in the laboratory include reductions in inflammation, cancer, and 
Alzheimer‘s disease symptoms.  The effectiveness of pomegranate fruits as disease-
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reducing mechanisms may also depend on the form of the fruit, as much research 
remains to be done on whether the benefits of pomegranates can be obtained from the 
individual chemical compounds or if greater benefits may be obtained by consuming the 
whole fruit.  Reports of toxicity from pomegranate fruits are rare.   
 The functional food market in the United States alone had a value of $27 billion 
in 2007 with an anticipated growth rate of 10% per annum. This market has been 
targeted by both food manufacturers and pharmaceutical companies with products that 
are suggested to have additional health benefits beyond their basic nutritional value.  
Much research has been conducted regarding factors that may affect consumer purchases 
of these products; most results indicate differences based on the type of product, the 
credibility of the information source for information on the product, the taste of the 
products, and underlying consumer attitudes as important determinants of purchases.    
 Pomegranate production worldwide is led by Iran, followed by India and the 
United States; some reports place China third worldwide in production followed by the 
U.S.  Within the United States, production is predominantly in the state of California, 
where 29,000 acres were estimated to be grown in 2009.  The typical harvest period in 
the United States is October to January, depending on weather conditions and the 
particular cultivar.   
 Pomegranates can best be grown in deep, fairly heavy soils with irrigation and 
selecting a cultivar that is appropriate for the growing climate.  Adequate attention 
should be given to soil preparation, planting design, pruning, fertilization, and disease, 
insect, and weed control.  Harvest of pomegranate fruits is typically done by hand but 
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mechanical harvesters are beginning to be developed.  Post-harvest, pomegranates may 
be stored for a typical range of four to five months; post-harvest issues to avoid include 
husk scaled and chilling injury.  Ready-to-eat pomegranate arils have a much shorter 
shelf life, estimated at anywhere from ten to eighteen days using modified-atmosphere 
packaging.   
 USDA provides several estimates of the size of the pomegranate industry, 
including estimated movements within the U.S. for the 2009 season of over 14 million 
pounds, with a season average shipping point price of $24.54 per 22-lb. carton.  
However, these prices were generally higher at the beginning of the season and dropped 
as more pomegranate fruit became available; prices also varied based on fruit size, 
variety, and location.  However, worldwide production is growing in order to meet the 
increased demand for pomegranate products and price trends that have been seen in 
recent years may be altered as prices adapt to these new levels of supply and demand for 
pomegranate fruits and other pomegranate products.   
 
Nonhypothetical Preference Ranking and Experimental Auction Procedures 
 In this study, two common techniques in experimental economics were combined 
into one nonhypothetical procedure to provide paired comparisons of the information 
provided by participants.  The participants in this study were asked to participate in 
repeated rounds of preference rankings and uniform nth-price modified Vickrey auctions 
for a baseline and three subsequent information treatments.  There has been extensive 
discussion in the literature for WTP estimation and preference elicitation on what type of 
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methods provide the most accurate measures of preference.  Despite this discussion, 
there is no overarching conclusion as to which methodology is the best; rather, there are 
a number of tools available to economists in the form of different types of experiments 
and these tools should be targeted at the particular question of interest.  The application 
of these two basic methods of preference elicitation (ranking and bidding) for a set of 
products allows preferences to be gauged in two ways, and thus the results of these two 
methods compared.  Given that participants were informed that all of the products sold at 
retail for the same price, the expectation would be that the two methods provide 
equivalent measures of preference. 
 In particular, the application of this combined ranking and bidding preference 
elicitation mechanism provided a useful means of gaining information on preferences for 
novel products and the effects of information treatments.  For any good that is not 
currently available on the market, there will be a greater challenge in determining WTP 
for products; this is particularly true for those products that derive a large portion of their 
value from consumption of the item.  To mimic the gain of information on a novel 
product, a baseline set of preferences and bids was collected on the assumption that the 
relative knowledge base on the products would vary across consumers.  Seven products 
were included in the study: California Wonderful whole pomegranate fruit, Texas Red 
whole pomegranate fruit, Texas Salavatski pomegranate fruit, ready-to-eat California 
Wonderful pomegranate arils, ready-to-eat Texas Salavatski pomegranate arils, mixed 
pomegranate juice, and pineapple.  Subjects were asked to submit bids on these seven 
products in the experimental auction portion of the study, and to also rank the seven 
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products and the option of no product on a scale of one to eight.  The preference for the 
items was expected be individual-specific.  Marketers of novel products must carefully 
consider what types of information they target at which types of consumers if they have 
the aim of increasing WTP for their products.  Thus, a series of information treatments 
were implemented to make comparisons about three possible types of information that 
consumers might gain about the products of interest in this study.  Those three 
information treatments were: 1) Tasting Information, 2) Health and Nutrition 
Information, and 3) Anti-Cancer Information.   
 Consumers who were unfamiliar with a pomegranate product were expected to 
experience some effect on their WTP for that product once they have tasted the product 
and/or learned how to prepare it to eat.  It was also anticipated that consumers in Texas 
would be generally unfamiliar with the product prior to participation in the study.  This 
was confirmed by the survey results on whether the products had previously been 
consumed or purchased.  However, particularly given the recent interest in health 
benefits of food from a nutritional standpoint as well as in consideration of interest in 
functional foods, marketers often make claims regarding the nutrition and health benefits 
of novel food products.  The question remained as to whether this information would 
have any effect on WTP or indicated preferences for pomegranate and other fruit 
products.  To test this hypothesis, subjects were provided with the nutrition facts and a 
description of potential health benefits for each type of included product.  Third, recent 
developments in terms of functional foods have indicated that some foods may have 
specific anti-cancer properties.  These effects are very difficult to trace on an individual 
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basis, and making accurate scientific conclusions typically requires expensive and 
lengthy clinical trials.  Thus, the relevance of such claims for these products and 
estimation of the effects of such information on WTP are relevant for those considering 
the time-consuming and expensive process of gathering this information and obtaining 
government approval to make these claims about products.  Further, the use of several 
products allows for comparison of whether the effect of information treatments is the 
same for all products or whether it varies by product.   
The bidding procedure and ranking procedures were designed to elicit these 
preferences for a novel product (as opposed to a familiar one) where individual valuation 
of the product may be influenced by later opportunities to learn more about the product 
characteristics.  A full bidding technique was used, but each participant was informed 
that most of the study participants would purchase a product, based either on being a 
winning bidder or based on a weighted selection of his or her preference rankings.  Thus, 
it was unlikely that participants would have an opportunity to purchase the product at a 
later time.  By allowing the result of whether a product was purchased or not to depend 
on both the experimental auction bids and preference rankings, the two main 
components of the procedures were nonhypothetical in nature and participants would be 
expected to express their true preferences for the products in either portion of the study.  
A survey of consumer demographics and behavioral characteristics provided other 
variables for comparison to the preference rankings and experimental auction bids.  
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Analytical Procedures and Results Summary 
 The mechanism described above was utilized to obtain results based on 
behavioral and demographic characteristics reported by participants as well as make 
estimates of factors that influence WTP and preferences for the included products.  A 
summary of these results follows.  
  
Survey Procedures and Results 
There are a few key demographics and behavioral characteristics of interest that 
were measured by the survey portion of the experiment.  The average weekly household 
spending of participants was $109, and the average weekly household spending on fruits 
and vegetables was $25.  The average participant had 6.37 pounds of fruits and 
vegetables on hand; this result was measured to determine if there was a potential effect 
from current stocks of similar products on the WTP for the products in the study.  
Subjects reported that on average 71% of their fruit and vegetable purchases were for 
fresh (not frozen, dried, or canned) fruits and vegetables.  Study participants were asked 
about their relative position in their buying cycle in order to account for possible effects 
of whether they had just gone to the store to make purchases or whether they were about 
to go to make those purchases; it had been an average of 3 days since participants had 
last been to the store and they indicated an average length of time between trips to buy 
fruits and vegetables of 8 days.   
To determine the relative novelty of the pomegranate products, participants were 
surveyed as to their previous experience with the products.  Only 24.6% of participants 
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had previously purchased a pomegranate, and just 7.5% of study participants had a 
pomegranate fruit on hand.  The portion of the subjects who had previously heard the 
term functional foods was small (16%), but the proportion who had purchased a 
functional food product when examples were provided was much larger (i.e. 85% for 
breakfast cereal for heart health).  Taste, freshness, and price were all cited as being very 
important to subjects on an individual basis as factors in making fresh produce 
purchasing decisions.  However, when asked about the factors that they expected most 
Americans to be concerned with, price and convenience became more important and 
nutrition and growing location became less important.  This result would be expected 
since the factors that were more important when subjects were asked about their 
individual behaviors were also those factors that would be expected to have a positive 
social connotation (―social desirability bias‖), while that bias should have been avoided 
when subjects were asked about the typical American.   
Of course, caution should be used in extrapolating all of these results to the 
general population, as the study sample was recruited with the explicit purpose of being 
a study on fruit purchase decision-making.  For example, if the individuals in the sample 
differed from the average American in a way that systematically affected the factors that 
influence fruit and vegetable purchasing decisions, then the result that the average of the 
included individuals and ―average Americans‖ were predicted to be different would be 
expected.  Nevertheless, the sample should serve the purpose of providing general trends 
and results for the relevant population.   
However, the mean experimental auction bids for the included products ranged 
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from $0.84 to $1.99, all well below the retail price of $3.50 for all the included products.  
A portion of this result could be attributed to a lack of familiarity with the products, and 
perhaps more important than the absolute price levels are the relative differences in WTP 
for the products, as the retail price of the products is expected to vary with the season, 
geographic region, size of the individual products, and other factors.   
Caution should also be exercised in extending any results for the products 
included in this study to products outside the study.  Even so, it would be expected that 
some of the behavioral and demographic characteristics measured in this study may be 
useful for other products in predicting factors that influence buying behavior, 
particularly for a product that is less novel than pomegranate fruits. 
 
Estimation Procedures and Results 
 Individual WTP for a product was censored at $0.00 when measured using this 
experimental auction, with 18% of all submitted bids being censored.  To model these 
results, a number of approaches were considered.  Individual models for each product 
and information treatment were first applied with a tobit model to account for the bid 
censoring.  Using the separate tobit models, demographic and behavioral characteristics 
were as a whole poor predictors of WTP for the included pomegranate and other fruit 
products, with the exception of whether pomegranates had previously been purchased.  
For some products there were other factors that were predicted to influence WTP, 
including household size, income use, and tobacco use.  Also, whether participants were 
given a reference price (current retail price) for the product was generally significant.   
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 The bids were then pooled across individuals, information treatments, and 
products to suggest characteristics of the products that might influence WTP.  The 
following models were considered: ordinary least squares, standard tobit, random effects 
tobit, and mixed linear.  Each of these models was found to have benefits and 
drawbacks.  These models were each considered with several independent variable 
specifications, including models with only the product characteristics, the product 
characteristics along with information treatments, and both of the previous coupled with 
the demographic and behavioral characteristics.  While the results varied depending on 
the specific model used for estimation and the variables that were included, the product 
characteristics of ready-to-eat product form, juice product form, and pineapple product 
often increased WTP for the products; the distinction between the California Wonderful, 
Texas Red, and Texas Salavatski varieties was often not significant for the estimations 
based on the full bids.  Also, the random effects tobit model predicted a significant 
presence of a random effect due to the individual, and the mixed linear model also 
predicted an effect for each individual.  The ordinary least square model and standard 
tobit model were thus rejected as models for the experimental auction bids in this study; 
however, both models were still included as a baseline comparison.   
 Although the censoring and individual effects were discussed in the model 
results, there were several other effects of importance.  First, there were a number of 
bidders who were found to be either unengaged as individuals or unengaged for a 
particular product.  The models were re-estimated excluding the unengaged bidders; 
excluding unengaged bidders changed the parameter estimates and resulted in a 
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prediction that the Texas Salavatski variety positively affected WTP.  Second, while 
comparisons using full bids across individuals are useful in predicting relative WTP for 
products, they do not account for differences in product substitutes, and thus the bids 
were reanalyzed by comparing the implied bid differences from one information 
treatment to the next; in this way the outside substitutes for a product and individual 
should cancel out.  In this case it is particularly important to exclude any bids that were 
unengaged (that is, where an individual submitted a bid of zero in the treatment round 
and the baseline round for a product).  The results from these models suggest that over 
the information treatments the change in WTP for the two Texas varieties increased but 
the change in WTP for RTE, juice, and pineapple decreased.  Also, if demographic 
variables were included, tobacco use caused an increase in the change in WTP.   
 Although several different models were estimated to predict WTP, the effect of 
the information treatments was tested directly using two types of tests: the paired t-test, 
which assumes normality of the bid distributions, and the Wilcoxon signed rank test to 
compare bids with nonparametric distributions.  For the three whole pomegranate fruits 
and  the Texas RTE arils, all the information treatments as well as the full information 
set resulted in bids that were different from the baseline; results for the other products 
were mixed depending on the product and information treatment.   
 The rankings data were also analyzed to gather information on preferences for 
the included products.  The preference for each product using a rank-ordered logit model 
was estimated first for the products for each information treatment.  Thus, product 
characteristics within a given round of bids could be compared to predict which product 
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characteristics were likely to result in the product being more preferred.  Using the 
complete set of rankings, the relative effect of the product characteristics varied across 
information treatments.  In the baseline round there was no effect for the Texas variety, 
items that were RTE, juice, or pineapple were more preferred, and the option of no 
product was discounted.  However, in considering the other information treatments and 
the full information set, the two Texas varieties were preferred to the California variety, 
the option of no product was discounted more severely relative to the other products, and 
juice and pineapple were not as strongly preferred.  The improvement in ranking for the 
Texas varieties was largest in the tasting information treatment; and for all rounds where 
subjects had received any information the Texas Red variety was preferred to the Texas 
Salavatski variety.  Due to the possibility of heterogeneity in ranking ability (more 
precisely, the possibility of subjects being less careful when ranking less preferred 
products than more preferred products), the rank-ordered logit model was re-estimated 
using the partial rankings (ranks 1-4).  The estimates of this model were not identical to 
the estimations based on the complete rankings, which is indicative of possible 
heterogeneity in ranking ability.   
 The explicit preference rankings were compared to the implied preferences based 
on the ordered bids.  The bids submitted by subjects were sorted from highest to lowest 
and rankings were assigned for the values of 1-8.  The option of no product was assigned 
the next lowest rank after the last non-zero bid.  Checking for reversals in preferences 
(instances when the explicit orderings and implied orderings did not ―match‖) within the 
same information treatment indicated that this was a concern for comparing preference 
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rankings and ordered bids.  Thus, although both mechanisms were designed to be 
incentive compatible in nature with weakly dominant strategies of submitting true 
preferences and bids, respectively, an estimation of the rank-ordered logit models based 
on the implied rankings was not expected to provide identical results for this study.  For 
the full information treatment relative to the baseline, the Texas varieties were neither 
preferred nor discounted, the no product option was less preferred at the baseline and 
became even less preferred across the information treatments, and ready-to-eat, juice, 
and pineapple all had a positive relationship with preference but this became less true 
across the information treatments, indicating a stronger preference for the excluded 
dummy variable (whole fruit for the product form and pomegranate for the product 
type). 
The individual preferences for the pomegranate and other fruit product options 
were also analyzed with the use of the mixed rank-ordered logit model.  Such models 
were estimated using both explicit preference rankings and implied rankings based on 
ordered bids. These models suggest the presence of individual preference heterogeneity 
for the product form characteristics, as well as for the interaction of some product 
characteristics with the additional information treatments.  These results varied 
depending on which information treatment was considered, providing the insight that for 
explicit rankings tasting information increased the preference for the Texas Red variety 
over the California Wonderful variety but decreased it for RTE products relative to 
whole fruit products.  We would not expect the exact parameter estimates for these two 
models to be equal; however, the fruit variety was generally not significant in the 
  
312 
bidding models but was significant in several of the preference ranking models. This 
suggests that there may be differences in the way that subjects viewed the consequences 
of misbehavior in each procedure or the individual variability that was expressed 
through either rankings or bidding.   
 
Conclusions 
 The summary of the pomegranate industry and experimental results based on 
both the nonhypothetical auction and preference ranking procedures lead to both 
conclusions and further questions.  These are discussed further here. 
 
Key Challenges for Expansion of Pomegranate Production 
There are a number of challenges that must be addressed in order for 
pomegranate production to expand both in terms of acreage and profitability.  The 
registration of fungicides, insecticides, and herbicides for application in pomegranate 
production will be necessary in order to address disease, insect, and weed management 
issues.  As far back as 1917, Robert Hodgson, author of a text on pomegranate history 
and production in California, recognized that one of the keys for the growth of the 
pomegranate industry was successful education of the public about this fruit.  
Several individuals involved with pomegranate production also suggest that as 
global supply of pomegranates expands, prices may decrease (e.g., Cline 2008; 
―Pomegranate Acreage‖ 2009).  This is particularly true for storable (and thus more 
easily transportable) forms of pomegranate such as concentrated juice or other 
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pomegranate by-products which may be sourced from other regions or other countries.  
Thus, those considering expanding production should consider marketing opportunities 
at a range of price points when determining the feasibility of expansion.   
Also, expanded production plans might also take into account the seasonality of 
pomegranate production and what product forms will be marketed.  Fresh pomegranates 
cannot be stored long enough to sustain sales from one growing season to the next with 
current post-harvest technology, whereas juice or other processed products may be 
stored for such a length of time.  However, particularly for growers who intend to market 
a product as a regionally-grown product, the price premium received may vary for each 
of these different types of products.  Also, there may be different cultivars of 
pomegranates that are ideally suited for one of the juice, RTE, or whole fruit products 
but be less than desirable for use for others.   
In terms of further considerations for expansion of the pomegranate industry, the 
following issues may be potential opportunities or concerns.  First, considerable media 
as well as research attention has been devoted to health claims about antioxidants in 
general and pomegranates specifically.  However, many of these claims are made based 
on laboratory results and have not been verified in large, long-term studies of human 
populations.  As these health claims are one component of the growth in the 
pomegranate industry, if these health claims cannot be verified then the projected growth 
in sales of pomegranate products may not come to fruition.  Until those studies can be 
completed, a short-term alternative would be to emphasize the positive taste and 
nutritional benefits of pomegranates.   
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Further, although health claims about functional foods are not as strictly 
regulated in the United States as in some other places, the risk to producers remains that 
stricter regulations may be imposed.  However, such regulation may increase WTP for 
any products for which regulatory approval is obtained and thereby increase consumer 
confidence in the health claims that are made.  
Although the acreage of pomegranates planted in the United States is growing, 
the total acreage is still small relative to other commodities and more common fruit and 
vegetable crops.  In terms of insect, weed, and disease management, chemical products 
that are available for use on other crops may not be registered for use on pomegranates 
or in the state where pomegranate production may be considered.  Thus, these products 
may not be available for use or may be expensive if they are later registered for use.   
One final issue with expansion of pomegranate production is labor considerations 
for harvest.  At present, use of mechanical harvesters for the crop is not widespread.  
However, as with many other fruit and vegetable crops the availability and consistency 
of labor for harvesting seasonal fruits and vegetables can be an uncertain component of 
the process from planting to sales of pomegranates.  Thus, the industry as a whole would 
stand to benefit from an effective mechanical harvester that does not damage the fruit 
and provides greater certainty for the supply of harvest labor. 
Information provided by this study and conclusions drawn from results may not 
hold absolutely; this conclusion is based on the extensive discussion of the validity of 
WTP from auction mechanisms.  Further, the exact levels of the WTP estimates from 
this model may not be exact and should not be assumed to be easily extrapolated to exact 
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premiums in a market setting.  However, there does appear to be value in the relative 
importance of the factors analyzed.   
 
Novel Products and Value Elicitation Mechanisms 
 The pomegranate products included in the study were generally novel to 
participants, and this was an important consideration in the design of the WTP elicitation 
procedures.  A mechanism was needed that would limit opportunities for future learning 
about the products, so that all participants would submit values that were a ―snapshot‖ of 
a point-in-time valuation for all of the products and not biased by future opportunities to 
gather information on the products or transaction costs of doing so.  As a result, in the 
estimation of WTP many of the demographic variables that may have influenced 
valuations for more familiar products had little influence on the novel product, 
particularly for the baseline round where participants were not given any additional 
information.  Prior experience with pomegranate products had a larger effect on an 
individual‘s valuation of the products.  This result indicates the importance of gauging 
prior experience with a novel product if value elicitation procedures will be used to 
estimate WTP.  Also, given the lack of familiarity with the products, participant bids in 
the experimental auction were affected based on whether or not a reference price was 
provided as a part of the study mechanism.   
 Individual values varied considerably for the products, and comparisons of 
within subject differences for a product across information treatments allows the 
possible differences in outside substitutes to cancel out and should provide more 
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information on how the information treatments affected the change in WTP.  Further, 
bids and rankings on all products were collected; theory would suggest that for two 
incentive compatible preference elicitation mechanisms the results would be similar.   
However, the two procedures yielded results that were similar for some product 
characteristics and divergent for others; the results for the two procedures were not 
identical.  This leads to the question of which results are more reflective of the purchases 
that consumers will actually make in the future; this is the economic result of interest.  
Perhaps the best way to address this would be with a paired experiment that involved 
collection of both sets of results in comparison with actual sales at a retail establishment 
to answer the question of which results have more external validity.   
 This leads to an important point: the design of the study must be done in such a 
way that not only can the questions of interest outside of the experimental setting be 
answered with the results, but the results would hold if the experiments were repeated.  
The results of this study suggest that experimental economics may offer interesting 
opportunities to evaluate new products before they are introduced to a large marketplace.  
The results also suggest that outside substitutes and product attributes of the products to 
be included in the study could affect the results of the preference elicitation procedures.   
 This study was designed to examine consumer preferences for pomegranate 
products and for Texas varieties of pomegranates in particular.  The results indicate that 
the biggest hurdle in increasing WTP for the pomegranate products may be increasing 
consumer familiarity with the product.  Of the information treatments that were 
provided, the one that generally had the largest effect on WTP for the Texas 
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pomegranate varieties was the tasting treatment, but this is not to say that the health and 
nutrition information or the anti-cancer information did not have an effect.  Producers or 
retailers could increase this sort of awareness in consumers for the taste attributes of 
pomegranate fruits and other pomegranate products by giving away samples of the 
product, either for consumers to take home or as point-of-purchase promotions.   
 
Directions for Further Research 
 While this research answered a number of questions, it has also opened up a 
wealth of other questions yet to be answered.  For comparing the rankings and auction 
portions of the study, more research is needed into what the possible reasons for the 
differences between the two preference elicitation methods are and if there is a method 
that can be developed so that the results of the two are consistent.   
 Also, further work is needed to make the actual values obtained by the WTP 
procedures more meaningful, particularly for novel products.  Consumers would be 
unlikely to know the suggested retail price for a product that was not currently available 
in stores, yet the results of this study suggest that providing a reference price had a 
significant effect on WTP for the items in this study.  This is also necessary since the 
standard buying environment in the United States would be one where prices are posted 
on products and consumers do not have to generate their own prices for their products; 
rather, they only have to decide whether they want to purchase the product at the given 
price.  If the results of experimental auctions could reliably be transferred to quantitative 
measures of the marketplace, they would become an even more indispensible tool for 
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economists and marketers.  Although results of auctions have been applied to make 
welfare estimations previously, if this could be reliably done with new products or even 
new government policies and regulations of those products, then policymakers could use 
such results as a consideration of the costs and benefits of new regulations.    
 Extending the results of auctions and /or rankings procedures to make predictions 
about market trends and consumption patterns would be a logical next step.  If the 
mechanisms and results estimations can be calibrated in order to allow marketers to 
make larger assumptions about regional or national trends then they could be an 
important component in new product development.  Also, if marketers could compare 
WTP for a new product with existing products in the marketplace they would have the 
ability to gauge the effect that a new product introduction would have on the WTP for 
the other products in that product sector.   
 The results of the auction procedure and preference ranking procedure in this 
experiment were not identical.  This leads to the question of whether arbitrage 
procedures that have been implemented in some other auctions (e.g., Cherry and 
Shogren 2007) would be an effective way to correct this problem and lead to convergent 
results for the two procedures.  Comparing the two procedures using induced rather than 
homegrown values might provide additional insight into more specific procedural 
questions.   
 Further research is also needed on the relationship among the size of the 
endowment, the retail value of the products, and the relative income effect.  Mixed 
results have been obtained by other experiments, and in some experimental designs it is 
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not practical to implement a payment procedure that requires payments to vary across 
subjects.  In most instances the value of the endowment for participation in an 
experimental auction or other preference elicitation procedure will be a small proportion 
of total income.  However, the endowment may be a much larger portion of a subject‘s 
expenditures for that type of product or in relation to the retail value of that product.  
Experiments that varied the size of the endowment as well as the values of the products 
would be needed to further develop the impact that such an effect has on the 
experimental results.   
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APPENDIX A 
NEWSPAPER ADVERTISEMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24. Newspaper Advertisement for Fruit Purchasing Decisions Study 
  
384 
APPENDIX B 
VERBAL AUCTION INSTRUCTIONS 
 
A portion of the verbal instructions that subjects received are included below.  
These instructions were read by the session moderator for each session of the study. 
 
―Today‘s session will involve two types of procedures: ranking of 
your preferred goods, and placing bids on goods in an auction setting. We 
will now go over the information provided to you in stages 1 and 2. 
Ranking Procedure.  Today you will be asked to rank your 
preferences for several products.  You will also complete several rounds 
of these rankings. The rankings will work as follows: 
First, you will all be given the opportunity to carefully examine 
each item.  Second, you should mark your numerical ranking for each 
item, with 1 being the item you would most like to purchase and the 
highest number being the item you would least like to purchase.  Use 
each number only once.  Turn in your ranking sheet when you finish your 
rankings. 
We have a few examples of rankings for four items.  Which of 
these look acceptable to you?  ―1, 2, 3, 4‖- Yes; ―4, 3, 2, 1‖- Yes; 0, 2, 1, 
3- No, ―1, 1, 2, 4‖- No; 1, 3, 4, blank- No.  There are three keys to 
remember with the rankings.  No zeroes, no duplicates, and no blanks. 
[Emphasis added]. 
The 11th-Price Auction. We will also conduct several rounds of 
auctions today.  The auction we conduct will likely be different from any 
auction you have had experience with previously. You are probably 
familiar with the traditional English  auctions where the auctioneer calls 
for higher and higher prices and concludes with something like ―Do I 
hear $90?, Do I hear $95?, Do I hear $100?, going once, going twice, 
SOLD for $95 to the bidder on my right.‖  However, the auctions we will 
hold today will be sealed bid auctions where you write down your bid 
rather than calling it out verbally. 
The auction that you will participate in today is called an ―11th 
price‖ auction.  The auction will work like this: You will be given the 
opportunity to re-examine the products.  You will then write down your 
bid for the most you would be willing to pay for each product. Your bid 
sheets will be collected.  After all the bids for the items have been 
collected from all participants, the bids will be sorted from highest to 
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lowest.  The 11th highest bid will be the market price. 
Remember that the auctions are different than the rankings.  You 
should still submit a bid for every item, but you are allowed to bid the 
same amount for more than one item and you are allowed to bid zero for 
any item you would like.  
How Winners are Determined.  You will participate in more 
than one round of auctions today.  However, we will randomly choose 
which one of these auctions will be binding.  Only the results of that 
round will be used to determine the ACTUAL WINNERS who will 
purchase the items in the auction.  Within that round only one product 
will be the one that is binding.  Therefore, you will only have a chance to 
purchase one fruit product from today‘s session. 
For the round that is binding, the 10 people who bid higher than 
the market price (the 11th price) will be the buyers.  These 10 buyers will 
pay the market price for that round and will take home the product in 
exchange for paying the market price. 
Then, of those who did not purchase an item in the auction, 10 
participants will randomly be drawn to have the ranking procedure be 
binding.  We will draw which rank will be the one purchased. The 
likelihood of an item being drawn is proportional to the ranking.  The 
highest ranked product is most likely to be drawn.  The lowest ranked 
product is least likely to be drawn.  We will draw one rank and 10 
individuals who were not winners from the auction bids to purchase the 
product at the market price. 
The price for these winners will be the market price from the 
auction for that round.  Ten randomly selected individuals who did not 
purchase a fruit item by winning the auction will purchase a fruit item 
based on the binding ranking. 
Important Reminders: For both the ranking and the auction, it is 
in your best interest to be truthful about your preferences.   
For the ranking portion, you should rank the items as you actually 
prefer them.  Put the item that you actually prefer the most as first, your 
next most preferred item second, and so on.  This is because it is most 
likely that whichever item you select as first will be chosen as the item 
you buy and least likely that the item you rank as last will be chosen.  
*In the auction, it is also in your best interest to submit a bid of your 
TRUE value for the good.  If you submit a bid for less than you value the 
item, then other bidders may win the item at a price equal to your value 
and you miss out on having the item at your price. If you submit a bid for 
more than you value the item, then you may win the auction for that price 
and pay more than you wanted to pay for the item.  
These are not hypothetical experiments.  The winner will actually 
pay money to obtain the item.  The market price for any purchased items 
will be deducted from your participation payment for today‘s session. 
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You may bid any value for the item, including $0.00. 
 When deciding on your bid, consider the alternatives for what 
you could spend that much money on.  For example, if you did not buy 
the product up for auction, how many gallons of gas could you purchase 
with the amount you bid?  Consider your other options when deciding 
what your true value is for that good.   
You will not win more than one item from each of these markets.  
We ensure this by randomly drawing one round and one item to be the 
ones that are binding. 
Many session participants will take home ONE fruit product 
today.  There will be 10 session participants who buy a product based on 
their auction bids and 10 session participants who buy a fruit product 
based on their rankings. Therefore, you should think carefully about your 
ranking and bidding decisions.‖ 
 
 
Examples of preferences and the rankings and bids that would be submitted are given as 
follows.   
 
―I will now give you a couple of examples to help explain the 
auction and the ranking procedures.  Consider this general example of 
ranking and auctions.  Suppose that you are going to purchase a rug for 
your living room. You like blue rugs the best, followed by red, followed 
by green, and you like brown rugs the least.  You would rank the rugs in 
this order for the ranking procedure. You would also bid on the products 
in the auction, bidding the maximum amount you are willing to pay for 
each item.  Most likely, you would bid the greatest dollar amount for the 
color rug you like the best and the smallest dollar amount for the rug of 
the color you like the least.  
Now, consider these numerical examples of ranking and bidding.  
First, suppose that your favorite soda is Pepsi®.  Suppose that you are 
willing to pay $2 to consume a Pepsi®.  Your next favorite soda is Diet 
Coke®, which you will pay $1.50 to consume.  Following Diet Coke®, 
you next prefer Coke®, and would pay $1 to consume Coke®.  You 
really do not enjoy Dr. Pepper® very much, so you would pay just $0.50 
to consume it.  For the ranking part of the session, you would mark a 1 
beside Pepsi®, 2 beside Diet Coke®, 3 beside Coke®, and 4 beside Dr. 
Pepper®.  This indicates that you like Pepsi® the most and Dr. Pepper® 
the least of the 4 options, with Diet Coke® and Coke® in between.   
Then you will move on to the auction portion of the experiment.  
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You still prefer all of the soft drinks in the way that we just described.  
However, in this portion of the session you are asked to submit a bid for 
each soda.  Here it is in your best interest to submit a bid for exactly your 
value for the good.  So, on the auction bid sheet, you would write $2.00 
beside Pepsi®, $1.50 for Diet Coke®, $1.00 for Coke®, and $0.50 for Dr. 
Pepper®.  The winning bids will then be determined for each round.   We 
will then determine who the buyers of the soft drinks are based on the 
bids and then based on the rankings.‖ 
 
After subjects were given an opportunity to read and answer the five questions for the 
practice quiz, they were provided with answers to the quiz questions and any other 
questions they had about procedures.  The quiz questions and scripted answers are given 
here.   
―We will now review the answers to the practice quiz.  The first 
two questions in the quiz were about the ranking procedure.  
1. The best strategy for the ranking is to rank only the first item 
that you would prefer to purchase, true or false? 
The correct answer to this question is FALSE.  You should rank 
all of the items in each round by marking a one for the item you would 
most like to purchase on through to marking the highest number for the 
item you would least like to purchase.  
2. The results of the ranking could determine which product you 
will purchase, true or false? 
The correct answer to this question is TRUE.  Your rankings will 
be used to determine which product you buy if you are not one of the 
winners of the auction, as we just saw in the case of the soft drink 
practice auction. 
Questions 3 and 4 were about the auction procedure.  
3. In an 11th price auction, the 10 highest bidders win the 
auctioned item, true or false? 
The correct answer is TRUE.  In an 11
th
-price auction, the ten 
highest bidders are the buyers, and they pay a market price equal to the 
next highest bid, i.e. the 11th highest bid.  
4. The people who win the auction will pay the amount they bid 
for the item, true or false? 
The correct answer is FALSE.  You will not pay the amount that 
you bid for an item; you will pay the amount that someone else bid.  
Therefore, it is in your best interest to bid the exact value of the amount 
of the most you are willing to pay for each product.  
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The last question was about both the auction and the ranking 
procedures. 
5. There will be the opportunity to purchase more than one fruit 
product today, true or false? 
The correct answer is FALSE.  You will only purchase one fruit 
product today because we will only draw one round of the auction to be 
binding.  If you are not a winner in the fruit product auction, we will still 
only have one set of rankings as binding. Therefore, you cannot purchase 
more than one fruit product from today‘s auctions.  
Does anyone have any additional questions about the ranking or 
auction procedures?‖ 
 
These portions of the moderator‘s script are highlighted, and the majority of the 
additional instructions were very similar to those seen in the written instructions 
provided to subjects.   
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APPENDIX C 
WRITTEN AUCTION INSTRUCTIONS AND SURVEY 
 
Contained in this appendix is the text of the instructions participants received during 
participation in the study: 
_______________________________________________________________________  
DECISION-MAKING FOR FRUIT PURCHASES 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Please do not look at instruction pages until directed to do so. 
 
Failure to follow the instructions outlined here may result in a session monitor asking 
you to leave.  If this occurs, any money you may have received and any products you 
may have purchased will be forfeited. 
 
_______________________________________________________________________  
INTRODUCTORY INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Welcome!  Thank you for agreeing to participate in today‘s session.   
 
When you entered the room you received a packet of information.  You should have also 
been assigned an ID number, located on the packet of information you received.  You 
should use this ID number to identify yourself throughout the session today.  The use of 
identification numbers ensures individual confidentiality. 
As a reminder before we start today‘s session, your participation is completely 
voluntary.  At any time you may elect to end your participation in the session.  Non-
participants will not be penalized.  All information collected today will be kept 
confidential and will not be used for any purpose other than this research.   
The purpose of today‘s session is to gather some general information on the decision 
making process for purchasing fruit.  The first thing you should do is open your packet.  
Inside you will find a packet of instructions along with several other papers.  Please take 
a few minutes to read the overview page and the instructions provided as stages 1 and 2.   
We will now go through a series of instructions for what will happen in the remainder of 
the session.  These instructions will be read from a script to ensure the procedures are 
accurately described.   There will be an opportunity for questions once we go through 
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the instructions.  Please do not read ahead in the instruction packet or you may be asked 
to leave.  
 For the rest of today‘s session, it is very important that there be no further talking or 
other communication between participants.  If you have questions or comments, please 
inform a session monitor.   If you are not able to comply with these requests you will be 
disqualified from the experiment.   
 
If you have any questions, please direct them to a session monitor who will answer them. 
_______________________________________________________________________  
OVERVIEW 
 
***Please follow all instructions presented in this booklet carefully.  If you have any 
questions, please ask a session monitor. 
 
The purpose of today‘s experiment is to better understand purchasing decisions for fruit 
and fruit products.  To accomplish this purpose, you will be asked to complete two 
surveys, rank which items you like most, and submit bids on several items.  If you are 
one of the winners of these auctions, you will pay the auction price and in exchange you 
will receive the item.  You will receive more information on the auction procedures 
shortly. 
 
The experiment will proceed in several stages as described below. 
 
STAGE 1: Learn How Bids and Rankings Are Submitted  
STAGE 2: Learn How Prices and Winners Are Determined 
STAGE 3: Submit First Practice Round Rankings/Bids 
STAGE 4: Complete Short Knowledge Quiz on Auction Format 
STAGE 5: Submit Second Practice Round Rankings/Bids 
STAGE 6: Complete the First Survey 
STAGE 7: Submit Rankings/Bids for Products 
STAGE 8: Complete the Second Survey 
STAGE 9: Determine Auction Winners 
STAGE 10: Receive Payment 
 
However, first please review the Consent Form if you have not already done so.  Once 
you have read the form, you should print your name and sign and date on the second 
page.  Please leave the portion for the ―Signature of the Person Obtaining Consent‖ 
blank.  You will be provided with a copy of this document. 
_______________________________________________________________________  
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STAGE 1: LEARN HOW RANKINGS AND BIDS ARE SUBMITTED 
 
Ranking What You Like: Today you will be asked to rank your preferences for several 
products.   
1. Examine the products that will be evaluated. 
All participants will be given the opportunity to carefully examine each item. 
 
2. Write down your numerical ranking. 
You should mark your numerical ranking for each item, with 1 being the item you would 
most like to purchase and the highest number being the item you would least like to 
purchase.  
 
The Auction: The auction that you will participate in today is called an ―11th price‖ 
auction.   
 
1. Re-examine the products that will be auctioned. 
You will be given the opportunity to re-evaluate each item if you would like to do so. 
 
2. Write down your bid. 
After you examine the items, please write down the amount that you would pay for each 
one on the ―Bid Sheet.‖  
 
IMPORTANT REMINDERS: For both the ranking and the auction, it is in your best 
interest to be truthful about your preferences.   
 
* For the ranking portion, you should rank the items as you actually prefer them.  Put the 
item that you actually prefer the most as first, your next most preferred item second, and 
so on.  This is because it is most likely that whichever item you select as first will be 
chosen as the item you buy and least likely that the item you rank as last will be chosen.  
 
* In the auction, it is also in your best interest to submit a bid of your true value for the 
good.  If you submit a bid for less than your value, then other bidders may win the item 
at a price equal to your value and you may miss out on having the item at a price you 
would be willing to pay. If you submit a bid for more than you value the item, then you 
may win the auction for that price and pay more than you wanted to pay for the item.  
 
* These are not hypothetical experiments.  The winner will actually pay money to obtain 
the item. 
 
* You may bid any value for the item, including $0.00. 
 
* When deciding on your bid, consider the alternatives for what you could spend that 
much money on.  For example, if you did not buy the product up for auction, how many 
gallons of gas could you purchase with the amount you bid?  Consider other options 
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when deciding what your true value is for that good.   
 
* You will not win more than one item from this market.  We have already selected one 
product to be binding, and it is in a sealed envelope that will be opened at the conclusion 
of today‘s session. 
_______________________________________________________________________  
STAGE 2: LEARN HOW PRICES AND WINNERS ARE DETERMINED 
 
How The Auction Price is Determined:  
Today you will be participating in an 11th-price auction. 
1. Choosing the 11th Price. 
After all the bids for the items have been collected from all participants, the bids will be 
sorted from highest to lowest.  The 11th highest bid will be the market price.  
 
How Buyers are Determined: 
1. Auction Buyers 
You will participate in more than one round of auctions today.  However, we will choose 
only one of these rounds which will be binding.  Only the results of that round will be 
used to determine the actual buyers who will purchase the items in the auction.  Within 
that round only one product will be the one that is binding.  Therefore, you will only 
have a chance to purchase one fruit item from today‘s session. 
 
 For the round that is binding, the 10 people who bid higher than the market price (the 
11th price) will be the buyers.  These 10 buyers will pay the market price for that round. 
 
2. Ranking Buyers 
Four individuals who did not purchase an item as a result of the bidding will buy a 
product based on the ranking portion of the session.  Only one product will be selected.  
This item will be purchased at the specified price. 
 
 
IMPORTANT REMINDERS: 
*Remember, in both the ranking and auction it is in your best interest to submit a bid of 
EXACTLY your true value for the good.  It is not in your best interest to bid more or 
less than the price you would pay for the good or to rank the items differently than how 
you actually prefer them.  
*Many session participants will take home ONE fruit product today.  There will be 10 
session participants who buy a product based on their auction bids and 10 session 
participants who buy a fruit product based on their rankings. Therefore, you should think 
carefully about your ranking and bidding decisions. 
 
_______________________________________________________________________  
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Please do not read any further in this booklet until instructed to do so by the session 
monitor.  Your cooperation is greatly appreciated.   
 
_______________________________________________________________________  
STAGE 3: FIRST PRACTICE ROUND OF RANKING/ AUCTION 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
In this stage you will participate in the first practice round.  First you will be asked to 
rank and bid on four types of soft drinks. The stage will proceed as follows. 
1. When instructed by a session monitor, go to the tables with the soft drinks on 
them and examine each product.  
2. On the practice ranking sheet, rank each soft drink from 1 to 4, with 1 being the 
one you would most like to purchase and 4 being the soft drink you would least like to 
purchase. Turn in your practice ranking sheet to the session monitor. 
3. On the practice bidding sheet, write down your bid for each item. Turn in your 
practice bidding sheet to the session monitor. 
 
Please take your practice ranking sheet and practice bidding sheets with you to the table 
with the items on it.  Please do not talk with each other during bidding.  The monitor will 
be happy to answer any of your questions.  
Once you have completed the practice bidding and ranking on the soft drinks, please 
return to your seat and wait while the price and buyers are determined. Following the 
auction you will complete a short knowledge quiz on your understanding of the auction 
procedures. 
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You may now take your practice ranking and bidding sheets to the table with the sodas 
on it and begin the practice round.  
_______________________________________________________________________  
STAGE 4: SHORT KNOWLEDGE QUIZ ON RANKING AND AUCTION FORMAT 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is a brief quiz designed for you to check your understanding of how the ranking and 
auctions you will participate in today will operate.  Please choose the answer you feel is 
correct.  Once all participants have completed the quiz, we will go over the answers 
together. 
 
About the Ranking: 
1. The best strategy for the ranking is to rank ONLY the first item that you would 
prefer to purchase. 
a. True 
b. False 
 
2. The results of the ranking could determine which product you will purchase. 
a. True 
b. False 
 
About the Auction: 
3. In an 11th price auction, the 10 highest bidders win the auctioned item. 
a. True 
b. False 
 
4. For the binding round, the people who win the auction will pay the amount they 
bid for the item. 
a. True 
b. False 
 
About Both the Ranking and the Auction: 
5. There will be the opportunity to actually purchase and take home more than one 
fruit product today. 
a. True 
b. False 
 
Please do not read any further in this booklet until instructed to do so by the session 
monitor.  Your cooperation is greatly appreciated. 
 
_______________________________________________________________________  
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STAGE 5: SECOND PRACTICE ROUND OF RANKING/ AUCTION 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
You have completed half of the practice.  Now you will be asked to rank and bid on four 
types of snack products. The stage will proceed as follows. 
1. When instructed by a session monitor, go to the tables with the snack products on 
them and examine each product.   
2. On the practice ranking sheet, rank each item from 1 to 4, with 1 being the one 
you would most like to purchase and 4 being the item you would least like to purchase. 
Turn in your practice ranking sheet to the session monitor. 
3. On the practice bidding sheet, write down your bid for each item. Turn in your 
practice bidding sheet to the session monitor. 
 
Please take your practice ranking sheet and practice bidding sheets with you to the table 
with the items on it.  Please do not talk with each other during bidding.  The monitor will 
be happy to answer any of your questions.  
After you have completed the practice bidding and ranking on the snack products, please 
return to your seat.  You will complete the first survey while the market price and the 
buyers are determined.  
 
You may now take your practice ranking and bidding sheets to the table with the snack 
products on it and begin the second set of practice rounds.  
_______________________________________________________________________  
 
STAGE 6: SURVEY NUMBER ONE 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please answer the survey questions that follow.  There are no right or 
wrong answers.  Please think carefully about your answers, and then please mark an ―X‖ 
beside the letter of your response.  Your survey responses are very important to the 
results of today‘s sessions.  Please remember that all responses will be kept confidential.  
Please select only one answer by marking an ―X‖ in the blank unless otherwise 
indicated.  
 
1. AGE: Please indicate your age in years: 
 a. ___ 18- 19 
b. ___ 20-29 
c. ___ 30-39 
d. ___ 40-49 
e. ___ 50-59 
f. ___60-69 
g. ___ 70 or over 
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2. EDUCATION: Please indicate the highest level of education you have 
completed: 
a. ___ Some high school or less 
b. ___ High School Diploma 
c. ___ Some College 
d. ___ 2 year/ Associates Degree 
e. ___ 4 year/ Bachelors Degree 
f. ___ Some Graduate School 
g. ___ Graduate Degree 
 
3. HOUSEHOLD SIZE: Including yourself, how many people live in your 
household?  Include yourself, your spouse, and any dependents.  Please do NOT include 
your roommates.  
a. ___ 1 
b. ___ 2 
c. ___ 3 
d. ___ 4 
e. ___ 5 
f. ___ 6 
g. ___ 7 
h. ___ 8 
i. ___ 9 
j. ___ 10 or more 
  
4. GENDER: Please indicate your gender: 
a. ___ Female 
b. ___ Male 
  
5. RACE: Please indicate your race: 
a. ___ Asian/Pacific Islander 
b. ___ African American 
c. ___ Caucasian/White  
d. ___ Native American/ Indigenous 
e. ___ Hispanic 
f. ___ Other (Please List: _______________________________________) 
 
6. MARITAL STATUS: What is your current marital status? 
a. ___ Single, never married 
b. ___ Married 
c. ___ Separated or Divorced 
d. ___ Widowed 
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7. INCOME: Please indicate your household yearly income for 2009 for all the 
people in your household.  (Include all forms of income, including salary, interest and 
dividend payments, tips, scholarship support, student loans, parental support, social 
security, child support, and alimony. 
a. ___ Less than $30,000 
b. ___ $30,000-$39,999 
c. ___ $40,000-$49,999 
d. ___ $50,000-$59,999 
e. ___ $60,000-$69,999 
f. ___ $70,000-$79,999 
g. ___ $80,000-$89,999 
h. ___ $90,000-$99,999 
i. ___ $100,000-$149,999 
j. ___ More than $150,000 
  
8. EMPLOYMENT: Which of these best describes your employment status? 
a. ___ Student 
b. ___ Stay-at-Home Parent 
c. ___ Part-time Employed 
d. ___ Full-time Employed 
e. ___ Retired 
f. ___ Disabled 
g. ___ Unemployed  
 
9. PRIMARY SHOPPER: Are you the PRIMARY grocery shopper for your 
household? 
a. ___ Yes 
b. ___ No 
  
10. WEEKLY FOOD EXPENDITURES: How much, on average, does your 
household spend on food PER WEEK?  (Include grocery, snacks, restaurants, and any 
other food purchases).  
a. ___ $0-$49 
b. ___ $50 - $99 
c. ___ $100 - $149 
d. ___ $150 - $199 
e. ___ $200 - $249 
f. ___ $250  - $299 
g. ___ $300  - $399 
h. ___ $400 - $499 
i. ___ $500 - $749 
j. ___ $750 or more 
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11. WEEKLY FRUIT AND VEGETABLE EXPENDITURES: How much, on 
average, does your household spend on fruits and vegetables PER WEEK? 
a. ___ $0 - $24 
b. ___ $25 - $49 
c. ___ $50 - $74 
d. ___ $75 - $99 
e. ___ $100 or more 
  
 
12. FRESH FRUIT AND VEGETABLE EXPENDITURES: Approximately what 
portion of your fruit and vegetable purchases are for FRESH fruits and vegetables 
(Please exclude any canned, frozen, and/or processed fruits and vegetables). 
a. ___ None of the fruits and vegetables purchased are fresh. 
b. ___ ¼ of the fruits and vegetables purchased are fresh. 
c. ___ ½ of the fruits and vegetables purchased are fresh. 
d. ___ ¾ of the fruits and vegetables purchased are fresh. 
e. ___ All of the fruits and vegetables purchased are fresh. 
 
13. LOCATION OF FRUIT AND VEGETABLE PURCHASES: Of the following 
options, where does your household make the LARGEST PERCENTAGE of its fruit 
and vegetable purchases? 
a. ___ Mass-merchandiser (e.g., Wal-mart, Target) 
b. ___ Supermarket/ Grocery Store (e.g. HEB, Kroger, Albertsons) 
c. ___ Roadside Fruit and Vegetable Stand 
d. ___ Farmers‘ Market 
e. ___ Other (Please Indicate:_____________________________________) 
 
14. LAST VISIT TO PURCHASE FRUIT AND VEGETABLES: When did 
someone in your household last visit the establishment where you usually purchase fruits 
and vegetables? 
a. ___ Less than 2 days ago 
b. ___ 2-4 days ago 
c. ___ 4-6 days ago 
d. ___ 7- 10 days ago 
e. ___ 11-14 days ago 
f. ___ More than 2 weeks ago 
  
15. FREQUENCY OF FRUIT AND VEGETABLE PURCHASES: How often does 
your household purchase fresh fruits and vegetables? 
a. ___ Less than once a month 
b. ___ Once a month 
c. ___ Two to three times / month 
d. ___ Once a week 
e. ___ More than once a week 
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 16. FRESH FRUIT ON HAND: Please estimate the amount of FRESH FRUIT that 
you currently have on hand in your home. 
a. ___ Less than 1 pound 
b. ___ 1-2 pounds 
c. ___ 2-5 pounds 
d. ___ 5-10 pounds 
e. ___ More than 10 pounds 
  
17. FRESH VEGETABLES ON HAND: Please estimate the amount of FRESH 
VEGETABLES that you currently have on hand in your home. 
a. ___ Less than 1 pound 
b. ___ 1-2 pounds 
c. ___ 2-5 pounds 
d. ___ 5-10 pounds 
e. ___ More than 10 pounds 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please do not read any further in this booklet until instructed to do so by the session 
monitor.  Your cooperation is greatly appreciated.   
_______________________________________________________________________ 
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STAGE 7: RANKING AND AUCTIONS 
 
Thank you for participating in the practice rounds.  The next rounds will be for fruit 
products.  They will proceed in a similar way to the practice rounds.   
 
INSTRUCTIONS: You will be ranking and bidding on several fruit products. The stage 
will proceed as follows.  
1. When instructed by a session monitor, go to the tables with the fruit products on 
them and examine each product.   
2. On the ranking sheet, rank each item from 1 to 8, with 1 being the one you would 
most like to purchase and 8 being the item you would least like to purchase. Note that 
there are 7 products and one additional option of ―No Product.‖  Please turn in your 
ranking sheet to the session monitor. 
 
3. On the bidding sheet, write down your bid for each item. Turn in your practice 
bidding sheet to the session monitor. 
4. Return to your seat.  The market price will be not be posted until the end of 
today‘s session.   
 
Please take your ranking sheet and bidding sheet with you to the table with the items on 
it.  Please do not talk with each other during bidding.  The monitor will be happy to 
answer any of your questions.  
 
You may now take your ranking and bidding sheet to the table with the fruit products on 
it and begin.  
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
STAGE 8: SURVEY NUMBER TWO 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please answer the survey questions that follow.  There are no right or 
wrong answers.  Please think carefully about your answers, and then please mark an ―X‖ 
beside the letter of your response.  Your survey responses are very important to the 
results of today‘s sessions.  Please remember that all responses will be kept confidential.  
Please select only one answer by marking an ―X‖ in the blank unless otherwise 
indicated.  
 
18. In the store where you purchase your fruits and vegetables, have you ever seen a 
pomegranate for sale?  
a.  ____Yes   
b.  ____No   
c.  ____Don't Know/ Don't Remember 
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19. Have you ever eaten a pomegranate prior to today's session?   
a.  ____Yes   
b.  ____No   
c.  ____Don't Know/ Don't Remember 
     
20. Have you ever purchased a pomegranate fruit prior to today's session?     
a.  ____Yes   
b.  ____No   
c.  ____Don't Know/ Don't Remember 
 
21. If you answered yes to the previous question, which months of the year do you 
typically purchase pomegranate fruits? (Mark all that apply) 
a. ___ January 
b. ___ February 
c. ___ March 
d. ___ April 
e.    ___ May 
f.  ___ June 
g.  ___ July 
h.  ___ August 
i.   ___ September  
j.   ___ October 
k.  ___ November 
l.    ___ December 
m.  ___ Don‘t Remember/ Not Applicable 
  
 
22. Do you have any pomegranate fruits on hand at home? If so, how many? 
a. ___ No 
b. ___ Yes, 1-2 pomegranate fruit on hand 
c. ___ Yes, 3 or more pomegranate fruits on hand 
 
Which of the following pomegranate products have you seen in stores and/or purchased 
within the last year? (please mark all that apply; N/A is Not Applicable) 
23. 100% Pomegranate Juice:   
a. ___Seen in stores b. ___ Purchased         c. ___N/A 
 
24. Mixed Pomegranate Juice   
a. ___Seen in stores b. ___ Purchased         c. ___N/A 
 
25. Pomegranate Fruit:     
a. ___Seen in stores b. ___ Purchased         c. ___N/A 
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26. Ready-to-Eat Pomegranate Product:   
a. ___Seen in stores b. ___ Purchased         c. ___N/A 
 
27. Pomegranate-Flavored Product(s):  
a. ___Seen in stores b. ___ Purchased         c. ___N/A 
 
28. Which of these factors do you consider most important in making fruit and 
vegetable purchasing decisions? (please select up to 3) 
a. ___ Visual appearance 
b. ___ Size 
c. ___ Convenience 
d. ___ Price 
e. ___ Freshness 
f. ___ Growing Location (e.g., Texas, United States) 
g. ___ Production Practices (e.g., sustainable, organic) 
h. ___ Nutrition 
  
29. Which of these factors do you believe the average American considers most 
important in making fruit and vegetable purchasing decisions? (please select up to 3) 
a. ___ Visual appearance 
b. ___ Size 
c. ___ Convenience 
d. ___ Price 
e. ___ Freshness 
f. ___ Growing Location (e.g., Texas, United States) 
g. ___ Production Practices (e.g., sustainable, organic) 
h. ___ Nutrition  
  
How important are the following factors to you when making a fruit purchase decision? 
(Please select only one level of importance per factor). 
30. PRICE  
a.  ____Not Important At All  
b.  ____Not Very Important  
c.  ____Somewhat Important  
d.  ____Very Important 
        
31. TASTE 
a.  ____Not Important At All  
b.  ____Not Very Important  
c.  ____Somewhat Important  
d.  ____Very Important 
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32. NUTRITION 
a.  ____Not Important At All  
b.  ____Not Very Important  
c.  ____Somewhat Important  
d.  ____Very Important 
         
33. CONVENIENCE   
a.  ____Not Important At All  
b.  ____Not Very Important  
c.  ____Somewhat Important  
d.  ____Very Important 
       
34. VISUAL APPEARANCE    
a.  ____Not Important At All  
b.  ____Not Very Important  
c.  ____Somewhat Important  
d.  ____Very Important 
             
35. SIZE 
a.  ____Not Important At All  
b.  ____Not Very Important  
c.  ____Somewhat Important  
d.  ____Very Important 
         
36. FRESHNESS 
a.  ____Not Important At All  
b.  ____Not Very Important  
c.  ____Somewhat Important  
d.  ____Very Important 
         
37. GROWING LOCATION    
a.  ____Not Important At All  
b.  ____Not Very Important  
c.  ____Somewhat Important  
d.  ____Very Important 
  
38. PRODUCTION PRACTICES     
a.  ____Not Important At All  
b.  ____Not Very Important  
c.  ____Somewhat Important  
d.  ____Very Important 
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39. Prior to today‘s session, had you heard the term ―functional foods‖ before? 
a. ___ Yes 
b. ___ No 
c. ___ Don‘t Know/ Don‘t Remember  
 
40. How important do you think the average American thinks his or her own health 
is?  
a. ___ Not important at all 
b. ___ Not very important 
c. ___ Somewhat Important 
d. ___ Very Important 
 
41. Do you currently have any serious health issues (including any conditions which 
require regular doctors visits and/or prescription medication)? 
a. ___ Yes  
b. ___ No (If No, please also answer ―Not Applicable‖ to the next two questions) 
 
42. If you have health issues that you would consider serious, are any of them 
nutrition related? 
a. ___ Yes 
b. ___ No 
c. ___ Not Applicable 
 
43. If you have health issues that you would consider serious, do any of them have 
specific diet requirements? 
a. ___ Yes 
b. ___ No 
c. ___ Not Applicable 
 
44. Have you or an immediate family member (mother, father, brother, sister and/or 
child) ever been diagnosed with cancer? 
a. ___ Yes 
b. ___ No 
 
45. Do you believe there to be health benefits of consuming fruits and vegetables? 
a. ___ Yes 
b. ___ No 
c. ___ Don‘t Know/ Not Sure 
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46. On average, how often do you smoke and/or use other tobacco products? 
a. ___ Never 
b. ___ Less than 10 times per year 
c. ___ Once a month 
d. ___ Once a week 
e. ___ Once a day 
f. ___ More than once a day 
  
47. How often do you exercise? (Include only periods of exercise longer than 20 
minutes). 
a. ___ Never 
b. ___ Less than 10 times per year 
c. ___ Once a month 
d. ___ Once a week 
e. ___ 2-3 times per week 
f. ___ 4-6 times per week 
g. ___ Once a day 
h. ___ More than once a day 
  
48. Do you read labels on new food products before you purchase them? 
a. ___ Never 
b. ___ Rarely 
c. ___ Sometimes 
d. ___ Most of the time 
e. ___ Always 
  
49. Do you think MOST AMERICANS read labels on new food products before 
they purchase them? 
a. ___ Never 
b. ___ Rarely 
c. ___ Sometimes 
d. ___ Most of the time 
e. ___ Always 
  
50. Have you ever purchased any of the following foods? (Please check all that 
apply). 
a. ___ Yogurt or other dairy products with probiotics to promote digestion 
b. ___ Green tea with antioxidants 
c. ___ Wine with added polyphenols 
d. ___ Fish high in omega-3 fatty acids 
e. ___ Breakfast cereal with oat ingredients to improve heart health 
f. ___ Tomato products high in lycopene 
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_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Thank you for your participation in today‘s study over decision-making for fruit 
purchases.  A session monitor will collect your survey.   
 
Please do not discuss the procedures of today‘s study with anyone who will be 
participating in later rounds of the study until after they have completed their session.  
This will help ensure the validity of our results. 
 
Shortly, you will receive your payment for participation, less whatever amount you spent 
on purchases in today‘s session.  Please wait for further instructions. 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX D 
INCLUDED FRUIT PRODUCTS 
 
The products pictured in Figure 25 and Figure 26 below were included in the 
experimental auction and preference ranking procedures. 
 
 
Figure 25. Photographs of Whole Pomegranate Fruit Products. 
Note:  From left to right, California Wonderful Pomegranate Fruit, Texas Red 
Pomegranate Fruit, and Texas Salavatski Pomegranate Fruit   
 
 
 
Figure 26. Photographs of Ready-to-Eat (RTE) Pomegranate Fruit Products. 
Note:  From left to right, California Wonderful Ready-to-Eat Pomegranate Arils, Texas 
Salavatski Ready-to-Eat Pomegranate Arils 
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Figure 27. Mixed Pomegranate Juice 
 
 
 
Figure 28. Pineapple 
 
 
 The pictures in the next three figures (Figure 29, Figure 30, Figure 31) show the 
arils of the three varieties of pomegranate fruits that were used, as well as a picture of 
the samples that were distributed for tasting to the experimental auction participants.    
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Figure 29. Photograph of California Wonderful Pomegranate Arils 
 
 
 
 
Figure 30. Photograph of Texas Red Pomegranate Arils 
 
 
Figure 31. Photograph of Texas Salavatski Pomegranate Arils 
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Figure 32. Pomegranate Fruit Tasting Samples 
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APPENDIX E 
AUCTION BID AND RANKING SHEETS EXAMPLES 
 
 
Figure 33. Example Fruit Product Ranking Sheet  
 
 
 
Figure 34. Example Fruit Product Bidding Sheet 
  
412 
APPENDIX F 
STUDY INFORMATION TREATMENTS 
 
Each information treatment script and/or printed handouts are described below.  
The information treatments are presented here in the order of tasting information, health 
and nutrition information, and anti-cancer information; however, the order in which the 
information treatments were applied was randomized.   
 
Tasting Information 
For the tasting information treatment, subjects were provided with a small 
sample (approximately 1.5 to 2 oz.) of each type of fruit product.  They were further 
provided with information on how to prepare the pomegranate fruits.  Subjects were also 
given the following verbal instructions. 
 
―At this time we will now provide additional information on the 
fruit products here.  You will learn how to prepare a whole pomegranate 
fruit as well as have an opportunity to taste the products you just 
submitted bids for.   
To prepare a pomegranate for eating, you should first remove both 
ends and cut the pomegranate fruit into quarters.  Then remove the small 
juice sacs inside by breaking apart each quarter of the pomegranate fruit. 
If desired, this part of the process can be done with the pomegranate 
submerged in a bowl of water to keep the pomegranate juice from getting 
on your clothes. If you follow this method, drain the water from the juice 
sacs, and your pomegranate fruit is ready to eat.  
You will now have the opportunity to taste the products that you 
just ranked and bid on.  If you do not wish to participate in this portion of 
today‘s session, you may indicate that at this time.  You will not be able 
to participate in the remainder of the session if you do not participate in 
the tasting.  You will be asked to complete the second survey when the 
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other participants complete that survey.  However, deciding to not 
participate will not affect your payment for participating in today‘s 
session, provided you remain here until the other participants finish with 
today‘s session.   
For the tasting, please take only one sample of each product.  
Once you have tasted the products, you will have the opportunity to rank 
the products and bid on the products again.  Does anyone have any 
questions?‖ 
 
Please note that subjects were only provided with verbal instructions for the 
tasting information treatment, subjects were not provided with any written information 
for this round. 
 
Health and Nutrition Information 
 For the health and nutrition information rounds, subjects were provided with the 
nutrition facts for fresh pomegranate fruit, juice, and pineapple.  Subjects were also 
provided with information on the additional health benefits of pomegranates and the 
additional health benefits of pineapple.  Subjects were provided with the following 
verbal instructions. 
―You will now have an opportunity to look at some of the health 
and nutrition information for the products you bid on in previous rounds. 
You may also re-examine the products if you wish to do so.  Once you 
have reviewed all the products and information, you will have an 
opportunity to resubmit your rankings and bids on these products.‖ 
 
Subjects were also provided with the written information.  
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Pomegranate Health and Nutrition Information (Fruit and Juice) 
Pomegranates are rich in a variety of compounds that act as antioxidants. 
Antioxidants in the body protect against oxidative stress that can damage cells.  
Specifically, pomegranates contain a number of compounds called polyphenols that are 
very active antioxidants that may play an important role in its suggested health effects.   
Much scientific research suggests that there may be health benefits to consuming 
pomegranate, either as a fresh fruit, as juice, or in other products.  The health benefits 
that have been suggested include reduction in disease risk for certain cancers, reduction 
of inflammatory diseases, and reduction of cardiovascular disease.   
Below to the left are the nutrition facts for a ½ cup serving of pomegranate arils, 
the small sacks inside a pomegranate fruit that contain juice, pulp, and seeds. Below to 
the right are the nutrition facts for a 1 cup serving of mixed pomegranate juice.  
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Pineapple Health and Nutrition Information 
 
Pineapples are rich in a variety of compounds that act as antioxidants.  
Antioxidants in the body protect against oxidative stress that can damage cells.  
Specifically, pineapples contain a number of compounds called polyphenols that are 
very active antioxidants that may play an important role in its suggested health effects.   
Much scientific research suggests that there may be health benefits to consuming 
pineapple, either as a fresh fruit, as juice, or in other products.   The health benefits that 
have been suggested include reduction in disease risk for certain cancers, reduction of 
inflammatory diseases, and reduction of cardiovascular disease. 
   
Below are the nutrition facts for a ½ cup serving of pineapple chunks. 
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Anti-Cancer Information 
 
 For the anti-cancer information rounds, subjects were provided with written 
information on the anti-cancer properties of pomegranates.  In a similar manner to the 
health and nutrition information treatment, subjects were provided with the following 
verbal instructions. 
―You will now have an opportunity to look at some health 
information for the products you bid on in previous rounds. You may also 
re-examine the products if you wish to do so.  Once you have reviewed 
all the products and information, you will have an opportunity to resubmit 
your rankings and bids on these products.‖ 
 
Subjects were also provided with the written information given below.  
 
Pomegranate Health Information 2 
Pomegranates are rich in a variety of compounds that act as antioxidants.  
Antioxidants in the body protect against oxidative stress that can damage cells.  Much 
scientific research suggests that there may be health benefits to consuming pomegranate, 
either as a fresh fruit, as juice, or in other products.    
The health benefits that have been suggested include reduction in disease risk for 
certain cancers, reduction of inflammatory diseases, and reduction of cardiovascular 
disease.  The effects of pomegranate and its components were seen in laboratory studies 
on cancer cell lines; cancer cell lines where effects were seen include breast, colon, 
leukemia, prostate, and skin cancer cell lines.   However, these results were observed in 
laboratory experiments and need to be further investigated in humans before such claims 
can be fully verified. 
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APPENDIX G 
TOBIT MODEL RESULTS 
 
 Table 48. Tobit Model Estimates, Baseline Round 
 
California 
Wonderful 
Pom. Fruit
Texas Red 
Pom. Fruit
Texas 
Salavatski 
Pom. Fruit
Ready-to-
Eat 
California 
Pom. Arils
Ready-to-
Eat Texas 
Pom. Arils
Mixed 
Pom. Juice
Pineapple
Parameter 
(Std. Error)
Parameter 
(Std. Error)
Parameter 
(Std. Error)
Parameter 
(Std. Error)
Parameter 
(Std. Error)
Parameter 
(Std. Error)
Parameter 
(Std. Error)
Constant
-0.250 
(0.321)
-0.104 
(0.335)
-0.116 
(0.314)
-0.029 
(0.398)
-0.181 
(0.394)
0.947** 
(0.406)
0.715* 
(0.379)
Demographics/ Behaviors
DAGE2 0.121      
(0.199)
0.065 
(0.208)
0.061 
(0.195)
0.102 
(0.247)
0.135 
(0.245)
0.171 
(0.255)
0.302 
(0.237)
DAGE3 0.137 
(0.187)
0.030 
(0.196)
0.061 
(0.183)
-0.021 
(0.234)
0.097 
(0.231)
-0.051 
(0.243)
-0.170 
(0.226)
DEDU2 0.189 
(0.223)
0.397* 
(0.232)
0.260 
(0.218)
0.404 
(0.279)
0.522* 
(0.274)
0.294 
(0.285)
0.245 
(0.265)
DEDU3 0.237 
(0.162)
0.088 
(0.170)
0.182 
(0.159)
0.350* 
(0.202)
0.286 
(0.200)
0.019 
(0.209)
-0.063 
(0.195)
HOUSE -0.124* 
(0.069)
-0.136* 
(0.073)
-0.141** 
(0.068)
-0.208** 
(0.085)
-0.179** 
(0.084)
-0.194** 
(0.088)
-0.219*** 
(0.082)
FEMALE 0.274* 
(0.159)
0.195 
(0.165)
0.249 
(0.156)
0.572*** 
(0.197)
0.465** 
(0.195)
0.086 
(0.201)
0.432** 
(0.188)
DMAR -0.062 
(0.185)
0.087 
(0.193)
-0.032 
(0.182)
0.134 
(0.227)
0.227 
(0.225)
0.155 
(0.237)
0.266 
(0.219)
DINC2 0.114 
(0.178)
0.017 
(0.185)
0.114 
(0.174)
0.092 
(0.221)
0.171 
(0.218)
0.342 
(0.229)
0.230 
(0.212)
DINC3 0.327 
(0.249)
0.125 
(0.263)
0.190 
(0.246)
0.568* 
(0.310)
0.527* 
(0.307)
0.059 
(0.326)
0.498* 
(0.299)
SPENDFV 0.006 
(0.004)
0.003 
(0.004)
0.005 
(0.004)
0.006 
(0.005)
0.005 
(0.005)
0.008 
(0.005)
0.007 
(0.005)
FPOH 0.014 
(0.017)
0.022 
(0.017)
0.022 
(0.016)
0.004 
(0.021)
0.008 
(0.021)
0.007 
(0.021)
-0.008 
(0.020)
POMFRUITP 0.942*** 
(0.157)
0.781*** 
(0.164)
0.789*** 
(0.154)
0.672*** 
(0.196)
0.654*** 
(0.194)
0.423** 
(0.204)
0.217 
(0.191)
ILLNESS -0.038 
(0.162)
-0.056 
(0.169)
-0.034 
(0.158)
-0.028 
(0.202)
-0.060 
(0.199)
0.205 
(0.207)
0.284 
(0.193)
TOBACCO -0.081 
(0.220)
0.019 
(0.229)
0.020 
(0.215)
0.078 
(0.272)
0.151 
(0.269)
0.049 
(0.278)
0.126 
(0.258)
EXERCISE 0.084 
(0.228)
-0.043 
(0.238)
-0.052 
(0.223)
0.184 
(0.283)
0.176 
(0.279)
-0.234 
(0.290)
0.543** 
(0.271)
Price Information 0.456*** 
(0.149)
0.528*** 
(0.156)
0.481*** 
(0.146)
0.527*** 
(0.185)
0.630*** 
(0.183)
0.532*** 
(0.190)
0.707*** 
(0.176)
σ 0.899*** 
(0.055)
0.938*** 
(0.058)
0.881*** 
(0.054)
1.134*** 
(0.066)
1.121*** 
(0.066)
1.187*** 
(0.066)
1.109*** 
(0.059)
Log-Likelihood -236.662 -241.988 -233.574 -282.182 -281.105 -303.102 -296.397
Baseline Round
Note: Single (*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks are used to denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
levels, respectively.  Standard errors are given in parentheses.
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Table 49. Tobit Model Marginal Effects, Baseline Round 
 
California 
Wonderful 
Pom. Fruit
Texas Red 
Pom. Fruit
Texas 
Salavatski 
Pom. Fruit
Ready-to-
Eat 
California 
Pom. Arils
Ready-to-
Eat Texas 
Pom. Arils
Mixed 
Pom. Juice
Pineapple
∂y/∂x ∂y/∂x ∂y/∂x ∂y/∂x ∂y/∂x ∂y/∂x ∂y/∂x
Demographics/ Behaviors
DAGE2 0.068 
(0.113)
0.036 
(0.113)
0.034 
(0.110)
0.061 
(0.149)
0.082 
(0.150)
0.122 
(0.184)
0.243 
(0.192)
DAGE3 0.077 
(0.107)
0.016 
(0.106)
0.034 
(0.103)
-0.013 
(0.139)
0.059 
(0.141)
-0.036 
(0.172)
-0.135 
(0.178)
DEDU2 0.110 
(0.134)
0.231 
(0.145)
0.153 
(0.134)
0.256 
(0.187)
0.341* 
(0.192)
0.216 
(0.216)
0.200 
(0.221)
DEDU3 0.136 
(0.096)
0.048 
(0.094)
0.104 
(0.093)
0.216* 
(0.128)
0.177 
(0.127)
0.013 
(0.148)
-0.050 
(0.154)
HOUSE -0.069* 
(0.039)
-0.074* 
(0.039)
-0.079** 
(0.038)
-0.124** 
(0.051)
-0.108** 
(0.051)
-0.138** 
(0.062)
-0.175*** 
(0.065)
FEMALE 0.149* 
(0.084)
0.103 
(0.086)
0.135* 
(0.082)
0.327*** 
(0.108)
0.272** 
(0.110)
0.061 
(0.141)
0.338** 
(0.143)
DMAR -0.035 
(0.104)
0.047 
(0.104)
-0.018 
(0.102)
0.080 
(0.135)
0.137 
(0.135)
0.109 
(0.168)
0.212 
(0.173)
DINC2 0.064 
(0.101)
0.009 
(0.100)
0.064 
(0.099)
0.055 
(0.133)
0.104 
(0.135)
0.247 
(0.167)
0.185 
(0.172)
DINC3 0.195 
(0.158)
0.069 
(0.149)
0.110 
(0.149)
0.369* 
(0.218)
0.345 
(0.216)
0.042 
(0.234)
0.415 
(0.260)
SPENDFV 0.003 
(0.002)
0.002 
(0.002)
0.003 
(0.002)
0.003 
(0.003)
0.003 
(0.003)
0.005 
(0.004)
0.006 
(0.004)
FPOH 0.008 
(0.009)
0.012 
(0.009)
0.012 
(0.009)
0.002 
(0.012)
0.005 
(0.012)
0.005 
(0.015)
-0.006 
(0.016)
POMFRUITP 0.595*** 
(0.112)
0.466*** 
(0.108)
0.490*** 
(0.106)
0.429*** 
(0.134)
0.423*** 
(0.134)
0.310** 
(0.155)
0.176 
(0.156)
ILLNESS -0.021 
(0.090)
-0.030 
(0.090)
-0.019 
(0.088)
-0.016 
(0.120)
-0.036 
(0.119)
0.148 
(0.151)
0.230 
(0.159)
TOBACCO -0.045 
(0.123)
0.010 
(0.124)
0.011 
(0.120)
0.046 
(0.162)
0.091 
(0.163)
0.034 
(0.197)
0.101 
(0.206)
EXERCISE 0.047 
(0.127)
-0.023 
(0.128)
-0.029 
(0.125)
0.110 
(0.169)
0.107 
(0.169)
-0.166 
(0.206)
0.433** 
(0.215)
Price Information 0.244*** 
(0.077)
0.270*** 
(0.077)
0.256*** 
(0.075)
0.303*** 
(0.103)
0.363*** 
(0.102)
0.366*** 
(0.127)
0.547*** 
(0.132)
Baseline Round
Note: Single (*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks are used to denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01 levels, respectively.  Standard errors are given in parentheses.
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      Table 50. Tobit Model Estimates, Tasting Information Round 
 
California 
Wonderful 
Pom. Fruit
Texas Red 
Pom. Fruit
Texas 
Salavatski 
Pom. Fruit
Ready-to-
Eat 
California 
Pom. Arils
Ready-to-
Eat Texas 
Pom. Arils
Mixed 
Pom. Juice
Pineapple
Parameter 
(Std. Error)
Parameter 
(Std. Error)
Parameter 
(Std. Error)
Parameter 
(Std. Error)
Parameter 
(Std. Error)
Parameter 
(Std. Error)
Parameter 
(Std. Error)
Constant -0.251 
(0.382)
-0.254 
(0.399)
-0.201 
(0.389)
0.151 
(0.429)
0.108 
(0.447)
0.604 
(0.408)
0.813** 
(0.383)
Demographics/ Behaviors
DAGE2 0.356 
(0.239)
0.267 
(0.249)
0.203 
(0.243)
0.169 
(0.269)
0.067 
(0.280)
0.106 
(0.257)
0.478** 
(0.240)
DAGE3 0.285 
(0.227)
-0.019 
(0.236)
0.096 
(0.230)
-0.013 
(0.256)
-0.010 
(0.266)
0.265 
(0.243)
-0.138 
(0.228)
DEDU2 0.559** 
(0.269)
0.671** 
(0.279)
0.661** 
(0.272)
0.430 
(0.303)
0.595* 
(0.314)
0.229 
(0.289)
0.092 
(0.268)
DEDU3 0.461** 
(0.196)
0.290 
(0.205)
0.414** 
(0.199)
0.509** 
(0.221)
0.463** 
(0.229)
0.174 
(0.209)
-0.061 
(0.196)
HOUSE -0.091 
(0.083)
-0.112 
(0.086)
-0.109 
(0.084)
-0.139 
(0.093)
-0.129 
(0.096)
-0.216** 
(0.089)
-0.237*** 
(0.082)
FEMALE 0.231 
(0.189)
0.127 
(0.197)
0.019 
(0.192)
0.379* 
(0.213)
0.155 
(0.221)
0.151 
(0.202)
0.222 
(0.189)
DMAR 0.070 
(0.221)
0.235 
(0.230)
0.149 
(0.225)
0.045 
(0.248)
0.015 
(0.258)
0.159 
(0.239)
0.220 
(0.221)
DINC2 -0.011 
(0.214)
0.075 
(0.224)
0.010 
(0.218)
-0.053 
(0.242)
0.137 
(0.251)
0.262 
(0.229)
0.315 
(0.214)
DINC3 0.072 
(0.306)
0.022 
(0.316)
0.082 
(0.309)
0.261 
(0.341)
0.247 
(0.354)
0.166 
(0.326)
0.543* 
(0.303)
SPENDFV 0.004 
(0.005)
0.005 
(0.005)
0.004 
(0.005)
0.004 
(0.006)
0.005 
(0.006)
0.004 
(0.005)
0.007 
(0.005)
FPOH 0.004 
(0.020)
0.002 
(0.021)
0.026 
(0.020)
0.016 
(0.023)
0.016 
(0.024)
0.019 
(0.022)
0.007 
(0.020)
POMFRUITP 0.819*** 
(0.190)
0.780*** 
(0.199)
0.610*** 
(0.193)
0.741*** 
(0.214)
0.658*** 
(0.223)
0.501** 
(0.205)
0.435** 
(0.192)
ILLNESS -0.162 
(0.196)
0.143 
(0.204)
-0.030 
(0.198)
-0.287 
(0.222)
-0.066 
(0.229)
0.252 
(0.208)
0.324* 
(0.195)
TOBACCO 0.491* 
(0.261)
0.342 
(0.273)
0.432 
(0.265)
0.199 
(0.294)
0.264 
(0.306)
0.579** 
(0.279)
0.346 
(0.261)
EXERCISE -0.156 
(0.274)
0.073 
(0.285)
-0.095 
(0.278)
-0.063 
(0.308)
-0.083 
(0.319)
-0.357 
(0.291)
0.413 
(0.273)
Price Information 0.685*** 
(0.179)
0.839*** 
(0.188)
0.815*** 
(0.183)
0.604*** 
(0.202)
0.808*** 
(0.211)
0.484** 
(0.190)
0.600*** 
(0.177)
σ 1.099*** 
(0.064)
1.147*** 
(0.067)
1.117*** 
(0.065)
1.240*** 
(0.072)
1.288*** 
(0.076)
1.183*** 
(0.067)
1.120*** 
(0.059)
Log-Likelihood -276.998 -284.062 -278.999 -297.326 -302.877 -297.148 -298.652
Tasting Information Treatment
Note: Single (*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks are used to denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01 levels, respectively.  Standard errors are given in parentheses.
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Table 51. Tobit Model Marginal Effects, Tasting Information Round 
 
California 
Wonderful 
Pom. Fruit
Texas Red 
Pom. Fruit
Texas 
Salavatski 
Pom. Fruit
Ready-to-
Eat 
California 
Pom. Arils
Ready-to-
Eat Texas 
Pom. Arils
Mixed 
Pom. Juice
Pineapple
∂y/∂x ∂y/∂x ∂y/∂x ∂y/∂x ∂y/∂x ∂y/∂x ∂y/∂x
Demographics/ Behaviors
DAGE2 0.212 
(0.146)
0.160 
(0.152)
0.120 
(0.145)
0.101 
(0.163)
0.040 
(0.169)
0.070 
(0.170)
0.388** 
(0.197)
DAGE3 0.169 
(0.137)
-0.011 
(0.140)
0.056 
(0.135)
-0.008 
(0.152)
-0.006 
(0.159)
0.176 
(0.163)
-0.109 
(0.181)
DEDU2 0.356* 
(0.186)
0.437** 
(0.199)
0.426** 
(0.192)
0.271 
(0.202)
0.385* 
(0.218)
0.155 
(0.201)
0.074 
(0.218)
DEDU3 0.282** 
(0.125)
0.176 
(0.128)
0.251** 
(0.125)
0.315** 
(0.143)
0.288* 
(0.148)
0.116 
(0.141)
-0.048 
(0.156)
HOUSE -0.053 
(0.048)
-0.066 
(0.051)
-0.064 
(0.049)
-0.082 
(0.055)
-0.077 
(0.058)
-0.142** 
(0.059)
-0.189*** 
(0.066)
FEMALE 0.133 
(0.107)
0.074 
(0.115)
0.011 
(0.112)
0.219* 
(0.120)
0.092 
(0.130)
0.098 
(0.130)
0.175 
(0.148)
DMAR 0.041 
(0.129)
0.139 
(0.135)
0.087 
(0.131)
0.027 
(0.147)
0.009 
(0.154)
0.104 
(0.156)
0.176 
(0.175)
DINC2 -0.006 
(0.125)
0.044 
(0.134)
0.006 
(0.127)
-0.031 
(0.143)
0.083 
(0.153)
0.175 
(0.155)
0.254 
(0.174)
DINC3 0.043 
(0.183)
0.013 
(0.188)
0.049 
(0.185)
0.161 
(0.218)
0.153 
(0.226)
0.111 
(0.224)
0.455* 
(0.264)
SPENDFV 0.002 
(0.003)
0.003 
(0.003)
0.002 
(0.003)
0.002 
(0.003)
0.003 
(0.003)
0.003 
(0.003)
0.005 
(0.004)
FPOH 0.002 
(0.012)
0.001 
(0.012)
0.015 
(0.012)
0.009 
(0.013)
0.009 
(0.014)
0.012 
(0.014)
0.005 
(0.016)
POMFRUITP 0.521*** 
(0.131)
0.498*** 
(0.137)
0.379*** 
(0.128)
0.471*** 
(0.146)
0.418*** 
(0.150)
0.344** 
(0.147)
0.358** 
(0.162)
ILLNESS -0.093 
(0.111)
0.086 
(0.124)
-0.017 
(0.115)
-0.166 
(0.126)
-0.039 
(0.136)
0.169 
(0.142)
0.263 
(0.161)
TOBACCO 0.287* 
(0.153)
0.203 
(0.161)
0.252 
(0.155)
0.118 
(0.175)
0.158 
(0.183)
0.381** 
(0.183)
0.276 
(0.208)
EXERCISE -0.091 
(0.160)
0.043 
(0.169)
-0.055 
(0.162)
-0.037 
(0.183)
-0.050 
(0.191)
-0.235 
(0.191)
0.330 
(0.218)
Price Information 0.379*** 
(0.095)
0.465*** 
(0.099)
0.445*** 
(0.095)
0.343*** 
(0.111)
0.000 
(0.000)
0.308*** 
(0.118)
0.467*** 
(0.134)
Tasting Information Treatment
Note: Single (*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks are used to denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01 levels, respectively.  Standard errors are given in parentheses.
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Table 52. Tobit Model Estimates of WTP, Health and Nutrition Information  
 
California 
Wonderful 
Pom. Fruit
Texas Red 
Pom. Fruit
Texas 
Salavatski 
Pom. Fruit
Ready-to-
Eat 
California 
Pom. Arils
Ready-to-
Eat Texas 
Pom. Arils
Mixed 
Pom. Juice
Pineapple
Parameter 
(Std. Error)
Parameter 
(Std. Error)
Parameter 
(Std. Error)
Parameter 
(Std. Error)
Parameter 
(Std. Error)
Parameter 
(Std. Error)
Parameter 
(Std. Error)
Constant -0.652* 
(0.372)
-0.500 
(0.396)
-0.617 
(0.422)
0.006 
(0.419)
0.158 
(0.422)
0.701 
(0.430)
0.723* 
(0.384)
Demographics/ Behaviors
DAGE2 0.405* 
(0.232)
0.392 
(0.246)
0.209 
(0.262)
0.215 
(0.263)
0.175 
(0.264)
0.052 
(0.269)
0.410* 
(0.241)
DAGE3 0.293 
(0.220)
0.217 
(0.233)
0.154 
(0.248)
0.062 
(0.249)
0.094 
(0.250)
0.207 
(0.254)
-0.049 
(0.229)
DEDU2 0.571** 
(0.261)
0.569** 
(0.276)
0.430 
(0.295)
0.429 
(0.294)
0.393 
(0.296)
0.353 
(0.301)
0.297 
(0.269)
DEDU3 0.470** 
(0.190)
0.318 
(0.201)
0.471** 
(0.214)
0.392* 
(0.214)
0.221 
(0.216)
0.009 
(0.220)
0.051 
(0.197)
HOUSE -0.081 
(0.081)
-0.110 
(0.085)
-0.037 
(0.091)
-0.186** 
(0.092)
-0.169* 
(0.091)
-0.182* 
(0.093)
-0.217*** 
(0.083)
FEMALE 0.353* 
(0.186)
0.166 
(0.195)
0.263 
(0.209)
0.348* 
(0.207)
0.127 
(0.208)
0.058 
(0.213)
0.224 
(0.190)
DMAR 0.093 
(0.217)
0.058 
(0.228)
-0.058 
(0.244)
0.238 
(0.244)
0.092 
(0.244)
0.188 
(0.250)
0.173 
(0.222)
DINC2 -0.006 
(0.209)
0.091 
(0.220)
0.115 
(0.235)
0.054 
(0.235)
0.118 
(0.236)
0.232 
(0.240)
0.304 
(0.216)
DINC3 0.217 
(0.294)
0.070 
(0.313)
0.433 
(0.332)
0.406 
(0.331)
0.285 
(0.335)
0.048 
(0.344)
0.534* 
(0.305)
SPENDFV 0.006 
(0.005)
0.007 
(0.005)
0.010* 
(0.005)
0.005 
(0.005)
0.004 
(0.005)
0.002 
(0.006)
0.006 
(0.005)
FPOH 0.003 
(0.020)
0.008 
(0.021)
0.009 
(0.022)
0.011 
(0.022)
0.032 
(0.022)
0.033 
(0.023)
0.010 
(0.020)
POMFRUITP 0.792*** 
(0.185)
0.689*** 
(0.196)
0.861*** 
(0.209)
0.709*** 
(0.208)
0.633*** 
(0.210)
0.572*** 
(0.214)
0.485** 
(0.193)
ILLNESS -0.042 
(0.190)
0.058 
(0.200)
-0.049 
(0.214)
-0.259 
(0.215)
-0.236 
(0.216)
0.240 
(0.218)
0.310 
(0.196)
TOBACCO 0.493* 
(0.255)
0.341 
(0.270)
0.341 
(0.288)
0.282 
(0.287)
0.364 
(0.288)
0.515* 
(0.292)
0.353 
(0.263)
EXERCISE 0.034 
(0.266)
0.017 
(0.281)
0.017 
(0.300)
0.029 
(0.299)
-0.149 
(0.300)
-0.362 
(0.305)
0.266 
(0.275)
Price Information 0.738*** 
(0.175)
0.883*** 
(0.186)
0.635*** 
(0.198)
0.627*** 
(0.196)
0.804*** 
(0.198)
0.433** 
(0.200)
0.753*** 
(0.178)
σ 1.064*** 
(0.063)
1.124*** 
(0.067)
1.197*** 
(0.072)
1.200*** 
(0.071)
1.210*** 
(0.071)
1.240*** 
(0.071)
1.127*** 
(0.059)
Log-Likelihood -268.083 -276.321 -282.848 -290.315 -292.987 -303.983 -301.094
Health and Nutrition Information
Note: Single (*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks are used to denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01 levels, respectively.  Standard errors are given in parentheses.
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Table 53. Tobit Model Marginal Effects on WTP, Health and Nutrition 
Information  
 
California 
Wonderful 
Pom. Fruit
Texas Red 
Pom. Fruit
Texas 
Salavatski 
Pom. Fruit
Ready-to-
Eat 
California 
Pom. Arils
Ready-to-
Eat Texas 
Pom. Arils
Mixed 
Pom. Juice
Pineapple
∂y/∂x ∂y/∂x ∂y/∂x ∂y/∂x ∂y/∂x ∂y/∂x ∂y/∂x
Demographics/ Behaviors
DAGE2 0.239* 
(0.141)
0.229 
(0.147)
0.115 
(0.147)
0.129 
(0.160)
0.107 
(0.163)
0.034 
(0.176)
0.334* 
(0.198)
DAGE3 0.171 
(0.131)
0.125 
(0.136)
0.085 
(0.137)
0.037 
(0.149)
0.057 
(0.153)
0.135 
(0.168)
-0.039 
(0.184)
DEDU2 0.360** 
(0.179)
0.354* 
(0.186)
0.251 
(0.183)
0.271 
(0.197)
0.251 
(0.200)
0.240 
(0.213)
0.245 
(0.227)
DEDU3 0.284** 
(0.120)
0.187 
(0.122)
0.268** 
(0.128)
0.241* 
(0.136)
0.137 
(0.136)
0.006 
(0.143)
0.041 
(0.159)
HOUSE -0.047 
(0.046)
-0.063 
(0.049)
-0.020 
(0.049)
-0.111** 
(0.055)
-0.102* 
(0.056)
-0.118* 
(0.061)
-0.174*** 
(0.066)
FEMALE 0.198** 
(0.101)
0.094 
(0.108)
0.141 
(0.110)
0.202* 
(0.117)
0.076 
(0.124)
0.037 
(0.137)
0.178 
(0.150)
DMAR 0.054 
(0.125)
0.033 
(0.130)
-0.032 
(0.134)
0.141 
(0.144)
0.056 
(0.147)
0.121 
(0.161)
0.139 
(0.178)
DINC2 -0.004 
(0.120)
0.052 
(0.127)
0.063 
(0.130)
0.032 
(0.141)
0.072 
(0.145)
0.152 
(0.159)
0.247 
(0.176)
DINC3 0.129 
(0.182)
0.040 
(0.182)
0.252 
(0.207)
0.256 
(0.221)
0.180 
(0.220)
0.032 
(0.226)
0.450* 
(0.266)
SPENDFV 0.003 
(0.003)
0.004 
(0.003)
0.005* 
(0.003)
0.003 
(0.003)
0.002 
(0.003)
0.001 
(0.004)
0.005 
(0.004)
FPOH 0.002 
(0.011)
0.005 
(0.012)
0.005 
(0.012)
0.007 
(0.013)
0.020 
(0.013)
0.021 
(0.015)
0.008 
(0.016)
POMFRUITP 0.496*** 
(0.126)
0.422*** 
(0.128)
0.512*** 
(0.135)
0.451*** 
(0.141)
0.407*** 
(0.143)
0.390** 
(0.153)
0.402** 
(0.165)
ILLNESS -0.024 
(0.108)
0.033 
(0.116)
-0.026 
(0.116)
-0.150 
(0.122)
-0.140 
(0.126)
0.159 
(0.147)
0.254 
(0.163)
TOBACCO 0.284* 
(0.147)
0.194 
(0.154)
0.186 
(0.157)
0.167 
(0.171)
0.221 
(0.175)
0.334* 
(0.190)
0.284 
(0.211)
EXERCISE 0.020 
(0.153)
0.010 
(0.160)
0.009 
(0.164)
0.017 
(0.178)
-0.090 
(0.182)
-0.235 
(0.198)
0.214 
(0.221)
Price Information 0.399*** 
(0.090)
0.468*** 
(0.093)
0.330*** 
(0.099)
0.356*** 
(0.107)
0.460*** 
(0.108)
0.274** 
(0.123)
0.587*** 
(0.135)
Note: Single (*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks are used to denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01 levels, respectively.  Standard errors are given in parentheses.
Health and Nutrition Information
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Table 54. Tobit Model Estimates of WTP, Anti-Cancer Information Treatment 
 
California 
Wonderful 
Pom. Fruit
Texas Red 
Pom. Fruit
Texas 
Salavatski 
Pom. Fruit
Ready-to-
Eat 
California 
Pom. Arils
Ready-to-
Eat Texas 
Pom. Arils
Mixed 
Pom. Juice
Pineapple
Parameter 
(Std. Error)
Parameter 
(Std. Error)
Parameter 
(Std. Error)
Parameter 
(Std. Error)
Parameter 
(Std. Error)
Parameter 
(Std. Error)
Parameter 
(Std. Error)
Constant -0.193 
(0.367)
-0.053 
(0.396)
-0.091 
(0.380)
-0.046 
(0.438)
0.051 
(0.409)
0.523 
(0.394)
0.848** 
(0.377)
Demographics/ Behaviors
DAGE2 0.058 
(0.228)
-0.011 
(0.246)
-0.077 
(0.236)
0.198 
(0.274)
0.255 
(0.256)
0.235 
(0.248)
0.402* 
(0.236)
DAGE3 0.104 
(0.215)
0.085 
(0.232)
0.042 
(0.222)
-0.016 
(0.261)
-0.032 
(0.243)
0.247 
(0.235)
-0.028 
(0.225)
DEDU2 0.470* 
(0.256)
0.647** 
(0.274)
0.559** 
(0.264)
0.424 
(0.309)
0.535* 
(0.286)
0.304 
(0.277)
0.541** 
(0.264)
DEDU3 0.409** 
(0.187)
0.307 
(0.202)
0.333* 
(0.194)
0.441* 
(0.225)
0.246 
(0.210)
0.094 
(0.202)
0.071 
(0.194)
HOUSE -0.059 
(0.078)
-0.083 
(0.085)
-0.070 
(0.081)
-0.120 
(0.094)
-0.127 
(0.088)
-0.182** 
(0.085)
-0.215*** 
(0.081)
FEMALE 0.204 
(0.182)
0.135 
(0.196)
0.118 
(0.189)
0.344 
(0.218)
0.262 
(0.203)
0.011 
(0.195)
0.229 
(0.187)
DMAR -0.085 
(0.212)
-0.052 
(0.228)
-0.019 
(0.219)
0.020 
(0.254)
0.055 
(0.236)
0.041 
(0.230)
0.162 
(0.218)
DINC2 0.010 
(0.205)
-0.082 
(0.221)
-0.050 
(0.212)
0.153 
(0.246)
0.217 
(0.229)
0.316 
(0.222)
0.292 
(0.212)
DINC3 0.128 
(0.291)
-0.096 
(0.313)
-0.041 
(0.301)
0.396 
(0.348)
0.241 
(0.324)
0.296 
(0.315)
0.592** 
(0.299)
SPENDFV 0.006 
(0.005)
0.005 
(0.005)
0.005 
(0.005)
0.007 
(0.006)
0.004 
(0.005)
0.006 
(0.005)
0.006 
(0.005)
FPOH 0.021 
(0.019)
0.022 
(0.021)
0.029 
(0.020)
0.023 
(0.023)
0.043** 
(0.022)
0.020 
(0.021)
0.015 
(0.020)
POMFRUITP 0.885*** 
(0.181)
0.733*** 
(0.196)
0.706*** 
(0.188)
0.628*** 
(0.219)
0.498** 
(0.204)
0.415** 
(0.198)
0.225 
(0.190)
ILLNESS -0.152 
(0.187)
-0.018 
(0.200)
-0.128 
(0.193)
-0.161 
(0.225)
-0.053 
(0.209)
0.209 
(0.201)
0.136 
(0.193)
TOBACCO 0.280 
(0.251)
0.157 
(0.271)
0.178 
(0.259)
0.359 
(0.300)
0.338 
(0.280)
0.507* 
(0.269)
0.410 
(0.258)
EXERCISE -0.509* 
(0.264)
-0.339 
(0.283)
-0.378 
(0.272)
-0.204 
(0.315)
-0.328 
(0.292)
-0.157 
(0.281)
0.200 
(0.270)
Price Information 0.702*** 
(0.173)
0.750*** 
(0.186)
0.796*** 
(0.179)
0.710*** 
(0.206)
0.789*** 
(0.192)
0.788*** 
(0.184)
0.545*** 
(0.175)
σ 1.039*** 
(0.063)
1.121*** 
(0.068)
1.077*** 
(0.066)
1.266*** 
(0.073)
1.181*** 
(0.068)
1.149*** 
(0.063)
1.105*** 
(0.059)
Log-Likelihood -259.394 -271.376 -265.412 -301.357 -292.980 -297.238 -296.252
Anti-Cancer Information Treatment
Note: Single (*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks are used to denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01 levels, respectively.  Standard errors are given in parentheses.
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Table 55. Tobit Model Marginal Effects on WTP, Anti-Cancer Information 
 
California 
Wonderful 
Pom. Fruit
Texas Red 
Pom. Fruit
Texas 
Salavatski 
Pom. Fruit
Ready-to-
Eat 
California 
Pom. Arils
Ready-to-
Eat Texas 
Pom. Arils
Mixed 
Pom. Juice
Pineapple
∂y/∂x ∂y/∂x ∂y/∂x ∂y/∂x ∂y/∂x ∂y/∂x ∂y/∂x
Demographics/ Behaviors
DAGE2 0.033 
(0.128)
-0.006 
(0.136)
-0.043 
(0.131)
0.120 
(0.167)
0.120 
(0.167)
0.168 
(0.179)
0.325* 
(0.193)
DAGE3 0.059 
(0.122)
0.047 
(0.129)
0.024 
(0.125)
-0.010 
(0.156)
-0.010 
(0.156)
0.177 
(0.170)
-0.023 
(0.179)
DEDU2 0.284* 
(0.166)
0.396** 
(0.184)
0.343* 
(0.176)
0.269 
(0.207)
0.269 
(0.207)
0.224 
(0.211)
0.454** 
(0.231)
DEDU3 0.238** 
(0.114)
0.175 
(0.118)
0.193* 
(0.116)
0.274* 
(0.145)
0.274* 
(0.145)
0.067 
(0.146)
0.057 
(0.156)
HOUSE -0.033 
(0.044)
-0.046 
(0.047)
-0.039 
(0.046)
-0.072 
(0.057)
-0.072 
(0.057)
-0.130** 
(0.061)
-0.172*** 
(0.065)
FEMALE 0.112 
(0.099)
0.074 
(0.106)
0.065 
(0.104)
0.201 
(0.124)
0.201 
(0.124)
0.008 
(0.139)
0.181 
(0.146)
DMAR -0.047 
(0.119)
-0.029 
(0.126)
-0.011 
(0.123)
0.012 
(0.152)
0.012 
(0.152)
0.029 
(0.163)
0.129 
(0.173)
DINC2 0.005 
(0.115)
-0.045 
(0.121)
-0.028 
(0.118)
0.092 
(0.150)
0.092 
(0.150)
0.228 
(0.162)
0.236 
(0.172)
DINC3 0.073 
(0.170)
-0.052 
(0.168)
-0.023 
(0.167)
0.250 
(0.232)
0.250 
(0.232)
0.218 
(0.240)
0.498* 
(0.263)
SPENDFV 0.003 
(0.003)
0.003 
(0.003)
0.003 
(0.003)
0.004 
(0.003)
0.004 
(0.003)
0.004 
(0.004)
0.004 
(0.004)
FPOH 0.012 
(0.011)
0.012 
(0.011)
0.016 
(0.011)
0.014 
(0.014)
0.014 
(0.014)
0.014 
(0.015)
0.012 
(0.016)
POMFRUITP 0.547*** 
(0.123)
0.437*** 
(0.126)
0.427*** 
(0.122)
0.398*** 
(0.146)
0.398*** 
(0.146)
0.305** 
(0.150)
0.182 
(0.156)
ILLNESS -0.084 
(0.102)
-0.010 
(0.110)
-0.071 
(0.106)
-0.095 
(0.131)
-0.095 
(0.131)
0.150 
(0.147)
0.109 
(0.156)
TOBACCO 0.157 
(0.141)
0.087 
(0.150)
0.100 
(0.145)
0.215 
(0.180)
0.215 
(0.180)
0.360* 
(0.191)
0.327 
(0.205)
EXERCISE -0.285* 
(0.148)
-0.187 
(0.156)
-0.212 
(0.153)
-0.122 
(0.188)
-0.122 
(0.188)
-0.111 
(0.199)
0.160 
(0.215)
Price Information 0.369*** 
(0.087)
0.388*** 
(0.092)
0.416*** 
(0.089)
0.405*** 
(0.113)
0.405*** 
(0.113)
0.534*** 
(0.120)
0.425*** 
(0.133)
Anti-Cancer Information Treatment
Note: Single (*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks are used to denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01 levels, respectively.  Standard errors are given in parentheses.
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APPENDIX H 
COMPARISON OF ONE VERSUS TWO VARIABLES FOR  
TEXAS VARIETIES 
 
Table 56. Comparison of Random Effects Tobit Model Parameter Estimates for 
WTP for Fruit Products by Engaged Bidders, One Texas Variety vs. Two Texas 
Varieties 
 
 
Parameter Standard Error Parameter Standard Error
Constant 0.419 
(a)
0.272 0.419 0.272
Variety
1: Texas Red 0.056 0.036 --- ---
2: Texas Salavatski 0.057** 0.027 --- ---
Any Texas Variety --- --- 0.057** 0.025
Product Form
Ready-To-Eat (RTE) 0.320*** 0.027 0.320*** 0.025
Juice 0.567*** 0.036 0.567*** 0.035
Pineapple 0.948*** 0.036 0.948*** 0.035
Price Information 0.723*** 0.134 0.723*** 0.134
Additional Information
Tasting 0.172*** 0.029 0.172*** 0.029
Health and Nutrition 0.137*** 0.029 0.137*** 0.029
Anti-Cancer 0.145*** 0.029 0.145*** 0.029
Demographics/ Behaviors
DAGE2 0.038 0.171 0.038 0.171
DAGE3 -0.062 0.161 -0.062 0.161
DEDU2 0.281 0.192 0.281 0.192
DEDU3 0.219 0.141 0.219 0.141
HOUSE -0.120** 0.059 -0.120** 0.059
FEMALE 0.115 0.138 0.115 0.138
DMAR 0.016 0.162 0.016 0.162
DINC2 -0.047 0.155 -0.047 0.155
DINC3 0.469** 0.231 0.469** 0.231
SPENDFV 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003
FPOH 0.002 0.014 0.002 0.014
POMFRUITP 0.376*** 0.133 0.376*** 0.133
ILLNESS 0.094 0.142 0.094 0.142
TOBACCO 0.058 0.183 0.058 0.183
EXERCISE -0.015 0.198 -0.015 0.198
σ(u) (d) 0.706*** 0.042 0.706*** 0.042
σ(e) (e) 0.670*** 0.008 0.670*** 0.008
ρ 0.526*** 0.030 0.526*** 0.030
Log-Likelihood -4681.491 -4681.491
Likelihood ratio test 
(f)
2652.20*** 2652.20***
N (individuals) 154 154
"Any Texas Variety" Variable 
with Bidders Who Are 
Unengaged for Any  Product 
Excluded 
(b) (c)
Two Texas Variety Variables 
with Bidders Who Are 
Unengaged for Any  Product 
Excluded 
(b) (c)
(d)
 Standard deviation of individual-specific error.
(e)
 Standard deviation of overall error.
(f)
 Likelihood ratio test that σ(u) = 0.
(b)
 Unengaged bidders are those who submitted bids of $0.00 for all rounds for the specified fruit product.
(c)
 "Any product" refers to bidders who were unengaged for any  one of the  seven included fruit products.
(a)
 Single (*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks are used to denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 57. Comparison of Random Effects Tobit Model Marginal Effects Estimates 
for WTP for Fruit Products by Engaged Bidders, One Texas Variety vs. Two Texas 
Varieties 
 
∂y/∂x Standard Error ∂y/∂x Standard Error
Variety
1: Texas Red 0.043
(a)
0.027 --- ---
2: Texas Salavatski 0.043** 0.021 --- ---
Any Texas Variety --- --- 0.043** 0.019
Product Form
Ready-To-Eat (RTE) 0.243*** 0.021 0.243*** 0.020
Juice 0.431*** 0.029 0.431*** 0.029
Pineapple 0.720*** 0.032 0.720*** 0.031
Price Information 0.525*** 0.093 0.525*** 0.093
Additional Information
Tasting 0.130*** 0.022 0.130*** 0.022
Health and Nutrition 0.103*** 0.022 0.103*** 0.022
Anti-Cancer 0.109*** 0.022 0.109*** 0.022
Demographics/ Behaviors
DAGE2 0.029 0.130 0.029 0.130
DAGE3 -0.047 0.122 -0.047 0.122
DEDU2 0.221 0.155 0.221 0.155
DEDU3 0.169 0.110 0.169 0.110
HOUSE -0.091** 0.045 -0.091** 0.045
FEMALE 0.087 0.103 0.087 0.103
DMAR 0.012 0.123 0.012 0.123
DINC2 -0.036 0.118 -0.036 0.118
DINC3 0.378* 0.195 0.378* 0.195
SPENDFV 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003
FPOH 0.001 0.011 0.001 0.011
POMFRUITP 0.294*** 0.106 0.294*** 0.106
ILLNESS 0.072 0.109 0.072 0.109
TOBACCO 0.044 0.139 0.044 0.139
EXERCISE -0.011 0.150 -0.011 0.150
(b)
 Unengaged bidders are those who submitted bids of $0.00 for all rounds for the specified fruit product.
(c)
 "Any product" refers to bidders who were unengaged for any  one of the  seven included fruit products.
(a)
 Single (*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks are used to denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Two Texas Variety Variables with 
Bidders Who Are Unengaged for 
Any  Product Excluded 
(b) (c)
"Any Texas Variety" Variable with 
Bidders Who Are Unengaged for 
Any  Product Excluded 
(b) (c)
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Table 58. Comparison of Mixed Linear Model Parameter Estimates for WTP for 
Fruit Products by Engaged Bidders, One Texas Variety vs. Two Texas Varieties 
 
Parameter Standard Error Parameter Standard Error
Constant 0.438
(a)
0.268 0.438 0.268
Variety
1: Texas Red 0.053 0.035 --- ---
2: Texas Salavatski 0.054** 0.026 --- ---
Any Texas Variety --- --- 0.054** 0.024
Product Form
Ready-To-Eat (RTE) 0.308*** 0.026 0.308*** 0.024
Juice 0.555*** 0.035 0.555*** 0.034
Pineapple 0.930*** 0.035 0.930*** 0.034
Price Information 0.725*** 0.132 0.725*** 0.132
Additional Information 0.000 0.000
Tasting 0.158*** 0.028 0.158*** 0.028
Health and Nutrition 0.128*** 0.028 0.128*** 0.028
Anti-Cancer 0.136*** 0.028 0.136*** 0.028
Demographics/ Behaviors
DAGE2 0.057 0.168 0.057 0.168
DAGE3 -0.057 0.159 -0.057 0.159
DEDU2 0.278 0.189 0.278 0.189
DEDU3 0.210 0.139 0.210 0.139
HOUSE -0.116** 0.059 -0.116** 0.059
FEMALE 0.104 0.136 0.104 0.136
DMAR 0.015 0.159 0.015 0.159
DINC2 -0.038 0.153 -0.038 0.153
DINC3 0.469** 0.227 0.469** 0.227
SPENDFV 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003
FPOH 0.002 0.014 0.002 0.014
POMFRUITP 0.367*** 0.131 0.367*** 0.131
ILLNESS 0.106 0.140 0.106 0.140
TOBACCO 0.067 0.180 0.067 0.180
EXERCISE -0.015 0.195 -0.015 0.195
 
(d) 
0.483*** 0.057 0.483*** 0.057
Log-Likelihood -4523.360 -4523.360
LR Test 
(e)
2756.57*** 2756.57***
N (individuals) 154 154
(b)
 Unengaged bidders are those who submitted bids of $0.00 for all rounds for the specified fruit product.
(c)
 "Any product" refers to bidders who were unengaged for any  one of the  seven included fruit products.
(d)
 Estimated standard deviation for the random effects specified at the individual level. 
(e)
 Likelihood Ratio Test of Mixed Linear Model versus Linear Regression.
(a)
 Single (*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks are used to denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 
Two Texas Variety Variables with 
Bidders Who Are Unengaged for 
Any  Product Excluded 
(b) (c)
"Any Texas Variety" Variable with 
Bidders Who Are Unengaged for 
Any  Product Excluded 
(b) (c)
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APPENDIX I 
PROBABILITY THAT A PARTICULAR PRODUCT WILL BE RANKED FIRST 
 
Table 59. Likelihood of a Fruit Product Option Being Ranked First, Fully-Ranked 
Preferences 
 
 
Table 60. Likelihood of a Fruit Product Option Being Ranked First, Partially- 
Ranked Preferences 
 
 
Baseline
Tasting 
Information
Health and Nutrition 
Information
Anti-Cancer 
Information
Full 
Information
California Wonderful Pomegranate Fruit 0.074 0.090 0.090 0.085 0.092
Texas Red Pomegranate Fruit 0.077 0.140 0.111 0.113 0.132
Texas Salavatski Pomegranate Fruit 0.083 0.119 0.104 0.111 0.119
Ready-to-Eat Pomegranate Arils - 
California Wonderful
0.124 0.111 0.135 0.137 0.126
Ready-to-Eat Pomegranate Arils - Texas 
Salavatski
0.140 0.148 0.157 0.178 0.163
Mixed Pomegranate Juice 0.156 0.080 0.091 0.125 0.072
Pineapple 0.309 0.293 0.282 0.221 0.272
No Product 0.037 0.019 0.030 0.030 0.022
a 
Single (*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks are used to denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Fully-Ranked Preference Rankings
Baseline
Tasting 
Information
Health and Nutrition 
Information
Anti-Cancer 
Information
Full 
Information
California Wonderful Pomegranate Fruit 0.053 0.075 0.065 0.062 0.071
Texas Red Pomegranate Fruit 0.048 0.114 0.084 0.091 0.103
Texas Salavatski Pomegranate Fruit 0.060 0.102 0.078 0.080 0.093
Ready-to-Eat Pomegranate Arils - 
California Wonderful 0.105 0.090 0.117 0.123 0.105
Ready-to-Eat Pomegranate Arils - Texas 
Salavatski 0.119 0.123 0.141 0.159 0.138
Mixed Pomegranate Juice 0.178 0.099 0.109 0.158 0.090
Pineapple 0.374 0.363 0.363 0.283 0.361
No Product 0.063 0.033 0.044 0.044 0.039
a 
Single (*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks are used to denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Partially-Ranked Preference Rankings
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Table 61. Likelihood of a Fruit Product Option Being Ranked First, Fully-Ranked 
Implied Ordered Bids 
 
 
Table 62 . Likelihood of a Fruit Product Option Being Ranked First, Partially-
Ranked Implied Ordered Bids 
 
 
Baseline
Tasting 
Information
Health and Nutrition 
Information
Anti-Cancer 
Information
Full 
Information
California Wonderful Pomegranate Fruit 0.054 0.075 0.068 0.065 0.069
Texas Red Pomegranate Fruit 0.048 0.089 0.070 0.071 0.086
Texas Salavatski Pomegranate Fruit 0.055 0.089 0.076 0.074 0.079
Ready-to-Eat Pomegranate Arils - 
California Wonderful 0.113 0.114 0.116 0.136 0.110
Ready-to-Eat Pomegranate Arils - Texas 
Salavatski 0.116 0.136 0.129 0.154 0.125
Mixed Pomegranate Juice 0.203 0.123 0.128 0.181 0.104
Pineapple 0.397 0.358 0.397 0.303 0.410
No Product 0.014 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.016
a 
Single (*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks are used to denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Fully-Ranked Implied Ordered Bids
Baseline
Tasting 
Information
Health and Nutrition 
Information
Anti-Cancer 
Information
Full 
Information
California Wonderful Pomegranate Fruit 0.043 0.059 0.057 0.051 0.058
Texas Red Pomegranate Fruit 0.037 0.076 0.062 0.063 0.074
Texas Salavatski Pomegranate Fruit 0.045 0.075 0.063 0.060 0.069
Ready-to-Eat Pomegranate Arils - 
California Wonderful 0.106 0.105 0.113 0.127 0.103
Ready-to-Eat Pomegranate Arils - Texas 
Salavatski 0.110 0.133 0.125 0.149 0.122
Mixed Pomegranate Juice 0.212 0.130 0.133 0.197 0.117
Pineapple 0.428 0.403 0.428 0.333 0.438
No Product 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.020 0.019
a 
Single (*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks are used to denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Partially Ranked Implied Ordered Bids
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APPENDIX J 
STATA CODE 
 
 
*DOFILE 0STARTUP: 
cd E:\ 
*Start log file and append to the end of previous file 
log using E:\THESIS\DATA\STATALONGOUT1All.log, append name(OUT1ALL) 
*Start command log and append to the end of previous command log file 
cmdlog using E:\THESIS\DATA\STATALONGOUT2CMD.log, append  
*========================================================== 
*===========================================DATE = ________ 
*========================================================== 
*Increase Memory Space to use 
set memory 100M 
*========================================================== 
*Use the specified data 
use "E:\Thesis\Data\STATAIn9AllLongFormMissingDropped.dta" 
*###################################################################### 
*========================================================== 
*========================================================== 
*========================================================== 
*###################################################################### 
 
 
*DOFILE 1BLOCALS: 
di ”MODEL TYPE Ai- No interactions, no demographic variables, no info, 
no price” 
local typeAi var1txr var2txs formrte formjuice productpine 
*   
di "MODEL TYPE Aii- No interactions, no demographic variables, no info, 
with price" 
local typeAii var1txr var2txs formrte formjuice productpine i.price  
* 
di “MODEL TYPE B- No interactions, no demographic variables, info 
included, with price” 
local typeB var1txr var2txs formrte formjuice productpine i.price 
i.info 
*  
di “MODEL TYPE C- No interactions, with  demographic variables, info 
included, with price” 
local typeC var1txr var2txs formrte formjuice productpine i.agefew2sta 
i.agefew3sta i.edufew2sta i.edufew3sta house i.female i.dmarfewsta 
i.incfew2sta i.incfew3sta c.spendfvavgstat c.fpohstat i.pomfruitp 
i.hissue c.tobacavgstat c.exeravgstat i.price i.info  
* 
di "MODEL TYPE H- No interactions, with  demographic variables, info 
NOT included, with price" 
local typeH var1txr var2txs formrte formjuice productpine i.agefew2sta 
i.agefew3sta i.edufew2sta i.edufew3sta house i.female i.dmarfewsta 
i.incfew2sta i.incfew3sta c.spendfvavgstat c.fpohstat i.pomfruitp 
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i.hissue c.tobacavgstat c.exeravgstat i.price  
* 
di "MODEL TYPE I- No interactions, with  demographic variables, info 
NOT included, NO price" 
local typeI var1txr var2txs formrte formjuice productpine i.agefew2sta 
i.agefew3sta i.edufew2sta i.edufew3sta house i.female i.dmarfewsta 
i.incfew2sta i.incfew3sta c.spendfvavgstat c.fpohstat i.pomfruitp 
i.hissue c.tobacavgstat c.exeravgstat 
* 
di"MODEL TYPE J- No interactions, NO Product Characteristics, with 
demographic variables, info NOT included, with price" 
local typeJ  i.agefew2sta i.agefew3sta i.edufew2sta i.edufew3sta house 
i.female i.dmarfewsta i.incfew2sta i.incfew3sta c.spendfvavgstat 
c.fpohstat i.pomfruitp i.hissue c.tobacavgstat c.exeravgstat i.price  
* 
di “MODEL TYPE K- One Texas Variable, No interactions, with  
demographic variables, info included, with price” 
local typeK vartexas formrte formjuice productpine i.agefew2sta 
i.agefew3sta i.edufew2sta i.edufew3sta house i.female i.dmarfewsta 
i.incfew2sta i.incfew3sta c.spendfvavgstat c.fpohstat i.pomfruitp 
i.hissue c.tobacavgstat c.exeravgstat i.price i.info” 
* 
di “MODEL TYPE L- SAME AS TYPE C BUT FOR DELTAS- Forces all Information 
to be kept” 
local typeL var1txr var2txs formrte formjuice productpine i.agefew2sta 
i.agefew3sta i.edufew2sta i.edufew3sta house i.female i.dmarfewsta 
i.incfew2sta i.incfew3sta c.spendfvavgstat c.fpohstat i.pomfruitp 
i.hissue c.tobacavgstat c.exeravgstat i.price inform2 inform3 inform4 
* 
di “Variables to force all information treatments to be kept” 
local forceinfo inform2 inform3 inform4 
di"Variables for random effects" 
local infodemo agefew2sta agefew3sta edufew2sta edufew3sta house female 
dmarfewsta incfew2sta incfew3sta spendfvavgstat fpohstat pomfruitp 
hissue tobacavgstat exeravgstat price inform2 inform3 inform4  
* 
di"=======================================================" 
di"RANKINGS LOCAL VARIABLES" 
di"MODEL TYPE RAi- FOR RANKINGS- No interactions, no demographic 
variables, no info , no price, (with no product included)" 
local typeRAi var1txr var2txs formrte formjuice productpine 
productnoprod  
* 
di"MODEL TYPE RI- RANKINGS LOCAL VARIABLES and interactions" 
di"MODEL TYPE RI- FOR RANKINGS- info#prod chars. interactions, no 
demographic , no info , no price, (with no product included)" 
local typeRI `typeRAi' i.info#i.(formrte )  
* 
di “Create list of ranks to be dropped for calculations based on 
rankings” 
local dropforrank id!=108 & id!=204 & id!=208 & id!=209 & id!=220 & 
id!=313 & id!=412 & id!=420 & id!=422 & id!=810 & id!=833 
*###################################################################### 
*========================================================== 
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*========================================================== 
*========================================================== 
*###################################################################### 
 
 
*DOFILE 1CSUMMARY: 
display "Start log file and append to the end of previous file" 
log using ".\THESIS\DATA\STATALONGOUT1cSummary.log", append 
name(OUT1CSUMMARY) 
display "Start log file and replace previous file" 
log using ".\THESIS\DATA\STATALONGOUT1cSummaryrep.log", replace 
name(OUT1CSUMMARYrep) 
* 
*==================================================================== 
*==============Summary Statistics, As Needed========================= 
*=== (Data are balanced, so values will be correct for all data====== 
*==================================================================== 
di”Summary Statistics for included variables” 
summarize `typeC’ if key==”naivecali” 
* 
di"Summary Statistics for previous experience with Pomegranates" 
summarize pomsee-pomflavn if key=="naivecali" 
di"Detailed summary statistics for previous experience with 
pomegranates" 
summarize pomsee-pomflavn if key=="naivecali", detail 
di “Count of individuals with any pomegranates on hand” 
count if key=="naivecali" & pomhand!=1 
* 
di"Summarize vairables by session" 
forvalues i= 1(1)8{ 
summarize `typeC' if info!=5&prodkey!="noprod"&s`i's==1 
} 
* 
di "Count of individuals in each session" 
forvalues i=100(100)800{ 
list id if key=="naivecali" & `i'<=id & id<=(`i'+99) 
count if key=="naivecali" & `i'<=id & id<=(`i'+99) 
} 
* 
di"Count of total bidders included" 
count if key=="naivecali" 
log close OUT1CSUMMARY 
log close OUT1CSUMMARYrep 
*###################################################################### 
*========================================================== 
*========================================================== 
*========================================================== 
*###################################################################### 
 
 
*DOFILE 2TOBITS: 
log using E:\THESIS\DATA\STATALONGOUT2TOBITS.log, append 
name(OUT2TOBITS) 
*==================================================================== 
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*==================================================================== 
*===================TOBIT MODELS, WTP=============================== 
*======== WTP= f(WTP= f(product characteristics, info, demographics)= 
*======== 1 model for all WTP bids for all products==================  
*==================================================================== 
*==================================================================== 
di"TOBIT MODEL" 
di"MODEL TYPE Ai- No interactions, no demographic variables, no info , 
no price" 
tobit bids `typeAi'  if info!=5&prodkey!="noprod", ll(0) log 
margins, dydx(*) predict(e(0,.)) 
estimates store tobitAi 
* 
di"TOBIT MODEL" 
di"MODEL TYPE Aii- No interactions, no demographic variables, no info , 
with price" 
tobit bids `typeAii' if info!=5&prodkey!="noprod", ll(0) log 
margins, dydx(*) predict(e(0,.)) 
estimates store tobitAii 
* 
di"TOBIT MODEL" 
di"MODEL TYPE B- No interactions, no demographic variables, info 
included, with price" 
tobit bids `typeB' if info!=5&prodkey!="noprod"&i, ll(0) log 
margins, dydx(*) predict(e(0,.)) 
estimates store tobitB 
* 
di"TOBIT MODEL" 
di"MODEL TYPE C- No interactions, with  demographic variables, info 
included, with price" 
tobit bids `typeC' if info!=5&prodkey!="noprod", ll(0) log 
margins, dydx(*) predict(e(0,.)) 
estimates store tobitC 
* 
di"TOBIT MODEL" 
di"MODEL TYPE H- No interactions, with  demographic variables, info NOT 
included, with price" 
tobit bids `typeH' if info!=5&prodkey!="noprod", ll(0) log 
margins, dydx(*) predict(e(0,.)) 
estimates store tobitH 
* 
di"Do a likelihood ratio test on the model specifications and obtain 
AIC and BIC values" 
lrtest tobitH tobitAi, stats 
lrtest tobitH tobitAii, stats 
lrtest tobitH tobitB, stats 
lrtest tobitH tobitC, stats 
* 
log close OUT2TOBITS 
* 
*###################################################################### 
*========================================================== 
*========================================================== 
*========================================================== 
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*###################################################################### 
 
 
*DOFILE 3ROLOGITS: 
log using E:\THESIS\DATA\STATALONGOUT3rologits.log, append 
name(OUT3ROLOGITS) 
log using E:\THESIS\DATA\STATALONGOUT3rologitsRE.log, replace 
name(OUT3ROLOGITSRE) 
di"Generate variables to be used in saving estimates of rank-ordereled 
logit models" 
foreach ranking of varlist pref prefpart brprefer brprefpart{ 
forvalues i =1(1)5{ 
generate pRAi`ranking'info`i' =0 
} 
} 
* 
di"Create nested loops to run rank-ordered logit models for: 
di"Outside Loop: fully and partially ranked explicit rankings and 
implied rankings" 
di"Inside Loop: Each information treatment (identified 1-5)" 
foreach ranking of varlist pref prefpart brprefer brprefpart{ 
forvalues i =1(1)5{ 
di"===================================================================" 
di"============RANK-ORDERED LOGIT MODELS, Rankings====================" 
di"=================== Rank= f(product characteristics)===============" 
di"===== 5 models (BASELINE, TASTING, HEALTH, ANTI-CANCER, FULL)======" 
di"===================================================================" 
di"===========rologit, Baseline Treatment (info=`i')==================" 
di"================`ranking'==========================================" 
rologit `ranking' `typeRAi' if info==`i' & `dropforrank' , group (id) 
reverse 
di"-------Probability of ranking a specific product as first----------" 
drop pRAi`ranking'info`i' 
predict pRAi`ranking'info`i' if e(sample) 
sort id `ranking' pRAi`ranking'info`i' 
gsort - pRAi`ranking'info`i' 
list pRAi`ranking'info`i' prodkey `typeRAi' if id==101 & info==`i', 
noobs 
estimates store e`ranking'`i' 
di"----------------------------------------------------------" 
di"----------------------------------------------------------" 
} 
* 
} 
* 
di"Make table of all estimated values based on rank-ordered logits" 
estimates table epref1 epref2 epref3 epref4 epref5 eprefpart1 
eprefpart2 eprefpart3 eprefpart4 eprefpart5 ebrprefer1 ebrprefer2 
ebrprefer3 ebrprefer4 ebrprefer5 ebrprefpart1 ebrprefpart2 ebrprefpart3 
ebrprefpart4 ebrprefpart5 
* 
log close OUT3ROLOGITS 
log close OUT3ROLOGITSRE 
* 
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*###################################################################### 
*========================================================== 
*========================================================== 
*========================================================== 
*###################################################################### 
 
 
*DOFILE 4DELTAS: 
log using E:\THESIS\DATA\STATALONGOUT4DELTAS.log, append 
name(OUT4DELTAS) 
log using E:\THESIS\DATA\STATALONGOUT4DELTASrep.log, replace 
name(OUT4DELTASrep) 
di"log using E:\THESIS\DATA\STATALONGOUT4DELTAS.log, append 
name(OUT4DELTAS)" 
di"log using E:\THESIS\DATA\STATALONGOUT4DELTASrep.log, replace 
name(OUT4DELTASrep)" 
* 
di"Summary Statistics of Deltas" 
summarize deltabid* if key=="naivecali", detail 
summarize deltafbid* if key=="naivecali", detail 
graph box deltabidtastecali deltabidtastetxr deltabidtastetxs 
deltabidtastertec deltabidtastertet deltabidtastejuice 
deltabidtastepine deltabidhealthcali deltabidhealthtxr 
deltabidhealthtxs deltabidhealthrtec deltabidhealthrtet 
deltabidhealthjuice deltabidhealthpine deltabidcancercali 
deltabidcancertxr deltabidcancertxs deltabidcancerrtec 
deltabidcancerrtet deltabidcancerjuice deltabidcancerpine if 
key=="naivecali" 
*graph save "E:\Thesis\Data\STATAOUT4boxplot.gph", replace 
graph use "E:\Thesis\Data\STATAOUT4boxplot.gph" 
*============================================================== 
di"Count of total bids marked unengaged" 
count if unengall2==1 
di"Count of unique unengaged bids (taste, health, cancer)" 
count if unengall2==1 & info!=5 
* 
di"Loop to calculate counts for each unengaged category" 
forvalues i= 2(1)5{ 
di"========Counts for Each Category==================" 
di"======================info = `i'==================" 
di"" 
di"..................Unengaged Bids.................." 
count if unengall2==1 & info==`i' 
di"..............Total Bid Count....................." 
count if info==`i' 
} 
* 
foreach prod in cali txr txs rtec rtet juice pine{ 
forvalues i= 2(1)5{ 
di"========Counts for Each product in each category==================" 
di"======================info = `i'========================" 
di"======================Product = `prod'==================" 
di"" 
di".............Unengaged Bids info=`i' and prod 
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=`prod'.................." 
count if unengall2==1 & info==`i' & prodkey=="`prod'" 
di".....Number of total bids for info=`i' and prod 
=`prod'................" 
count if info==`i' & prodkey=="`prod'" 
} 
} 
* 
*==================================================================== 
*==============DELTA BIDS =========================================== 
*==============MIXED LINEAR MODELS, DELTA BIDS WTP=================== 
*========== WTP= f(product characteristics, demographics)============ 
*========================== 1 model==================================  
*==================================================================== 
di"DELTA'S refer to the changes in bids that an individual has for a 
single product across information treatments" 
di"Removes full bids, naive bids, noproduct bids, and unengaged bids" 
di"unengall2 identifies any individual that was a case four unengaged 
bid for that particular product and round" 
* 
di"MIXED LINEAR MODEL- DELTAS" 
di"MODEL TYPE Ai- No interactions, no demographic variables, no info , 
no price" 
xtmixed deltabids `typeAi' if info!=5 & info!=1 & prodkey!="noprod" & 
unengall2!=1, noconstant|| id: ,  mle 
*xtmixed deltabids `typeAi' if info!=5 & info!=1 & prodkey!="noprod" & 
unengall2!=1, noconstant|| id: , variance  mle 
estimates store randdeltAi 
* 
di"MIXED LINEAR MODEL- DELTAS" 
di"MODEL TYPE Aii- No interactions, no demographic variables, no info , 
with price" 
xtmixed deltabids `typeAii' if info!=5 & info!=1 & prodkey!="noprod" & 
unengall2!=1, noconstant|| id: ,  mle 
*xtmixed deltabids `typeAii' if info!=5 & info!=1 & prodkey!="noprod" & 
unengall2!=1, noconstant|| id: , variance mle 
estimates store randdeltAii 
* 
di"MIXED LINEAR MODEL- DELTAS" 
di"MODEL TYPE B- No interactions, no demographic variables, info 
included, with price" 
xtmixed deltabids `typeAii' `forceinfo' if info!=5 & info!=1 & 
prodkey!="noprod" & unengall2!=1, noconstant|| id: ,  mle 
xtmixed deltabids `typeAii' `forceinfo' if info!=5 & info!=1 & 
prodkey!="noprod" & unengall2!=1, noconstant|| id: ,   variance mle 
estimates store randdeltB 
* 
di"MIXED LINEAR MODEL- DELTAS" 
di"MODEL TYPE C- No interactions, with  demographic variables, info 
included, with price" 
xtmixed deltabids `typeH' `forceinfo' if info!=5 & info!=1 & 
prodkey!="noprod" & unengall2!=1, noconstant|| id: ,  mle 
xtmixed deltabids `typeH' `forceinfo' if info!=5 & info!=1 & 
prodkey!="noprod" & unengall2!=1, noconstant|| id: ,  variance mle 
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estimates store randdeltC 
* 
di"MIXED LINEAR MODEL- DELTAS" 
di"MODEL TYPE H- No interactions, with  demographic variables, info NOT 
included, with price" 
xtmixed deltabids `typeH' if info!=5 & info!=1 & prodkey!="noprod" & 
unengall2!=1, noconstant|| id: ,  mle 
*xtmixed deltabids `typeH' if info!=5 & info!=1 & prodkey!="noprod" & 
unengall2!=1, noconstant|| id: ,  variance mle 
estimates store randdeltH 
* 
di"Show statistics for each set of estimates" 
estimates stats randdeltAi randdeltAii randdeltB randdeltC randdeltH  
di"*****NOTE THAT THIS PREFERS THE MODELS WITH THE LOWEST AIC, BIC" 
di"see stata reference[R] XTMIXED on page 334-335" 
*==================================================================== 
* 
*==================================================================== 
*==============DELTA BIDS, BASELINE TO FULL INFO===================== 
*==============MIXED LINEAR MODELS, DELTA BIDS WTP=================== 
*========== WTP= f(product characteristics, demographics)============ 
*========================== 1 model==================================  
*==================================================================== 
di"Removes full bids, naive bids, noproduct bids, and unengaged bids" 
di"unengall2 identifies any individual that was a case four unengaged 
for that particular product and round" 
* 
di"MIXED LINEAR MODEL- DELTAS" 
di"MODEL TYPE Ai- No interactions, no demographic variables, no info , 
no price" 
xtmixed deltabids `typeAi' if info==5 & prodkey!="noprod" & 
unengall2!=1|| id: ,  mle 
*xtmixed deltabids `typeAi' if info==5 & prodkey!="noprod" & 
unengall2!=1|| id: ,  variance mle 
estimates store randdeltFAi 
* 
di"MIXED LINEAR MODEL- DELTAS" 
di"MODEL TYPE Aii- No interactions, no demographic variables, no info , 
with price" 
xtmixed deltabids `typeAii' if info==5 & prodkey!="noprod" & 
unengall2!=1|| id: ,  mle 
*xtmixed deltabids `typeAii' if info==5 & prodkey!="noprod" & 
unengall2!=1|| id: ,  variance mle 
estimates store randdeltFAii 
* 
di"MIXED LINEAR MODEL- DELTAS" 
di"MODEL TYPE H- No interactions, with  demographic variables, info NOT 
included, with price" 
xtmixed deltabids `typeH' if info==5 & prodkey!="noprod" & 
unengall2!=1|| id: ,  mle 
*xtmixed deltabids `typeH' if info==5 & prodkey!="noprod" & 
unengall2!=1|| id: ,  variance mle 
estimates store randdeltFH 
* 
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di"Display all stored estimates for full bids" 
estimates stats randdeltFAi randdeltFAii randdeltFH  
di"NOTE THAT THIS PREFERS THE MODELS WITH THE LOWEST AIC, BIC" 
di"see stata reference[R] XTMIXED on page 334-335" 
*======================================================== 
* 
log close OUT4DELTAS 
log close OUT4DELTASrep 
* 
*###################################################################### 
*========================================================== 
*========================================================== 
*========================================================== 
*###################################################################### 
 
 
DOFILE 5MIXEDLINEAR: 
log using E:\THESIS\DATA\STATALONGOUT5MIXED.log, append name(OUT5MIXED) 
*==================================================================== 
*==============MIXED LINEAR MODELS, FULL BIDS WTP==================== 
*========== WTP= f(product characteristics, demographics)============ 
*========================== 1 model==================================  
*==================================================================== 
di"MIXED LINEAR MODEL" 
di"MODEL TYPE Ai- No interactions, no demographic variables, no info , 
no price" 
xtmixed bids `typeAi' if info!=5&prodkey!="noprod"|| id: , variance mle 
estimates store randAi 
* 
di"MIXED LINEAR MODEL" 
di"MODEL TYPE Aii- No interactions, no demographic variables, no info , 
with price" 
xtmixed bids `typeAii' if info!=5&prodkey!="noprod"|| id: , variance 
mle 
estimates store randAii 
* 
di"MIXED LINEAR MODEL" 
di"MODEL TYPE B- No interactions, no demographic variables, info 
included, with price" 
xtmixed bids `typeB' if info!=5&prodkey!="noprod"|| id: , variance mle 
estimates store randB 
* 
di"MIXED LINEAR MODEL" 
di"MODEL TYPE C- No interactions, with  demographic variables, info 
included, with price" 
xtmixed bids `typeC' if info!=5&prodkey!="noprod"|| id: , variance mle 
estimates store randC 
* 
di"MIXED LINEAR MODEL" 
di"MODEL TYPE H- No interactions, with  demographic variables, info NOT 
included, with price" 
xtmixed bids `typeH' if info!=5&prodkey!="noprod"|| id: , variance mle 
estimates store randH 
* 
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di"MIXED LINEAR MODEL" 
di"MODEL TYPE G- No interactions, with  demographic variables, info 
included, with price, nested effects" 
xtmixed bids `typeC' if info!=5&prodkey!="noprod"|| id: R.info, 
variance mle 
estimates store randG 
* 
estimates stats randAi randAii randB randC randH randG 
di"NOTE THAT THIS PREFERS THE MODELS WITH THE LOWEST AIC,BIC" 
di"see stata reference[R] XTMIXED on page 334-335" 
log close OUT5MIXED 
* 
*######################################################################
### 
*========================================================== 
*========================================================== 
*========================================================== 
*###################################################################### 
 
 
*DOFILE 6RANDOMEFFECTSTOBITS: 
*==================================================================== 
*==============RANDOM EFFECTS TOBIT, FULL BIDS WTP=================== 
*========== WTP= f(product characteristics, demographics)============ 
*========================== 1 model==================================  
*==================================================================== 
di"XTTOBIT- RANDOM EFFECTS TOBIT MODEL" 
di"MODEL TYPE Ai- No interactions, no demographic variables, no info , 
no price" 
xtset id 
xttobit bids `typeAi'  if info!=5&prodkey!="noprod", ll(0) log tobit 
margins, dydx(*) predict(e(0,.)) 
estimates store xttobitAi 
xtset, clear 
* 
di"XTTOBIT- RANDOM EFFECTS TOBIT MODEL" 
di"MODEL TYPE Aii- No interactions, no demographic variables, no info , 
with price" 
xtset id 
xttobit bids `typeAii' if info!=5&prodkey!="noprod", ll(0) log tobit 
margins, dydx(*) predict(e(0,.)) 
estimates store xttobitAii 
xtset, clear 
* 
di"XTTOBIT- RANDOM EFFECTS TOBIT MODEL" 
di"MODEL TYPE B- No interactions, no demographic variables, info 
included, with price" 
xtset id 
xttobit bids `typeB' if info!=5&prodkey!="noprod", ll(0) log tobit 
margins, dydx(*) predict(e(0,.)) 
estimates store xttobitB 
xtset, clear 
* 
di"XTTOBIT- RANDOM EFFECTS TOBIT MODEL" 
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di"MODEL TYPE C- No interactions, with  demographic variables, info 
included, with price" 
xtset id 
xttobit bids `typeC' if info!=5&prodkey!="noprod", ll(0) log tobit 
margins, dydx(*) predict(e(0,.)) 
estimates store xttobitC 
xtset, clear 
* 
di"XTTOBIT- RANDOM EFFECTS TOBIT MODEL" 
di"MODEL TYPE H- No interactions, with  demographic variables, info NOT 
included, with price" 
xtset id 
xttobit bids `typeH' if info!=5&prodkey!="noprod", ll(0) log tobit 
margins, dydx(*) predict(e(0,.)) 
estimates store xttobitH 
xtset, clear 
* 
di"Do a likelihood ratio test on the model specifications and obtain 
AIC and BIC values" 
lrtest xttobitH xttobitAi, stats 
lrtest xttobitH xttobitAii, stats 
lrtest xttobitH xttobitB, stats 
lrtest xttobitH xttobitC, stats 
* 
*###################################################################### 
*========================================================== 
*========================================================== 
*========================================================== 
*###################################################################### 
 
 
 
DOFILE 8OLS: 
*==================================================================== 
*==============ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES, FULL BIDS WTP================= 
*========== WTP= f(product characteristics, info, demographics)====== 
*========================== 1 model================================== 
*===================(28 obsevations/ individual)===================== 
*==================================================================== 
* 
di"Ordinary Least Squares Regression" 
di"MODEL TYPE Ai- No interactions, no demographic variables, no info , 
no price" 
regress bids var1txr var2txs formrte formjuice productpine  if 
info!=5&prodkey!="noprod" 
* 
di"Ordinary Least Squares Regression" 
di"MODEL TYPE Aii- No interactions, no demographic variables, no info , 
with price" 
regress bids var1txr var2txs formrte formjuice productpine i.price if 
info!=5&prodkey!="noprod" 
* 
di"Ordinary Least Squares Regression" 
di"MODEL TYPE B- No interactions, no demographic variables, info 
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included, with price" 
regress bids var1txr var2txs formrte formjuice productpine i.price 
i.info if info!=5&prodkey!="noprod" 
* 
di"Ordinary Least Squares Regression" 
di"MODEL TYPE C- No interactions, with  demographic variables, info 
included, with price" 
regress bids var1txr var2txs formrte formjuice productpine i.agefew2sta 
i.agefew3sta i.edufew2sta i.edufew3sta house i.female i.dmarfewsta 
i.incfew2sta i.incfew3sta c.spendfvavgstat c.fpohstat i.pomfruitp 
i.hissue c.tobacavgstat c.exeravgstat i.price i.info if 
info!=5&prodkey!="noprod" 
* 
di"Ordinary Least Squares Regression" 
di"MODEL TYPE H- No interactions, with  demographic variables, info NOT 
included, with price" 
regress bids var1txr var2txs formrte formjuice productpine i.agefew2sta 
i.agefew3sta i.edufew2sta i.edufew3sta house i.female i.dmarfewsta 
i.incfew2sta i.incfew3sta c.spendfvavgstat c.fpohstat i.pomfruitp 
i.hissue c.tobacavgstat c.exeravgstat i.price if 
info!=5&prodkey!="noprod" 
* 
*###################################################################### 
*========================================================== 
*========================================================== 
*========================================================== 
*###################################################################### 
 
 
 
*DOFILE 9PRODUCTTOBITS: 
log using E:\THESIS\DATA\STATALONGOUT9PRODTOBITS.log, append 
name(OUT9PROD) 
di "==35 Tobit Models for Each Product and Each information 
Treatment==" 
di"===================================================================" 
di"===========SEPARATE TOBIT MODELS, FULL BIDS WTP====================" 
di"========== Bids= f(product characteristics, demographics)==========" 
di"===5 info trtmts:(BASELINE, TASTING, HEALTH, ANTI-CANCER, FULL)====" 
di"==========7 products:(cali txr txs rtec rtet juice pine)===========" 
di"===================================================================" 
di"===================================================================" 
* 
di"Create Nested Loops to Do Individual Tobit Models by Product and 
Information Treatment" 
forvalues i = 1(1)5{ 
foreach prod in cali txr txs rtec rtet juice pine{ 
di"===================================================================" 
di"============TOBIT MODEL, INFO = `i',  PRODUCT = `prod'=============" 
di"===================================================================" 
di"MODEL TYPE H- No interactions, with  demographic variables, info NOT 
included, with price" 
tobit bids `typeJ' if info==`i'&prodkey== "`prod'", ll(0) log 
margins, dydx(*) predict(e(0,.)) 
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} 
} 
* 
log close OUT9PROD 
*###################################################################### 
*========================================================== 
*========================================================== 
*========================================================== 
*###################################################################### 
 
 
 
*DOFILE 10UNENGAGED: 
di"Start log file and append to the end of previous file" 
log using E:\THESIS\DATA\STATALONGOUTT10UNENGAGED.log, append 
name(OUT10UNENGAGED) 
log using E:\THESIS\DATA\STATALONGOUTT10UNENGAGEDrep.log, replace 
name(OUT10UNENGAGEDrep) 
di" log using E:\THESIS\DATA\STATALONGOUTT10UNENGAGED.log, append 
name(OUT10UNENGAGED)" 
di" log using E:\THESIS\DATA\STATALONGOUTT10UNENGAGEDrep.log, append 
name(OUT10UNENGAGEDrep)" 
*==================================================================== 
*==============ANALYSIS OF UNENGAGED BIDDERS, FULL BIDS WTP========== 
*==================================================================== 
*====Random effects tobits, mixed linear, and separate product tobits 
*==================================================================== 
* 
********************************************************************* 
*==========NO BIDDERS WHO ARE UNENGAGED FOR ANY PRODUCT============== 
********************************************************************* 
di"Bidders are identified as unengaged in the overall models if there 
was any product for which they were unengaged" 
di"Further described as 'case 4' in the text" 
* 
*From DOFILE 6RANDOMEFFECTSTOBITS 
*==================================================================== 
*==============RANDOM EFFECTS TOBIT, FULL BIDS WTP==================== 
*========== WTP= f(product characteristics, demographics)============ 
*========================== 1 model==================================  
*==========NO BIDDERS WHO ARE UNENGAGED FOR ANY PRODUCT============== 
*==================================================================== 
* 
di"XTTOBIT- RANDOM EFFECTS TOBIT MODEL" 
di"MODEL TYPE C- No interactions, with  demographic variables, info 
included, with price" 
xtset id 
*random effects tobit model with information treatment and demographic 
variables 
xttobit bids `typeC' if info!=5&prodkey!="noprod"&casefourany!=1, ll(0) 
log tobit 
margins, dydx(*) predict(e(0,.)) 
xtset, clear 
* 
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di"From DOFILE 5MIXEDLINEAR" 
*==================================================================== 
*==============MIXED LINEAR MODELS, FULL BIDS WTP==================== 
*========== WTP= f(product characteristics, demographics)============ 
*========================== 1 model==================================  
*==========NO BIDDERS WHO ARE UNENGAGED FOR ANY PRODUCT============== 
*==================================================================== 
di"MIXED LINEAR MODEL" 
di"REMOVE ALL UNENGAGED BIDDERS, Removes anyone unengaged for any 
product" 
di"MODEL TYPE C- No interactions, with  demographic variables, info 
included, with price" 
xtmixed bids `typeC' if info!=5&prodkey!="noprod"& casefourany!=1|| id: 
, variance mle 
estimates store randcaseC 
* 
********************************************************************* 
*==========NO BIDDERS WHO ARE UNENGAGED FOR ALL PRODUCTS============= 
********************************************************************* 
di"Bidders are identified as unengaged for all products in the overall 
models if they were unengaged for all of the included products" 
di"Further described as 'case 4' in the text" 
* 
*From DOFILE 6RANDOMEFFECTSTOBITS 
*==================================================================== 
*==============RANDOM EFFECTS TOBIT, FULL BIDS WTP==================== 
*========== WTP= f(product characteristics, demographics)============ 
*========================== 1 model==================================  
*==========NO BIDDERS WHO ARE UNENGAGED FOR ALL PRODUCTS============= 
*==================================================================== 
di"XTTOBIT- RANDOM EFFECTS TOBIT MODEL" 
di"MODEL TYPE C- No interactions, with  demographic variables, info 
included, with price" 
xtset id 
di"random effects tobit model with information treatment and 
demographic variables" 
xttobit bids `typeC' if info!=5&prodkey!="noprod"&casefourall!=1, ll(0) 
log tobit 
margins, dydx(*) predict(e(0,.)) 
xtset, clear 
* 
di"From DOFILE 5MIXEDLINEAR" 
*==================================================================== 
*==============MIXED LINEAR MODELS, FULL BIDS WTP==================== 
*========== WTP= f(product characteristics, demographics)============ 
*========================== 1 model==================================  
*==========NO BIDDERS WHO ARE UNENGAGED FOR ALL PRODUCTS============= 
*==================================================================== 
di"MIXED LINEAR MODEL" 
di"REMOVE ALL UNENGAGED BIDDERS, Removes anyone unengaged for any 
product" 
di"MODEL TYPE C- No interactions, with  demographic variables, info 
included, with price" 
xtmixed bids `typeC' if info!=5&prodkey!="noprod"& casefourall!=1|| id: 
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, variance mle 
estimates store randcaseC 
* 
********************************************************************* 
*====NO BIDDERS WHO WERE UNENGAGED FOR THAT PARTICULAR PRODUCT======= 
********************************************************************* 
di"Bidders are identified as unengaged in the individual product and 
information models" 
di"if for that particular product they were unengaged" 
di"Further described as 'case 4' in the text" 
* 
*From STATADoLong9ProdTobits 
di"=35 Tobit Models, 1 for Each Product and Each information 
Treatment==" 
di"===================================================================" 
di"===========SEPARATE TOBIT MODELS, FULL BIDS WTP====================" 
di"======== Bids= f(product characteristics, demographics)============" 
di"===5 info trtmts:(BASELINE, TASTING, HEALTH, ANTI-CANCER, FULL)====" 
di"============7 products:(cali txr txs rtec rtet juice pine)=========" 
di"===================================================================" 
di"====NO BIDDERS WHO WERE UNENGAGED FOR THAT PARTICULAR PRODUCT======" 
di"===================================================================" 
 
forvalues i = 1(1)5{ 
foreach prod in cali txr txs rtec rtec juice pine{ 
di"===================================================================" 
di"==============TOBIT MODEL, INFO = `i',  PRODUCT = `prod'===========" 
di"===================================================================" 
di"MODEL TYPE H- No interactions, with  demographic variables, info NOT 
included, with price" 
di"tobit bids `typeJ' if info==`i'&prodkey== 
"`prod'"&casefour`prod'!=1, ll(0) log" 
di" margins, dydx(*) predict(e(0,.))" 
tobit bids `typeJ' if info==`i'&prodkey== "`prod'"&casefour`prod'!=1, 
ll(0) log 
margins, dydx(*) predict(e(0,.)) 
di "" 
di "" 
di 
"====================================================================" 
di "" 
} 
} 
* 
********************************************************************* 
*====NO BIDDERS WHO WERE UNENGAGED FOR THAT PARTICULAR PRODUCT ====== 
*---------IN THAT PARTICULAR ROUND----------------------------------- 
********************************************************************* 
di"Bidders are identified as unengaged in the individual product and 
information models" 
di"if for that particular product in that particular round they were 
unengaged" 
di"(Participants could be unengaged for a product in one round and not 
in another" 
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di"Further described as 'case 4' in the text" 
*==================================================================== 
*==============RANDOM EFFECTS TOBIT, FULL BIDS WTP=================== 
*========== WTP= f(product characteristics, demographics)============ 
*========================== 1 model==================================  
*==========Only particular unengaged bids are removed================ 
*==================================================================== 
di"XTTOBIT- RANDOM EFFECTS TOBIT MODEL- UNENGALL Bids Removed" 
di"MODEL TYPE C- No interactions, with  demographic variables, info 
included, with price" 
xtset id 
di"random effects tobit model with information treatment and 
demographic variables" 
xttobit bids `typeC' if info!=5&prodkey!="noprod"&unengall!=1, ll(0) 
log tobit 
margins, dydx(*) predict(e(0,.)) 
xtset, clear 
* 
**==================================================================== 
*==============MIXED LINEAR MODELS, FULL BIDS WTP==================== 
*========== WTP= f(product characteristics, demographics)============ 
*========================== 1 model==================================  
*==========Only particular unengaged bids are removed================ 
*==================================================================== 
di"MIXED LINEAR MODEL" 
di"REMOVE ALL UNENGAGED BIDDERS, Removes anyone unengaged for any 
product" 
di"MODEL TYPE C- No interactions, with  demographic variables, info 
included, with price" 
xtmixed bids `typeC' if info!=5&prodkey!="noprod"& unengall!=1|| id: , 
variance mle 
estimates store randunengC 
* 
log close OUT10UNENGAGED 
log close OUT10UNENGAGEDrep 
* 
*###################################################################### 
*========================================================== 
*========================================================== 
*========================================================== 
*###################################################################### 
 
 
*DOFILE 11ROMixedLogit: 
cd E:\ 
*Start log file and append to the end of previous file 
log using E:\THESIS\DATA\STATALONGOUT1All.log, append name(OUT1ALL) 
*Start command log and append to the end of previous command log file 
cmdlog using E:\THESIS\DATA\STATALONGOUT2CMD.log , append  
*==================================================================== 
* ===================================================DATE = _________ 
*==================================================================== 
*Increase Memory Space to use 
set memory 500M 
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*==================================================================== 
* 
di"Create Mixed Rank-Ordered Logit Log" 
log using .\THESIS\DATA\STATALONGOUT11ROMixed, append  
name(OUT11MIXEDROLOGIT) 
* 
di"====================================================================
" 
di"===================MIXED RANK-ORDERED LOGIT========================" 
di"==================PREFERENCE RANKINGS, FULLY RANKED MODELS=========" 
di"===================================================================" 
di"Use the specified data" 
use "E:\Thesis\Data\STATAIn11MissDropGLLAMM.dta", replace 
di"EXPLODE DATA" 
di"Based on Rabe-Hesketh, Pickles, and Skrondal (2001) 
egen maxr=max(pref), by (idinfo) 
gen chosen=1 
gen idx=_n 
stset pref, fail(chosen) id(idx) 
stsplit, at(failures) strata (idinfo) riskset (stage) 
replace chosen=0 if chosen==. 
drop if pref==maxr 
bysort stage: generate groupcount=sum(chosen) 
* 
di"===================================================================" 
di"===================================================================" 
di"==================MIXED RANK-ORDERED LOGIT=========================" 
di"==================PREFERENCE RANKINGS, FULLY RANKED MODELS=========" 
di"==================NO INTERACTION TERMS=============================" 
di"===================================================================" 
di"===================================================================" 
di"===================================================================" 
mixlogit chosen  if info!=5 & `dropforrank' & stage!=. &groupcount==1 , 
group(stage) rand(`typeRAi') id(id) nrep(100) 
mixlpred pRPLfull if e(sample) & info!=5 & `dropforrank' & stage!=. 
&groupcount==1, nrep(100) 
sort id prodkey 
log using .\THESIS\DATA\STATALONGOUT11ROMixedProbs, append 
name(OUT11MIXEDROLOGITprobs) 
log using .\THESIS\DATA\STATALONGOUT11ROMixedProbsRep, replace 
name(OUT11MIXEDROLOGITprobsRep) 
list pRPLfull1 prodkey id if pref==1& info==1, noobs 
list pRPLfull1 prodkey id if pref==1& info==2, noobs 
list pRPLfull1 prodkey id if pref==1& info==3, noobs 
list pRPLfull1 prodkey id if pref==1& info==4, noobs 
log close OUT11MIXEDROLOGITprobs 
log close OUT11MIXEDROLOGITprobsRep 
mixlbeta `typeRAi' if info!=5 & `dropforrank' & stage!=. &groupcount==1 
, saving (E:\THESIS\DATA\STATAOUT11Betas100I1) replace 
save "E:\Thesis\Data\STATAIn11MissDropGLLAMMmixlogit2011_03_21.dta", 
replace 
* 
di"===================================================================" 
di"===================MIXED RANK-ORDERED LOGIT========================" 
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di"==================PREFERENCE RANKINGS, FULLY RANKED MODELS=========" 
di"===========WITH INTERACTION TERMS==================================" 
di"===================================================================" 
di"===================================================================" 
* 
forvalues i=2(1)4{ 
di"===================================================================" 
di"===================MIXED RANK-ORDERED LOGIT========================" 
di"==================PREFERENCE RANKINGS, FULLY RANKED MODELS=========" 
di"=============WITH INTERACTION TERMS================================" 
di"===================================================================" 
di"===================================================================" 
di"=========info= `i' INTERACTION TERMS===============================" 
mixlogit chosen  if info!=5 & `dropforrank' & stage!=. &groupcount==1 , 
group(stage) rand(`typeRAi' interact*`i') id(id) nrep(100) 
mixlpred pRPLfullI`i' if e(sample) & info!=5 & `dropforrank' & stage!=. 
&groupcount==1, nrep(100) 
sort id prodkey 
log using .\THESIS\DATA\STATALONGOUT11ROMixedProbsI`i', append 
name(OUT11MIXEDROLOGITprobsI`i') 
log using .\THESIS\DATA\STATALONGOUT11ROMixedProbsI`i'Rep, replace 
name(OUT11MIXEDROLOGITprobsI`i'Rep) 
forvalues k=1(1)4{ 
di"=====================Probabilities if info= `k'===================" 
list pRPLfullI`i' prodkey id if pref==1& info==`k', noobs 
} 
log close OUT11MIXEDROLOGITprobsI`i' 
log close OUT11MIXEDROLOGITprobsI`i'Rep 
mixlbeta `typeRAi' interact*`i' if info!=5 & `dropforrank' & stage!=. 
&groupcount==1 , saving (E:\THESIS\DATA\STATAOUT11Betas100I`i') replace 
save E:\Thesis\Data\STATAIn11MissDropGLLAMMmixlogit2011_03_21.dta, 
replace 
} 
* 
di"===================================================================" 
di"===================MIXED RANK-ORDERED LOGIT========================" 
di"==================PREFERENCE RANKINGS, FULLY RANKED MODELS=========" 
di"===========WITH INTERACTION TERMS==================================" 
di"===================================================================" 
di"===================================================================" 
di"=========FULL INFORMATION INTERACTION TERMS========================" 
mixlogit chosen  if info!=2 & info!=3&info!=4 & `dropforrank' & 
stage!=. &groupcount==1 , group(stage) rand(`typeRAi' interact*5) 
id(id) nrep(100) 
mixlpred pRPLfullI5 if e(sample) & info!=2 & info!=3&info!=4 & 
`dropforrank' & stage!=. &groupcount==1, nrep(100) 
sort id prodkey 
log using .\THESIS\DATA\STATALONGOUT11ROMixedProbsI5, append 
name(OUT11MIXEDROLOGITprobsI5) 
log using .\THESIS\DATA\STATALONGOUT11ROMixedProbsI5Rep, replace 
name(OUT11MIXEDROLOGITprobsI5Rep) 
list pRPLfullI5 prodkey id if pref==1& info==1, noobs 
list pRPLfullI5 prodkey id if pref==1& info==5, noobs 
log close OUT11MIXEDROLOGITprobsI5 
  
448 
log close OUT11MIXEDROLOGITprobsI5Rep 
mixlbeta `typeRAi' interact*5 if info!=2 & info!=3&info!=4  & 
`dropforrank' & stage!=. &groupcount==1 , saving 
(E:\THESIS\DATA\STATAOUT11Betas100I5) replace 
save E:\Thesis\Data\STATAIn11MissDropGLLAMMmixlogit2011_03_21.dta, 
replace 
* 
di"===================================================================" 
di"===================================================================" 
di"===========ESTIMATED BETA PARAMETERS===============================" 
di"===================================================================" 
di"===================================================================" 
di"Do these at the end to copy and paste data" 
use "E:\Thesis\Data\STATAOUT11Betas100I1.dta",  
browse 
pause on 
pause "copy data and save and then type --pause off--" 
*pause off 
use "E:\Thesis\Data\STATAOUT11Betas100I2.dta",  
browse 
pause on 
pause "copy data and save and then type --pause off--" 
*pause off 
use "E:\Thesis\Data\STATAOUT11Betas100I3.dta",  
browse 
pause on 
pause "copy data and save and then type --pause off--" 
*pause off 
use "E:\Thesis\Data\STATAOUT11Betas100I4.dta",  
browse 
pause on 
pause "copy data and save and then type --pause off--" 
*pause off 
use "E:\Thesis\Data\STATAOUT11Betas100I5.dta",  
browse 
pause on 
pause "copy data and save and then type --pause off--" 
*pause off 
*################################################################# 
di"===================================================================" 
di"===================MIXED RANK-ORDERED LOGIT========================" 
di"==============ORDERED BIDS, FULLY-RANKED MODELS====================" 
di"===================================================================" 
di"===================================================================" 
di"===================================================================" 
* 
destring brpref, generate (brprefsta) 
di"Use the specified data" 
use "E:\Thesis\Data\STATAIn11MissDropGLLAMM.dta", replace 
di"EXPLODE DATA" 
egen maxr=max(brprefsta), by (idinfo) 
gen chosen=1 
gen idx=_n 
stset brprefsta, fail(chosen) id(idx) 
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stsplit, at(failures) strata (idinfo) riskset (stage) 
replace chosen=0 if chosen==. 
drop if brprefsta==maxr 
bysort stage: generate groupcount=sum(chosen) 
di"==================MIXED RANK-ORDERED LOGIT=========================" 
di"==================ORDERED BIDS, FULLY RANKED MODELS================" 
di"==================WITH INTERACTION TERMS===========================" 
di"===================================================================" 
* 
mixlogit chosen  if info!=5 & `dropforrank' & stage!=. &groupcount==1 , 
group(stage) rand(`typeRAi') id(id) nrep(100) 
mixlpred pRPLfullBRI1 if e(sample) & info!=5 & `dropforrank' & stage!=. 
&groupcount==1, nrep(100) 
sort id prodkey 
log using .\THESIS\DATA\STATALONGOUT11ROMixedBRProbs, append 
name(OUT11MIXEDROLOGITBRprobs) 
log using .\THESIS\DATA\STATALONGOUT11ROMixedBRProbsRep, replace 
name(OUT11MIXEDROLOGITBRprobsRep) 
forvalues k=1(1)4{ 
di"======Probabilities if info=`k'======================" 
list pRPLfullBRI1 prodkey id if pref==1& info==`k', noobs 
} 
log close OUT11MIXEDROLOGITBRprobs 
log close OUT11MIXEDROLOGITBRprobsRep 
mixlbeta `typeRAi' if info!=5 & `dropforrank' & stage!=. &groupcount==1 
, saving (E:\THESIS\DATA\STATAOUT11Betas100BRI1) replace 
save "E:\Thesis\Data\STATAIn11MissDropORDEREDBIDS.dta", replace 
* 
di"===================================================================" 
di"===================MIXED RANK-ORDERED LOGIT========================" 
di"==================Ordered Bids, FULLY RANKED MODELS================" 
di"===========WITH INTERACTION TERMS==================================" 
di"===================================================================" 
di"===================================================================" 
* 
forvalues i=2(1)4{ 
di"===================================================================" 
di"===================MIXED RANK-ORDERED LOGIT========================" 
di"==================ORDERED BIDS, FULLY RANKED MODELS================" 
di"===========WITH INTERACTION TERMS==================================" 
di"===================================================================" 
di"===================================================================" 
di"=========info= `i' INTERACTION TERMS===============================" 
mixlogit chosen  if info!=5 & `dropforrank' & stage!=. &groupcount==1 , 
group(stage) rand(`typeRAi' interact*`i') id(id) nrep(100) 
mixlpred pRPLfullBRI`i' if e(sample) & info!=5 & `dropforrank' & 
stage!=. &groupcount==1, nrep(100) 
sort id prodkey 
log using .\THESIS\DATA\STATALONGOUT11ROMixedProbsBRI`i', append 
name(OUT11MIXEDROLOGITprobsBRI`i') 
log using .\THESIS\DATA\STATALONGOUT11ROMixedProbsBRI`i'Rep, replace 
name(OUT11MIXEDROLOGITprobsBRI`i'Rep) 
forvalues k=1(1)4{ 
di"=====================Probabilities if info= `k'===================" 
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list pRPLfullBRI`i' prodkey id if pref==1& info==`k', noobs 
} 
log close OUT11MIXEDROLOGITprobsBRI`i' 
log close OUT11MIXEDROLOGITprobsBRI`i'Rep 
mixlbeta `typeRAi' interact*`i' if info!=5 & `dropforrank' & stage!=. 
&groupcount==1 , saving (E:\THESIS\DATA\STATAOUT11Betas100BRI`i') 
replace 
save "E:\Thesis\Data\STATAIn11MissDropORDEREDBIDS.dta", replace 
} 
* 
di"===================================================================" 
di"=====================MIXED RANK-ORDERED LOGIT======================" 
di"==================PREFERENCE RANKINGS, FULLY RANKED MODELS=========" 
di"=============WITH INTERACTION TERMS================================" 
di"===================================================================” 
di"===================================================================" 
di"===========FULL INFORMATION INTERACTION TERMS======================" 
mixlogit chosen  if info!=2 & info!=3&info!=4 & `dropforrank' & 
stage!=. &groupcount==1 , group(stage) rand(`typeRAi' interact*5) 
id(id) nrep(100) 
mixlpred pRPLfullBRI5 if e(sample) & info!=2 & info!=3&info!=4 & 
`dropforrank' & stage!=. &groupcount==1, nrep(100) 
sort id prodkey 
log using .\THESIS\DATA\STATALONGOUT11ROMixedProbsBRI5, append 
name(OUT11MIXEDROLOGITprobsBRI5) 
log using .\THESIS\DATA\STATALONGOUT11ROMixedProbsBRI5Rep, replace 
name(OUT11MIXEDROLOGITprobsBRI5Rep) 
list pRPLfullBRI5 prodkey id if pref==1& info==1, noobs 
list pRPLfullBRI5 prodkey id if pref==1& info==5, noobs 
log close OUT11MIXEDROLOGITprobsBRI5 
log close OUT11MIXEDROLOGITprobsBRI5Rep 
mixlbeta `typeRAi' interact*5 if info!=2 & info!=3&info!=4  & 
`dropforrank' & stage!=. &groupcount==1 , saving 
(E:\THESIS\DATA\STATAOUT11Betas100BRI5) replace 
save "E:\Thesis\Data\STATAIn11MissDropORDEREDBIDS.dta", replace 
* 
di"===================================================================" 
di"===================================================================" 
di"=========ESTIMATED BETA PARAMETERS=================================" 
di"===================================================================" 
di"===================================================================" 
di"Do these at the end to copy and paste data" 
use "E:\Thesis\Data\STATAOUT11Betas100BRI1.dta",  
browse 
pause on 
pause "copy data and save and then type --pause off--" 
*pause off 
use "E:\Thesis\Data\STATAOUT11Betas100BRI2.dta",  
browse 
pause on 
pause "copy data and save and then type --pause off--" 
*pause off 
use "E:\Thesis\Data\STATAOUT11Betas100BRI3.dta",  
browse 
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pause on 
pause "copy data and save and then type --pause off--" 
*pause off 
use "E:\Thesis\Data\STATAOUT11Betas100BRI4.dta",  
browse 
pause on 
pause "copy data and save and then type --pause off--" 
*pause off 
use "E:\Thesis\Data\STATAOUT11Betas100BRI5.dta",  
browse 
pause on 
pause "copy data and save and then type --pause off--" 
*pause off 
*###################################################################### 
*========================================================== 
*========================================================== 
*========================================================== 
*###################################################################### 
 
 
 
*DOFILE 12KSTestWilcoxonTest: 
log using ".\data\KSTESTandSignedRankTest.log", append (OUT12TESTS) 
codebook 
di"Do a test for normality using skewness and kurtosis and correcting 
for sample size" 
di"Similar in design to the Jarque-Bera Tests for normality" 
sktest deltabidtastecali deltabidtastetxr deltabidtastetxs 
deltabidtastertec deltabidtastertet deltabidtastejuice 
deltabidtastepine deltabidhealthcali deltabidhealthtxr 
deltabidhealthtxs deltabidhealthrtec deltabidhealthrtet 
deltabidhealthjuice deltabidhealthpine deltabidcancercali 
deltabidcancertxr deltabidcancertxs deltabidcancerrtec 
deltabidcancerrtet deltabidcancerjuice deltabidcancerpine deltafbidcali 
deltafbidtxr deltafbidtxs deltafbidrtec deltafbidrtet deltafbidjuice 
deltafbidpine 
* 
di"Do a Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test for differences across information 
treatments" 
foreach DELTAWTP in deltabidtastecali deltabidtastetxr deltabidtastetxs 
deltabidtastertec deltabidtastertet deltabidtastejuice 
deltabidtastepine deltabidhealthcali deltabidhealthtxr 
deltabidhealthtxs deltabidhealthrtec deltabidhealthrtet 
deltabidhealthjuice deltabidhealthpine deltabidcancercali 
deltabidcancertxr deltabidcancertxs deltabidcancerrtec 
deltabidcancerrtet deltabidcancerjuice deltabidcancerpine deltafbidcali 
deltafbidtxr deltafbidtxs deltafbidrtec deltafbidrtet deltafbidjuice 
deltafbidpine { 
display "`DELTAWTP'" 
signrank `DELTAWTP' = 0 
} 
* 
log close OUT12TESTS 
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*###################################################################### 
*========================================================== 
*========================================================== 
*========================================================== 
*###################################################################### 
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